

Sifry, M. L. & Cerf, C. (Editors). (2003). *The Iraq War reader: History, documents, opinions*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Part One Roots of Conflict: 1915 – 1989

"I am strongly in favor of using poisoned gas against uncivilized tribes."

—Winston Churchill, then British secretary of state for war and air, on dealing with the Arab revolt against British rule over Iraq in 1920

"We have about 50% of the world's wealth but only 6.3% of its population. ... In this situation, we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity without positive detriment to our national security. To do so, we will have to dispense with all sentimentality and day-dreaming; and our attention will have to be concentrated everywhere on our immediate national objectives. We need not deceive ourselves that we can afford today the luxury of altruism and world-benefaction."

—George Kennan, former head of the U.S. State Department Policy Planning Staff and leading architect of U.S. foreign policy after World War II, February 24, 1948

Imperial Legacy – Phillip Knightley

The new crusaders from the United States and Europe, along with their Arab auxiliaries, are gathered again in the Middle East, But their chances of a lasting victory are slim. No matter what happens to Iraq and its leader, Saddam Hussein, there will be no peace in the area until the world faces up to these historical facts: the West lied to the Arabs in the First World War; it promised them independence but then imposed imperial mandates; this ensured Arab disunity at the very moment when the West created the state of Israel.

In January 1919, Paris was a city of pomp and splendor. The most ghastly war in history had ended two months earlier in triumph for the Allies: Britain, France, and the United States. Now diplomats from these countries, grave, impressive men flanked by their military advisers, had arrived for the peace conference that would decide the fate of Germany and divide the spoils of victory.

Each night the best Paris hotels, ablaze with light from their grand chandeliers, buzzed with conversation and laughter as the delegates relaxed after their duties. In this colorful, cosmopolitan gathering, one delegate stood out. Restaurants grew quiet when he entered, and there was much behind-the-scenes jostling to meet him. For this was Lawrence of Arabia, the young Englishman who had helped persuade the Arabs to revolt against their Turkish masters, who were allies of Germany. This was the brilliant intelligence officer who had welded the warring tribes of the Middle East into a formidable guerrilla force.

This sounded sufficiently romantic in itself, but it emerged that Lawrence had appeared destined almost from birth to become the Imperial Hero. The illegitimate son of an Anglo-Irish landowner and the family governess, he became interested in archaeology as a boy and at Jesus College, Oxford, and came under the influence of D. G. Hogarth, a leading archaeologist of his time.

Hogarth imbued Lawrence with the ideals of enlightened imperialism, which, Hogarth believed, could lead to a new era of the British empire. Lawrence began to study medieval history and military tactics and to train his body to resist pain and exhaustion. He would walk his bicycle downhill and ride it up, fast; take long cross-country walks, fording streams even in the

coldest weather; and spend long, lonely evenings on the Cadet Force pistol range until he became an adept shot with either hand.

During a break from Oxford, Lawrence embarked on a 1,000-mile walking tour of Syria and became fascinated by the Arabs. The Crusades became the subject of his special interest, and he dreamed of becoming a modern-day crusading knight—clean, strong, just, and completely chaste.

Just before the outbreak of war in 1914 Lawrence did a secret mapping survey of the Sinai Desert for British military intelligence, working under the cover of a historical group called the Palestine Exploration Fund. It was no surprise then that Hogarth was able to get him a wartime job with military intelligence in Cairo, where he was soon running his own agents.

But it was when the Arab revolt broke out in June 1916 that Lawrence came into his own. As Lawrence later described in his book, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, one of the most widely read works in the English language (and the inspiration for the film *Lawrence of Arabia*), he led his Arabs on daring raids against Turkish supply trains on the Damascus-Medina railway. They would blow up the line, derailing the engine, then charge from the hills on their camels—brave, unspoiled primitives against trained troops with machine guns.

As word of the exploits of this blue-eyed young man from Oxford spread across the desert, the Arab tribes put aside their differences. Under Lawrence, they captured the vital port of Aqaba with one glorious charge, then went on to Damascus in triumph. If the war had not ended and the politicians had not betrayed him, the story went, Lawrence might well have conquered Constantinople with half the tribes of Asia Minor at his side. Small wonder Paris was entranced.

As James T. Shotwell, a former professor of history at Columbia University and a member of the American delegation, described it, "The scene at dinner was the most remarkable I have ever witnessed. . . . Next to the Canadian table was a large dinner party discussing the fate of Arabia and the East with two American guests. . . . Between them sat that young successor of Muhammad, Colonel [T. E.] Lawrence, the twenty-eight-year-old conqueror of Damascus, with his boyish face and almost constant smile—the most winning figure, so everyone says, at the whole peace conference."

Shotwell did not know it, but Lawrence, dressed in the robes of an Arab prince, gold dagger across his chest, had dubious official status at the conference. Although usually seen in the company of Emir Faisal—who was the third son of Hussein, sharif of Mecca, a direct descendant of Muhammad and guardian of the holy places in Mecca and Medina—no one quite knew who Lawrence represented.

Faisal, the military leader of the revolt started by Hussein, thought Lawrence represented him. He thought that Lawrence was there to make certain that the Allies kept the promises made to the Arabs in return for their help in defeating Turkey—promises of freedom and self-government.

The British Foreign Office thought that Lawrence was there to keep Faisal amenable and to calm him down when he learned the bitter truth—that Britain and France planned to divide the Middle East between them and turn Palestine into a national home for the Jews.

Britain's India Office thought that Lawrence was there to frustrate their plan to make Iraq into a province of India, populated by Indian farmers and run from Delhi. This would be the ultimate act of revenge against the British Foreign Office for having backed Hussein during the war rather than the India Office's candidate for leader of the Arabs, King ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia.

As a British political intelligence officer, Lawrence's job had been to find the Arab leaders most suited to run the revolt against the Turks, to keep them loyal to Britain by promises of freedom that he knew Britain would never keep and to risk this fraud "on my conviction that Arab

help was necessary to our cheap and speedy victory in the East and that better we win and break our word than lose."

Lawrence salved his conscience at this deception by creating a romantic notion of his own. This was that he would be able to convince his political superiors—and the Arabs—that the best compromise would be for the Arabs to become "brown citizens" within the British empire, inhabitants of a dominion entitled to a measure of self-government but owing allegiance to the British king emperor—something like Canada.

With everyone pursuing his own goal and no one really interested in what the Arabs themselves wanted, the victorious European powers proceeded to carve up the Middle East.

Did they realize that their broken promises and cynical disposition of other peoples' countries would one day bring a reckoning? Did they not recall the words of that great Arabist Gertrude Bell, who once warned that the catchwords of revolution, "fraternity" and "equality," would always have great appeal in the Middle East because they challenged a world order in which Europeans were supreme or in which those Europeans—and their client Arab leaders—treated ordinary Arabs as inferior beings? Do the ghosts of those delegates at the Paris Peace Conference—and the "tidying up" meetings that followed—now shiver as the United States and Europe gear up to impose another settlement on the Middle East?

The past will haunt the new Crusades because the Arabs have never forgotten the promises of freedom made to them in the First World War by the likes of Lawrence and President Woodrow Wilson, and the subsequent betrayal of them at Paris. It will haunt them because history in the Middle East never favors the foreigner and always takes its revenge on those who insist on seeing the region through their own eyes.

The mess began soon after the turn of the century. Until then the Middle East had been under 400 years of domination by the Ottoman empire, a vast and powerful hegemony extending over northern Africa, Asia, and Europe. At one stage it had stretched from the Adriatic to Aden and from Morocco to the Persian Gulf, and the skill of its generals and the bravery of its soldiers once pushed its reach into Europe as far as the outskirts of Vienna.

But by the mid—nineteenth century the impact of Western technology had started to make itself felt, and the great empire began to flake at the edges. When in 1853 Czar Nicholas called Turkey "a sick man," Britain became worried. If Turkey collapsed, Britain would have a duty to protect her own military and economic lines of communication with India, where half the British army was stationed and which was unquestionably Britain's best customer.

Others also looked to their interests. Germany wanted to turn Iraq into "a German India"; France longed for Syria, a sentiment that dated back to the Crusades: and Russia yearned to dominate Constantinople, a terminus for all caravan routes in the Middle East.

By the early 1900s all these countries were pursuing their aims by covert action. In the regions now known as Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the Persian Gulf, networks of Western intelligence agents—ostensibly consuls, travelers, merchants and archaeologists—were busy influencing chieftains, winning over tribes, settling disputes, and disparaging their rivals in the hope that they would benefit from the eventual disintegration of the Ottoman empire.

When the First World War broke out in August 1914, Turkey dithered and then chose the wrong side by joining Germany. Lawrence, working for the Arab Bureau in Cairo, was part of a plan to use Arab nationalism in the service of British war aims.

The scheme was simple. The British would encourage the Arabs to revolt against their Turkish masters by the promise of independence when Turkey was defeated. How firm were these promises? Let us charitably discount those made in the heat of battle, when victory over Germany and Turkey was by no means certain, and consider only two—one made in June 1918

to seven Arab nationalist leaders in Cairo, the other part of the Anglo-French declaration made just before Germany surrendered.

The first promise was that Arab territories that were free before the war would remain so, and that in territories liberated by the Arabs themselves, the British government would recognize "the complete and sovereign independence of the inhabitants"; elsewhere governments would be based on the consent of the governed. The Anglo-French declaration promised to set up governments chosen by the Arabs themselves—in short, a clear pledge of self-determination.

The more worldly Arab nationalists warned that helping France and Britain achieve victory over Turkey might well lead merely to an exchange of one form of foreign domination for another. But these words of warning went unheeded because the hopes of the Arab masses were raised by the United States' entry into the war in April 1917.

The Arabs thought that the American government might be more receptive than the British to their demands for self-determination. After all, the Americans knew what it was like to be under the thumb of a colonial power, and President Wilson's Fourteen Points, which advocated freedom and self-determination for races under the domination of the old multinational empires, was highly encouraging.

But the Arab skeptics turned out to be right. The Allies did not keep their promises. The Arabs did exchange one imperial ruler for another. There were forces at work of which they were ignorant. The two most powerful of these were oil and the Zionist hunger for a national home in Palestine.

The automobile had in 1919 not yet become the twentieth-century's most desirable object, but the war had made everyone realize the strategic importance of oil. Germany's oil-fired navy had been immobilized in port after the Battle of Jutland in May 1916, largely because the British blockade caused a shortage of fuel. German industrial production was hindered by a lack of lubricants, and its civilian transport almost came to a halt.

It was clear, then, that in any future conflict oil would be an essential weapon. Britain already had one source: British Petroleum, owned in part by the British government, had been pumping oil at Masjid-i-Salaman in Iran's Zagros Mountains since 1908. But it was not enough.

Even before the 1919 peace conference began to divide up the Middle between Britain and France, some horse trading had taken place, making it unlikely that the promises made to the Arabs would be respected. France, for example, gave Britain the oil-rich area around Mosul, Iraq, in exchange for a share of the oil and a free hand in Syria. Unfortunately, Britain had already promised Syria to the Arabs. St. John Philby, the eccentric but perceptive English adviser to Ibn Saud—and the man who eventually introduced American oil interests to Saudi Arabia—understood that British explanations were mere pieties: "The real crux is oil."

At the peace conference, private oil concerns pushed their governments (in the national interest, of course) to renounce all wartime promises to the Arabs. For the oilmen saw only too well that oil concessions and royalties would be easier to negotiate with a series of rival Arab states lacking any sense of unity, than with a powerful independent Arab state in the Middle East.

