

Hudson, W. E. (2006). *American democracy in peril: Eight challenges to*

America's future, 4th ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, pp. 1 – 22.

Introduction

Models of Democracy

As I would not be a slave, so I would not be a master. This expresses my idea of democracy. Whatever differs from this, to the extent there is a difference, is no democracy.

—Abraham Lincoln

Democracy is a complicated concept. The dictionary definition of "government (or rule) by the people" seems simple, but once we begin to think about the components of the definition, complexities arise. What does "government" or "rule" mean? Does government by the people mean that all the people are directly responsible for the day-to-day operation of government? Or is a scheme of representation acceptable? If so, what sort of scheme? How should it be organized? Elections? How often and for which offices? Does government have special meaning in a democracy? What is its proper scope? Who decides what is proper? The people, again? How is this decision made and expressed? And who are the people anyway? Everyone who lives in the governed territory or citizens only? What is a citizen? Can newly arriving people (immigrants) become citizens? Under what rules? Should the "people" include everyone or just those with a stake in the community, say, property holders? Should certain groups of people, such as criminals and traitors, be excluded from citizenship? This is just the beginning of a list of questions we could make about the meaning of "government by the people." Notice that in this short list of questions such additional complex concepts as *representation*, *citizen*, and *elections* are mentioned and suggest additional questions. The search for answers to all these questions is the concern of democratic theory, the branch of scholarship that specializes in elucidating, developing, and defining the meaning of democracy.

If we move beyond dictionary definitions and ask Americans what *they* think about democracy, we find additional layers of complexity. Americans associate diverse and often contradictory characteristics of their political system with democracy. Most Americans believe democracy requires majority rule, but at the same time they consider the protection of minority rights from the will of the majority as a key component of democracy. In fact, most Americans place considerable emphasis on the importance of freedom from government interference in their lives as *the* crucial ingredient of democracy. The individualistic American values democracy because it helps her or him to lead a personal life freely, without government getting in the way. At the same time, patriotic Americans believe democracy imposes obligations—the duty to vote, for example, or to support the government in times of crisis such as war. Many Americans associate democracy with particular constitutional features, such as the separation of powers and the Bill of Rights. These same Americans would be surprised to see democracy performing quite well in political systems possessing neither of these features; Great Britain is one example. For some, American economic arrangements, usually described as the free enterprise system (capitalism), are a part of democracy. Others, as we later see, believe capitalism is a threat to political equality and, hence, democracy. Given these differing views, one can understand why the essay contest on "What Democracy Means to Me" remains a continuing tradition in American schools.

If we are to analyze various challenges to democracy intelligently, we need to clarify some of this confusion about what democracy means. We need some sophisticated standards to use in evaluating the degree and kind of threat each of the challenges we examine poses for democratic politics. For example, what democratic characteristics and values does increasing economic inequality or a growing military-industrial complex threaten? This chapter presents an overview of some of the basic concepts of democracy as found in democratic theory. It offers a base to be used in evaluating the challenges to contemporary democracy. Democratic theory is presented

here in terms of four distinct "models" of democracy.¹ Each model provides a different understanding of democracy as it has been interpreted by different groups of political theorists. Four different models are needed because democratic theorists have not agreed on what procedures, practices, and values need to be emphasized for "government by the people" to be realized. The discussion of the models also provides a brief summary of the major issues and questions raised in modern democratic theory over the past two hundred years. Although some of the ideas in the models were first presented long ago, I believe each of the models offers viable alternative conceptions of democracy relevant to the United States today. The reader, however, should be warned that the discussion of democratic theory presented here is not meant to be a comprehensive review of the voluminous topic. Many important issues are not raised, and some important theorists are not discussed. Readers interested in a more thorough review of democratic theory should consult the works listed in the Suggestions for Further Reading at the end of this chapter.

The models discussed in this chapter are derived from writings on democracy since the eighteenth century. Only in the past two hundred years have humans had experience with democratic government in large nations. The theorists of what I call *modern* democracy agree that democratic politics is possible on such a scale, and they premise their discussions on this assumption. But before the emergence of modern democratic theory, certain historical experiences and political ideas prepared the way for these theorists. These precursors to modern democratic theory are discussed in the next section.

Precursors to Modern Democratic Theory

Democracy is an ancient concept. The idea of people participating equally in self-rule antedates recorded human history and may be as old as human society itself.² From recorded history, we know that the ancient Greeks had well-developed and successful democratic societies among their various forms of government. Several Greek city-states, most notably Athens, organized governments that involved the direct participation of their citizens in governing.³ The Athenian Assembly (Ecclesia), composed of all male citizens, met more than forty times each year to debate and decide all public issues.⁴ Officials responsible for implementing assembly decisions were either elected or chosen by lot; their terms of office lasted usually one year or less. From historical accounts and the analyses of classic Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, we know that Greek democracy involved many of the key concepts and practices associated with modern democracy. Political equality, citizen participation (and in Athens usually *lively* participation), the rule of law, and free and open discussion and debate were all part of Greek democratic practice.⁵ Nevertheless, the Greek form of democracy had characteristics that limited it as a model for modern democracy.

The first and most obvious limitation was scale. The Greeks assumed the city-state, composed of a few thousand citizens, to be the appropriate size for the polity. Greek democracy was carried out within this small territory among several thousand citizens, a condition permitting face-to-face interaction in a single public assembly. Political interaction beyond the scale of the city-state involved either diplomacy or conquest—hardly a democratic procedure. During the fourth and fifth centuries b.c., when Athenian democracy was at its height, Athens ruled its conquered territories in a decidedly undemocratic manner. The idea that democracy could encompass more than a few thousand citizens in a single city-state would have been absurd to Greek democrats.

A second limitation of Greek democracy was its exclusivity.⁶ Although all male citizens participated in governing themselves in Athens, this group constituted only a minority of the people who actually lived in Athens and were governed by the laws of the Ecclesia. The most obvious exclusion was the female half of the population (an exclusion that would prevail, until quite recently, in modern democracies). Likewise, the enormous slave population, larger than that of free citizens (about three slaves for each two citizens), had no right to political participation.⁷ According to some scholars, one of the ironies of Greek democracy was that its existence depended to a great extent on the slave economy, which permitted citizens the leisure to perform public duties.⁸ In

addition to slaves and women, a large population of free individuals, immigrants from other Greek cities and other parts of the world, were denied citizenship rights even though they had lived in Athens for generations and its laws governed their lives. The Greek conception of democracy did not include the modern notion that democracy should provide opportunities for political participation to all (with only a few exceptions) who live within a polity and are subject to its laws.

