

Chomsky, N. (1982). *Toward a new Cold War: U.S. foreign policy from Vietnam to Reagan*. New York: The New Press.

**Chapter Seven
Toward a New Cold War**

These essays have so far focused on relations between intellectuals and the state at one particular historical moment, in the aftermath of the Vietnam war. The consequences of the war for the international system -were not negligible, but it led to no structural or institutional changes in Western societies. It is therefore to be expected that the programs of counterrevolutionary intervention rooted in these institutional structures will persist as they have through the "post-colonial era," taking new forms in the context of conflicts over scarce resources and the conditions of exploitation. But such programs require a docile and obedient population. It has therefore been imperative to overcome what is now called the "Vietnam syndrome," that is, the reluctance on the part of large sectors of the population of the West to tolerate the programs of aggression, subversion, massacre, and brutal exploitation that constitute the actual historical experience of much of the Third World, faced with "Western humanism." In part as a consequence of the Indochina wars, dangerous feelings of sympathy for oppressed and suffering people developed in Western society. These had to be reversed and the image of Western benevolence restored, a difficult task, but one that was forthrightly addressed and carried out with great skill by the Western propaganda system.

It is unrealistic to suppose that the propaganda campaign was planned or centrally orchestrated. Rather, it was conducted on the basis of perceived self-interest, with the willing cooperation of the secular priesthood in conformity with traditional and quite intelligible tendencies towards service to the state. Opportunities were seized and exploited as they arose. Nixon's petty criminality provided an occasion to personify the evil that could not be denied and to expunge it from the body politic, its institutional structures protected from scrutiny; his serious crimes—the merciless bombing of Laos and Cambodia and the murderous "pacification" campaigns in South Vietnam, the domestic terrorism of the national political police that was exposed during exactly the Watergate period, vastly exceeding in scale and significance anything charged against Nixon—were no part of the Watergate farce. Now cleansed and purified, the U.S. government embarked on a noble campaign to defend human rights everywhere—at least, everywhere east of the Elbe—to the applause of its allies, eager to reap what benefit they might from the exercise. Meanwhile, the docile intellectuals of the Western world assumed the task of presenting in the most lurid light the suffering, brutality, and terror to be found throughout the shattered societies of Indochina, often effacing the Western role and responsibility. As for the bitter consequences of Western actions elsewhere, these are noted at most on an episodic basis, rarely subjected to systematic analysis or traced to their causes. Whenever the flimsiest opportunity arises, the West is portrayed as a victim, not an active agent in world affairs, suffering the blows of its tormentors everywhere, but now increasingly aroused to defend its legitimate interests and the values it proclaims.

These and other noteworthy propaganda successes have helped set the stage for a renewed commitment to militarization as a mechanism for imposing order on a domestic and international society that is regarded as dangerously "out of control." By the latter stages of the Carter Administration, the predictable and predicted moves were already evident. In late 1978—long before the Russian invasion of Afghanistan or the taking of the hostages in Iran—President Carter stated that "our goal ... is to increase the real level of defense expenditures." ' Later, he proudly announced that whereas "defense spending dropped by one third in those eight years before I became President," since he assumed office "outlays for defense spending [have] been

increased every year." ² In November 1978, the *New York Times* reported that "Administration sources said that the Defense Department was especially gratified because Carter has decided to cut about \$15 billion out of the normal growth of a range of social and domestic programs" while raising military spending by some \$12 billion. "Officials indicated that the 'guns and butter' argument waged within the Administration has now, in fact, been settled by Carter in favor of the Defense Department."³ Meanwhile, in direct violation of campaign promises, the Carter Administration stepped up arms sales,⁴ while also accelerating the development of new strategic weapons and pressuring its allies to install nuclear missiles (with, it is reported, a flight time of five minutes to Moscow) in Western Europe.

It goes without saying that Western initiatives are only one element in this race towards disaster, which have led many commentators to speak ominously of the mood of 1914 and 1939. But they nevertheless constitute one significant component. What deserves specific mention in this context is the contribution to this dangerous state of affairs that has been made by the remarkably effective campaign to reconstruct the ideological system that was battered by the Indochina wars.

The taking of the American hostages in Iran was also exploited, not without cynicism, as a target of opportunity in the process of overcoming the "Vietnam syndrome." Shortly after the crisis erupted, the *New York Times* ran a front-page story by Hedrick Smith headlined "Iran Is Helping the U.S. to Shed Fear of Intervening Abroad."⁵ Smith reported "an important shift of attitudes" in Washington "that, many believe, will have a significant long-term impact on the willingness of the United States to project its power in the third world and to develop greater military capacities for protecting its interests there." "We are moving away from our post-Vietnam reticence," one policymaker said. Democratic National Chairman John White stated that "we may have reached a turning point in our attitude toward ourselves, and that is a feeling that we have a right to protect legitimate American interests anywhere in the world." Senator Frank Church indicated support for military intervention in the Middle East "if our interests were threatened." The "lesson of Vietnam," Smith reports, is that we must be "more-selective" in the use of military power with a more careful calculation of the costs to us, as we consider intervention "in such troubled regions of potential American influence as the Middle East and the Caribbean." Consider what must be intended if our influence in these regions is regarded as only "potential."

Such reactions are a very natural culmination of the process of reconstruction of imperial ideology that has been progressing step by step for the past years. It is hardly surprising that in Kuwait and other Middle Eastern states bitter resentment is expressed over the concept of "legitimate American interests" that may be "protected" by U.S. armed force, a fact little noted or appreciated here since it is assumed that the resources of the world are ours by right. On similar assumptions, the respected political commentator Walter Laqueur suggested that Middle East oil "could be internationalized, not on behalf of a few oil companies but for the benefit of the rest of mankind," though his concern for the benefit of the rest of mankind did not extend to the natural conclusion that the industrial and agricultural resources of the West should also be internationalized and made generally available.⁶

In January 1978, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown ordered the Pentagon to plan for a rapid deployment force of 100,000 men backed by air and naval units for possible intervention in the Persian Gulf region or elsewhere, renewing plans that had been blocked by a Congress hobbled by "post-Vietnam reticence"—for example, by the conservative Senator Richard Russell, who warned that "if it is easy for us to go anywhere and do anything, we will always be going somewhere and doing something," with consequences that were dramatically evident at the time. The lesson of the hostage crisis in Iran is supposed to be that we should overcome our "reticence," develop more destructive strategic weapons, deploy forces prepared for rapid intervention throughout the world, "unleash" the CIA, and otherwise demonstrate our pugnacity.

That such lessons should be drawn from the taking of the hostages in Iran is quite revealing. It is obvious on a moment's thought that a rapid deployment force, now estimated at 200,000 men,⁷ would be no more effective than the MX missile system in rescuing the hostages or preventing the takeover of the embassy (or deterring the USSR in Afghanistan); and that it was precisely the policies of military intervention and subversion that led to the Iranian debacle, while subjecting Iranians to a quarter-century of torture, murder, and suffering—"progressive methods of development," as U.S. ideologists describe what was taking place when the U.S.-trained secret police were gouging out eyes of children and much of the rural population was being driven to miserable urban slums while the agricultural system collapsed and Iran practically sank into the sea under the weight of American armaments. The hostage crisis served as a useful opportunity to advance policies that derive from other interests and concerns.

As the decade of the 1970s came to an inauspicious end, NATO, under U.S. pressure, agreed to deploy in Western Europe new advanced missiles targeted against the Soviet Union, the USSR invaded Afghanistan, and the Carter Doctrine was proclaimed, calling for still further increases in the military budget, including not only intervention forces but also preparations for a peacetime draft and the MX missile system, vast in scale and cost and a major contribution to an escalating arms race. War clouds are gathering. We are entering the period of what some are calling "the New Cold War."

If there is indeed a renewal of superpower confrontation, it is likely to resemble the Old Cold War in certain respects but to be crucially different in others. Consider first some likely similarities. The Cold War is generally described as a "zero-sum game" in which the gains of one antagonist equal the losses of the other. But this is a highly questionable interpretation. It would be more realistic to regard the Cold War system as a macabre dance of death in which the rulers of the superpowers mobilize their own populations to support harsh and brutal measures directed against victims within what they take to be their respective domains, where they are "protecting their legitimate interests." Appeal to the alleged threat of the powerful global enemy has proven to be a useful device for this purpose. In this respect, the Cold War has proven highly functional for the superpowers, which is one reason why it persists despite the prospect of mutual incineration if the system misbehaves, as sooner or later it very likely will. When the United States moves to overthrow the government of Iran or Guatemala or Chile, or to invade Cuba or Indochina or the Dominican Republic, or to bolster murderous dictatorships in Latin America or Asia, it does so in a noble effort to defend free peoples from the imminent Russian (or earlier, Chinese) threat. Similarly, when the USSR sends its tanks to East Berlin, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or Afghanistan, it is acting from the purest of motives, defending socialism and freedom against the machinations of U.S. imperialism and its cohorts. The rhetoric employed on both sides is similar,⁸ and is generally parroted by the intelligentsia in each camp. It has proven effective in organizing popular support, as even a totalitarian state must do. In this respect, the New Cold War promises to be no different, and can be understood in part as a natural outcome of the effort to overcome the "Vietnam syndrome."