These old imperialist prerogatives, salted with new commercial pressures, raised few eyebrows in Europe. Sir Mark Sykes, the British side of the partnership with Francois Georges-Picot that in 1916 drew up the secret Sykes-Picot agreement dividing the Middle East between Britain and France, believed Arab independence would mean "Persia, poverty, and chaos."

Across the Atlantic, President Wilson looked on "the whole disgusting scramble for the Middle East" with horror. It offended everything he believed the United States stood for, and the British establishment became worried about Wilson's views. They could imperil British policy for the area. The question became, therefore, how could Britain's imperialist designs on the Middle

East be reconciled with President Wilson's commitment to Middle Eastern independence? One school of thought was that Lawrence of Arabia might provide the link.

Lawrence of Arabia was the creation of an American: Lowell Thomas, one-time newspaperman and lecturer in English at Princeton. When the United States entered the war in April 1917, the American people showed a marked reluctance to take up arms, so to inspire the nation to fight, President Wilson set up the Committee on Public Information under the chairmanship of a journalist, George Creel.

One of his first acts was to propose sending Thomas to gather stirring stories in Europe to stimulate enthusiasm for the war. It did not take long for Thomas to realize that there was nothing heartening or uplifting to be found in the mud and mechanized slaughter on the Western Front, so the British Department of Information guided him toward the Middle East where the British army was about to capture Jerusalem.

There Thomas found a story with powerful emotional appeal for an American audience. The war in the Middle East, militarily only a sideshow, could be presented as a modern crusade for the liberation of the Holy Land and the emancipation of its Arab, Jewish, and Armenian communities. Thomas called Lawrence "Britain's modern Coeur de Lion."

Thomas and an American newsreel photographer, Harry Chase, sought out Lawrence and did stories about this new Richard the Lion-hearted. Chase's newsreel footage was a part of Thomas's lecture on the Middle Eastern campaign, which opened at New York's Century Theatre in March 1919. Its success inspired a British impresario, Percy Burton, to bring Thomas to London, where he opened at the Royal Opera House, Covent Garden.

Thomas had refined his presentation with the help of Dale Carnegie, who later wrote *How to Win Friends and Influence People*. It was now more an extravaganza than a lecture, complete with a theater set featuring moonlight on the Nile and pyramids in the background, the Dance of the Seven Veils, the muezzin's call to prayer (adapted and sung by Mrs. Thomas), slides, newsreel footage and Thomas's commentary, accompanied by music from the band of the Welsh Guards and clouds of eastern incense wafting from glowing braziers.

Chase had devised a projection technique that used three arc-light projectors simultaneously, and a fade and dissolve facility that heightened the drama of the presentation. Thomas began by saying, "Come with me to lands of history, mystery, and romance," and referred to Lawrence as "the uncrowned king of Arabia," who had been welcomed by the Arabs for delivering them from 400 years of oppression.

It was an enormous success, later toured the world, was seen by an estimated four million people and made Thomas—whom Lawrence referred to as "the American who made my vulgar reputation, a well-intentioned, intensely crude, and pushful fellow"—into a millionaire.

But there was more to the whole business than was realized at the time. The impresario Burton was encouraged to produce the show by the English-Speaking Union, of which Thomas was a member and whose committee included such notables as Winston Churchill and the newspaper proprietor Lord Northcliffe.

The union's aim was to emphasize the common heritage of Britain and the United States, to draw the two countries closer together and forge a common sense of future destiny. If Lawrence were portrayed as an old-style British hero and, more important, a representative of the new benevolent British imperialism, then American misgivings about Britain as a greedy, oppressive power in the Middle East might be dispelled.

According to Thomas, the Arabs did not regard the fall of the Turks and the arrival of the British as a simple exchange of one ruler for another but rather as a liberation, and they were delighted when Britain agreed to run their affairs for them.

Britain's aims went further. The United States should not leave the entire burden of running the region to Britain and France. It should accept the challenge of this new imperialism and take on its own responsibilities in the Middle East. At the Paris Peace Conference Lawrence himself suggested that the United States run Constantinople and Armenia as its own mandates. The Americans were more interested, however, in what was to become of Palestine.

The second force that helped frustrate Arab aspirations was Zionism. While the European powers had seen the war with Turkey as an opportunity to divide the Ottoman empire and thus extend their imperial ambitions in the Middle East, the Zionists quickly realized that the future of Palestine was now open and that they might be able to play a large part in its future.

The British Zionists were led by Dr. Chaim Weizmann, a brilliant chemist who contributed to the war effort by discovering a new process for manufacturing acetone, a substance vital for TNT that was until then produced only in Germany. Weizmann saw a historic opening for Zionism and began to lobby influential British politicians.

He found support from Herbert Samuel, then under secretary at the Home Office, who put the Zionist case before the cabinet in a secret memorandum. He said that the Zionists would welcome an annexation of Palestine by Britain, which "would enable England to fulfill in yet another sphere her historic part as civilizer of the backward countries."

There was not much sympathy in the cabinet at first, but the Zionists did not let the matter lapse. Early in their talks with British politicians it became clear to them that the British government felt that only a British Palestine would be a reliable buffer for the Suez Canal. Weizmann therefore assured Britain that in exchange for its support, Zionists would work for the establishment of a British protectorate there. This suited Britain better than the agreement it had already made with France for an *international* administration for Palestine.

So on November 2, 1917, Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour made his famous and deeply ambiguous declaration that Britain would "view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. . . ." (Editors' note: Balfour qualified his promise with the assurance that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civic and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.").

How did the pledge to the Zionists square with what had already been promised to the Arabs in return for their support in the war against the Turks?

This has been a matter of continuing controversy, but has never been satisfactorily resolved. The first agreement between the Arabs and the British was in correspondence between the British high commissioner in Egypt and King Hussein in Mecca. The Arabs say that these letters included Palestine in the area in which Britain promised to uphold Arab independence.

The Zionists deny this. The denial has also been the official British attitude, and it was endorsed by the Palestine Royal Commission report in 1937. But an Arab Bureau report, never rescinded or corrected, puts Palestine firmly in the area promised to the Arabs.

By the time of the peace conference, with a Zionist lobby led by Weizmann and Harvard Law School professor Felix Frankfurter (later a U.S. Supreme Court justice) actively working for a national home in Palestine, the Arabs realized that they had been outmaneuvered. President Wilson, trying to be fair, insisted that a commission be dispatched to find out the wishes of the people in the whole area.

Their report made blunt reading: While there could be mandates for Palestine, Syria, and Iraq, they should only be for a limited term—independence was to be granted as soon as

possible. The idea of making Palestine into a Jewish commonwealth should be dropped. This suggestion that the Zionists should forget about Palestine must have seemed quite unrealistic—their aims were too close to realization for them to be abandoned—so it surprised only the Arabs when the report was ignored, even in Washington.

It took a further two years for the Allies to tidy up the arrangements they had made for the division of the Middle East. In April 1920, there was another conference, at San Remo, Italy, to ratify earlier agreements. The whole Arab rectangle lying between the Mediterranean and the Persian frontier, including Palestine, was placed under mandates allotted to suit the imperialist ambitions of Britain and France.

There was an outburst of bitter anger. The Arabs began raiding British establishments in Iraq and striking at the French in Syria. Both insurrections were ruthlessly put down. In Iraq the British army burnt any village from which an attack had been mounted, but the Iraqis were not deterred. Lawrence weighed in from Oxford, where he was now a fellow of All Souls College, suggesting with heavy irony that burning villages was not very efficient: "By gas attacks the whole population of offending districts could be wiped out neatly; and as a method of government it would be no more immoral than the present system."

The grim truth was that something along these lines was actually being considered. Churchill, then secretary of state for war and air, asked the chief of air staff, Sir Hugh Trenchard, if he would be prepared to take over control of Iraq because the army had estimated it would need 80,000 troops and £21.5 million a year, "which is considered to be more than the country is worth." Churchill suggested that if the RAF were to take on the job, "it would . . . entail the provision of some kind of asphyxiating bombs calculated to cause disablement of some kind but not death ... for use in preliminary operations against turbulent tribes." In the end the air force stuck to conventional high-explosive bombs, a method Britain used to control the Middle East well into the 1950s.

Arab nationalist leaders waited for American protests at this suppression in Iraq and Syria but nothing happened. What the Arabs failed to see was that with the Zionists already in the ascendancy in Palestine, America had lost interest in the sordid struggle of imperial powers in the Middle East.

The humiliation suffered by those Arabs who had allied themselves with the imperial powers was encapsulated by the experiences of Faisal, the Arab leader Lawrence had "created" and then abandoned, the Arab he had chosen as military leader of the revolt, the man to whom he had conveyed all Britain's promises. When the French kicked Faisal out of Syria, an embarrassed delegation of British officials waited on him as he passed through Palestine. One described the incident: "We mounted him a guard of honor a hundred strong. He carried himself with the dignity and the noble resignation of Islam . . . though tears stood in his eyes and he was wounded to the soul. The Egyptian sultanate did not 'recognize' him, and at Quantara station, he awaited his train sitting on his luggage."

And where was Lawrence during all this? He was at his mother's home in Oxford undergoing a major crisis of conscience. He was depressed, and according to his mother, would sometimes sit between breakfast and lunch "in the same position, without moving, and with the same expression on his face." It seems reasonable to assume that Lawrence felt guilty over the betrayal of the Arabs, both on a personal and a national level.

This would explain why he jumped at the chance to join Churchill, who had by this time moved to the Colonial Office, and was determined to do something about the Middle East. Lawrence's first job was to make amends to Faisal by offering to make him king of Iraq.

The problem was that it was not clear that the Iraqis wanted Faisal. There were other popular claimants, including ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, whom Churchill had rejected for fear that

"he would plunge the whole country into religious pandemonium." Another candidate, the nationalist leader Sayid Taleb, gained enormous popular support after threatening to revolt if the British did not allow the Iraqis to choose their leader freely.

Ever resourceful the British sabotaged Taleb's candidacy by arranging for an armored car to pick him up as he left the British high commissioner's house in Baghdad following afternoon tea. He was then whisked on board a British ship and sent for a long holiday in Ceylon. With Sayid Taleb out of the way, Faisal was elected king by a suspiciously large majority—96.8 percent.

Because the British desired a quiet, stable state in Jordan to protect Palestine, Faisal's brother Abdullah was made king and provided with money and troops in return for his promise to suppress local anti-French and anti-Zionist activity. Their father, Hussein, the sharif of Mecca, the man who had started the Arab revolt, was offered £100,000 a year not to make a nuisance of himself, and ibn Saud received the same amount (as the strictures of the cynical Cairo accord advised, "to pay one more than the other causes jealousy") to accept the whole settlement and not attack Hussein.

And that was that. Lawrence regarded this as redemption in full of Britain's promises to the Arabs. Unfortunately, the Arabs did not see it this way and have, in one way or another, been in revolt ever since.

In Iraq, Faisal managed to obtain some measure of independence by the time of his death in 1932. But British forces intervened again in 1942 to overthrow the pro-German nationalist government of Rashid Ali and restore the monarchy. Faisal's kingdom fell for the last time in 1958, a belated casualty of the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt two years earlier.

France hung on to Syria and Lebanon until 1946 before grudgingly evacuating its forces. In the same year Britain—then coming to terms with her diminished postwar status—gave up her claim on Jordan. Abdullah reigned until 1951 when he was shot dead while entering the mosque of El Aqsa in Jerusalem in the company of his grandson, the present King Hussein. The assassin was a follower of the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, who had accused Abdullah of having betrayed the Arabs over Palestine.

In 1958 the American Sixth Fleet stood by to save Hussein from a repetition of the coup that had just ousted his cousin, Faisal II, in Iraq. Hussein and his kingdom, shorn of the West Bank, have survived—the lasting legacy of Lawrence.