Despite its limitations, Greek democracy remained the Western world's most complete expression of the ideal of "rule by the many" for two thousand years after its demise. Among the numerous empires, monarchies, oligarchies, and tyrannies that followed, the Greek experience remained an inspiration to those who sought to provide power to ordinary citizens to govern themselves. Until the eighteenth century, the few experiments with democratic government, like the Greek experience, involved political regimes encompassing a limited geographic area and a small population. During the Middle Ages and later in various locales, from Italian city-states to Swiss cantons, democratic experiments achieved some success, but scale and exclusivity continued to limit democracy. As in Greece, democracy meant all citizens gathering together in one assembly to make laws; size remained a practical limitation to the relevance of democracy to the governance of large nation-states.

Not surprisingly, given this experience, political theorists assumed that democracy was feasible only in small states where face-to-face interaction of the entire citizenry could occur. For example, the great eighteenth-century French political theorist Montesquieu argued that the ability of citizens to perceive the public good easily, which he considered a requisite of democratic government, was possible only in a small republic.⁹ Even the influential democratic theorist of this same period, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, assumed a polity the size of his native Geneva to be the appropriate context for the application of his theories.¹⁰ Only in a small state, where people could meet together in the relative intimacy of a single assembly and where a similarity of culture and interests united them, could individuals discuss and find the public good.

By the end of the eighteenth century, events began to overtake the small-state view of democracy and stimulate a more expansive and modern conception. Inspired by the Enlightenment values of liberty and equality, political activists agitated for more popular forms of government. These democratic aspirations stimulated two key historical events in the history of democracy: the American and French revolutions. Because these popular revolutions occurred in large nation-states, satisfying democratic aspirations required moving beyond the small-state limitation. Conceptions of democracy had to be developed to provide for popular government among millions living in large territories.

The idea of democratic *representation* offered the mechanism to solve the dilemma of organizing democratic government over a large territory.¹¹ The American and French revolutionaries intended to make democracy work through popularly elected assemblies: state legislatures in the United States and the National Assembly in France. Representative assemblies made democracy feasible in large nation-states, even if the direct participation of the entire people in a single democratic assembly was impossible; representatives would speak on behalf of their constituents. In his famous essay No. 10 from *The Federalist*, James Madison went so far as to turn the conventional wisdom of the political theorists on its head. He argued that representative democracy in a large territory would lead to a more stable popular government than was possible in a small democracy. The introduction of the concept of democratic representation in practice and theory opened the way for the modern conception of democracy.¹²

Along with the idea of representation, a set of political ideas found in the political philosophy called *liberalism* were influential in the emergence of modern conceptions of democracy. Liberal political philosophy was first articulated in the work of the sixteenth-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes and later in the work of the seventeenth-century English theorist John Locke.¹³ Although neither Hobbes nor Locke, as we soon see, would be considered democrats, their ideas about the nature of political life were influential in modern conceptions of democracy.

Liberal theorists begin with two basic assumptions about human nature: (1) humans are reasonable creatures who can use their reason to improve their social existence; and (2) humans are self-interested, that is, concerned with their individual well-being. Based on these two

assumptions, theorists such as Locke and Hobbes argued that political society comes into being through a "social contract" among reasonable and self-interested individuals. These individuals understand the need for political order because they wish prosperity and security. For Hobbes, the social contract replaced a horrible "state of nature" in which selfish individuals spend their lives engaged in a "war of all against all," making human life "nasty, brutish and short." In contrast, Locke had a more benign view of the state of nature, arguing that most reasonable humans could understand the laws of nature and the need to restrain their selfishness for the good of the community. But because some individuals might sometimes be unreasonable and likely to violate the natural rights of others, prudent people should see the advantage of forming a political society with their fellow citizens to protect themselves. Furthermore, this social contract would place "natural" rights on a more secure and stable basis than they had in the state of nature. According to Locke, government, not the goodwill of humans, would become the guardian of natural law. Despite their differing conceptions of the actual "state" of the state of nature, both Hobbes and Locke agreed that reasonable individuals would prefer the security of a social contract to the state of nature.

The purpose of the social contract, and of the government that follows from it, was to maximize the opportunity for individual self-fulfillment. Liberalism was distinguished from medieval and ancient political theories because it identified the individual, his or her rights, and the need for self-fulfillment as the goals of the political order. Individual goals, rather than the glory of God or some universal notion of "the Good," the sorts of goals assumed in earlier political theory, were the proper end of government.¹⁴ For liberals, government existed to allow individuals to pursue whatever individual "goods" they desired. Individualism meant that each person, informed by reason, was the best judge of what was to be valued in life. The function of government was limited to protecting each individual's natural rights to "life, liberty, and property."

Among these individual rights, liberals counted the right to property among the most important. For Locke, the natural—that is, God-given—right to property was central to human existence. The main reason individuals would leave the state of nature and form a political commonwealth was the protection of that right: "The great and chief end of Men's uniting into Commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their Property."¹⁵ Since protection of property and other rights is the reason people placed themselves under the authority of a government, it follows logically that government itself should not be allowed to interfere in the exercise of those rights. This liberal commitment to limited government means that individuals have broad leeway in acquiring and disposing of property, free of government control.

Obviously, such a view of government and individual rights of property was very compatible with the emergence of capitalist economic relations. Capitalist entrepreneurs in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries sought to be free of the dictates of government. They found liberal political theory especially supportive of their efforts to accumulate wealth and make investments based on their individual estimates of profitability, rather than the dictates of government. Adam Smith, for example, argued in his *Wealth of Nations*, published in 1776, that economic prosperity, not chaos, would be the result if markets were allowed to function free of government interference, a view quite consistent with Locke's notions of property rights and limited government.