Another typical gambit is the pretense that only a show of force will deter the superpower antagonist from its relentless marauding and subversion. The actual dynamics of the Cold War system suggest a rather different conclusion. Typically, acts of subversion, violence, and aggression, or development and deployment of new weapons systems, have had the predictable effect of reinforcing those elements of the antagonist state that are committed, for their own reasons, to similar practices, a recurrent pattern throughout the Cold War period. Examples that are cited in support of the standard thesis regularly collapse on examination, e.g., Angola, where the U.S.-backed South African intervention is generally disregarded in Western propaganda on the Cuban menace, and a more accurate assessment would take note of "the manner in which Kissinger tried to foment and sustain a civil war in Angola simply to convince the Russians that the American tiger could still bite."⁹ It does not, of course, follow that

a willingness to seek accommodation would mechanically lead to a relaxation of tensions and a reduction of international violence, but its role as a possible factor should not be discounted.

One persistent element of the Cold War system is the portrayal of the superpower antagonist in the most menacing terms. In Soviet propaganda, the United States is led by warmongers deterred from their limitless drive for expansion only by Russian power. In the West, it is now an article of faith that the Soviet Union is outspending its rivals in a race towards military domination of the planet. There is some basis of truth in these competing claims, as is usually the case even in the most vulgar propaganda exercises, but it is revealing to disentangle the element of truth from the web of distortion. The claim that the USSR is unrivaled in its commitment of resources to military production is based largely on CIA analyses which estimate the dollar equivalent of the USSR military effort; thus the question asked is what it would cost the United States, in dollars, to duplicate the military force deployed by the USSR. As a number of commentators have observed,¹⁰ these calculations have a built-in bias. The Soviet military force is labor-intensive, in contrast to the military system of the West with its superior technological level and higher cost of labor relative to capital. It would be highly inefficient, and extremely costly, for the United States to duplicate a technologically less advanced Soviet military machine that relies heavily on manpower. Hence calculations of dollar equivalents considerably exaggerate Russian power. For the United States to duplicate the Russian agricultural system, with its intensive use of human labor power and low level of technology, would also be extremely expensive. But we do not therefore conclude that the Russians are outmatching us in the field of agricultural production. For similar reasons, calculations of dollar equivalents give a highly misleading picture of relative military strength.

Suppose that we were to reverse the process and estimate a ruble-equivalent of the American military force. This would be a meaningless exercise. It is probable that the Soviet Union simply lacks the technological capacity to duplicate the American military machine, so the ruble-equivalent would be infinite. These observations simply point up the absurdity of the calculations that are used to frighten the populations of the West so that they will be induced to support the militarization of their own societies. The absurdity is heightened when we note that NATO, by any calculation, outspends the Warsaw Pact," and when we bring into consideration such factors as the Sino-Soviet conflict and the strained relations between the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. Holzman notes that the American Joint Chiefs-of-Staff consistently conclude that the United States fields the world's most powerful military force, despite the insistent claims that the Russians are outspending us in their drive for world domination. The paradox is resolved when the analyses of relative military strength are dissected. No doubt an analysis of Soviet propaganda would reveal comparable duplicity.

The fact is that both of the superpowers—and many lesser powers as well—are ruining their economies and threatening world peace, indeed human survival, by a mindless commitment to military production for themselves and for export. Many factors contribute to the emphasis on military production, quite apart from the drive for global dominance. There has always been a temptation to resort to chauvinist appeals and militarization to deal with social and economic crises that appear unmanageable. The domestic power of the military-bureaucratic elite that rules the Soviet Union is enhanced by the diversion of resources to military production. In the 1950s, liberal economists in the United States denounced the Eisenhower Administration for insufficient military spending, testifying before Congress that it was frittering away American affluence in "indulgences, luxuries, and frivolities" while the United States faced "the possibility of annihilation or humiliation" (Walter Heller), and calling for "accelerating and enlarging our defense effort" rather than diverting military resources to consumer goods for people who already have a "frivolous standard of living" (James Tobin).¹² When the Kennedy Administration came to power, it followed their advice, using a faked "missile gap" as a propaganda device and relying on massive military expenditures as a mechanism for economic growth, thus setting off the arms race of the 1960s, accelerated by the needless humiliation of Khrushchev at the time of

the Cuban missile crisis.¹⁵ Without the benefit of Keynes, the fascist states of the 1930s also proved that the "new economics" works, as economies were stimulated by programs of rearmament. In principle, other methods are available, but a look at the class character of the major industrial powers helps to explain why governments have so commonly turned to production of waste (primarily, armaments) and bribes for the wealthy in their efforts to stimulate a sluggish economy (see Introduction). Unfortunately, a great many factors—the drive for domestic and global power, the need to mobilize popular support for costly government programs, the concern to recycle petrodollars by exploiting the comparative advantage of the industrial powers in advanced technology (the arms trade), the requirement that state-induced production must not harm but rather must enhance the interests and power of the private empires that control the economy and largely staff the state executive in the state capitalist democracies—all converge on military production. Unless effective mass popular movements develop committed to different aims, the likely consequences are rather gloomy. In these respects too, the New Cold War is likely to resemble its earlier phase, though the risks are now considerably more grave.

Focus on Middle East oil production is still another respect in which the New Cold War is likely to resemble its earlier phase. Speaking to congressional leaders who were reluctant to return to military confrontation in February 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall warned them that "if Greece should dissolve into civil war" and Turkey should fall, then "Soviet domination might thus extend over the entire Middle East and Asia," an early version of the "domino theory." A more realistic concern, as already discussed (cf. Chapter 2), was the question of how domination over the stupendous natural resources of the Middle East would be shared among the industrial capitalist states, with the United States gradually taking over positions that had long been held by Britain and France. According to James Forrestal, Marshall's first response to Britain's announcement that it was no longer capable of controlling Greece was that this was "tantamount to British abdication from the Middle East with obvious implications as to their successor,"¹⁴ though the collapse of Britain's imperial position may well have been proceeding more rapidly than was anticipated in Grand Area planning at that point.

Joyce and Gabriel Kolko point out that the U.S. "dilemma . . . involved Western European capitalist nations rather than Russia" at that stage of planning, leading to the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, with the Middle East one among a number of factors.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the "Russian threat" was invoked, with adroitness and cynicism, in the style that became typical of subsequent Cold War interventionism, which, no doubt, learned a valuable lesson from this success. Dean Acheson, in his memoirs, takes credit for converting congressional leaders to the new doctrine in February 1947 with this rhetoric:¹⁶

In the past eighteen months, I said, Soviet pressure on the Straits, on Iran, and on northern Greece had brought the Balkans to the point where a highly possible Soviet breakthrough might open three continents to Soviet penetration. Like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the east. It would also carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt, and to Europe through Italy and France, already threatened by the strongest domestic Communist parties in Western Europe.

Acheson surely knew that the Soviet Union had already been rebuffed in its efforts to modify the Straits regime in its favor and gain a share in the exploitation of Iranian oil, and presumably was also aware that Stalin was urging restraint on the Greek guerrillas (recognizing that Greece was in the American sphere of influence) and instructing the Communist parties of the West to join in the reconstruction of capitalism. But the Russian threat served as a powerful device to mobilize support for intervention.

It is interesting that Acheson takes great pride in this exercise in deception. Acheson's concern over the dangers of democratic politics in the West is no less noteworthy. The New Cold War displays similar features once again, as is hardly necessary to document.

According to the "New Cold Warriors," the search for military bases in the Middle East and the general program of militarization of American society are "defensive measures" taken to protect potential victims of Russian aggression.¹⁷ Senator Church is more honest when he speaks of protecting "our interests," a fact that is well understood by those we are preparing to "protect." When the Islamic states met in Islamabad to condemn the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, they did not fail to warn against U.S. intervention as well, a fact that was hardly highlighted in the U.S. press. A business-oriented review of economic and political news from the Middle East notes that the meeting "adopted a Saudi-inspired resolution to protect Iran from the effects of an American boycott," and reports that the Gulf countries "are more worried about the potential reaction of the U.S. to the crisis than they are about Soviet intervention itself." The Middle East is heading towards war, one official stated, "but towards a war which would mean the sharing by the superpowers of its oil and mineral wealth."¹⁸ Subsequent indications confirm that these fears remain dominant.

When these facts are noted in the U.S. press, the phenomenon is often attributed to the mysterious process of "Finlandization," whereby states accommodate to Russian power because they recognize the weakness of the United States. Thus their expressed opposition to U.S. military intervention is neatly converted into an appeal that American military power be enhanced so that our "defensive umbrella" can be extended to states that would willingly take shelter under it if only they could place their trust in U.S. force.¹⁹ This fanciful interpretation is easy enough to explain, given the commitments of its authors to U.S. interventionism and, in many instances, Israeli power. A more serious look at the facts shows quite clearly that the primary concern of the states in question is Israeli military power, which they regard as the primary threat as long as Israel continues with U.S. support to occupy territories conquered in 1967. Furthermore, they have repeatedly stated that they feel no less threatened by the U.S. intent to "defend its legitimate interests" than by the potential Russian menace.