In Palestine, Jewish immigration increased rapidly in the 1930s as many fled from Hitler's Europe. This influx, in turn, led in 1936—less than a year after Lawrence's death—to an Arab revolt, which was crushed by the British Army in 1938. Unable to cope with a Jewish revolt, Britain relinquished her mandate in 1947 (Editor's note: In November of 1947, the U.N. voted to partition Palestine into two states – one Jewish and one Arab – but the Arab states rejected the plan.) In 1948, the state of Israel was established, and immediately afterward the first Arab-Israeli war occurred.

The United States held aloof from the area until oil finally locked it in. There had been some prospecting on the Saudi's eastern seaboard since 1923, but the first swallow to herald Saudi Arabia's long summer of revenue from oil was the American Charles R. Crane, who in 1931 brought in a mining engineer, Karl Twitchell, to make some mineral and water surveys.

The following year Twitchell interested the Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL) in exploring for oil in Saudi Arabia. SOCAL negotiated a deal using St. John Philby as an intermediary and achieved commercial production in March 1938. The United States now had a strategic interest in the region.

If the new crusaders defeat and occupy Iraq, what then? A United Nations mandate, something like that imposed on the country after the First World War, allowing the victorious army to remain in control of the conquered land? Perhaps a new "Faisal" inserted as token ruler of a reluctant population? And so a new cycle of anger, frustration and bloodshed will begin because 800 years after the Crusades there will still be foreigners in Arab lands.

And Lawrence himself? Everything after his experiences in the Middle East was an anticlimax for him. He wrote *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, undoubtedly a masterpiece, but found little further in life that really gripped him. He was consumed with guilt over the way the Arabs had been treated, had a mental breakdown and embarked on a series of homosexual sadomasochistic experiences.

He changed his name, first to John Hume Ross when he joined the Royal Air Force, and later to Thomas Edward Shaw when he joined the tank corps. He eventually went back into the RAF again and, not long after retiring, crashed his motorcycle near his home in Dorset. Six days later, on May 19, 1935, his injuries proved fatal.

Lawrence's role in the Arab revolt and his deceit on behalf of Britain left him an emotionally damaged man. He was, as one sympathetic American biographer wrote, "a prince of our disorder." But the conclusion must be that the continuing tragic history of the Middle East is largely due to the likes of Lawrence, servants in the imperial mold.

An incident during the Cairo Conference in 1921 sums up the Arab attitude toward Western intervention in their affairs—one which may not have changed over the years. One day while Lawrence and Churchill were touring Palestine their party got caught up in an anti-Zionist riot. Lawrence, in his neat suit and Homburg hat, conducted Churchill through the crowd of gesticulating Arabs. "I say, Lawrence," Churchill offered, looking rather worried, "are these people dangerous? They don't seem too pleased to see us."

Joost Hilterman – The Men Who Helped the Man Who Gassed His Own People

In calling for regime change in Iraq, George W. Bush has accused Saddam Hussein of being a man who gassed his own people. Bush is right, of course. The public record shows Saddam's regime repeatedly spread poisonous gases on Kurdish villages in 1987 and 1988 in an attempt to put down a persistent rebellion.

The biggest such attack was against the town of Halabja in March 1988. According to local organizations providing relief to the survivors, some 6,800 Kurds were killed, the vast majority of them civilians.

It is a good thing that Bush has highlighted these atrocities by a regime that is more brutal than most. Yet it is cynical to use them as a justification for American plans to terminate the regime. By any measure, the American record on Halabja is shameful.

Analysis of thousands of captured Iraqi secret police documents and declassified U.S. government documents, as well as interviews with scores of Kurdish survivors, senior Iraqi defectors, and retired U.S. intelligence officers, show (1) that Iraq carried out the attack on Halabja; (2) that the United States, fully aware it was Iraq, accused Iran, Iraq's enemy in a fierce war, of being partly responsible for the attack; and (3) that the State Department instructed its diplomats to propagate Iran's partial culpability.

The result of this stunning act of sophistry was that the international community failed to muster the will to condemn Iraq strongly and unambiguously for an act as heinous as the terrorist strike on the World Trade Center.

This was at a time when Iraq was launching what proved to be the final battles of the 8-year war against Iran. Its wholesale use of poison gas against Iranian troops and Iranian Kurdish towns, and its threat to place chemical warheads on the missiles it was lobbying at Tehran, brought Iran to its knees.

Iraq had also just embarked on a counterinsurgency campaign, called the Anfal, against its rebellious Kurds. In this effort, too, the regime's resort to chemical weapons gave it a decisive edge, enabling the systematic killing of an estimated 100,000 men, women, and children.

The deliberate American prevarication on Halabja was the logical outcome of a pronounced six-year tilt toward Iraq, seen as a bulwark against the perceived threat posed by Iran's zealous brand of politicized Islam. The United States began the tilt after Iraq, the aggressor in the war, was expelled from Iranian territory by a resurgent Iran, which then decided to pursue its own, fruitless version of regime change in Baghdad. There was little love for what virtually all of Washington recognized as an unsavory regime, but Iraq was considered the lesser evil. Sealed by National Security Decision Directive 114 in 1983, the tilt funneled billions of dollars in loan guarantees and other credits to Iraq.

The tilt included not only material (though largely non-military) support of the Iraqi war effort, but also a deliberate closing of the eyes to atrocities committed by the Iraqi military in a war that saw unspeakable brutalities on both sides. Some of the facts about this shameful episode in American history have only recently come to light.

In warning against a possible Iraqi chemical or biological strike against American troops, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld remarked in November 2002 that "there's a danger that Saddam Hussein would do things he's done previously—he has in the past used chemical weapons."

Rumsfeld should know. Declassified State Department documents show that when he had an opportunity to raise the issue of chemical weapons with the Iraqi leadership in 1983, he failed to do so in any meaningful way. Worse, he may well have given a signal to the Iraqis that the United States would close its eyes to Iraq's use of chemical weapons during its war with Iran, providing an early boost to Iraq's plans to develop weapons of mass destruction. As President Ronald Reagan's special envoy for the Middle East, Rumsfeld in December 1983 made the first visit by an American official of his seniority to Baghdad, where he met President Saddam Hussein and Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. Iraq had broken off diplomatic relations with the United States in June 1967. Now both sides hoped that the talks in Baghdad would facilitate a resumption of formal ties.

The visit came at a time when Iraq was facing Iranian "human wave" assaults that posed a serious threat to the regime. In response, Iraq had started to use chemical weapons on the battlefield—primarily mustard gas, a blister agent that can kill. This was known in Washington at least as early as October 1983. State Department officials had raised the alarm, suggesting ways of deterring further Iraqi use. But they faced resistance because of the tilt, which had just begun to gather bureaucratic momentum.

As talking points and minutes of the meetings show, the aim of Rumsfeld's mission was to inform the Iraqi leadership of America's shifting policy in the Middle East. It was also intended to explore a proposal to run an oil pipeline from Iraq to the Jordanian port of Aqaba (an American business interest involving the Bechtel Corporation), and to caution the Iraqis not to escalate the war in the Gulf through air strikes against Iranian oil facilities and tankers (which Washington feared might draw the United States into the war).

There is no indication that Rumsfeld raised American concerns about Iraq's use of poison gas with Saddam Hussein. But in a private meeting with Tariq Aziz, he made a single brief reference to "certain things" that made it difficult for the United States to do more to help Iraq. These things included "chemical weapons, possible escalation in the Gulf, and human rights." There is no record of further discussion of chemical weapons or human rights at these meetings, which covered the length and breadth of the warming relationship. Rumsfeld did, however, place considerable emphasis on the need for Iraq to prevent an escalation in the Gulf conflict via attacks on Iranian oil installations and tankers. Certainly nothing suggests that he told the Iraqi leadership to take care of "certain things" before diplomatic relations could be restored.

The senior U.S. diplomat in Baghdad reported a few days later with evident delight that "Ambassador Rumsfeld's visit has elevated U.S.-Iraqi relations to a new level." But, he noted, "during and following the Rumsfeld visit we have received no commitment from the Iraqis that they will refrain from military moves toward escalation in the Gulf."

To the contrary. The record of the war suggests that, flush with their new confidence in American backing, the Iraqis may have felt that they were now less restrained. They attacked Iranian oil facilities and ended up drawing United States into the war, in 1987.

Moreover, sensing correctly that it had *carte blanche*, Saddam's regime escalated its resort to gas warfare, graduating to ever more lethal agents. In the first Iranian offensive after Rumsfeld's visit, in February 1984, Iraq used not only large amounts of mustard gas but also the highly lethal nerve agent tabun. It was the first recorded use of the nerve agent in history. In November 1984, shortly after Reagan's reelection, diplomatic relations between the Washington and Baghdad were restored.

In February 2003 Rumsfeld made a statement that he was concerned about "Saddam Hussein using weapons of mass destruction against his own people and blaming it on us, which would fit a pattern." I can't think of many, or any, instances in which Iraq pinned chemical attacks on the United States, but the one pattern that is clearly discernible is the regime's escalating use of gas warfare as the American tilt toward Iraq intensified.

After 1984 Iraq made increasing use of chemical weapons on the battlefield and even against civilians. Because of the strong western animus against Iran, few paid heed. Then came Halabja. Unfortunately for Iraq's sponsors, Iran rushed western reporters to the blighted town. The horrifying scenes they filmed were presented on prime time television a few days later. Soon Ted Koppel could be seen putting the Iraqi ambassador's feet to the fire on *Nightline*.

In response, Washington launched the "Iran too" gambit. The story was cooked up in the Pentagon, interviews with the principals show. Newly declassified State Department documents demonstrate that American diplomats then received instructions to press this line with Washington's allies, and to decline to discuss the details.

It took seven weeks for the United Nations Security Council to censure the Halabja attack. Even then, its choice of neutral language (condemning the "continued use of chemical weapons in the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq," and calling on "both sides to refrain from the future use of chemical weapons") diffused the effect of its belated move. Iraq, still reading the signals, proceeded to step up its use of gas until the end of the war and even afterward, during the final stage of the Anfal campaign, to devastating effect.

When I visited Halabja in the spring of 2002, the town, razed by successive Iranian and Iraqi occupiers, had been rebuilt, but the physical and psychological wounds remained.

Some of those who engineered the tilt today are back in power in the Bush administration. They have yet to account for their judgment that it was Iran, not Iraq, that posed the primary threat to the Gulf; for building up Iraq so that it thought it could invade Kuwait and get away with it; for encouraging Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs by giving the regime a *de facto* green light on chemical weapons use; and for turning a blind eye to Iraq's worst atrocities, and then lying about it.

Susan Wright – The Hijacking of UNSCOM

The work of the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) charged with disarming Iraq of its chemical and biological weapons was disrupted last December. And in an exceptionally problematic way.

UNSCOM's downfall resulted not only from the use of its work to justify, without the support of the U.N. Security Council—and possibly to assist—the bombing of Iraq by the United States

and Britain, but also because of the gradual blurring of organizational and operational boundaries that needed to be kept pristinely clear.

Saddam Hussein's campaign to conceal his biological and chemical weaponry was a major catalyst for UNSCOM's problems. Had Iraq fully declared its biological and chemical weapons programs under U.N. Security Council Resolutions 687 and 707, UNSCOM's role could have been restricted to confirming declarations and reporting to the U.N. Security Council.

Instead, the agency's tasks evolved from gathering information to countering an elaborate game of deception. In so doing, UNSCOM became a pawn in another game of deception being played by the United States. Details of UNSCOM's transformation have been exposed in recent months by the skill-ful investigative reporting of Barton Gellman and his colleagues at *The Washington Post*, as well as other journalists around the world.