Liberal political ideas clearly imply a capitalist or free enterprise economic order. To what extent does liberalism also imply democratic politics? Liberalism emphasizes that individuals in a society are equally entitled to the protection of their rights and that all humans are equal in forming a social contract. Most Americans associate these liberal political values with democracy. The association is understandable because our American *liberal* democracy has been greatly influenced by our liberal political culture. Nevertheless, liberal thought, although not necessarily incompatible with democratic politics, does not lead necessarily to popular control of government.

Neither Hobbes nor Locke favored democratic government. Hobbes, in fact, felt that a liberal society could be best protected if, as part of the original social contract, people turned over all power to a single absolute sovereign (the *Leviathan*), who would provide law and order, protecting citizens in return for their absolute obedience. He so distrusted selfish human nature that he could see no way to control it except with an authoritarian government. But keep in mind that Hobbes ad-

vocated authoritarian government for *liberal* ends: to protect individuals' freedom to benefit from their labors.¹⁶ In this respect, Hobbes's position is similar to the public statements of some modern military dictators, like Chile's former President Augusto Pinochet, who claim they must hold absolute power to protect law-abiding citizens and "free enterprise" from "communists and subversives."¹⁷

Locke favored some citizen participation in government, but he assumed that participation would be restricted to citizens who had a full stake in the commonwealth, namely, property holders. Although all citizens were obligated to obey government, having consented to the social contract that created it, Locke believed that only citizens with "estate" possessed the capacity for rationality that governing required.¹⁸ Liberals required of government only that it protect individual liberty and not meddle beyond this limited sphere. For this purpose, a nondemocratic government, as long as its powers were limited, might be more trustworthy than a democratic one.

So, liberalism does not lead inevitably to democracy. Nevertheless, there are elements in the liberal vision that do suggest democratic politics. For example, both Hobbes and Locke believed that free individuals participated *equally* in the formation of the initial compact that establishes the state. Therefore, they saw no artificial distinctions between people that could justify different political rights for different individuals. So even though differences between citizens may arise in the actual control of government, the foundation of the state rests on the initial consent of all citizens, irrespective of differences in wealth or social status. Furthermore, the initial social contract means that government itself has a democratic obligation to understand that its powers derive from the initial consent of citizens, and to enforce laws and protect political rights equally. Failure to do so constitutes justification for revolution. These potential democratic sentiments find sublime expression in the American Declaration of Independence, which both embodies liberal doctrine and provides a call for democratic revolution:

We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. . . . That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.

Certainly these liberal ideas provided fruitful stimulus to inspire Americans to democratic revolution.

The significance of liberal ideas for modern conceptions of democracy is clearly evident in the first of the four models I describe in this chapter, the Protective Democracy model. Like all the models to follow, this set of ideas shows three things: (1) how one group of "democrats" value citizen participation; (2) what they think the purposes of government are, or should be; and (3) what political arrangements they find most consistent with their thoughts on the first two items. In the pages that follow, I describe each of the four models: Protective Democracy, Developmental Democracy, Pluralist Democracy, and Participatory Democracy.¹⁹ Toward the end of the chapter, a table summarizes and compares all four models.

Protective Democracy

Protective Democracy is a model of democracy that advocates popular control of government as a means of protecting individual liberty. Its most explicit formulation is found in the work of two nineteenth-century British political philosophers, Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, who favored democratic government as the best means for securing a liberal society. Bentham, founder of the philosophy of *Utilitarianism*, believed that a capitalist, market society, as described by Smith and implicit in liberal theory, was most likely to achieve the Utilitarian ideal of "the greatest good for the greatest number." He and his disciple Mill felt that for a capitalist society to flourish, it needed

government officials who would pass laws nurturing market relations and who would be restrained from using their powers to enrich themselves at the expense of the rest of society.²⁰

Bentham and Mill felt the democratic institutions of universal male suffrage, the secret ballot, a free press, and most of all, frequent elections, offered the best chance of keeping government under control. For them, democracy was a method for protecting *both* citizens and capitalism's market relationships: "A democracy, then, has for its characteristic object and effect, the securing its members against oppression and depredation at the hands of those functionaries which it employs for its defense."²¹

If members of society were self-interested and competitive, as assumed, then voters would be vigilant against government officials bent on violating their liberties. Voters would be ready to punish (at the polls) government officials who raised taxes too severely or whose policies reduced voters' incomes. Bentham and Mill were willing to embrace universal suffrage, even though this meant including in the electorate the poor, people with no property, and the working class. They were confident that middle-class political leaders like themselves could lead the lower class to support liberal, pro-market governments.

After all, in their Utilitarian philosophy, the long-run best interest of even the poor lay in the successful operation of the market society. (This belief is still widely held in the United States, as in the "trickle down" economics of many conservative Republicans.)

Bentham's and Mill's confidence in the support of the poor and propertyless for liberal values contrasted sharply with earlier liberal anxiety about the participation of the poor. Just a few years earlier, in 1787, the American founding fathers also held an essentially liberal view of the role of the government. In the famous *Federalist* No. 10, James Madison asserts that "the protection of [the diversity of the faculties of men from which the rights of property originate] is the first object of government."²² To Madison, the chief danger to limited government (a liberal goal) was the emergence of factions that might gain control of governmental power and use it in their own interest and against that of the rest of society. Of particular concern was the potential faction of the majority of citizens without property, who might use government to inflate the currency, abolish debts, or appropriate property directly.

This concern with the dangers of popular participation, or the "excesses of democracy," as the Founders put it, was a major factor precipitating the American Constitutional Convention of 1787. Many of the institutional arrangements established in the Constitution were intended to reduce the potential for a democratic majority to threaten individual liberty. Among the most important was the system of separation of powers, which divides lawmaking power among different institutions: the presidency, Congress, and the judiciary. In addition, Congress is divided into two branches, whose members are elected under different electoral schemes. This division of power assured that even if a democratic citizenry succeeded in capturing control of one institution of government, the other, separate institutions would manage to check the potentially tyrannical institution. Several articles, especially the Bill of Rights, also contain specific limitations on governmental power in order to protect individual liberty. All these provisions were intended to create a government that anyone bent on tyranny, whether a faction of the majority or a minority, could not easily use.