The doctrine of the "New Cold Warriors" holds that one of the greatest threats to world peace now lies in western Pakistan, where the Russians are preparing to march towards the Gulf in order to take control of the Middle East oil that belongs to us as a natural right. We must therefore dispatch military forces to the region and arm General Zia, one of the most unpopular rulers in Pakistan's history. A Russian agent in the State Department, at least one who happened to have the strange desire to be incinerated along with the rest of us, could offer no better advice. General Zia's arms will not deter a Russian army any more than a few thousand U.S. marines in the Gulf, nor is there any indication that the Soviet Union would be insane enough to invade Pakistan; the invasion of Afghanistan, while brutal and reprehensible, was characteristic of Soviet military actions in that it aimed to maintain a position of power already attained, now under internal attack. But arms for General Zia will be used—for internal repression, a fact of which many Pakistanis are gloomily aware, so we learn (as if we had to learn it) from reports from Pakistan in the foreign press. The Baluch of western Pakistan seem rather ambivalent about the threat of Russian aggression or even the invasion of Afghanistan. One reason is that they are aware of recent history, even if most Americans are not. They recall, for example, that in the mid-1970s, U.S. helicopter gunships supplied via the Shah were used by the Pakistani army to murder them and destroy their villages. They do not exactly welcome the American "aid" now being offered. The *Manchester Guardian* observes editorially: "More American helicopter gunships blasting Baluchis; the finest Russian propaganda in the world. . . . The West will be in appalling dilemma, reviled in Baluchistan, the Frontier and Sind as the succourer of the oppressor,"²⁰ and reviled as well by other Pakistanis, who may turn to the Russians for support against their tormentor, "defending" them with U.S. aid. A report from Rawalpindi quotes a Baluch chief who says: "If the West props up Zia and the Russians move

south, there will be no civil resistance as I see it. Some might even be prepared to aid them." And a Pakistani politician adds: "This aid America is talking about is not aid to the people. It is aid to the army junta. They will perhaps use it on the wrong people—on the Pakistanis and particularly the Baluchis." ²¹ A realistic judgment.

U.S. planners are presumably not unaware of the possible dynamics: arms for General Zia, internal repression, expansion of Russian influence as the victims turn to the USSR for support, a new Afghanistan, nuclear holocaust. But the dangers are regarded as insignificant in comparison with the importance of overcoming "post-Vietnam reticence" and eliminating the annoying domestic barriers to military intervention and other harsh measures to protect "our interests"—that is, the interests of those whose power in the private economy gives them a dominant influence over policy formation, and who believe that they stand to gain (though "we" may not) by maintaining a world system in which they are free to exploit human and material resources. A serious inquiry into U.S. foreign policy will show that these are the central factors that govern it, however they may be obscured by ideological obfuscation.

A look at some of the American successes during the Old Cold War reveals that those we intend to "protect" have good reason for fear. The first major U.S. intervention in defense of freedom was in Greece, when Britain, which invaded and conquered Greece after the Nazis had withdrawn, could no longer maintain its position there in 1946—47 after its success in undermining the anti-Nazi resistance and restoring royalist elements and Nazi collaborators to state power, setting off a wave of violence and persecution that finally evoked armed resistance. Displacing the British, the American military mission (AMAG: American Mission for Aid to Greece) lent its fervent and uncompromising support to state violence, which included the imprisonment without trial of tens of thousands of people in concentration camps where they were subjected to "reindoctrination" if they "were found to have affiliations which cast grave doubt upon their loyalty to the state," in the words of the AMAG chief. (It was only many years later, when the atrocity could be charged to an official enemy, that Westerners became exercised over "reeducation camps"; similarly, British and American reeducation camps for hundreds of thousands of German and Italian POWs up to three years after the war's end, where the victims were not only indoctrinated but also subjected to forced labor and severe mistreatment, are described in the West—if noted at all—as an amazing example of Western humanism, as contrasted with the atrocious behavior of the Vietnamese.)²² Many thousands were executed and tens of thousands exiled, with the full support of the United States. U.S. charge Karl Rankin warned in May 1948 that "there must ... be no leniency toward the confirmed agents of an alien and subversive influence." Execution of political prisoners was legitimate, he argued, because even though when arrested they may not have been "hardened Communists, it is unlikely that they have been able to resist the influence of Communist indoctrination organizations existing within most prisons." Secretary of State George Marshall approved of the "administration of [Greek] justice." Meanwhile, U.S. intelligence engaged in extensive surveillance of Greek citizens and assisted the government in carrying out mass deportations of alleged subversives to concentration camps and reeducation centers, while forwarding to the FBI the names of U.S. citizens who wrote letters protesting executions; the FBI reciprocated by sending reports to the U.S. embassy on alleged Communist ties of Greek-American organizations.

The British protested some of these actions, but were rebuffed. When a British official objected that it was "unwise" to round up fourteen thousand people and exile them -without trial to island concentration camps, American Ambassador Lincoln Mac Veagh responded that the Greek government "had to throw their net very wide to catch the right people," whom he estimated at about "a dozen key men." This was the first major action undertaken after the United States took control under the aegis of the Truman Doctrine.

When the war was approaching its final stages, the United States insisted on the policy of systematic removal of population by force and backed renewed programs of mass arrest and

executions, moderating these commitments only in the very last months of the war. Continued "screening and re-education" -were recommended by the U.S. mission for the postwar period, while the State Department fought to block any substantive U.N. recommendations on amnesty, leniency, or an end to political executions.

Throughout, a prime concern of Washington and the U.S. mission in Greece was the unfavorable publicity resulting from the terror it advocated and organized. Measures were taken to control the flow of news. The State Department succeeded in preventing the *New York Times* from publishing stories on U.S. embassy support for repressive programs, and in convincing the United Press to appoint a "double-breasted Americano" as UP representative in Greece in place of a *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent whom the department considered a leftist. The U.S. government also succeeded in aborting an investigation of the assassination of U.S. correspondent George Polk when evidence began to mount that it was a right-wing assassination rather than the responsibility of the Greek left as had been claimed; the Pentagon withdrew the Air Force colonel who had been designated to investigate the murder by the Overseas Writers Association after he became convinced that the "extreme right" had committed the murder.

Meanwhile, the United States engaged in extensive psychological warfare operations, of which the ugliest example was fabrication of lies concerning the alleged "abduction" of children by the guerrillas (secretly, government officials conceded the fabrication); the Greek government was itself forcibly evacuating children from rebel-held territory. These allegations (whether there was some substance to them or not is, evidently, a question separate from the conscious fabrication) remained a staple of subsequent propaganda.

The long-term legacy of U.S. support for state terror in Greece was profound, culminating in the fascist coup of 1967, which was also welcomed and backed by the United States, sometimes with rhapsodic commentary on the opportunities it afforded for American business interests.²³

The Greek experience reveals clearly the true meaning of President Truman's call "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."

Another success was the overthrow of the reformist Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954, with consequences that are generally ignored in the United States. Some of these are graphically portrayed, for example, in a report from Guatemala by British journalist Anthony Wild.³⁴ "Migrant labor," he writes,

is at the core of Guatemala's economic system. Four million rural poor, most of them Indians descended from the Maya, scratch a bare existence from growing maize on plots that are shrinking by inheritance with each generation; with no jobs in their home villages, an estimated 1.5 million workers migrate for up to three months of the year, often taking wives and children with them. . . . The appalling living and working conditions in which [the great *haciendas*] keep them are the foundation on which the fabulous fortunes of Guatemala's elite are built.

The migrants work ten to twelve hours a day in broiling sun, then returning to their galleys, which are "hotbeds of disease" where "women shiver with malaria on a mattress of corrugated cardboard" and "the eyes of a little girl of six are half closed up with matter, for lack of washing." Drinking water, fetched from a stream half a mile away, "is white with pollution." Others "are poisoned by insecticides sprayed indiscriminately and excessively from light planes" or "die in horrific road accidents as badly maintained lorries, bringing them from their villages packed in like cattle to the slaughter, plunge off mountain roads." The laborers and their families "live little better than factory chickens or slaves on the Atlantic passage." In the galleys, "people sleep on long wooden platforms, stacked one on top of another like shelves, five layers deep in the

centre and three by the walls . . . each shed sleeps an unbelievable 700 people in a space 10 yards wide by 30 yards long and 25 feet high." "The migrants are recruited in squads of 20 to 50 people from the same village. Often, the recruiter will pocket the migrant's entire wages, owed to him because of loans at 100 per cent interest, contracted in the summer months to buy food on the market when the peasants' own granaries are running out of maize." "Nearly two-thirds of the land of the big estates is kept vacant," Wild adds, "held as a status symbol or a hedge against inflation. . . . Trade union leaders are being murdered in an attempt to intimidate the workers," preventing the growth of peasant unions that might mitigate these horrors. Meanwhile right-wing death squads, closely linked to the government, kill tens of thousands with impunity.²⁵

The London Anti-Slavery Society reports that 80 percent of the total labor force is comprised of seasonal migrant workers, who have been reduced by the Labor Code "to a position of virtual servitude at the hands of landowners and their labour contractors." It too gives details of massive atrocities committed by the government.²⁶

Wild notes that the last government to propose "a moderate land reform which transferred . . . vacant land to landless and near-landless," thus offering them freedom from dependence on such labor, "was toppled in 1954 by the U.S.-backed invasion of Colonel Castillo Armas." This invasion was justified under the doctrine that the United States had the right to intervene to "save" the free people of Guatemala from international Communism, the natural corollary to the Truman Doctrine and the predecessor of the Khrushchev, Johnson, and Brezhnev doctrines, which were quite similar in tone, even rhetoric, as noted earlier.

The horrors of Guatemala are the direct and natural result of U.S. military intervention within the ideological framework of the Old Cold War, in 1954 and in subsequent years. Hundreds of thousands have died as a result of this intervention—tens of thousands by assassination, often with torture and mutilation; many more from malnutrition and disease—while millions live in conditions of virtual slavery. The National Council of the Jesuit Order in Guatemala recently issued a statement reporting that "in Guatemala, it is only necessary to open one's eyes to realize that here we are ruled by a system of anti-Christian power which destroys life and persecutes those who fight for life. . . . This anguishing situation is being maintained with a repression among the most severe in Guatemala's recent history. A regime of unjust force is trying to prevent the working people from reclaiming their just rights." They reported over three thousand killings in the first ten months of 1979 by death squads that operate "with total impunity. It is axiomatic that in Guatemala there are no political prisoners, only the dead and disappeared."²⁷ The story can be repeated throughout much of the Free World.