UNSCOM's control over information was the first casualty of the blurring of boundaries. From its inception, UNSCOM relied on national information, particularly intelligence from the United States, to assess Iraq's chemical and biological warfare programs. It was understood—and even seen as "natural"—that the results of UNSCOM's analyses would flow back to those governments.

As Rolf Ekeus, UNSCOM's first chairman, told me in March, if governments provided intelligence, they expected feedback regarding the reliability of the information. That was "part of the game." In theory, information was not allowed to flow to national governments without the approval of UNSCOM's chairman. In practice, it appears this safeguard was not consistently observed.

A second casualty of the blurring of organizational and operational boundaries was the means by which UNSCOM generated data. Thwarted by Iraqi concealment strategies that aimed to defeat inspections by keeping sensitive materials and equipment on the move, Ekeus initiated probes into the strategies themselves as early as 1994. An important information source was Israeli intelligence—itsself problematic given the tense relations between Israel and Iraq. Following exposure of the biological weapons program in 1995 by a key defector, Hussein Kamel, Ekeus approved "special collection missions," headed by the controversial and disquietingly single-minded Scott Ritter, who later resigned to protest U.S. interference with UNSCOM's work.

Certain inspectors on these missions carried commercial scanners and recording devices into facilities to secretly intercept and record Iraqi security telecommunications. The United States, Britain, and Israel were involved in decrypting the clandestinely collected Iraqi messages.

Given the sophistication of the Iraqi concealment program, these measures seemed defensible. In mid-1996, Ekeus briefed the Security Council in a general way about the probe into Iraqi concealment methods, and about the risk that tracking the concealment of weapons might also reveal the techniques used to conceal Saddam Hussein.

Apparently no one objected. Perhaps no one imagined the shape of UNSCOM's intelligence efforts to come. (UNSCOM's future transformation may have been foreshadowed in a complaint issued by Ekeus in September 1996 to John Deutch, then director of U.S. Central Intelligence. Ekeus said that Washington had denied UNSCOM full access to the results of the special collection missions.)

Some time in the 1996-98 time frame, UNSCOM's intelligence gathering took a major turn. If *The Washington Post's* sources are accurate, U.S. spies, working undercover as UNSCOM technicians, installed minute listening devices in innocuous-looking monitoring equipment that UNSCOM placed in Iraqi facilities. The information acquired was relayed to Baghdad and then to a CIA post in Bahrain that beamed it to National Security Agency headquarters at Fort Meade.

Britain and Israel were relieved of their decryption duties, and within UNSCOM, access to information produced by the listening devices was tightly controlled by Washington. If U.S.

explanations given in March are accurate, Ekeus and his successor, Richard Butler, were not in the loop. The person with the fullest access to the information was said to be Charles Duelfer, the deputy to both directors and a former director of the U.S. State Department's Center for Defense Industry Trade, and a person undoubtedly equipped with a high-level security clearance. Washington's "help" had turned into virtual total control of the information collected by the listening devices.

A third casualty of the blurring of UNSCOM's boundaries was the substance of the information collected. Because the same elite Iraqi security forces that protect Saddam Hussein also protect his chemical and biological weapons, U.S. officials argue that information about the former was a mere "byproduct" of gathering information about the latter. The listening devices inevitably transmitted both types of information; therefore, say the officials, there was no choice but to receive both.

But such arguments falsely portray political choices as technical imperatives. They obscure the political nature of the decisions that allowed UNSCOM to be hijacked by the United States and used to clandestinely collect data about the nature and location of Iraq's security forces. Apparently no one who knew about it questioned Washington's infiltration of UNSCOM or its appropriation of data transmitted from Iraqi sites for its own geopolitical purposes.

According to a *Washington Post* story on March 2, "U.S. government officials considered the risk of discrediting an international arms control system by infiltrating it for their own eavesdropping. They said the stakes were so high in the conflict with Iraq, and the probability of discovery so low, that they deemed the risks worth running." Thus, U.S. officials acting in secret determined that their own goals would supersede those of the Security Council.

If press reports are accurate, a final casualty of boundary-blurring may have been the use of the information generated under cover of UNSCOM to define targets for the December bombing raids during Operation Desert Fox.

It is not known if information was actually used in this way. But certainly the American and British bombing attacks did not respect any boundaries between the weapons sites claimed as the provocation for the attacks and sites associated with the regime itself. Moreover, the present uncertainty about whether or not the information was used in this way underscores the point that it certainly could have been.

Originally UNSCOM was designed as an impartial organization of experts pursuing an international effort to disarm Iraq under Security Council Resolution 687. But under strong U.S. influence, it underwent a political transformation into a cover for U.S. espionage. Whether the information collected turned out to be of any actual use to the United States is beside the point.

The crucial political problem underscored by UNSCOM's transformation is that there were no barriers to prevent either the collection of the information or its use by the United States for its own purposes, possibly including bombing raids aimed at undermining the Baath regime.

There are no obvious solutions to addressing the problems posed by Saddam Hussein's regime, but surely the path chosen by the United States has produced one of the worst possible outcomes:

Today we have a discredited monitoring agency unable to reenter Iraq and resume its responsibilities; a low-intensity undeclared war against Iraq that has not been approved by Congress or the Security Council; a weakened Security Council; and the continuance of sanctions that are killing an unknown number of Iraqi children each month through disease and malnutrition.

In February, the Security Council appointed two panels chaired by the Brazilian ambassador to the United Nations, Celso Amorim, to address the disarmament and humanitarian dimensions of U.N. policies toward Iraq. On March 29, the 20-member disarmament panel produced a report that expresses the mixed national interests represented on it—those of Britain and the United States, who wish to retain UNSCOM and an intrusive approach to verification, and those

of France, Russia, and China, who want to phase out the verification phase of the Security Council's responsibilities.

While the report does not move to radically alter or disband UNSCOM, it perhaps offers possibilities for moving beyond the December 1998 deadlock. Clearly responding to the blurring of UNSCOM's organizational and operational boundaries, it proposes that UNSCOM's "substantive relationship with intelligence providers should be one way" and that the organization "should not be used for purposes other than the ones set forth" by the Security Council. Specific measures to reinforce these conditions are, however, not proposed.

In addition, the report proposes to "revitalize" UNSCOM's role by broadening its composition to include members of the U.N. Secretariat and the Hague-based Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in addition to representatives of national governments. This broader membership would "renovate" the inspectorate by appointing inspectors with a wider range of backgrounds and by ensuring that most inspectors were on the U.N. payroll rather than those of national governments—moves reportedly resisted by various Western representatives. Finally, the report proposes "ongoing monitoring and verification" that combines UNSCOM's disarmament function (actively ensuring that Iraq gives up its weapons of mass destruction) with the monitoring of sites previously declared to be free of weapons.

There is something for everyone in the disarmament panel's report. But at the time of this writing in late March, it remains to be seen how the Security Council will respond when it considers the report along with that of the second panel on sanctions. The United States could remedy some of the damage it has caused by giving full support to the disarmament panel's proposals for restructuring UNSCOM and its inspectorate. (Full support should include ensuring that American commissions and inspectors have an uncompromising commitment to the United Nations.)

The Security Council itself should seek to define a "third way" that would restructure the inspection and monitoring regime in a way that prevents Iraq from producing new nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons but maintains strong safeguards against the misuse of information by national governments. Continued monitoring of dual-purpose imports for their end-uses should play an important role. A new regime should also include an emergency program to rebuild critical civilian infrastructures, especially those for water purification, agricultural production, and medical care, and it should initiate conditional, phased steps towards lifting sanctions and normalizing trade.

But for now, it is unclear just how much the United States values the United Nations when it comes to Iraq. Meanwhile—and surely with unintended irony—the compromising of UNSCOM by the United States has helped Saddam Hussein tighten his grip over the Iraqi people. And because he no longer has to worry about inspections, he has the opportunity to rebuild his nuclear, chemical, and biological arsenals.

More profoundly, hijacking a U.N. agency to pursue national geopolitical goals, including a low-intensity war, has undermined trust in all forms of international cooperation.

Will this prompt American policy makers to rethink their assumption that the Security Council can be used when it suits American purposes and circumvented when it does not? The jury is out on that one.

**Project for a New American Century – An Open Letter to President Clinton
January 26, 1998**

The Honorable William J. Clinton -
President of the United States
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing you because we are convinced that current American policy toward Iraq is not succeeding, and that we may soon face a threat in the Middle East more serious than any we have known since the end of the Cold War. In your upcoming State of the Union Address, you have an opportunity to chart a clear and determined course for meeting this threat. We urge you to seize that opportunity, and to enunciate a new strategy that would secure the interests of the U.S. and our friends and allies around the world. That strategy should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime from power. We stand ready to offer our full support in this difficult but necessary endeavor.

The policy of "containment" of Saddam Hussein has been steadily eroding over the past several months. As recent events have demonstrated, we can no longer depend on our partners in the Gulf War coalition to continue to uphold the sanctions or to punish Saddam when he blocks or evades U.N. inspections. Our ability to ensure that Saddam Hussein is not producing weapons of mass destruction, therefore, has substantially diminished. Even if full inspections were eventually to resume, which now seems highly unlikely, experience has shown that it is difficult if not impossible to monitor Iraq's chemical and biological weapons production. The lengthy period during which the inspectors will have been unable to enter many Iraqi facilities has made it even less likely that they will be able to uncover all of Saddam's secrets. As a result, in the not-too-distant future we will be unable to determine with any reasonable level of confidence whether Iraq does or does not possess such weapons.

Such uncertainty will, by itself, have a seriously destabilizing effect on the entire Middle East. It hardly needs to be added that if Saddam does acquire the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction, as he is almost certain to do if we continue along the present course, the safety of American troops in the region, of our friends and allies like Israel and the moderate Arab states, and a significant portion of the world's supply of oil will all be put at hazard. As you have rightly declared, Mr. President, the security of the world in the first part of the 21st century will be determined largely by how we handle this threat.

Given the magnitude of the threat, the current policy, which depends for its success upon the steadfastness of our coalition partners and upon the cooperation of Saddam Hussein, is dangerously inadequate. The only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction. In the near term, this means a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of American foreign policy.

We urge you to articulate this aim, and to turn your Administration's attention to implementing a strategy for removing Saddam's regime from power. This will require a full complement of diplomatic, political and military efforts. Although we are fully aware of the dangers and difficulties in implementing this policy, we believe the dangers of failing to do so are far greater. We believe the U.S. has the authority under existing U.N. resolutions to take the necessary steps, including military steps, to protect our vital interests in the Gulf. In any case, American policy cannot continue to be crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in the U.N. Security Council.

Sincerely,

Elliott Abrams Richard L. Armitage William J. Bennett Jeffrey Bergner John Bolton Paula
Dobriansky Francis Fukuyama Robert Kagan Zalmay Khalilzad
William Kristol Richard Perle Peter W. Rodman Donald Rumsfeld William Schneider, Jr. Vin
Weber, Paul Wolfowitz R. James Woolsey Robert B. Zoellick

Editors' note: The Project for the New American Century was established in the spring of 1997 as a nonprofit educational organization "whose goal is to promote American global leadership." Of the eighteen signers of this letter to President Clinton, eleven held posts in the Bush administration as of March 2003: Elliott Abrams, Senior Director for Near East, Southwest Asian and North African Affairs on the National Security Council; Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State; John Bolton, Under Secretary, Arms Control and International Security; Paula Dobriansky, Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs; Zalmay Khalilzad, President Bush's special envoy to Afghanistan and Ambassador-at-Large for Free Iraqis; Richard Perle, chairman of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board; Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense; William Schneider, Jr., chairman of the Pentagon's Defense Science Board; Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense; and Robert B. Zoellick, the U.S. Trade Representative. Another friend of PNAC who has signed several of the group's other statements is I. Lewis Libby, who is today Vice President Cheney's chief of staff.