Combining the institutional vision of the American founding fathers with the democratic theory of Mill suggests our first distinctive model of democracy. Protective Democracy values democratic institutions and procedures to the extent that they protect and nurture a liberal, capitalist, market society. According to this model, democracy exists so that free competitive individuals may have and enjoy a maximum of freedom to pursue material wealth. Some individuals may choose other objectives for their lives, but the basic assumption is that most people are motivated primarily to seek wealth. These individuals are likely to be interested in politics and to participate in politics only to the extent necessary to protect their freedom in the marketplace.

Liberalism heavily influences the Protective Democracy model. In this model, the prime purpose of government is the protection of individual liberty and property. In fact, the limits government imposes are needed precisely because there are threats to property inherent in an acquisitive and competitive human nature. For its part, government should never threaten property rights and should always protect individual liberty. And since the natural human tendency toward

material greed and political tyranny lives in government leaders as well, individual liberty can best be protected if there are also clear and strong limits on government. Political institutions such as the separation of powers, federalism, and bicameralism are intended to limit the power of the government so that it will not behave in a tyrannical manner.

Political participation within these institutions provides further protection because citizens will be vigilant in protecting their freedoms. Although Protective Democracy is very concerned with equality in political rights, such as voting, and in equal protection under the law, Protective democrats are less concerned about the existence or potential threat of material inequality in society, and in fact they assume that such inequality will exist.

Developmental Democracy

As we have seen, the Protective model of democracy assumes a negative view of human nature. Democracy's first aim is to prevent the inherent selfishness, acquisitiveness, and even evil of humankind from controlling the state to the detriment of individual liberty. In sharp contrast to this negative view, the Developmental model of democracy assumes a much more positive view of people, especially people in a democratic society. Writing in the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill (James Mill's son), declared that man is not simply a "consumer and appropriator" (as assumed in the Protective model), but also an "exerter, developer, and enjoyer of his capacities."²³ As a result, people in democratic societies can come to possess "civic virtue," which permits them to look beyond their self-interest to the well-being of all of society. Through participation in governmental institutions and the affairs of their communities, people develop a broad appreciation of the public good and what it requires. They become public-spirited *citizens*.

The concept of the good citizen is central to the model we call Developmental Democracy. This conception of democratic citizenship is widely embraced in American society, not only in civics textbooks but also by such "good government" groups as the League of Women Voters. "Good citizens" are knowledgeable about, interested in, and active in government and civic affairs. They vote regularly, inform themselves on public issues, write to their elected representatives, and sometimes serve in public office. Democracy is desirable because it provides these opportunities.

Through their active involvement, good citizens contribute to the well-being of their communities, but they also receive something in return. Since democracy requires that citizens involve themselves in the community, it is a means for educating people, enhancing their capacity to improve themselves as well as their government. Democratic citizenship is an intellectual exercise, requiring ordinary people to make constant decisions about political issues and candidates. In making these judgments, citizens talk to one another, learn from one another, and develop their own intelligence.²⁴ Their active involvement in democratic institutions develops their characters in a more fully human direction." In being responsible for public affairs, people learn to be more responsible human beings. The virtue of democracy is that it develops these positive aspects of human character. In sum, the Developmental model sees democracy as having a moral value and purpose: It requires good citizens and thus develops good people. Like the Protective model, the Developmental model accepts the need for representative democracy, but only because of the impracticality of a more direct form of democracy. According to John Stuart Mill,

the only government which can fully satisfy all the exigencies of the social state is one in which the whole people participate; that any participation, even in the smallest public function is useful.... But since all cannot, in a community exceeding a single small town, participate personally in any but some very minor portion of the public business, it follows that the ideal type of a perfect government must be representative.²⁶

Even though the Developmental model accepts the need for representation, as indicated in the last lines of the quotation above, the emphasis rests on the people's active control of their "deputies." In such a relationship, citizens must be full and active participants in both electing their representatives and monitoring their activities. This view of representation is quite different from

that of the proponents of the Protective Democracy model. The Protective democrats, like Madison, thought representation improved on direct democracy because an elite, potentially more civic minded than ordinary citizens, would control day-to-day policymaking. The Developmental democrats, expecting and encouraging *all citizens* to be civic minded, accept representation only as a practical necessity.

For most of American history, this Developmental model of democracy dominated Americans' interpretation of their political life. This view became ascendant during the Jacksonian era, when suffrage was extended to nearly all white males and the spirit of the common man dominated the frontier. This democratic spirit led the French observer Alexis de Tocqueville to conclude in the 1830s that "the people reign over the American political world as God rules over the universe."²⁷ From Abraham Lincoln to Woodrow Wilson, American political leaders articulated this vision of Developmental Democracy, as their views were reiterated in schoolroom texts and in the writings of political philosophers.

Toward the middle of the twentieth century, however, some intellectuals began to question the Developmental model's accuracy as a description of actual political practice in the United States. This questioning led them to develop our next interpretation of democracy, Pluralist Democracy.

Pluralist Democracy

To a considerable extent, the Developmental model represents a democratic ideal: If political society were organized according to this model, popular control of government would be assured. But is it possible for such a political regime to exist? This key question troubled social scientists observing the emergent democratic regimes in such nations as the United States, Britain, and France at the turn of the century. The question was especially troubling because social scientists saw a political reality that differed greatly from the ideals represented in the Developmental model.

For example, instead of seeing average citizens actively engaged in political affairs, they observed that most ordinary people seemed to be apathetic and uninformed about politics. This left day-to-day governance in the hands of a political elite: party leaders, officeholders, "notables," and journalists. Moreover, average citizens were far from equal in their ability to influence public officials; some seemed to have more interest in politics and greater resources for contact with political leaders. Democratic constitutions alone, they concluded, did not seem to create the sort of democratic politics described in the Developmental model.

Among political theorists, these observations about the gap between the democratic ideal and political reality led to two different responses. The first social scientists to describe this gap, in the early years of the twentieth century, saw it as evidence that democracy was impossible. These "elitist" theorists—Roberto Michels, Gaetano Mosca, and Vilfredo Pareto—argued that the experience with democratic institutions proved that democracy could never be achieved.²⁸ For them, the ideas of democracy and democratic constitutions only hid the reality of elite control of politics and government. For these theorists, the actual practice of democracy differed little from politics in authoritarian or oligarchical regimes because a small "political class" inevitably ruled all societies. A democratic constitution did not change this fundamental "iron law of oligarchy."