In the democratic socialist journal *Dissent* (Fall 1980), Henry Pachter condemns the comment by H. Brand in the same journal (Spring 1980) that "American hegemony is generally in no way preferable to the Russian kind." That "embarrassing sentence," Pachter writes, treats foreign policy as a "beauty contest." "Is there no difference," he asks rhetorically, "between the violent subjection of one country by another and *the hegemony* of a big country trading with its smaller neighbors?" Perhaps the peasants of Guatemala might have something to say in response, if anyone were to ask; as might many others, who, for some reason, see U.S. intervention as going beyond trade.

To turn finally to another continent, consider Zaire, a potentially rich country subjected to repeated Western intervention in the framework of the Cold War system. The *London Financial Times* informs us²⁸ that the West feels that it must support President Mobutu because "there is no alternative"; he is the "bulwark against the spread of Soviet influence in Central and Southern Africa," and his country is rich in resources that the industrial powers crave. No matter, then, that the incredible corruption and terror of his rule have had a "devastating impact" on the lives of the country's 26 million people, as, for example, the cost of essential food items has gone up 540 percent in the past four years, while in 1979 real wages and salaries were 60 percent below their 1970 level, and much of the population starves, surviving at best in hopelessness and degradation.

To gain a further grasp of some of the realities that are obscured in Free World propaganda, one may turn to another recent study of the London Anti-Slavery Society. This received little notice in the United States. I found it discussed only in a Reuters report in the *Christian Science Monitor*, which appeared not in the news section but in the "living" section, which is reserved for "human interest stories" (December 19, 1979). The report alleges that almost 200 million children live under conditions of slavery, "often in dismal poverty." "Children have been maimed in India to become more effective beggars, sold to work under appalling conditions in factories in Thailand, and turned into Latin American chattel slaves at the age of three." "Latin America is singled out in the book as the continent where child labor will probably be harder to eradicate than anywhere else in the world. In countries with large Indian populations like Bolivia, girls as young as three are 'adopted' by white families, the book says. Traditionally they are sexually available to the sons of the family, not allowed to marry, and the children they conceive become virtual chattel slaves in turn." ²⁹

It would be an error to say that the harsh conditions of child labor evoke no concern in the humanitarian West. Thus, many articles have been written expressing shock and horror over the fact that in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, children were put to work in collectives. The vast and systematic enslavement of children throughout the Free World, however, deserves no comment. Nor is there any effort to determine why the situation appears to be most grim in the regions that have been exposed for so long to Western benevolence. Quite generally, starvation, massacre, slavery, and other atrocities within the Free World are either ignored or occasionally noted as curiosities perhaps attributable to some act of God or to the failure of the natives to absorb the message of "Western humanism," surely not to conscious human acts taken by the leaders of the Free World in accordance with institutional demands that reflect the structure of power in the state capitalist democracies.

The British economist Joan Robinson once described the American crusade against Communism as a "crusade against development." It would be accurate to regard it as a crusade against independent development outside of the structure of the global system of exploitation organized under the umbrella of U.S. power after World War II. There is no dearth of documentary evidence on the planning behind this crusade; for example, the Grand Area planning discussed in Chapter 2, which, as noted there, remains under a taboo in American scholarship, discussed only far from the mainstream, despite—or perhaps because of—the fact that it provides a valuable insight into the reality that lies behind conventional rhetoric. This reality is remote from conventional ideology, but is lived every day by hundreds of millions of people whose torment is of little concern to Western moralists—unless, of course, they are aroused by "Communist agitators" and subjected to "alien influences." This reality is not a collection of strange coincidences or an indication of the limits of American power to do good, as is constantly proclaimed, but is in significant and deplorable measure a direct and predictable consequence of policy decisions based on the principles expressed in the cool and antiseptic rhetoric of the planners. Until we come to appreciate these facts, we will understand very little about the contemporary world.

I have been discussing some features of the Old Cold War that one may expect, I believe, to persist if it is successfully resurrected. But there will also be differences. The world is not what it was a generation ago. It is doubtful that the United States, no longer in a position of overwhelming dominance, can devote its resources to the production of waste while maintaining its position in international trade—of course, apart from sales of military equipment, which continue to increase, not solely from the United States. Efforts to pressure U.S. allies to "bear their share of the burden" of military expenditures are not likely to prove too successful. Europe and Japan have shown little enthusiasm for the new crusade. East-West trade in Europe is now quite substantial, as traditional relationships are being reestablished, and it is unlikely that the European powers will be willing to sacrifice it. American allies may choose to take their own independent initiatives, not only towards the USSR but also towards the Middle East and other

resource-rich areas, realizing long-term fears of American planners. It is worth recalling Henry Kissinger's warning, in explaining the thinking behind the "Year of Europe" in 1973, about "the prospect of a closed trading system embracing the European Community and a growing number of other nations in Europe, the Mediterranean, and Africa" from which the United States might be excluded. The proper organization of the world system, he explained, should be based on the recognition that "the United States has global interests and responsibilities," while our allies have "regional interests"; the United States must be "concerned more with the overall framework of order than with the management of every regional enterprise," these being accorded to our allies, as he elaborated elsewhere.³⁰ But this version, of "trilateralism" is unlikely to survive for long.

The Trilateral Commission, which was formed in 1973 to come to terms with the problems of fragmentation within the First World of industrial capitalism, was quite correct in describing the international system that arose from World War II in these terms: "For a quarter century the United States was the hegemonic power in a system of •world order"⁵¹—correct, at least, if we interpret the phrase "world order" with appropriate irony. It is true that in the system that arose from the ashes of World War II, the United States was in a position of quite considerable power, sufficient to materially influence historical developments though not to control them completely in its interests. It is hardly surprising, then, that it attempted to organize a global system, or at least a Grand Area, in the interests of those who held domestic power. The USSR created its own power bloc in Eastern Europe and to some degree China. This was the basic structure of the Old Cold War, but the world is now radically different. China is an American ally and a bitter enemy of the USSR, a major shift in the balance of world power in favor of the United States. And the capitalist -world is drifting towards a kind of trilateralism which may eventuate in three partially closed trading blocs—a dollar block, a yen bloc, a European Currency Union bloc—as a recent OECD study suggests, with international consequences that are uncertain, and in many ways ominous. Those who recall the mood of 1914 and 1939 do so with some reason.

There is no doubt that U.S. power has waned as the bipolar system of the postwar years has gradually evolved to something more complex. The same is true of Soviet power. A recent study of the Center for Defense Information in Washington, tracing Russian influence on a country-by-country basis since World War II, concludes quite reasonably that it reached a peak in the late 1950s and has since declined to the point where by 1979, "the Soviets were influencing only 6% of the world's population and 5% of the world's GNP, exclusive of the Soviet Union."³² For reasons already discussed, Cold War ideologists in both camps like to pretend that their adversary is marching from strength to strength, but the facts hardly support these conclusions. Though their capacity to destroy grows steadily, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union now has the power it once was able to wield in world affairs, and this process is not likely to be reversed.

Europe and Japan pose a greater potential threat to U.S. world power than the Soviet Union, if they move towards a more independent role. And a U.S.-sponsored New Cold War may press them in that direction, raising the possibility of new and unanticipated crises and alignments. In the shorter term, one may expect the superpowers to create new and more awesome forces of destruction and to try to subjugate those who stand in the way of their global ambitions, marching towards nuclear catastrophe.

The recent steps towards Armageddon have evoked little articulate protest in the United States, though there is a substantial ground swell of popular concern. This testifies again to the great success of the campaign to overcome the "Vietnam syndrome" (see, however, pp. 46, 55f.). A few recent examples will illustrate the astonishing achievements of the efforts to restore what Hans Morgenthau once called "our conformist subservience to . those in power"—though as noted in these essays, the distance that had to be traveled was far less than is often supposed. First, some additional words of background.

The war against the world's poor and oppressed reached its peak under the liberal democratic administrations of the 1960s, with the considerable amplification of the doctrine and practice of counterinsurgency and counterrevolutionary subversion and violence. A plague of neofascist states spread through Latin America and elsewhere as well. Brazil, because of its size and power, was a particularly significant example. The U.S.-backed military coup of 1964 placed in power a repressive and murderous regime that carried out an "economic miracle" while keeping the great mass of the population in conditions of grinding poverty and actually lowering the already miserable standard of living for many of them. It also had a noticeable "domino effect," contributing to the spread of U.S.-backed military dictatorships committed to repression and violence. As always, U.S. support for the Brazilian coup was justified on the grounds that "the nation needed it in order to free itself of a corrupt government which was about to sell us out to international communism" (General Andrew O'Meara, Commander of the U.S. Southern Command, testifying before Congress in 1965). President Kennedy's ambassador to Brazil, Lincoln Gordon, described the Brazilian "revolution" as the "the single most decisive victory for freedom in the mid-twentieth century."³³ Similarly, the Indonesian coup a year later was welcomed in liberal circles as a vindication of the U.S. policy of standing firm in Indochina, while the resulting massacre of hundreds of thousands of landless peasants, if noted at all, was dismissed as an unfortunate reaction to Communist plotting. The revolution in Cuba, in contrast, was understood to pose such threats to human rights and civilized values that the leader of the Free World subjected Cuba to invasion, subversion, embargo, terrorism, poisoning of crops and livestock—and now, after this record, stands in judgment over Cuba for its violation of human rights.