President Bill Clinton – Televised Address To The Nation: “The Costs of Inaction Must Be Weighed Against the Price of Inactions”

On December 16, 1998, President Bill Clinton ordered the extensive bombing of Iraqi targets, a four-day campaign called Desert Fox which he told the American people about in a televised speech that evening. An abridged version of his address appears below.

President Clinton's action came after a series of confrontations between Iraq and the U.N. inspectors, Saddam's decision to prohibit fresh inspections on October 31, and the subsequent withdrawal of inspectors from Baghdad.

Earlier, on August 20, 1998, as special prosecutor Ken Starr's investigation of the president's alleged indiscretions with Monica Lewinsky was reaching a climax, cruise missiles had been fired at the Sudan and Afghanistan, aimed at punishing Osama bin Laden for the bombing of U.S. embassies in East Africa on August 7. They failed to hit bin Laden, and evidence soon surfaced that the "chemical weapons plant" they destroyed in the Sudan was not a munitions facility at all, but rather a pharmaceutical factory producing vital medicines for civilian purposes.

Three days after Clinton announced his Desert Fox campaign, the House of Representatives voted to impeach him for perjuring himself before a grand jury and obstructing justice in the Monica Lewinsky affair. In the wake of Desert Fox, the Security Council was split on determining new terms for an inspection regime. Four years were to pass before inspectors returned to Iraq.

GOOD EVENING. Earlier today, I ordered America's Armed Forces to strike military and security targets in Iraq. They are joined by British forces. Their mission is to attack Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological programs, and its military capacity to threaten its neighbors. Their purpose is to protect the national interest of the United States and, indeed, the interest of people throughout the Middle East and around the world. Saddam Hussein must not be allowed to threaten his neighbors or the world with nuclear arms, poison gas, or biological weapons.

I want to explain why I have decided, with the unanimous recommendation of my national security team, to use force in Iraq, why we have acted now and what we aim to accomplish.

Six weeks ago, Saddam Hussein announced that he would no longer cooperate with the United Nations weapons inspectors, called UNSCOM. They are highly professional experts from dozens of countries. Their job is to oversee the elimination of Iraq's capability to retain, create and use weapons of mass destruction, and to verify that Iraq does not attempt to rebuild that capability. The inspectors undertook this mission, first, seven and a half years ago, at the end of the Gulf War, when Iraq agreed to declare and destroy its arsenal as a condition of the cease-fire.

The international community had good reason to set this requirement. Other countries possess weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. With Saddam, there's one big difference: he has used them, not once but repeatedly—unleashing chemical weapons against Iranian troops during a decade-long war, not only against soldiers, but against civilians; firing Scud missiles at the citizens of Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Iran—not only against a foreign enemy, but even against his own people, gassing Kurdish civilians in Northern Iraq.

The international community had little doubt then, and I have no doubt today, that left unchecked, Saddam Hussein will use these terrible weapons again.

The United States has patiently worked to preserve UNSCOM, as Iraq has sought to avoid its obligation to cooperate with the inspectors. On occasion, we've had to threaten military force, and Saddam has backed down. Faced with Saddam's latest act of defiance in late October, we built intensive diplomatic pressure on Iraq, backed by overwhelming military force in the region. The U.N. Security Council voted 15 to zero to condemn Saddam's actions and to demand that

he immediately come into compliance. Eight Arab nations—Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman—warned that Iraq alone would bear responsibility for the consequences of defying the U.N.

When Saddam still failed to comply, we prepared to act militarily. It was only then, at the last possible moment, that Iraq backed down. It pledged to the U.N. that it had made—and I quote— "a clear and unconditional decision to resume cooperation with the weapons inspectors."

I decided then to call off the attack, with our airplanes already in the air, because Saddam had given in to our demands. I concluded then that the right thing to do was to use restraint and give Saddam one last chance to prove his willingness to cooperate.

I made it very clear at that time what "unconditional cooperation" meant, based on existing U.N. resolutions and Iraq's own commitments. And along with Prime Minister Blair of Great Britain, I made it equally clear that if Saddam failed to cooperate fully, we would be prepared to act without delay, diplomacy or warning.

Now, over the past three weeks, the U.N. weapons inspectors have carried out their plan for testing Iraq's cooperation. The testing period ended this weekend, and last night, UNSCOM's Chairman, Richard Butler, reported the results to U.N. Secretary General Annan. The conclusions are stark, sobering and profoundly disturbing.

In four out of the five categories set forth, Iraq has failed to cooperate. Indeed, it actually has placed new restrictions on the inspectors. Here are some of the particulars:

Iraq repeatedly blocked UNSCOM from inspecting suspect sites. For example, it shut off access to the headquarters of its ruling party, and said it will deny access to the party's other offices, even though U.N. resolutions make no exception for them and UNSCOM has inspected them in the past.

Iraq repeatedly restricted UNSCOM's ability to obtain necessary evidence. For example, Iraq obstructed UNSCOM's effort to photograph bombs related to its chemical weapons program. It tried to stop an UNSCOM biological weapons team from videotaping a site and photocopying documents, and prevented Iraqi personnel from answering UNSCOM's questions.

Prior to the inspection of another site, Iraq actually emptied out the building, removing not just documents, but even the furniture and the equipment. Iraq has failed to turn over virtually all the documents requested by the inspectors; indeed, we know that Iraq ordered the destruction of weapons-related documents in anticipation of an UNSCOM inspection.

So Iraq has abused its final chance. As the UNSCOM report concludes— and again I quote—"Iraq's conduct ensured that no progress was able to be made in the fields of disarmament. In light of this experience, and in the absence of full cooperation by Iraq, it must, regrettably, be recorded again that the Commission is not able to conduct the work mandated to it by the Security Council with respect to Iraq's prohibited weapons program."

In short, the inspectors are saying that, even if they could stay in Iraq, their work would be a sham. Saddam's deception has defeated their effectiveness. Instead of the inspectors disarming Saddam, Saddam has disarmed the inspectors.

This situation presents a clear and present danger to the stability of the Persian Gulf and the safety of people everywhere. The international community gave Saddam one last chance to resume cooperation with the weapons inspectors. Saddam has failed to seize the chance.

And so we had to act, and act now. Let me explain why.

First, without a strong inspections system, Iraq would be free to retain and begin to rebuild its chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs—in months, not years.

Second, if Saddam can cripple the weapons inspections system and get away with it, he would conclude that the international community, led by the United States, has simply lost its will. He will surmise that he has free rein to rebuild his arsenal of destruction. And some day, make no mistake, he will use it again, as he has in the past.

Third, in halting our air strikes in November, I gave Saddam a chance, not a license. If we turn our backs on his defiance, the credibility of U.S. power as a check against Saddam will be

destroyed. We will not only have allowed Saddam to shatter the inspections system that controls his weapons of mass destruction program; we also will have fatally undercut the fear of force that stops Saddam from acting to gain domination in the region.

That is why, on the unanimous recommendation of my national security team, including the Vice President, Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of State, and the National Security Advisor, I have ordered a strong, sustained series of air strikes against Iraq. They are designed to degrade Saddam's capacity to develop and deliver weapons of mass destruction, and to degrade his ability to threaten his neighbors. At the same time, we are delivering a powerful message to Saddam: If you act recklessly, you will pay a heavy price.

[...]

I hope Saddam will come into cooperation with the inspection system now and comply with the relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions. But we have to be prepared that he will not, and we must deal with the very real danger he poses. So we will pursue a long-term strategy to contain Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction, and work toward the day when Iraq has a government worthy of its people.

First, we must be prepared to use force again if Saddam takes threatening actions, such as trying to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction or their delivery systems, threatening his neighbors, challenging allied aircraft over Iraq, or moving against his own Kurdish citizens. The credible threat to use force and, when necessary, the actual use of force, is the surest way to contain Saddam's weapons of mass destruction program, curtail his aggression and prevent another Gulf War.

Second, so long as Iraq remains out of compliance, we will work with the international community to maintain and enforce economic sanctions. Sanctions have cost Saddam more than \$ 120 billion—resources that would have been used to rebuild his military. The sanctions system allows Iraq to sell oil for food, for medicine, for other humanitarian supplies for the Iraqi people. We have no quarrel with them. But without the sanctions, we would see the oil-for-food program become oil-for-tanks, resulting in a greater threat to Iraq's neighbors and less food for its people.

The hard fact is that so long as Saddam remains in power, he threatens the well-being of his people, the peace of his region, the security of the world. The best way to end that threat once and for all is with the new Iraqi government, a government ready to live in peace with its neighbors, a government that respects the rights of its people.

Bringing change in Baghdad will take time and effort. We will strengthen our engagement with the full range of Iraqi opposition forces and work with them effectively and prudently.

The decision to use force is never cost-free. Whenever American forces are placed in harm's way, we risk the loss of life. And while our strikes are focused on Iraq's military capabilities, there will be unintended Iraqi casualties. Indeed, in the past, Saddam has intentionally placed Iraqi civilians in harm's way in a cynical bid to sway international opinion. We must be prepared for these realities. At the same time, Saddam should have absolutely no doubt: If he lashes out at his neighbors, we will respond forcefully.

Heavy as they are, the costs of action must be weighed against the price of inaction. If Saddam defies the world and we fail to respond, we will face a far greater threat in the future. Saddam will strike again at his neighbors; he will make war on his own people. And mark my words, he will develop weapons of mass destruction. He will deploy them, and he will use them. Because we are acting today, it is less likely that we will face these dangers in the future.

Susan Sontag – Reflections on September 11th

The disconnect between last Tuesday's monstrous dose of reality and the self-righteous drivel and outright deceptions being peddled by public figures and TV commentators is startling, depressing. The voices licensed to follow the event seem to have joined together in a campaign to infantilize the public. Where is the acknowledgement that this was not a "cowardly" attack on "civilization" or "liberty" or "humanity" or "the free world" but an attack on the world's self-proclaimed super-power, undertaken as a consequence of specific American alliances and actions? How many citizens are aware of the ongoing American bombing of Iraq? And if the word "cowardly" is to be used, it might be more aptly applied to those who kill from beyond the range of retaliation, high in the sky, than to those willing to die themselves in order to kill others. In the matter of courage (a morally neutral virtue): whatever may be said of the perpetrators of Tuesday's slaughter, they were not cowards.

Our leaders are bent on convincing us that everything is O.K. America is not afraid. Our spirit is unbroken, although this was a day that will live in infamy and America is now at war. But everything is not O.K. And this was not Pearl Harbor. We have a robotic president who assures us that America stands tall. A wide spectrum of public figures, in and out of office, who are strongly opposed to the policies being pursued abroad by this Administration apparently feel free to say nothing more than that they stand united behind President Bush. A lot of thinking needs to be done, and perhaps is being done in Washington and elsewhere, about the ineptitude of American intelligence and counterintelligence, about options available to American foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East, and about what constitutes a smart program of military defense. But the public is not being asked to bear much of the burden of reality. The unanimously applauded, self-congratulatory bromides of a Soviet Party Congress seemed contemptible. The unanimity of the sanctimonious, reality-concealing rhetoric spouted by American officials and media commentators in recent days seems, well, unworthy of a mature democracy.