By the middle of the twentieth century, another group of social and political scientists formulated an alternative response to the elitists' conclusion about the impossibility of democracy. If the actual practice of politics in "democratic" regimes did not measure up to the democratic ideal, then, instead of giving up on democracy altogether, they suggested redefining democracy to fit actual political practice. Rather than let the standards of the developmental model define democracy, the "revisionists" sought to redefine democracy by careful observation of politics as it was actually practiced in "democratic" societies like the United States.

In 1954 Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee made this argument in their book *Voting*, which was based on a sophisticated survey of a sample of citizens in Elmira, New York, at the time of the 1948 presidential election.²⁹ They found that the behavior of Elmira's citizens differed significantly from the democratic ideal as presented in the Developmental model. Levels of knowledge about the election were quite low for most citizens. More important, there was

great variation among citizens in the level of political interest and participation. Some people were highly interested and involved, others passive and apathetic, while still others showed moderate interest. Overall, there were not many "good citizens" among the population they studied.

But Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee did not conclude that these "facts" meant a threat for democracy. Instead, they wrote that this mixture of involvement and apathy contributed positively to the stability of democratic politics:

How could mass democracy work if all the people were deeply involved in politics? Lack of interest by some people is not without its benefits, too.... Extreme interest goes with extreme partisanship and might culminate in rigid fanaticism that could destroy democratic processes if generalized throughout the community. Low affect toward the election . . . underlies the resolution of many political problems; votes can be resolved into a two party split instead of fragmented into many parties. . . . Low interest provides maneuvering room for political shifts necessary for a complex society. . . . Some people are and should be highly interested in politics, but not everyone is or needs to be.³⁰

Thus, for these authors, apathy among some citizens, even among a large portion of a society, is considered a positive dimension of democracy. In fact, too many "good citizens," as described in the Developmental model, would constitute a danger to orderly democratic politics.

If, then, democracy is not to be defined by the activism of its citizens, how do "democratic" regimes differ from authoritarian ones? For the Pluralists, the answer to this question is *competitive elections*. This might seem paradoxical, given the quotation above concerning the dangers of electoral participation, but to the Pluralists, elections provide an opportunity for even apathetic and passive citizens to choose their political leaders. This choice distinguishes democratic regimes from authoritarian ones. Since Pluralists assume that the political elite will make actual policy decisions, the role of democratic citizens lies primarily and almost exclusively in their capacity to choose among alternative political leaders. As Joseph Schumpeter put it in a famous definition of democracy: "The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote."³¹ Elections are important, then, not because they provide *direct* citizen involvement in governance, but because they allow citizens to choose who their rulers will be. For the Pluralists, this assures that political leaders will remain responsive to the general preferences of the people and at the same time maintain the flexibility to make intelligent policy decisions without intrusive public meddling.

For the periods between elections, Pluralists assign to interest groups the important role of providing democratic responsiveness."³² Most citizens, Pluralist observe, are not very aware of day-to-day governmental policymaking, but leaders of interest groups represent average citizens in those policy debates. Since some interest group represents almost everyone's interests, the activities of interest-group leaders are an effective democratic channel for the expression of the public's wants and needs. Moreover, interest-group leaders possess the knowledge and institutional skills to influence policymaking that ordinary people lack. They actively compete with leaders of other interest groups on a daily basis to convince elected officials to enact favorable policies.

For their part, elected officials seek to please as many groups as possible as a means of maximizing electoral support. To achieve this, they must fashion compromises satisfactory to a wide variety of groups. Government policies, then, represent democratic compromises reflecting the preferences of numerous interest groups and their members. Some Pluralists argue that even the concerns of those *not* represented by an interest group are taken into account in these compromises. Politicians need to worry about the preferences of "potential" interest groups that might form if some citizens become too dissatisfied with a policy compromise. For Pluralists, therefore, interest-group activity and regular competitive elections produce a democratic system responsive to the popular will, even though an elite is responsible for day-to-day governing and most citizens are relatively uninvolved in politics.

Finally, Pluralists emphasize that successful democratic politics rests on a base of social

diversity. Society consists of many different and competing groups, interests, and associations, and government must be responsive to the legitimate aspirations of all these while it protects the right of various groups to exist. Pluralists feel that democracy can thrive only if the variety of associations inherent in society express themselves politically."³³ Consequently, the concentration of power in the state, a class, or any single part of society is the complete opposite of democracy. As long as power is widely dispersed among many groups, all provide a check against the accumulation of hegemonic power by any one of them. The competition among aspiring government leaders, the fairness of elections, the free interplay of interest groups, and the formulation of democratic compromises can work only if no single group is able to monopolize power and limit competition, undermine free elections, restrict interest groups, and bias policy compromises.

In conclusion, the Pluralist model emerged as social scientists observed apathetic, disinterested, and uninformed citizens in democratic societies. Based on their observations, they concluded that earlier democratic theorists, like those who created the Developmental model, had overestimated the capacity of most people to participate as active democratic citizens. If most people were apathetic toward political affairs, it seemed logical to look to the active political elite as guardians of democratic values and actual participants in policy formation. Most ordinary citizens could be assigned the more minor (although still important) role of voting in periodic elections to choose among alternative leaders. The basis of the Pluralist conception was the intermittent and indirect, even remote, participation of most people in political affairs.

Participatory Democracy

But why are citizens apathetic? The Pluralists assume political apathy to be a natural inclination of most people. Unless political affairs directly affect people's immediate interests, most prefer to focus on their private concerns. In the 1960s, political activists and political theorists began to question this Pluralist assumption. They formulated a conception of Participatory Democracy, which sees apathy as a result of the lack of opportunities for significant participation, rather than a fact inherent in human nature. If most people preferred to concern themselves with their private affairs rather than public ones, this was because of the structure of social institutions, not human nature. For Participatory democrats, the solution to citizen apathy lay in restructuring political and social institutions so that citizens could learn, through participation, the value and joys of democratic citizenship.