The situation in Latin America has not gone unnoticed in establishment media. Richard Fagen writes in *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1979) that the Linowitz Commission was accurate in describing the "plague of repression" that had settled over Latin America by 1976: "At no time in the recent history of the hemisphere had the incidence of military rule been so high, the gross violations of political and human rights so widespread, and the use of officially sponsored assassination, torture and brutality so systematic." But in journalistic or scholarly discussion these facts are rarely related to U.S. initiatives; rather, these developments show that it is not within the power of the United States to eliminate inequality and poverty, as it has been striving so desperately to do for so many years in Brazil, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and elsewhere within the domains of its influence and control. Actually, it is interesting to inquire into the relation between human rights violations and U.S. aid and support. There does, in fact, appear to be a correlation, which has been noted in several studies, one of them by Edward S. Herman and myself (see our *Political Economy of Human Rights*, vol. i). We found, as did Michael Klare in an independent study, that the deterioration of the human rights climate in some Free World dependency tends to correlate rather closely with an increase in U.S. aid and support. Of course, one must be cautious with statistical correlations; the correlation in question should not be interpreted as implying that the U.S. government is rewarding some ruling group for the increase in torture, death squads, destruction of unions, elimination of democratic institutions, decline of living standards for much of the population, etc. These are not a positive priority for U.S. policy; rather, they are irrelevant to it. The correlation between abuse of human rights and U.S. support derives from deeper factors. The deterioration in human rights and the increase in U.S. aid and support each correlate, independently, with a third and crucial factor: namely, improvement of the investment climate, as measured by privileges granted foreign capital. The climate for business operations improves as unions and other popular organizations are destroyed, dissidents are tortured or eliminated, real wages are depressed, and the society as a whole is placed in the hands of a collection of thugs who are willing to sell out to the foreigner for a share of the loot—often too large a share, as business regularly complains. And as the climate for business operations improves, the society is welcomed into the Free World and offered the specific kind of "aid" that will further these favorable developments. If the

consequences are, for example, that crops are produced for export by wealthy landowners or transnational agribusiness while the population starves, that is simply the price that must be paid for the survival of free institutions.

The correlation just cited, and the obvious explanation for it, reveal that there may well be a relation between U.S. foreign policy and human rights, though not precisely the one that is widely heralded throughout the international propaganda system. No less striking than the correlation is the general avoidance of all of these matters in respectable scholarship. In this context, it is possible for an American President to stand up and proclaim that concern for human rights is "the Soul of our foreign policy," and to be listened to with respect—even critics limit themselves to noting "contradictions," "inconsistencies," and "deviations," thus reinforcing the basic principle of the propaganda system, that the United States is committed to a program of freedom and human rights (as is the West in general), one of the great lies of modern history, and one of the most effective.

The spread of neo-fascist torture-and-corruption states in the Third World under U.S. sponsorship has in part been a response to "the lessons of Vietnam." General Maxwell Taylor, who has been described as the *eminence grise* of the Kennedy Administration, explained that "the outstanding lesson [of the Indochina conflict] is that we should never let another Vietnam-type situation arise again. We were too late in recognizing the extent of the subversive threat. . . . We have learned the need for a strong police force and a strong police intelligence organization to assist in identifying early the symptoms of an incipient subversive situation."³⁴ This was in December 1965, after the Brazilian and Indonesian coups, after the invasion of the Dominican Republic, events that revealed how well the lessons of Vietnam had been absorbed by ruling groups that have a historical memory, a capacity to learn, and a high level of class consciousness, and that benefit by the absence of any substantial domestic critique. True, the "Vietnam syndrome" and the "crisis of democracy" impeded their programs for a time, but it is hoped that these maladies of our social order have now been overcome.

The refusal of Western ideologists to consider the systematic character of the impact of the West, specifically the United States, is particularly striking in discussion of the Caribbean and Central America, traditionally the region in which the United States has resorted to direct aggression and other forms of intervention. Typically, the problems of this region are described as though the United States were simply a passive onlooker, helpless to alleviate them despite its endless good will. For example, the *New York Times Magazine* devoted its lead story on May 25, 1980, to a discussion of "Radical Winds of the Caribbean" by Tad Szulc, a highly regarded investigative reporter who is known for his independence of mind and crusading journalism in the area of foreign affairs. It is illuminating to watch how he proceeds.

Szulc begins by noting that "when most people in the United States think of trouble in the Caribbean, they think of Fidel Castro's Cuba ... it has been the Castro regime that brought us the Bay of Pigs, the missile crisis, the Soviet military presence in the Caribbean and, most recently, the flood of refugees into Florida." Szulc is, of course, correct in saying that Castro is generally regarded by the well-indoctrinated American public as *the* source of trouble in the Caribbean, though he goes somewhat beyond the propaganda norm in writing that Castro "brought us the Bay of Pigs"—one can perhaps imagine some party hack writing in *Pravda* that "Dubcek brought us the tanks in Prague." The other examples are hardly less interesting. The number of people fleeing to the United States from intolerable conditions to the south is in the millions annually; immigration officials estimate that about a million escape detection. Since 1972, there has been a flood of "boat people" from Haiti, traveling eight-hundred miles through shark-infested waters in leaky tubs to be interned by immigration officials and sent back to the Duvalier dictatorship (a few dozen received asylum between 1972 and 1978). A still more horrifying example is the denial of asylum to refugees from El Salvador, whom the U.S. government regularly compels to return to face torture, mutilation, and murder by the gangsters armed and trained by the United States. One can easily imagine the consequences if the United

States were to open its doors and welcome refugees from virtually any country of the region. One estimate is that 20 percent of the Caribbean population has come to the United States since World War II.³⁵ But it is only the refugees from Castro's Cuba whose plight reveals the horrors of their native land, which had the misfortune to be forced out of the Free World.

Szulc then proceeds to explain that the common view is in error: "The roots of the Caribbean problems are not entirely Cuban." Rather, it is the "Soviet offensive" in the region that is to blame, alongside of "Cuban adventurism." As an illustration, he observes that the Soviet Union has rejected "the notion that the Caribbean is an American *mare nostrum*," a clear sign that they are intent on trouble-making. There are, of course, some more general problems in the region: "the pressing need to free the population from grinding poverty and endemic unemployment," one cause for the flight of the population. In Grenada, for example, about two-thirds of the population live abroad, including "the brightest and best-educated young people"; it was Soviet and Cuban "adventurism" in Grenada that directly inspired Szulc's article. These problems are long-standing: "The seeds of the present turmoil in the Caribbean were sown in the days of colonial greed and mismanagement"; England, Spain, France, and the Netherlands are mentioned. "The unanswered question is the extent to which Cuba and the Soviet Union proposes [sic] to exploit the turbulent situation." Nowhere in this extensive discussion is there any indication that the United States has played any role in bringing about the "trouble in the Caribbean," apart from its "indifference" to the social and economic problems that have been brewing.

Scholarship is hardly different. Consider, for example, the contributions of two outstanding specialists on foreign policy to a *Foreign Affairs* symposium on "America and the World 1979."³⁶ Robert Scalapino writes that "American policies toward Indochina during 1979 were dominated by two considerations: a deep compassion for the tremendous human suffering throughout the region, and a strong distaste for Hanoi's policies and alignments." The latter is no doubt true, though it might have been useful to comment on the U.S. role in driving Hanoi into a close alliance with the Soviet Union that it surely did not prefer. What about the "deep compassion," surely merited, given the U.S. role in causing the tremendous suffering throughout the region by devastating the societies and the land. In Laos, where the agricultural system "was destroyed by a relentless bombing campaign against an entirely defenseless peasant population, hundreds of thousands face starvation while the United States shows its deep compassion by withholding more than a tiny trickle of aid. A year earlier, a ludicrously small U.S. contribution was dispatched with great fanfare, but it turned out that this amount was quietly deducted from the regular U.S. contribution to a U.N. aid program for Laos, demonstrating that there are no limits to the hypocrisy of the "human rights" crusaders.⁵⁷ It is superfluous to review the destruction of Vietnam for which U.S. terror is responsible. Expressing its "deep compassion for the tremendous human suffering" that has resulted in Vietnam, the United States, in 1979, successfully pressured the World Bank to withdraw its only development loan to Vietnam and then compelled the International Monetary Fund to do likewise.⁵⁸ According to the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, the letter written by World Bank President Robert McNamara announcing the Vietnam loan moratorium was drafted by Fred Bergsten, Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Treasury Department in the Human Rights Administration. The *Review* was informed by an unidentified source in the IMF that "since 1977, the U.S. has constantly refused to make any accommodation with Vietnam, forcing it further and further into the Soviet camp"—and, correspondingly, entitling American scholars to deplore Hanoi's "alignments." (See pp. 26f, 75.)

Robert Tucker, one of the better-known academic doves and a leading commentator on international affairs, writes in the same issue that "the American role in Southeast Asia has been transformed in the course of a decade from that of imperial guarantor of the area to one of tacitly supporting Chinese policy and of performing humanitarian missions." Putting aside discussion of the interesting notion of "imperial guarantor" or the intriguing idea that the United States simply follows the Chinese lead, having withdrawn from world affairs under the impact of

the "Vietnam syndrome," what of the "humanitarian missions" performed by the United States in Southeast Asia in the late 1970s? Among them is the consistent U.S. support for the brutal Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines. A still more notable example is the U.S. support for the Indonesian invasion of East Timor, including diplomatic support to prevent effective international action (U.N. Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan, widely praised for his courage in denouncing Idi Amin as a "racist murderer" and for other comparable acts of heroism, specifically takes credit, in his memoirs, for preventing any U.N. action that might have restrained the Indonesian aggressors, an admission that elicited no comment from reviewers or other admirers), a continuing flow of arms accelerating under the Human Rights Administration, extensive lying to Congress, and an extremely effective cover-up by the press in one of the more dramatic examples of media servility in recent years.³⁹ It is quite true that U.S. allies, specifically Japan, have tried their best to contribute to the slaughter in similar ways, but primary credit falls to the U.S. government. The result has been the massacre of tens if not hundreds of thousands of people and a level of suffering among the remnants that was comparable to that in Cambodia in the same years. Surely a "humanitarian mission" of the highest order.