Those in public office have let us know that they consider their task to be a manipulative one: confidence-building and grief management. Politics, the politics of a democracy—which entails disagreement, which promotes candor—has been replaced by psychotherapy. Let's by all means grieve together But let's not be stupid together. A few shreds of historical awareness might help us to understand what has just happened, and what may continue to happen. "Our country is strong," we are told again and again. I for one don't find this entirely consoling. Who doubts that America is strong? But that's not all America has to be.

Charles Krauthammer – Voices of Moral Obtuseness

In the wake of a massacre that killed more than 5,000 innocent Americans in a day, one might expect moral clarity. After all, four days after Pearl Harbor, the isolationist America First Committee (which included such well-meaning young people as Gerald Ford and Potter Stewart) formally disbanded. There had been argument and confusion about America's role in the world and the intentions of its enemies. No more.

Similarly, two days after Hitler invaded Poland, it was Neville Chamberlain himself, seduced and misled by Hitler for years, who declared war on Germany.

And yet, within days of the World Trade Center massacre, an event of blinding clarity, we are already beginning to hear the voices, prominent voices, of moral obtuseness.

Susan Sontag is appalled at "the self-righteous drivel" that this was an "attack on 'civilization'" rather than on America as "a consequence of specific American alliances and actions. How many citizens are aware of the ongoing American bombing of Iraq?"

What Sontag is implying, but does not quite have the courage to say, is that because of these "alliances and actions," such as the bombing of Iraq, we had it coming. The implication is as disgusting as Jerry Falwell's blaming the attack on sexual deviance and abortion, except that Falwell's excrescences appear on loony TV, Sontag's in *The New Yorker*.

Let us look at those policies. The bombing of Iraq? First, we are not bombing Iraqi civilians. We attack anti-aircraft positions that are trying to shoot down our planes. Why are our planes there? To keep Iraq from projecting its power to re-invade and re-attack its neighbors.

Why are we keeping Saddam in his box? Because we know he is developing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and we know of what he is capable: He has already gassed 5,000 Kurds, used chemical weapons against Iran and launched missiles into Tehran, Riyadh and Tel Aviv with the explicit aim of murdering as many people as possible.

Or maybe Sontag means American support for Israel. Perhaps she means that America should have abandoned Israel—after it made its astonishingly generous peace offer to the Palestinians (with explicit American assurances to support Israel as it took "risks for peace") and was rewarded with a guerrilla war employing the same terrorist savagery that we witnessed on September 11.

Let us look at American policies. America conducted three wars in the 1990s. The Gulf War saved the Kuwaiti people from Saddam. American intervention in the Balkans saved Bosnia. And then we saved Kosovo from Serbia. What do these three military campaigns have in common? In every one we saved a Muslim people.

And then there was Somalia, a military operation of unadulterated altruism. Its sole purpose was to save the starving people of Somalia. Muslims all.

For such alliances and actions, we get more than 5,000 Americans murdered, or, as Sontag puts it, "last Tuesday's monstrous dose of reality."

Moral obtuseness is not restricted to intellectuals. I witnessed a High Holiday sermon by a guest rabbi warning the congregation, exactly seven days after our generation's Pearl Harbor, against "oversimplifying" by speaking in terms of "good guys and bad guys."

Oversimplifying? Has there ever been a time when the distinction between good and evil was more clear?

And where are the Muslim clerics—in the United States, Europe and the Middle East—who should be joining together to make that distinction with loud unanimity? Where are their *fatwas* against suicide murder? Where are the authoritative communal declarations that these crimes are contrary to Islam?

President Bush said so in his visit to Washington's main mosque. But Bush is a Christian. He is hardly an authority on Islam.

Why did the spiritual leader of the Islamic Society of North America, Dr. Muzammil Siddiqi, not say that such terrorism is contrary to Islam in his address at the national prayer service at the Washington National Cathedral? His words went out around the world. Yet he was vague and elusive. "But those that lay the plots of evil, for them is a terrible penalty." Very true. But who are the layers of plots of evil? Those who perpetrated the World Trade Center attack? Or America, as thousands of Muslims in the street claim? The imam might have made that clear. He did not.

This is no time for obfuscation. Or for agonized relativism. Or, obscenely, for blaming America first. (The habit dies hard.) This is a time for clarity. At a time like this, those who search for shades of evil, for root causes, for extenuations are, to borrow from Lance Morrow, "too philosophical for decent company."

Robert Kagan and William Kristol – What to Do About Iraq

What next in the war on terrorism? We hear from many corners that it is still too early to ask this question. If you mention the word Iraq, respectable folks at the State Department and on *The New York Times* op-ed page get red-faced. After all, the mission in Afghanistan is not over. The destruction of Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda network is not finished. And even when these goals are accomplished, they say, we won't even begin to think about Iraq until we've taken care of Somalia, the Philippines, Yemen, Indonesia—and Antarctica, and the moon.

All this strikes us as an elaborate stratagem for avoiding the hard decision to confront Saddam Hussein. Yes, it is essential to capture bin Laden and destroy al Qaeda. It is necessary to stabilize Afghanistan and back a functioning government there. And, yes, we have to roll up the al Qaeda operations in other troublesome parts of the world.

But none of this precludes dealing with Iraq, or makes the obligation of dealing with Iraq less urgent. The United States can, after all, walk and chew gum at the same time. The Iraqi threat is enormous. It gets bigger with every day that passes. And it can't wait until we finish tying up all the "loose ends." For one thing, those loose ends are not just minor details. If bin Laden has left Central Asia, he'll be hard to find. Who knows how long it may take? Meanwhile, history moves on, and the clock is ticking in Iraq. If too many months go by without a decision to move against Saddam, the risks to the United States may increase exponentially. And after September 11, those risks are no longer abstract. Ultimately, what we do or do not do in the coming months about Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq will decisively affect our future security.

And it will determine more than that. Whether or not we remove Saddam Hussein from power will shape the contours of the emerging world order, perhaps for decades to come. Either it will be a world order conducive to our liberal democratic principles and our safety, or it will be one where brutal, well-armed tyrants are allowed to hold democracy and international security hostage. Not to take on Saddam would ensure that regimes implicated in terror and developing weapons of mass destruction will be a constant—and growing—feature of our world. Destroying Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda is, obviously, very important. Dealing with other sponsors of terrorism—Iran in particular—is crucial. But, in the near-future, Iraq is the threat and the supreme test of whether we as a nation have learned the lesson of September 11.

The amazing thing about the current "debate" over Iraq is that no one disputes the nature of the threat. Everyone agrees that, as Al Gore's former national security adviser Leon Fuerth puts it, "Saddam Hussein is dangerous and likely to become more so," that he "is a permanent menace to his region and to the vital interests of the United States."

No one questions, furthermore, the basic facts about Saddam Hussein's weapons programs:

- According to U.N. weapons inspectors and western intelligence agencies, Iraq possesses the necessary components and technical knowledge to build nuclear bombs in the near future. A report prepared by the German intelligence services in December 2000, based on defectors' reports, satellite imagery, and aerial surveillance, predicted that Iraq will have three nuclear bombs by 2005. But that may be too optimistic. Before the Gulf War no one had a clue how far advanced Saddam's nuclear weapons program was. According to the Federation of American Scientists, even with an intrusive inspections regime, "Iraq might be able to construct a nuclear explosive before it was detected." Today, no one knows how close Saddam is to having a nuclear device. What we do know is that every month that passes brings him,| closer to the prize.

- The chemical weapon VX is the most toxic poison known to man. Ten j milligrams—one drop—can kill a-human being. In the mid-1990s, Iraq admitted producing VX in large quantities. When U.N. inspectors left Iraq at the end of 1998, they believed Iraq maintained 41 different

sites capable of; producing VX in a matter of weeks. They also believed Iraq possessed enough precursor materials to produce over 200 tons of the poison, enough to kill] hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people. A year ago, U.S. officials] told *The New York Times* that Iraq had rebuilt "a series of factories that the United States has long suspected of producing chemical and biological weapons." A year later, who knows how many of those factories are operational?

- The Federation of American Scientists reports that Iraq possesses the equipment, the know-how, and the materials to produce "350 liters of weapons-grade anthrax" a week. In the five years before Desert Storm, Iraq produced 8,500 liters of anthrax and managed to place 6,500 liters in various munitions. We can only imagine how much anthrax Saddam Hussein may have at his disposal today.

Nor is there any doubt that, after September 11, Saddam's weapons of mass destruction pose a kind of danger to us that we hadn't fully grasped before. In the 1990s, much of the complacency about Saddam, both in Washington and in Europe, rested on the assumption that he could be deterred. Saddam was not a madman, the theory went, and would not commit suicide by actually using the weapons he was so desperately trying to obtain. Some of us, it's true, had our doubts about this logic. The issue seemed to us not so much whether we could deter Saddam, but whether he could deter us: If Saddam had had nuclear weapons in 1991, would we have gone to war to drive him from Kuwait?

But after September 11, we have all been forced to consider another scenario. What if Saddam provides some of his anthrax, or his VX, or a nuclear device to a terrorist group like al Qaeda? Saddam could help a terrorist inflict a horrific attack on the United States or its allies, while hoping to shroud his role in the secrecy of cutouts and middlemen. How in the world do we deter that? To this day we don't know who provided the anthrax for the post-September 11 attacks. We may never know for sure.

What we do know is that Saddam is an ally to the world's terrorists and always has been. He has provided safe haven to the infamous Abu Nidal. Reliable reports from defectors and former U.N. weapons inspectors have confirmed the existence of a terrorist training camp in Iraq, complete with a Boeing 707 for practicing hijackings, and filled with non-Iraqi radical Muslims. We know, too, that Mohamed Atta, the ringleader of September 11, went out of his way to meet with an Iraqi intelligence official a few months before he flew a plane into the World Trade Center. As Leon Fuerth understates, "There may well have been interaction between Mr. Hussein's intelligence apparatus and various terrorist networks, including that of Osama bin Laden."

So there is no debate about the facts. No one doubts the nature of the threat Saddam poses. Most even agree that, as former national security adviser Samuel R. Berger says, "the goal. . . should be getting rid of Saddam Hussein." Leon Fuerth recently wrote that Saddam "and his government must be ripped out of Iraq if we are ever to be secure and if the sufferings of the Iraqi people are ever to abate."

Tough talk from a Clintonista. But when it comes to actually doing something about Saddam, suddenly it's a different story. Fuerth, Berger, Madeleine Albright, and Tom Daschle and a host of other Democrats (with the increasingly notable and honorable exception of Joseph Lieberman) insist over and over again that no matter how much of a threat Saddam may pose, no matter how necessary it may be to "rip" him out of Iraq—nevertheless we should not do it.

Here is Daschle, in late December: "A strike against Iraq would be a mistake. It would complicate Middle Eastern diplomacy. . . . I think we have to keep the pressure on Iraq in a

collective way, with our Arab allies. Unilateralism is a very dangerous concept. I don't think we should ever act unilaterally." What's more, the Iraq doves claim, removing Saddam would be a diversion from the war against al Qaeda, and the cure would be worse than the disease.

This is nonsense. It is almost impossible to imagine any outcome for the world both plausible and worse than the disease of Saddam with weapons of mass destruction. A fractured Iraq? An unsettled Kurdish situation? A difficult transition in Baghdad? These may be problems, but they are far preferable to leaving Saddam in power with his nukes, VX, and anthrax. As for the other arguments, the effort to remove Saddam from power would no more be a "diversion" from the war on al Qaeda than the fight against Hitler was a "diversion" from the fight against Japan. Can it really be that this great American superpower, much more powerful than in 1941, cannot fight on two fronts at the same time against dangerous but second-rate enemies?