The Participatory model, although it has antecedents in the earlier Developmental model, arose from the political turbulence of the 1960s. Its earliest formulations came from the manifestos of student political activists in such organizations as Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). In 1961 a small group of SDS members gathered in Port Huron, Michigan, to formulate a statement of principles, the Port Huron Statement, which included a call for "a democracy of individual participation."³⁴ Political, social, and economic institutions were to be reformed to make them more conducive to participation. In the South, the black and white student activists of SNCC attempted to put participatory ideals into practice in their efforts to register black voters. The battles for civil rights and later against the Vietnam War provided arenas to test the capacity of mass participation to influence public policy.

While students practiced Participatory Democracy in the streets, a number of political scientists challenged the then dominant Pluralist interpretation of American politics in scholarly journals."³⁵ They questioned whether the elite-dominated politics the Pluralists celebrated merited the label "democratic." They said that the Pluralists complacently praised the virtues of American politics while ignoring the structures that prevented the development of a more authentic democratic politics. Pluralists were criticized for claiming that interest groups offered wide representation to societal interests, even though many Americans did not belong to any voluntary associations and not all groups had equal access to policymakers. Most important, for discounting the ideals of democratic citizenship in the name of "realism," Pluralists were accused of ignoring and undermining analysis of how more effective structures of democratic participation might be

constructed.

The Participatory model, as presented by theorists such as Carol Pateman, differs from previous models in its emphasis on the importance of democratic participation in nongovernmental as well as governmental institutions. The Developmental model (like the Protective and Pluralist models) views the democratic problem as subjecting governmental institutions and decisions to popular control. Participatory democrats agree with the need to control the government democratically, but they also point out that in modern industrialized societies it is not only government that makes authoritative decisions that individuals must obey or that has the capacity to apply sanctions to people who do not obey. Individuals are subject to the authoritative rules of their employers, unions, schools, churches, and other institutions. In fact, the decisions and rules of these institutions usually have a more immediate impact on people's lives than do government policies. The decisions an employer makes regarding salary, working conditions, or layoffs can have an immediate and, if adverse, devastating effect on an employee's life. In comparison to these decisions, the decision by the national government to emphasize a manned over an unmanned space program, or a local government's decision about which streets to pave, is remote or unimportant to most people.

In most cases, these nongovernmental decisions are made in hierarchical bureaucratic organizations, in an authoritarian manner, without any of the procedures and protection we associate with democracy. Participatory democrats feel that the absence of democracy in these nongovernmental settings undermines the capacity of citizens to function democratically and the overall quality of a society's democracy. The model presents three related arguments to support this idea. First, the lack of participatory opportunities in the workplace, the school, and the union deprives citizens of the chance to influence those decisions that are most meaningful to them. An opportunity to nurture those qualities of citizenship the Developmental theorists valued is lost when people are unable to influence decisions that directly affect their lives. Democratic participation would be much more meaningful to people if they could see such participation affecting decisions with direct impact on their day-to-day lives.

Second, people are apt to acquire non-participatory habits when subjected to an authoritarian environment on a daily basis. After spending the day following orders without question at the factory, a worker cannot be expected to return home in the evening to act like the civics textbook's inquiring, skeptical, self-actualizing citizen. Students who are taught primarily to obey authority in school are not likely to grow into effective democratic citizens. Third, Participatory democrats argue that a society can hardly be called democratic when so many socially and politically relevant decisions are in the hands of people who are not democratically accountable. For example, corporate officials sometimes make decisions, like deciding to close a factory, which affect the well-being of a whole community. The inability of the community's citizens to influence that decision is as indicative of a lack of democracy as their inability to influence the local property tax rate.

For Participatory democrats, the way to hold those who make decisions accountable is to expand participatory opportunities in society. Democracy is not just a concept relevant to government; it should be implemented in all instances where authoritative decisions affecting people's lives are made. Workers should be able to participate democratically in the running of their factories, students and faculty their schools and universities, and welfare recipients the welfare department. Through meaningful participation in these environments, people will acquire the capacity to be more effective participants in influencing government. For Participatory democrats, creating effective democracy in our industrialized and bureaucratized society requires that there be a radical restructuring of institutions to increase people's control over the decisions that affect their lives.

The Models Compared

Table I.1 compares and summarizes the characteristics of the four models of democracy described in this chapter. In the table, the purpose (goal, end) that the model assigns to democracy uniquely defines that model. The Protective model values democracy because democratic

institutions are thought to provide the best protection for individual liberties, particularly economic ones such as the right to individual control of property. Developmental democracy considers democratic politics the best method of developing the personal qualities associated with its idea of the "good citizen." Pluralists value the social diversity and system stability that democratic institutions encourage. And for the Participatory democrats, democracy is worthwhile because it permits people to participate in decisions that affect their lives. Each model's unique character seems to derive from the central purpose or goal it expects democracy to accomplish.

Other dimensions of the table direct our attention to values and characteristics the models share. For example, the Developmental and Participatory models obviously have a lot in common. Each assumes a positive view of human nature: People are thought to be capable of rising above their narrow self-interests. Through participation in democratic procedures and institutions, citizens acquire the quality of civic virtue, which enables them to evaluate public issues in terms of the public interest. Consequently, we should expect and encourage people to be active participants in political affairs in order to enrich both society and the individual. Both of these models also agree on the need for economic and social equality in democratic societies. When citizens come together to discuss the needs of the community, no artificial distinctions of political or social status should override the commonality of citizenship.

The differences between the Developmental and Participatory models center on their different evaluations of the impact of economic relationships on democratic politics. Developmental democrats do not view economic inequalities or class differences as significant barriers to equal citizenship. They emphasize the potential all citizens enjoy, no matter what their economic resources, to participate fully in governmental institutions. In contrast to this governmental focus, Participatory democrats focus on the importance of social relationships, particularly economic ones, outside government. For them, full and active participation in government alone cannot fulfill the requirements of democracy; democracy also means popular control of authoritative decisions in corporations, factories, unions, and schools. Moreover, social and economic inequality may impede the functioning of even political democracy. This broader view makes greater economic equality both a prerequisite for more meaningful participation and a likely consequence of popular power over economic decision making.