It is remarkable that knowledgeable American specialists can produce such drivel, but even more significant that it elicits no response. We would be appalled to read comparable remarks on the Russian role in the world produced by Soviet apologists, but it is regarded as entirely reasonable for American intellectuals, who are subject to no threats of state violence, to engage in a comparable display of obedience to the state propaganda system.

The humanitarian missions to which the U.S. government *is* devoting its energies out of its deep compassion for the suffering people of Southeast Asia deserve more attention than I can devote to them here. The zealous efforts of the industrial democracies to help implement Indonesian atrocities in East Timor are merely a by-product of their relations to Indonesia, which has thrown itself open to their plunder since the military coup of 1965. The United States, Japan, France, and their allies have no positive interest in the massacre of the population of East Timor, contrary to what is suggested by consideration of their actions. It is merely that the fate of the Timorese is of null import given the higher importance of exploiting the wealth of Indonesia. The case of Indochina *is* more complex. The United States did win a significant victory in Indochina, a fact that is crucial to the understanding of postwar events. True, it did not achieve the goal of retaining Indochina within the American system, so that its people could enjoy the happy life of the peasants, urban slum-dwellers, torture victims, and child slave laborers of Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Latin America. But that was always a secondary goal. The primary goal was to ensure that "the rot would not spread," in the terminology favored by the planners. In South Vietnam itself, the United States did win the war. The battering of the peasant society, particularly the murderous post-Tet accelerated pacification campaigns, virtually destroyed the indigenous resistance by eliminating its social base, setting the stage for the northern domination now deplored by Western hypocrites—exactly as had been predicted many years before.⁴⁰ In Cambodia, the horrendous bombing campaign of 1973, which was directed primarily against the peasant society, was a significant factor in brutalizing the Khmer Rouge victors, a conclusion supported by U.S. government studies and other sources.⁴¹ In Laos, the prospects for peaceful development in one of the world's poorest countries were destroyed by American subversion and military attack. North Vietnam, while not conquered, was left in ruins. The terrible prospect of successful economic development has been overcome for a long time, perhaps permanently. No one knows when, or if, the land and people poisoned by chemical warfare and bombed to ruin will be restored to a viable social order. The postwar policy of refusing reparations, aid, or normal relations with Vietnam and blocking assistance from other sources where possible is perfectly rational, as a further contribution to ensuring maximal suffering. It also succeeded in driving Vietnam into alliance with the Soviet Union as the only alternative remaining, again a consequence eagerly exploited by the Western propaganda system. By systematically creating conditions under

which existence is reduced to virtually the zero grade, Western power has attained its primary ends throughout Indochina. The West has once again taught the lesson that European civilization has offered to the world for centuries: those who try to resist the technologically advanced but morally primitive Western societies will pay a bitter price.

It is in this context that we can fully appreciate the pronouncements of Western commentators.

A curious, and perhaps unique feature of Western propaganda systems is that those -who serve them not only are not subjected to criticism but are in fact lauded for their amazing courage in marching to the beat of the patriotic drums. For example, Peter Kovler writes that there were "heroic exceptions" to the alleged attempts by American intellectuals to "defend Indochinese governments against the 'unverified' charges of killing and genocide that were made by 'hysterical' refugees."⁴² These attempts, incidentally, are a typical fabrication of the propaganda system, which has endeavored to create the appearance of a great debate over atrocities in Indochina, undeterred by the fact that American intellectuals were virtually uniform in vigorous denunciation of the official enemy, sometimes on the flimsiest evidence, in conformity with the needs of state propaganda. Criticism of refugee reports is virtually nonexistent, and the rare attempts to inquire into the credibility of those who transmitted the reports, as any rational person would do (e.g., in the case of germ warfare charges against the United States in Korea), or otherwise to determine the facts were castigated as an intolerable deviation from doctrinal purity, even though they were regularly coupled with condemnation of reasonably well-documented atrocities. At the same time the intellectual community refused even to hear about, let alone investigate or try to stop, the numerous atrocities for which the United States was responsible in the same period—in Timor, to cite just one obvious example, where in contrast to Cambodia, atrocities could have been brought to a halt by political action here.

But more interesting is the reference to the "heroic exceptions" to this fabricated pattern. Kovler's first example is Leo Cherne, director of the International Rescue Committee, "who, between 1975 and 1977, tried to get the United States Government to pay attention to the plight of some exotic individuals called 'boat people.' " Leo Cherne is, in fact, one of the more extraordinary apologists for violence and massacre in recent years, as, for example, in his supremely cynical description of the victims of U.S. bombings in South Vietnam cited above, Chapter 2, note i. But let us forget his past contributions, and consider his "heroism" in calling attention to the plight of the "boat people" from 1975 to 1977. A minor problem is that there were very few "boat people" during that period, at least "boat people" who count: There were 100,000 or more boat people who fled the Philippines and many thousands who attempted to escape from Haiti, not to speak of the refugees who fled U.S.-backed terror in Timor and in fact many millions of others throughout the world. But let us forget this, too, and consider the idea that it requires "heroism" to denounce atrocities attributed to an official enemy, to the overwhelming applause of articulate opinion. This concept is perhaps novel in the history of modern propaganda.

For the student of contemporary propaganda, it is particularly instructive to observe how the torment of Cambodia has been exploited by cynical Western humanitarians, desperately eager to overcome the "Vietnam syndrome." In an article on the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, Ben Bradlee quotes Theodore Eliot, dean of the prestigious Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, on the possibility of Russian genocide in Afghanistan: "Genocide? If they did it in Cambodia, why not in Afghanistan?"⁴³ With equal logic, one might have commented in 1965 on the likelihood of U.S. genocide in Vietnam: "Genocide? If they did it in Nazi Germany, why not in Vietnam?" Or consider the following, observation by Dennis Bloodworth, a well-known Asia correspondent, in an article on Pol Pot.⁴⁴ Pol Pot's Cambodia serves as "a grotesque caricature which warned the world against theorising left-wing iconoclasts eager to smash the existing order." Remember Pol Pot's cadres and his peasant army when you hear someone

proposing radical social change in the advanced industrial West. In a society less thoroughly indoctrinated than ours, such commentary would merely be greeted with ridicule. In the Western democracies, however, it is taken quite seriously, again, a revealing indication of the awesome effectiveness of Western propaganda systems.

The vast effort to overcome the "Vietnam syndrome" has not limited itself to whitewashing the West for its recent humanitarian endeavors, but has gone beyond, to submerge the entire history of imperialist savagery, and with no little success. A British intellectual can write, without shame, of "a growing indifference in Africa and Asia to a tradition of Western humanism—which had been imposed, first by European colonial powers as they spread their influence throughout the world, and more recently, by the United States in the name of the 'American century.'" ⁴⁵ Such comments suggest some interesting research projects: For example, one might conduct a survey among the aboriginal population of Tasmania to determine how well they have absorbed the lessons of Western humanism. Somehow, where they managed to survive, the natives often fail to grasp the humanist message, even, the more anglicized among them; for example, Jawaharlal Nehru, who observed that the ideology of British rule in India "was that of the herrenvolk and the Master Race," an idea that is "inherent in imperialism" and "was proclaimed in unambiguous language by those in authority" and put into practice as "Indians as individuals were subjected to insult, humiliation, and contemptuous treatment," ⁴⁶ not to mention somewhat more severe practices. As for the humanism of the American century in the Third World, no comment is required.

In an intellectual climate of the sort illustrated in these examples, which are typical of a substantial segment of articulate opinion, the managers of the national security state may proceed—so they believe—to reconstruct the Cold War framework for interventionism without too much fear of domestic protest. On the contrary, liberal journals will publish discussions of the "real reason" for the problems of the Middle East: "the profound reluctance of Western powers to do what is required in order to protect their own interests: namely, to make their strength visible and respected," using "political and military means" to "destroy" . . . [the] . . . OPEC monopoly."⁴⁷ (Typically, this call for overcoming "Western deference in the Middle East" and using military force to "defend Western interests" against the disreputable locals is subheaded: "If the U.S. is riot willing to counter the Russians, who is?"—Kedourie also does not enlighten the reader as to whether the Continental powers should invade Britain to "defend their interests" by taking over its petroleum resources, which fetch higher prices on the world market than those of the "sheiks" who are bent on destroying Western civilization.) In short, sophisticated, hardheaded realism: If they talk out of turn or don't behave, smash them in the face. The rhetoric may take its honored place in the annals of imperialism, serving as a further testimonial to the distinguished record that has been compiled by cultivated opinion in advanced civilizations.

In an important study discussed in Chapter i, the Trilateral Commission warned of the danger posed to democracy by the involvement of large parts of the population in the political arena during the terrible sixties, and by the work of "value-oriented intellectuals" who "challenge the existing structures of authority," undermining the effectiveness of "those institutions which have played the major role in the indoctrination of the young," such as the universities. The critique of the system of indoctrination by students and some others terrorized many intellectuals no less than the involvement of the formerly apathetic population in the democratic process, a fact illustrated in some of the paranoid fantasies later published in full seriousness: e.g., the description by G. Rees of how during this terrible period, the thesis that the universities must be destroyed "rang across every campus in the United States, and libraries were burned, and universities wrecked."⁴⁸ Others write of "the degenerating state of affairs" in the universities in 1968, "when it was impossible to imagine anything more slimy, sickly and stifling than the moral climate in that university" (Rochester University, in this specific case), though by 1975 "the Blacks were starting to become citizens" instead of "a curse" as they were in 1968, "the pus

was being squeezed out of the universities," and, in general, the nation's "moral fibre" was being restored.⁴⁹ Again, the rhetoric is revealing, as are the hysteria and fabrication, and the ideals and attitudes that are implicit in such commentary.