And as for the issue of unilateral versus multilateral action, we would prefer that the United States act together with friends and allies in any attack on Iraq. We believe others will indeed join us if we demonstrate our serious intention to oust Saddam—the British and some other Europeans, as well as Turkey and other states in the Middle East. But whether they join us or not, there is too much at stake for us to be deterred by the pro forma objections of, say, Saudi Arabia or France.

On one point, we agree with some of the critics. We doubt that the so-called "Afghanistan model" of airstrikes combined with very limited U.S. ground troops, and dependence on a proxy force, can be counted on as sufficient for Iraq. The United States should support Ahmad Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress—they are essential parts of any solution in Iraq. But we cannot count on the Iraqi opposition to win this war. Nor can we count on precision bombing and U.S. Special Forces alone to do the job. American ground forces in significant number are likely to be required for success in Iraq. At the least, we need to be prepared to use such forces, and for a number of reasons.

First, there is the special problem posed by Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. Any attack on Iraq must succeed quickly. There is no time to repeat the pattern in Afghanistan of trying a little of this and a little of that and seeing what works. In the Afghan war, it was a change of strategy after three weeks that eventually turned the tide against the Taliban. We don't have the luxury of early mistakes in Iraq. As soon as any attack begins, Saddam will be sorely tempted to launch a chemical or biological attack on one of his neighbors, probably Israel. Any U.S. attack will have to move with lightning speed to destroy or secure sites from which such an Iraqi strike could be launched.

But even then, as the Gulf War demonstrated, it is almost impossible to locate every Scud missile in the Iraqi desert before it is fired. A key element of American strategy must therefore aim at affecting the decision-making process of Saddam's top commanders in the field. Whether or not they carry out an order from Saddam to launch a chemical or biological weapon at Israel may depend on their perception of whether Saddam and his regime are likely to survive. If the size and speed of an American invasion make it clear, in the first hours, that Saddam is finished, an Iraqi commander may think twice before making himself an accomplice to Saddam's genocidal plans. We believe it is essential that the effort to remove Saddam not be a drawn-out affair.

American troops on the ground will be important for another reason. The best way to avoid chaos and anarchy in Iraq after Saddam is removed is to have a powerful American occupying force in place, with the clear intention of sticking around for a while. We have already begun to see the price of not having such a force in Afghanistan. In Iraq, even more than in Afghanistan, the task of nation-building will be crucial. We don't want a vacuum of power in Iraq. We don't want Iran playing games in Iraq. We don't want Turkey worried that it will be left alone to deal

with the Kurdish question. The United States will have to make a long-term commitment to rebuilding Iraq, and that commitment cannot be fulfilled without U.S. troops on the ground.

Although we hear only about the risks of such action, the benefits could be very substantial. A devastating knockout blow against Saddam Hussein, followed by an American-sponsored effort to rebuild Iraq and put it on a path toward democratic governance, would have a seismic impact on the Arab world—for the better. The Arab world may take a long time coming to terms with the West, but that process will be hastened by the defeat of the leading anti-western Arab tyrant. Once Iraq and Turkey—two of the three most important Middle Eastern powers—are both in the pro-western camp, there is a reasonable chance that smaller powers might decide to jump on the band wagon.

We are aware that many will find all this too much to stomach. Ground forces? Occupation? Nation-building? Democratization and westernization in the Arab world? Can't we just continue to "contain" Saddam? Or can't we just drop some bombs, let the Iraqis fight it out, and then beat it home? The answer is, we can't. And if we haven't learned this much from September 11 then all that we lost on that day will have been lost in vain.

It is past time for the United States to step up and accept the real responsibilities and requirements of global leadership. We've already tried the alternative. During the 1990s, those who argued for limiting American involvement overseas, for avoiding the use of ground troops, for using force in a limited way and only as a last resort, for steering clear of nation-building, for exit strategies and burden-sharing—those who prided themselves on their prudence and realism—won the day. When the World Trade Center was attacked in 1993, when former President Bush was almost assassinated by Saddam Hussein in Kuwait, when bin Laden and al Qaeda bombed U.S. embassies and the USS *Cole*, the Clinton administration took the cautious approach. A few missile strikes here and there, a few sting operations. But when confronted with the choice of using serious force against al Qaeda, or really helping the Iraqi opposition and moving to drive Saddam Hussein from power, President Clinton and his top advisers flinched. And most Republicans put little sustained pressure on the Clinton administration to act otherwise. The necessary actions were all deemed too risky. The administration, supported by most of the foreign policy establishment, took the "prudent" course. Only now we know that it was an imprudent course. The failure of the United States to take risks, and to take responsibility, in the 1990s paved the way to September 11.

It is a tough and dangerous decision to send American soldiers to fight and possibly die in Iraq. But it is more horrible to watch men and women leap to their deaths from flaming skyscrapers. If we fail to address the grave threats we know exist, what will we tell the families of future victims? That we were "prudent"?

The problem today is not just that failure to remove Saddam could someday come back to haunt us. At a more fundamental level, the failure to remove Saddam would mean that, despite all that happened on September 11, we as a nation are still unwilling to shoulder the responsibilities of global leadership, even to protect ourselves. If we turn away from the Iraq challenge—because we fear the use of ground troops, because we don't want the job of putting back together afterwards, because we would prefer not to be , deeply involved in a messy part of the world—then we will have made a momentous and fateful decision. We do not expect President Bush to make that choice. We expect the president will courageously decide to destroy Saddam's regime. No step would contribute more toward shaping a world order in which our people and our liberal civilization can survive and flourish.

Congressman Ron Paul – Questions That Won't Be Asked About Iraq

Soon we hope to have hearings on the pending war with Iraq. I am concerned there are some questions that won't be asked—and maybe will not even be allowed to be asked. Here are some questions I would like answered by those who are urging us to start this war.

1. Is it not true that the reason we did not bomb the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War was because we knew they could retaliate?
2. Is it not also true that we are willing to bomb Iraq now because we know it cannot retaliate—which just confirms that there is no real threat?
3. Is it not true that those who argue that even with inspections we cannot be sure that Hussein might be hiding weapons, at the same time imply that we can be more sure that weapons exist in the absence of inspections?
4. Is it not true that the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency was able to complete its yearly verification mission to Iraq just this year with Iraqi cooperation?
5. Is it not true that the intelligence community has been unable to develop a case tying Iraq to global terrorism at all, much less the attacks on the United States last year? Does anyone remember that 15 of the 19 hijackers came from Saudi Arabia and that none came from Iraq?
6. Was former CIA counter-terrorism chief Vincent Cannistraro wrong! when he recently said there is no confirmed evidence of Iraq's links to terrorism?
7. Is it not true that the CIA has concluded there is no evidence that a Prague meeting between 9/11 hijacker Atta and Iraqi intelligence took place?
8. Is it not true that northern Iraq, where the administration claimed al-Qaeda were hiding out, is in the control of our "allies," the Kurds?
9. Is it not true that the vast majority of al-Qaeda leaders who escaped appear to have safely made their way to Pakistan, another of our so-called allies?
10. Has anyone noticed that Afghanistan is rapidly sinking into total chaos, with bombings and assassinations becoming daily occurrences; and that according to a recent U.N. report the al-Qaeda "is, by all accounts, alive and well and poised to strike again, how, when, and where it chooses"?
11. Why are we taking precious military and intelligence resources away from tracking down those who did attack the United States—and who may again attack the United States—and using them to invade countries that have not attacked the United States?
12. Would an attack on Iraq not just confirm the Arab world's worst suspicions about the U.S., and isn't this what bin Laden wanted?
13. How can Hussein be compared to Hitler when he has no navy or air force, and now has an army 1/5 the size of twelve years ago, which even then proved totally inept at defending the country?
14. Is it not true that the constitutional power to declare war is exclusively that of the Congress? Should presidents, contrary to the Constitution, allow Congress to concur only when pressured by public opinion? Are presidents permitted to rely on the U.N. for permission to go to war?
15. Are you aware of a Pentagon report studying charges that thousands of Kurds in one village were gassed by the Iraqis, which found no conclusive evidence that Iraq was responsible, that Iran occupied the very city involved, and that evidence indicated the type of gas used was more likely controlled by Iran not Iraq?*
16. Is it not true that anywhere between 100,000 and 300,000 U.S. soldiers have suffered from Persian Gulf War syndrome from the first Gulf War, and that thousands may have died?
17. Are we prepared for possibly thousands of American casualties in a war against a country that does not have the capacity to attack the United States?
18. Are we willing to bear the economic burden of a 100 billion dollar war against Iraq, with oil prices expected to skyrocket and further rattle an already shaky American economy? How

about an estimated 30 years occupation of Iraq that some have deemed necessary to "build democracy" there?

19. Iraq's alleged violations of U.N. resolutions are given as reason to initiate an attack, yet is it not true that hundreds of U.N. Resolutions have been ignored by various countries without penalty?

20. Did former President Bush not cite the U.N. Resolution of 1990 as the reason he could not march into Baghdad, while supporters of a new attack assert that it is the very reason we can march into Baghdad?

21. Is it not true that, contrary to current claims, the no-fly zones were set up by Britain and the United States without specific approval from the United Nations?

22. If we claim membership in the international community and conform to its rules only when it pleases us, does this not serve to undermine our position, directing animosity toward us by both friend and foe?

23. How can our declared goal of bringing democracy to Iraq be believable when we prop up dictators throughout the Middle East and support military tyrants like Musharraf in Pakistan, who overthrew a democratically elected president?

24. Are you familiar with the 1994 Senate Hearings that revealed the U.S. knowingly supplied chemical and biological materials to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war and as late as 1992—including after the alleged Iraqi gas attack on a Kurdish village?

25. Did we not assist Saddam Hussein's rise to power by supporting and encouraging his invasion of Iran? Is it honest to criticize Saddam now for his invasion of Iran, which at the time we actively supported?

26. Is it not true that preventive war is synonymous with an act of aggression, and has never been considered a moral or legitimate U.S. policy?

27. Why do the oil company executives strongly support this war if oil is not the real reason we plan to take over Iraq?

28. Why is it that those who never wore a uniform and are confident that they won't have to personally fight this war are more anxious for this war than our generals?

29. What is the moral argument for attacking a nation that has not initiated aggression against us, and could not if it wanted?

30. Where does the Constitution grant us permission to wage war for any reason other than self-defense?

31. Is it not true that a war against Iraq rejects the sentiments of the time-honored Treaty of Westphalia, nearly 400 years ago, that countries should never go into another for the purpose of regime change?

32. Is it not true that the more civilized a society is, the less likely disagreements will be settled by war?

33. Is it not true that since World War II Congress has not declared war and—not coincidentally—we have not since then had a clear-cut victory?

34. Is it not true that Pakistan, especially through its intelligence services, was an active supporter and key organizer of the Taliban?

35. Why don't those who want war bring a formal declaration of war resolution to the floor of Congress?

Former Vice President Al Gore – Against A Doctrine of Pre-Emptive War

On September 23, 2002, former Vice-President and Democratic Presidential candidate Al Gore spoke out on the Bush administration's Iraq policy in a speech to the Commonwealth Club of California. Following is an abridged transcript of his remarks.

Like all Americans I have been wrestling with the question of what our country needs to do to defend itself from the kind of intense, focused and enabled hatred that brought about September 11th, and which at this moment must be presumed to be gathering force for yet another attack. I'm speaking today in an effort to recommend a specific course of action for our country which I believe would be preferable to the course recommended by President Bush. Specifically, I am deeply concerned that the policy we are presently following with respect to Iraq has the potential to seriously damage our ability to win the war against terrorism and to weaken our ability to lead the world in this new century.