Like the Developmental and Participatory models, the Protective and Pluralist models share a common view of human nature. Both adopt the pessimistic position that humans are primarily selfish and acquisitive creatures, concerned primarily with increasing and maintaining their private wealth. From this assumption follows these models' shared expectation that most people will have only limited interest in public affairs. Moreover, especially for the Pluralists, the average person's limited interest and participation in politics is quite acceptable, for it contributes to the stability of the system and the liberty of all. If people are naturally rapacious and interested in their own welfare, their active involvement in government will only produce factional conflict and, if one faction wins, potential violations of liberty.

The Pluralist and Protective democrats also agree that equality in a democracy need only apply to political rights and opportunities. But they expect social and economic inequalities to affect the degree of actual participation, a natural reality that does not disturb them. Political leaders, whether elected representatives or interest-group leaders, will probably possess higher social status and be more affluent, but that does not interfere with their ability to speak and act for their constituents and followers, according to these two models. Universal suffrage and competitive elections are enough in themselves to assure equal representation for all economic interests. Furthermore, the "one person, one vote" idea assures that the voting power of the many will counterbalance the potential political advantages of the affluent few.

The discussion so far may have left some readers a bit confused. The preface said this chapter would offer a definition of democracy as a standard against which to judge alternative challenges to the well-being of democracy. Instead of a single such definition, I have presented four very different models, each claiming to provide a description of democratic politics. It appears that one

of the challenges democracy faces is that no one can agree on what it means! What conclusions about the concept of democracy can be drawn from these various models? Can we identify some essential characteristics of democracy that will facilitate our identifying its challenges?

First, the models suggest that a part of the meaning of democracy is a continuing discussion of the meaning of democracy. You should note that these models have evolved historically in response to the practical efforts to establish and maintain democratic regimes during the past two hundred years. Democratic politics has been a new experience for humankind; it is understandable that conceptions of it remain in formation. There is obviously no single, authoritative blueprint for how democracy can be achieved. Instead, democratic politics involves a constant discussion among citizens about how best to organize their political life.

Table I.1 Models of Democracy Compared

	Protective Democracy	Developmental Democracy	Pluralist Democracy	Participatory Democracy
Goal or Purpose	Protect liberty (market relations and private property)	Nurture citizenship	Protect and promote	Foster participation
Role of Citizens	Passive	Active	Passive	Active
Institutional Mechanisms	Separation of powers and representation	Representation	Interest groups election	Neighborhood assemblies and workers' councils
Equality	Political	Political and Social	Political	Economic, political and social
Human Nature	Selfish and acquisitive	Capable of civic virtue	Selfish and acquisitive	Capable of civic virtue

Despite the differences among the models, one can identify certain common elements that seem to have emerged during humankind's two-century discussion about democracy. First, all models assume that democracy means popular rule; that is, government based on popular sovereignty (as opposed, say, to the divine right of kings) and subject to popular control. The models differ on how popular control is to be expressed, but all merit the label "democratic" because they assume the need for control by the people. Second, all models assume political equality. None questions the fact that democracy requires all citizens to possess equal political rights, even though the models differ on the capacity of individuals to take equal advantage of those rights. What differentiates these models from authoritarian theories of government is the absence of any argument in favor of an aristocracy or the assignment of a privileged political role to any preordained class or group in society. Third, all assume the need for political liberty. Democratic discussion and popular control of governmental actions can occur only if all people feel free to express themselves and to try to influence government. In sum, these three values—popular rule, liberty, and equality—constitute the core of democracy's definition. All those who honestly call themselves democrats embrace these concepts.

The differences among these models do not mean that the models are mutually exclusive.

Embracing one does not necessarily mean a total rejection of the others. Instead of containing mutually distinctive definitions of democracy, each highlights different values consistent with the other models and an implicit global definition of democracy. The Protective model, for example, emphasizes the importance of individual liberty and the need to protect liberty from government infringement. Participatory democrats would object to the Protective democrats' preoccupation with property rights, but would agree with the need to preserve the generic liberties required for free and open political participation. Pluralists emphasize the need for social diversity for effective democracy; the other models do not question this. The Developmental model calls attention to the value of good democratic citizenship, while the Participatory model emphasizes the value of searching for new ways for democratic citizens to make social decisions that control their lives. I do not mean to suggest that the disagreements among adherents of the various models are merely cosmetic, only that certain common values underlie them all.

What these models suggest and what this chapter shows is that democracy remains, even after much practical experience with democratic institutions throughout the world, an ideal to be continually sought after, rather than a settled system to be admired complacently. People in many countries, including the United States, strive to achieve democratic ideals. They aim to subject public decisions to popular control, protect individual civil rights and liberties, expand political equality, encourage participation in decisions that affect people's lives, foster social diversity, and promote good citizenship. Nevertheless, nowhere, not even in the United States, have these ideals been achieved. This is partly because our definitions of these ideals, like our definition of democracy, continually change. For example, in 1840 universal white male suffrage seemed to satisfy the aspirations of most American democrats; in the United States of the twenty-first century, the exclusion of women and nonwhites from voting is rightly considered a gross violation of democratic principles.

We can see, therefore, that the achievement of the democratic ideal is so difficult because the ideal itself is so demanding. The limitations of human nature and social organization are continual barriers in the way of successful democracy. Sometimes doing things non-democratically is just simpler than wrestling with democratic procedures. This impatience with the demands of democracy often tempts some people in democracies to bypass democratic procedures.³⁶ Another way democracy is demanding is in the time and energy democratic citizenship requires—time many people would prefer to devote to their private affairs. Also, despite the almost universal lip service given to democratic ideals in the modern world, not everyone believes in democracy. The active opposition from individuals and groups opposed to democratic aspirations is surely a significant barrier to the achievement of democratic ideals. Whether it is a government such as Saudi Arabia's or Cuba's, a segment of society such as Southern whites in the 1960s who opposed the civil rights movement, or the economic interests of corporate officials who resist public efforts to regulate their actions, the opponents of democracy remain powerful in every country and every segment of society. With such opposition, the world will never be absolutely "safe for democracy."

This recognition of the fragility of democratic political institutions brings us to the main point of this book. Observers of democratic politics are continually identifying threats to the future and well-being of democracy. When studying these challenges, several questions need to be asked: First, what is the implicit or explicit model of democracy each particular challenge seems to confront? Does the seriousness of the particular challenge diminish or increase depending on the model? Does the challenge threaten underlying values differently in the various models? Second, to what extent does the threat discussed undermine the democratic values of all the models, of democracy itself? Is the challenge so serious to democratic values that the Protective, Pluralist, Developmental, and Participatory democrats should be equally concerned? Finally, what does the analysis of the various threats to democracy tell us about the models themselves? Which model of democracy seems to offer the best chance of overcoming the challenges American democracy faces in the modern world? In other words, how should our politics be structured if we are to thrive as a society?