How completely the population has succumbed to the campaign of indoctrination during the 1970s is an open question. It has often been the case in the past that the articulate intelligentsia have tended to be both the committed partisans of the propaganda system and its most submissive victims, and there are indications that this may once again be true. It did not take long for the impressive intellectual edifice of conformism and subservience erected by the mainstream intelligentsia to collapse during the 1960s, and while it is partly true that the pus has been squeezed out of the universities—at least the elite universities that train the managers and leadership class—there is nevertheless, as there has been throughout the allegedly silent seventies, considerable ferment at the grass-roots level. The rivalries within the international system, the increasingly severe economic crisis, and the objective crisis over resources and destruction of the environment pose nontrivial problems for established power, and create opportunities for those who are committed to a different vision of the future than the one put forth by its spokesmen. The drive towards intervention, militarization, increased authoritarianism, submissiveness to the doctrinal system, and possibly eventual nuclear destruction is the result of human decisions taken within human institutions that do not derive from natural law and can be changed by people who devote themselves to the search for justice and freedom.

Chapter Seven Towards a New Cold War

1. Text of press conference, *New York Times*, December 1, 1978. This and the next reference are cited in Robert C. Johansen, *Jimmy Carter's National Security Policy*, Working Paper number 14, World Order Models Project, Institute for World Order, New York, 1980.

2. *State Department Bulletin* (March 1980).

3. *New York Times*, November 16, 1978, cited by Michael T. Klare, *Resurgent Militarism*, Institute for Policy Studies Issue Paper, Washington, D.C., 1978. This and Johansen, *op. cit.*, provide a useful picture of one aspect of the policies cloaked by human rights propaganda. For one example of another aspect, see Chapter 13, below. See Chomsky and E. S. Herman, *The Political Economy of Human Rights* (Boston: South End Press, 1979), for much further discussion, in the recent historical context of U.S.-Third World relations that is often ignored or obscured.

4. According to Klare, U.S. arms exports rose 20 percent during the first two years of the Carter Administration, reaching record levels in 1979. Cited by Johansen, *op. cit.*, from Klare, "The Arms Overstock," *Harper's* (November 1979). In *Resurgent Militarism*, Klare estimates the U.S. share of the international market in 1978 at 49 percent, followed by the USSR at 28 percent, France at 5 percent, and Britain at 4 percent. Smaller countries are fighting for their share of the international market, including Israel, which has become a major supplier for the murderous dictatorships backed (often installed) by the United States; it would not be unrealistic to regard this as part of the U.S. contribution to world order, given the unprecedented dependence of Israel on U.S. aid. (See Chapter 12.) Arms exports provide one index of the contribution of a state to international terrorism. Perhaps the most notorious example of this sort was the substantial increase in arms to Indonesia to expedite the huge massacre in Timor, abetted, in this case, by the convenient silence of the media. See Chapter 13.

5. Hedrick Smith, *New York Times*, December 2, 1975.

6. *New York Times Magazine*, December 16, 1973. See Chapter 8.

7. Drew Middleton, *New York Times*, March 20, 1980.

8. See Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, *Word Politics: Verbal Strategy among the Superpowers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971) for discussion of how the Khrushchev and Brezhnev doctrines mirrored, respectively, the earlier Eisenhower and Johnson doctrines in the rhetoric adopted to justify military intervention in satellite states.

9. Thomas Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets* (New York: Knopf, 1979), p. 306. Cf. also Basil Davidson, "South Africa's Border Wars," *New Society*, March 19, 1981, and for the general background, John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, vol. 2 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978). Also John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies* (New York: Norton, 1978). The French role in Africa is also consistently underplayed in U.S. commentary. See Daniel Volman, "Gendarme of Africa," *Progressive* (March 1981), for a rare exception. Attention in the United States is generally focused not on intervention by France or South Africa, or Belgium, Egypt, and Morocco (in Zaire, as U.S. proxies), or Zaire (in Angola), etc., but rather on the Cuban role, interpreted as Kremlin-inspired aggression. Whatever one thinks of Cuba's activities in Africa, it is well to recall that in Angola, Cuba's intervention in support of the MPLA (whose government is now recognized by black Africa and the West apart from the United States) "followed upon substantial intervention by others, including Zaire and South Africa . . . there is no question that Cuba's intervention was partly an improvised response to South Africa's" (Marcum, *op. cit.*). Furthermore, the country remains under regular attack by South African forces and mercenaries. On this matter, see Jonathan Steele's report from Angola (*Manchester Guardian Weekly*, February 8, 1981), concluding that "it is clear that South Africa is conducting a systematic policy of striking economic and military targets in Angola" and that "there can be no more doubt that the broad thrust of Angola's complaints that it is facing South African aggression is true, despite South African denials." Steele also gives a detailed account of the savagery and brutality of South African mercenaries (and their contempt for Savimbi's UNITA guerrillas, described as "a lot of crap"; Savimbi, widely touted as a freedom fighter in the United States, had made his peace with South Africa by mid-ig75, shortly before he began receiving U.S. arms; see Marcum, *op. cit.*, who notes that American arms also "poured in on Ci30s from Zaire to the FNLA's staging areas," while this group too was being helped by South Africa). The latter account is based on an interview with a British mercenary who explains how his colleagues "love killing," particularly, "killing women, hanging them and things." "They don't see them as people, just as things that are there." See also Introduction, note 108.

As for Cuba serving as a Soviet proxy, while it is obvious that the USSR foots the bill, Cuba has its own reasons for involvement in Angola. The majority of the population of Cuba is African in origin, many from what is now Angola, and relations would no doubt be close even apart from South African aggression and terror, motivated in large part by South African efforts to defy U.N. decisions on independence for mineral-rich Namibia.

Angola has stated publicly that Cuban forces will withdraw when South African aggression ceases and Namibia gains independence, in accordance with U.N. resolutions. *Washington Post*, April 25, 1981.

For detailed analysis of the U.S. press on Angola and its close adherence to official doctrine, see Marsha Coleman's forthcoming Ph.D. dissertation, MIT, Political Science

Department-See, for example, Franklyn Holzman, "Are the Soviets Really Outspending the U.S. on Defense?" *International Security* (Spring 1980).

11. Holzman estimates this gap at perhaps \$400 billion in the past decade; "The Military Expenditure Gap—Fact or Fiction," manuscript, Tufts University, 1981. See Introduction, notes 105, 106.

12. See Richard B. Duboff and Edward S. Herman, "The New Economics: Handmaiden of Inspired Truth," *Review of Radical Political Economics* (August 1972). See also their review of James Tobin, *The New Economics One Decade Older* (Princeton) in *Commonweal*, December 20, 1974.

13. These events, and the way they are commonly treated here, merit careful consideration. It will be recalled that at a crucial stage of the missile crisis, the Kennedy Administration was faced with what it regarded as a serious dilemma: whether to accept Khrushchev's offer to arrange a mutual withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba and American missiles from Turkey (obsolescent missiles, for which a withdrawal order had already been given since they were being replaced by Polaris submarines), or to reject this offer and face a probability of nuclear war that top-level Kennedy advisers estimated at 1:3 to 1:2. The latter course was chosen, so as to establish the principle that we have the right to maintain missiles at their borders (but not conversely), and to ensure that there would be no challenge to the machismo image that the Kennedy Administration endeavored so desperately to project. On the general character of Kennedy's much-admired statesmanship during this period, see Richard J. Walton, *Cold War and Counter-Revolution* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1972). The memoirs of the participants make sufficiently chilling reading.

14. Cited from the *Forrestal Diaries* in Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), which remains the most important analytic study of evolving U.S. policy in this period, though there has been much useful work since.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 341. The all too common incapacity of mainstream scholarship even to comprehend what is being said in work that departs too far from the chauvinist consensus is evident in the discussion of the Anglo-British conflict during this period. Consider, for example, John C. Campbell's review in *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1981) of Barry Rubin's *The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1941—1947* (London: Frank Cass, 1980), a book that provides documentation generally supporting the account by the Kolkos and other "revisionists," while typically disparaging the revisionist literature without serious argument. Campbell writes that the message of Rubin's book "brings no comfort to the revisionist school of cold-war historians" because it shows that U.S. policy was anti-imperialist ("Wilsonian") and "anti-British, and only anti-Soviet after the Russians began to subvert the independence of Middle East states." The anti-British element in U.S. policy and its "anti-imperialism" (i.e., opposition to imperial prerogatives that blocked the expansion of U.S.-based economic interests) is a major thesis of the revisionist literature—apart from the fact that Rubin's book hardly demonstrates any great success of the Russians in subverting the independence of Middle East states, a task that was then and subsequently a prerogative of the West, primarily.

16. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 219.

17. See Chapter 8 for further discussion.

18. *An-Nahar Arab Report & Memo*, Beirut, February 4, 1980.

19. See, for example, Bernard Lewis, *New York Times*, March 29, 1980.

20. *Manchester Guardian*, weekly edition, January 20, 1980.

21. Peter Niesewand, *Manchester Guardian*, February 17, 1980.

22. For documentation and discussion, see *The Political Economy of Human Rights*, vol. 2, chapter 2.

23. The material just reviewed is from Lawrence S. Wittner, "The Truman Doctrine and the Defense of Freedom," *Diplomatic History* 4 (Spring 1980), largely drawn from government documents. See also Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans, quoted in the *New York Times*, April 24, 1971, on "the welcome that is given here to American companies and the sense of security the Government of Greece is imparting to them" under the fascist regime of the U.S.-trained colonels.

24. Anthony Wild, *Manchester Guardian*, March 31, 1980.

25. Amnesty International provides evidence that the systematic massacre of the population and the regular "tortures and murders are part of a deliberate and long-standing program of the Guatemalan Government," and that the "selection of targets for detention and murder, and the deployment of official forces for extra-legal operations, can be pin-pointed to secret offices in an annex of Guatemala's National Palace, under the direct control of the President of the

Republic"; *Guatemala; a Government Program of Political Murder* (London: Amnesty International, 1981). AI began its campaign "focusing attention on the political murder encouraged by the Guatemalan Government" in September 1979 (*Amnesty International Report 1080*, which adds many further details). The reports of atrocities received some mention in the U.S. press, though analysis of the U.S. government role in placing these gangsters in power and supporting them is rarely noted. The latter topic is not part of AI's mandate, and it is legitimate for them to avoid the issue. The same cannot be said about the U.S. press and scholarship, which have the moral and intellectual duty to make this a primary topic of publicity and concern. For more on Guatemala, see *The Political Economy of Human Rights*, vol. i, pp. 274ff. Note that while the tortures and murders are sometimes noted, the far more significant topics discussed briefly above are generally—though not totally—ignored.

See also the Introduction to this volume, notes 21 and 189. On the military coup organized by the United States, which inaugurated the current era of horror, see Blanche W. Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981); Stephen Kinzer and Stephen Schlesinger, *Bitter Fruit* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981).

26. Anti-Slavery Society for the Protection of Human Rights, Report for 1980 to the United Nations Working Group of Experts on Slavery: *Guatemala—Deprivation of Indigenous Peasants' Land, Livelihood, Liberty and Lives, 1978--1980*, London.

It is a useful exercise to compare the reports of AI and the Anti-Slavery Society with the tempered account in the State Department's Human Rights report (*Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*, Report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, and Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, by the Department of State, February 2, 1981). The report notes the increase in violence in 1980, estimating politically motivated deaths at seventy-five to one hundred each month, far lower than the estimates by human rights groups, including church groups. The State Department, as distinct from human rights groups, notes merely that "reportedly these acts were carried out by armed extremists of the left and right and by elements of the official security forces. The government has not taken effective steps to halt abuses or carry out serious investigations," which is hardly surprising if the massacres are being organized from the presidential palace. The report continues: "Victims of the violence in 1980 included military and police personnel, government officials, pro-government politicians, businessmen, opposition political leaders, peasants and large numbers of students, academics and trade union activists," No distribution of killings is presented, just as the agent for the vast majority of them is suppressed. Nothing is said about the conditions of "virtual servitude" of the majority of the work force, though there is much discussion of the progressive programs planned by the government, and the new labor code, which "could theoretically strengthen trade unions." The report notes that "the government supports the dynamic industrial and well diversified, export-oriented agriculture sectors," but has nothing to say about the effect of export-oriented agriculture on the domestic population. On the various ways in which the State Department human rights reports conceal the true nature of governments placed and maintained in power by the United States, see *The Political Economy of Human Rights*, vol. I.

27. Stephen Kinzer, *Boston Globe*, February 18, 1980.

28. *London Financial Times*, December 4, 1979.

29. See also David Hayes, "One-way Ticket to Misery," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 3, 1980, 011 child slavery in Thailand, another beneficiary of U.S. intervention since the early postwar years; for background, see *The Political Economy of Human Rights*, vol. i, chapter 4, and my *American Power and the New Mandarins* (New York: Pantheon, 1969), pp. 6if.

On slavery in the United States, see John M. Crewdson, "Thousands of Aliens Held in Virtual Slavery in U.S.," *New York Times*, October 19, 1980, an important exception to the general rule.

30. Henry Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy*, expanded ed. (New York: Norton, 1974). Samuel P. Huntington, in his contribution to M. J. Crozier, S. P. Huntington, and J. Watanuki, *The Crisis of Democracy* (New York: New York University Press, 1975).

52. *Defense Monitor* (January 1980).

53. This and the preceding quote are cited in the important study by Jan K. Black, *United States Penetration of Brazil* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977).

34. Cited in *ibid.*

35. Peter Winn, *Nation*, June a, 1980. Recall the explanation by the current U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick as to why "such societies create no refugees." See Introduction, note 67.

36. *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 58, no. 3, 1980.

37. See *The Political Economy of Human Rights*, vol. 2, chapter 5.

38. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 16, 1979; May 9, 1979; *Christian Science Monitor*, November 5, 1979, the only mention of these incidents that I noted in the U.S. press.

39. See *The Political Economy of Human Rights*, vol. 1, chapter 3, section 4-4, for extensive documentation. See also Chapter 13 of the present volume.

40. See, for example, my *At War with Asia* (New York: Pantheon, 1970), p. 286: if the United States is able to "destroy the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, by employing the vast resources of violence and terror at its command," and to "break the will of the popular movements in the surrounding countries," then "it will create a situation in which, indeed, North Vietnam will necessarily dominate Indochina, for no other viable society will remain." Essentially what happened in Vietnam. In Cambodia, subsequent U.S. atrocities played a major role in "creat[ing] the Khmer Rouge" in Sihanouk's phrase (cf. Chapter 4, note 11); on the subsequent hostilities between Cambodia and Vietnam, leading to the Vietnamese takeover of Cambodia in December 1978-January 1979, see references cited in *The Political Economy of Human Rights*, vol. 2, Chapter 6. See the same chapter and references cited there for discussion of the "major atrocities and oppression," documented largely "from the reports of refugees" in a society that was "almost entirely closed to the West," focusing on the extensive fabrication of evidence as part of a more general study of Western propaganda. On Laos, see chapter 5, and on Vietnam, chapter 4, of the same volume. Forthcoming books by Michael Vickery (*Cambodia* [Boston, South End Press]) and Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua (eds., *Peasants and Communists in Kampuchea* [London, Zed Press]) add valuable information about the Pol Pot years and discuss the situation in Cambodia since, as do several important studies by Stephen Heder: *Kampuchean Occupation and Resistance*, *Asian Studies Monographs* No. 27 (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, 1980); "Kampuchea October 1979—August 1980," unpublished manuscript, Bangkok, November 1980, based on extensive refugee interviews. See also Laura J. Summers, "Co-operatives in Democratic Kampuchea," paper prepared for annual meeting of the Political Studies Association at the University of Hull, April 1981; Department of Politics, University of Lancaster, 1981.

See also the CIA research paper *Kampuchea: A Demographic Catastrophe* (Springfield, Va.: National Technical Information Service, 1980). The CIA estimates the population decline during the Pol Pot years at about 1.5 million, based on a December 1979 population estimate of about 5.2 million (the mid-ig75 population is generally estimated at about 7.5 million; the CIA research paper gives an estimate of about 700,000 deaths from the 1979 famine after the fall of the Pol Pot regime). International relief personnel estimate the 1980 population at about 6.5 million (*Report of the FAO Food Assessment, Kampuchea*, Office for Special Relief Operations, Rome, November 1980). See also *Nation Review*, Bangkok, November 10, 1980, for an AP report on the release of a United Nations study (perhaps the same one) by the special coordinator for Kampuchea Sir Robert Jackson, estimating the population at 6.4 million. These are stated to be revisions of earlier estimates upwards by over 25 percent. See Vickery, *op. cit.*, for evaluation of this and other material. See also Carlyle A. Thayer (of the Royal Military

College, Australia), review-article, *Problems of Communism* (May-June, 1981; and Chapter 1 above, notes 73, 92, 155.

As one indication of the reliability of earlier estimates, compare the *Asia 1979 Yearbook* and the *Asia 1980 Yearbook* of the *Far Eastern Economic Review*. The former estimated the population at the end of the Pol Pot regime (December 1978) at 8.2 million (figures "mostly based on CIA estimates"). The latter estimated the December 1979 population at 4.2 million. A common estimate in the Western press has been that the population was reduced from 7 to 4 million during the Pol Pot years, figures apparently derived from Hanoi.

41. See *The Political Economy of Human Rights*, vol. 2, chapter 6, for references and discussion.

42. Peter Kovler, *New York Times*, April 30, 1980. See also Chapter 2.

43. Ben Bradlee, "Russia's Vietnam," *Boston Globe Magazine*, May 11, 1980.

44. Dennis Bloodworth, "The Man Who Brought Death," *Observer Magazine* (London), January 20, 1980.

45. Anthony Hartley, *Encounter* (May 1980).

46. Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1961), p. 326.

47. British Middle East specialist Elie Kedourie, *New Republic*, June 7, 1980.

48. *Encounter* (December 1976).

49. Alain Besancon, *Encounter* (June 1980), an article presented under the rubric "Are Intellectuals 'Betraying' Again?," presumably without irony in a journal that has been committed since its origins to intellectual betrayal of the classic sort. On the process of acculturation that was used to overcome the "curse," see the documentation of state terrorism in my introduction to N. Blackstock, ed., *COINTELPRO* (New York: Vintage, 1976); Morton H. Halperin et al., *The Lawless State* (New York: Penguin, 1976); Robert J. Goldstein, *Political Repression in Modern America* (New York: Schenkman, 1978); Lennox S. Hinds, *Illusions of Justice* (Iowa City: School of Social Work, University of Iowa, 1978); Christy Macy and Susan Kaplan, eds., *Documents* (New York: Penguin, 1980).