Suggestions for Further Reading

Barber, Benjamin, and Patrick Watson. *The Struggle for Democracy*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1988. A history of democracy written to accompany a PBS documentary series on the topic. Videotapes of the television series are available from PBS.

Dahl, Robert. *On Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998. The most prominent American democratic theorist sums up his ideas on why democracy is the preferred system.

Hayek, Friedrich A. *The Political Order of a Free People*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979. A brilliant and thorough exposition of the case for the protective democracy model.

Held, David. *Models of Democracy*, 2d ed. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1996. Presents nine models to describe the history of democratic theory.

Macpherson, C. B. *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1977. A comprehensive review of the theoretical ideas underpinning the models of democracy presented in this chapter.

Margolis, Michael. *Viable Democracy*. London: Penguin Books, 1979. An analysis of why democratic practice has not lived up to democratic ideals, with a proposal to bring the two in line.

Miller, James E. *Democracy Is in the Streets*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. A history of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) that focuses on the political ideas of student activists in the 1960s.

Nino, Carlos Santiago. *The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996. This book, by the late renowned Argentinian scholar and human rights activist, is an intricate reflection on the relation between constitutionalism and democracy. He proposes a theory of deliberative democracy to overcome the limitations of existing conceptions.

Pateman, Carole. *Participation and Democratic Theory*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1970. A prominent democratic theorist dissects the Participatory model.

Sandel, Michael J. *Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996. An elegantly written and clear argument calling for a public philosophy that moves beyond the "procedural republic" of liberal rights and entitlements to a democracy grounded in the civic republican tradition and citizen self-government.

Endnotes

1. The models are based on those presented in C.B. Macpherson, *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1977). The names of some of the models and the descriptions of them differ from Macpherson in several respects. Readers interested in Macpherson's more complete analysis are encouraged to read his book. Similar models are employed in David Held, *Models of Democracy* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1987). Held draws as well on Macpherson, but he identifies a total of *nine* distinct models in democratic theory.

2. Ted C. Lewellen, *Political Anthropology: An Introduction* (South Hadley, Mass.: Bergin and Garvey, 1983), 18-19.

3. John V.A. Fine, *The Ancient Greeks: A Critical History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 383-441.

4. Held, *Models of Democracy*, 20-13.

5. Plato discusses democracy as part of his typology of governments in the *Republic* (London: Penguin, 1974). Aristotle's discussion of democracy can be found in *Politics* (London: Penguin, 1969), 115-16, 154-55. For a summary of the basic values of Greek democracy, Pericles's famous Funeral Oration is the classic source. It is reported in Thucydides's *The Peloponnesian War* (London: Penguin, 1972).

6. Held, *Models of Democracy*, 23.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*, 14.

9. Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, ed. David Wallace Carrithers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 176-77.

10. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (London: Penguin, 1968).

11. The concept of representation itself antedated the American and French revolutions. Many polities utilized representative assemblies prior to the eighteenth century, but these earlier bodies, like the

Roman Senate or the English Parliament, provided representation to only an elite portion of citizens. The representative assemblies instituted in the new French and American polities were different in that they were intended to represent the entire democratic citizenry. For a brief discussion of the history of representation see Robert Dahl, *On Democracy* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998), 22-25, 104-5.

12. *The Federalist*, ed. Jacob E. Cooke (Cleveland, Ohio: Meridian, 1967), 56-65.

13. The views of John Locke discussed here can be found in his *Second Treatise on Government* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953); Hobbes's famous political work is *Leviathan*.

14. Plato's *Republic* is an example of an earlier political theory that posits the "good" as the goal of political society.

15. Locke, *Second Treatise on Government*, 71.

16. Michael Margolis, *Viable Democracy* (London: Penguin, 1979), 32.

17. J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela, *Military Rule in Chile* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

18. C.B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1962), 248.

19. These models are based on those found in C.B. Macpherson, *Life and Times of Liberal Democracy*. I have called Macpherson's "Equilibrium Democracy" Pluralist Democracy.

20. *Ibid.*, 34.

21. *Ibid.*, 36.

22. *The Federalist*, 57.

23. Macpherson, *Life and Times of Liberal Democracy*, 48.

24. John Dewey, "Democracy as a Way of Life," in *Frontiers of Democratic Theory*, ed. Henry S. Kariel (New York: Random House, 1970), 14-15.

25. *Ibid.*, 13-14. See also Ernest Barker, "Democracy as Activity," in *ibid.*, 7.

26. John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958), 55.

27. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969), 60.

28. The essential works by the authors presenting this argument are Roberto Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy* (New York: Dover, 1959); Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939); and Vilfredo Pareto, *The Rise and Fall of Elites* (Totowa, N.J.: Bedminster Press, 1968).

29. Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

30. *Ibid.*, 314.

31. Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 3d ed. (New York: Harper & Bros., 1950), 269.

32. The best exposition of the democratic function of interest groups remains David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Knopf, 1952).

33. Robert Dahl, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press,

34. For a thorough analysis of the events surrounding the writing of the Port Huron Statement and a thoughtful analysis of it, see James E. Miller, *Democracy Is In the Streets* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). The complete text of the Port Huron Statement is included as an appendix.

35. There are a number of edited collections of the relevant articles. One of the best collections is Kariel, *Frontiers of Democratic Theory*. Kariel includes important articles by the leading participants in the exposition of more Participatory alternatives to Pluralist democracy, such as Jack L. Walker, Steven Lukes, Peter Bachrach, Morton Baratz, and Christian Bay.

36. An example of such impatience was the *Iran-contra* affair during Ronald Reagan's administration. Several National Security Council officials, such as Admiral John Poindexter and Lt. Col. Oliver North, preferred to find illegal means to fund the *contras*, a group of Nicaraguans fighting the Sandinista government, rather than concentrate on convincing Congress of the need for such funding. See chapter 8 for more details.