To begin with, I believe we should focus our efforts first and foremost against those who attacked us on September 11th and have thus far gotten away with it. The vast majority of those who sponsored, planned and implemented the cold blooded murder of more than 3,000 Americans are still at large, still neither located nor apprehended, much less punished and neutralized. I do not believe that we should allow ourselves to be distracted from this urgent task simply because it is proving to be more difficult and lengthy than predicted. Great nations persevere and then prevail. They do not jump from one unfinished task to another.

We are perfectly capable of staying the course in our war against Osama bin Laden and his terrorist network, while simultaneously taking those steps necessary to build an international coalition to join us in taking on Saddam Hussein in a timely fashion.

I don't think that we should allow anything to diminish our focus on avenging the 3,000 Americans who were murdered and dismantling the network of terrorists who we know to be responsible for it. The fact that we don't know where they are should not cause us to focus instead on some other enemy whose location may be easier to identify.

Nevertheless, President Bush is telling us that the most urgent requirement of the moment—right now—is not to redouble our efforts against Al Qaeda, not to stabilize the nation of Afghanistan after driving his host government from power, but instead to shift our focus and concentrate on immediately launching a new war against Saddam Hussein. And he is proclaiming a new, uniquely American right to pre-emptively attack whomsoever he may deem represents a potential future threat.

Moreover, he is demanding in this high political season that Congress speedily affirm that he has the necessary authority to proceed immediately against Iraq and for that matter any other nation in the region, regardless of subsequent developments or circumstances. The timing of this sudden burst of urgency to take up this cause as America's new top priority, displacing the war against Osama bin Laden, was explained by the White House Chief of Staff in his now well known statement that "from an advertising point of view, you don't launch a new product line until after Labor Day."

Nevertheless, Iraq does pose a serious threat to the stability of the Persian Gulf and we should organize an international coalition to eliminate his access to weapons of mass destruction. Iraq's search for weapons of mass destruction has proven impossible to completely deter and we should assume that it will continue for as long as Saddam is in power. Moreover, no international law can prevent the United States from taking actions to protect its vital interests, when it is manifestly clear that there is a choice to be made between law and survival. I believe, however, that such a choice is not presented in the case of Iraq. Indeed, should we decide to proceed, that action can be justified within the framework of international law rather than outside it. In fact, though a new U.N. resolution may be helpful in building international consensus, the existing resolutions from 1991 are sufficient from a legal standpoint.

We also need to look at the relationship between our national goal of regime change in Iraq and our goal of victory in the war against terror. In the case of Iraq, it would be more difficult for the United States to succeed alone, but still possible. By contrast, the war against terror manifestly requires broad and continuous international cooperation. Our ability to secure this kind of cooperation can be severely damaged by unilateral action against Iraq. If the Administration has reason to believe otherwise, it ought to share those reasons with the Congress—since it is asking Congress to endorse action that might well impair a more urgent task: continuing to disrupt and destroy the international terror network.

President George H. W. Bush purposely waited until after the mid-term elections of 1990 to push for a vote at the beginning of the new Congress in January of 1991. President George W. Bush, by contrast, is pushing for a vote in this Congress immediately before the election. Rather than making efforts to dispel concern at home and abroad about the role of politics in the timing of his policy, the President is publicly taunting Democrats with the political consequences of a "no" vote—even as the Republican National Committee runs pre-packaged advertising based on the same theme—in keeping with the political strategy clearly described in a White House aide's misplaced computer disk, which advised Republican operatives that their principal game plan for success in the election a few weeks away was to "focus on the war." Vice President Cheney, meanwhile, indignantly described suggestions of political motivation "reprehensible." The following week he took his discussion of war strategy to the Rush Limbaugh show.

The foreshortening of deliberation in the Congress robs the country of the time it needs for careful analysis of what may lie before it. Such consideration is all the more important because of the Administration's failure thus far to lay out an assessment of how it thinks the course of a war will run—even while it has given free rein to persons both within and close to the administration to suggest that this will *be* an easy conquest. Neither has the Administration said much to clarify its idea of what is to follow regime change or of the degree of engagement it is prepared to accept for the United States in Iraq in the months and years after a regime change has taken place.

By shifting from his early focus after September 11th on war against terrorism to war against Iraq . . . the President has somehow squandered the international outpouring of sympathy, goodwill and solidarity that followed the attacks of September 11th and converted it into anger and apprehension aimed much more at the United States than at the terrorist network—much as we manage to squander in one year's time the largest budget surpluses in history and convert them into massive fiscal deficits. He has compounded this by asserting a new doctrine—of pre-emption.

The doctrine of pre-emption is based on the idea that in the era of proliferating WMD, and against the background of a sophisticated terrorist threat, the United States cannot wait for proof of a fully established mortal threat, but should rather act at any point to cut that short.

The problem with pre-emption is that in the first instance it is not needed in order to give the United States the means to act in its own defense against terrorism in general or Iraq in particular. But that is a relatively minor issue compared to the longer-term consequences that can be foreseen for this doctrine. To begin with, the doctrine is presented in open-ended terms, which means that if Iraq is the first point of application, it is not necessarily the last. In fact, the very logic of the concept suggests a string of military engagements against a succession of sovereign states: Syria, Libya, North Korea, Iran, etc wherever the combination exists of an interest in weapons of mass destruction together with an ongoing role as host to or participant in terrorist operations. It means also that if the Congress approves the Iraq resolution just proposed by the Administration it is simultaneously creating the precedent for pre-emptive action anywhere, anytime this or any future president so decides.

The Bush Administration may now be realizing that national and international cohesion are strategic assets. But it is a lesson long delayed and clearly not uniformly and consistently accepted by senior members of the cabinet. From the outset, the Administration has operated in

a manner calculated to please the portion of its base that occupies the far right, at the expense of solidarity among Americans and between America and her allies.

On the domestic front, the Administration, months before conceding the need to create an institution outside the White House to manage homeland defense, has been willing to see progress on the new department held up, for the sake of an effort to coerce the Congress into stripping civil service protections from tens of thousands of federal employees.

Far more damaging, however, is the Administration's attack on fundamental constitutional rights. The idea that an American citizen can be imprisoned without recourse to judicial process or remedies, and that this can be done on the say-so of the President or those acting in his name, is beyond the pale.

Regarding other countries, the Administration's disdain for the views of others is well documented and need not be reviewed here. It is more important to note the consequences of an emerging national strategy that not only celebrates American strengths, but appears to be glorifying the notion of dominance. If what America represents to the world is leadership in a commonwealth of equals, then our friends are legion; if what we represent to the world is empire, then it is our enemies who will be legion. [...]

The events of the last eighty-five years provide ample evidence that our approach to winning the peace that follows war is almost as important as winning the war itself. The absence of enlightened nation building after World War I led directly to the conditions which made Germany vulnerable to fascism and the rise of Adolf Hitler and made all of Europe vulnerable to his evil designs. By contrast the enlightened vision embodied in the Marshall Plan NATO, and the other nation building efforts in the aftermath of World War II led directly to the conditions that fostered prosperity and peace for most of the years since this city gave birth to the United Nations.

Two decades ago, when the Soviet Union claimed the right to launch a pre-emptive war in Afghanistan, we properly encouraged and then supported the resistance movement which, a decade later, succeeded in defeating the Soviet Army's efforts. Unfortunately, when the Russians left, we abandoned the Afghans and the lack of any coherent nation building program led directly to the conditions which fostered Al Qaeda terrorist bases and Osama bin Laden's plotting against the World Trade Center. Incredibly, after defeating the Taliban rather easily, and despite pledges from President Bush that we would never again abandon Afghanistan we have done precisely that. And now the Taliban and Al Qaeda are quickly moving back to take up residence there again. A mere two years after we abandoned Afghanistan the first time, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Following a brilliant military campaign, the U.S. abandoned the effort to destroy Saddam's military prematurely and allowed him to remain in power.

What is a potentially even more serious consequence of this push to begin a new war as quickly as possible is the damage it can do not just to America's prospects to winning the war against terrorism but to America's prospects for continuing the historic leadership we began providing to the world fifty-seven years ago, right here in this city by the bay.

I believe, therefore, that the resolution that the President has asked Congress to pass is much too broad in the authorities it grants, and needs to be narrowed. The President should be authorized to take action to deal with Saddam Hussein as being in material breach of the terms of the truce and therefore a continuing threat to the security of the region. To this should be added that his continued pursuit of weapons of mass destruction is potentially a threat to the vital interests of the United States. But Congress should also urge the President to make every effort to obtain a fresh demand from the Security Council for prompt, unconditional compliance by Iraq within a definite period of time. If the Council will not provide such language, then other choices remain open, but in any event the President should be urged to take the time to assemble the broadest possible international support for his course of action. Anticipating that the President will still move toward unilateral action, the Congress should establish now what the administration's thinking is regarding the aftermath of a U.S. attack for the purpose of regime change.

Specifically, Congress should establish why the President believes that unilateral action will not severely damage the fight against terrorist networks, and that preparations are in place to deal with the effects of chemical and biological attacks against our allies, our forces in the field, and even the home-front. The resolution should also require commitments from the President that action in Iraq will not be permitted to distract from continuing and improving work to reconstruct Afghanistan, and that the United States will commit to stay the course for the reconstruction of Iraq.

The Congressional resolution should make explicitly clear that authorities for taking these actions are to be presented as derivatives from existing Security Council resolutions and from international law: not requiring any formal new doctrine of pre-emption, which remains to be discussed subsequently in view of its gravity.

Last week President Bush added a troubling new element to this debate by proposing a broad new strategic doctrine that goes far beyond issues related to Iraq and would affect the basic relationship between the United States and the rest of the world community. Article 51 of the United Nations charter recognizes the right of any nation to defend itself, including the right in some circumstances to take pre-emptive actions in order to deal with imminent threats. President Bush now asserts that we will take pre-emptive action even if we take the threat we perceive as not imminent. If other nations assert the same right then the rule of law will quickly be replaced by the reign of fear—any nation that perceives circumstances that could eventually lead to an imminent threat would be justified under this approach in taking military action against another nation. An unspoken part of this new doctrine appears to be that we claim this right for ourselves—and only for ourselves. It is, in that sense, part of a broader strategy to replace ideas like deterrence and containment with what some in the administration call "dominance."

This is because President Bush is presenting us with a proposition that contains within itself one of the most fateful decisions in our history: a decision to abandon what we have thought was America's mission in the world—a world in which nations are guided by a common ethic codified in the form of international law—if we want to survive.

We have faced such a choice once before, at the end of the Second World War. At that moment, America's power in comparison to the rest of the world was if anything greater than it is now, and the temptation was clearly to use that power to assure ourselves that there would be no competitor and no threat to our security for the foreseeable future. The choice we made, however, was to become a co-founder of what we now think of as the post-war era, based on the concepts of collective security and defense, manifested first of all in the United Nations. Through all the dangerous years that followed, when we understood that the defense of freedom required the readiness to put the existence of the nation itself into the balance, we never abandoned our belief that what we were struggling to achieve was not bounded by our own physical security, but extended to the unmet hopes of humankind. The issue before us is whether we now face circumstances so dire and so novel that we must choose one objective over the other.

So it is reasonable to conclude that we face a problem that is severe, chronic, and likely to become worse over time.

But is a general doctrine of pre-emption necessary in order to deal with this problem? With respect to weapons of mass destruction, the answer is clearly not. The Clinton Administration launched a massive series of air strikes against Iraq for the stated purpose of setting back his capacity to pursue weapons of mass destruction. There was no perceived need for new doctrine or new authorities to do so. The limiting factor was the state of our knowledge concerning the whereabouts of some assets, and a concern for limiting consequences to the civilian populace, which in some instances might well have suffered greatly.

Does Saddam Hussein present an imminent threat, and if he did would the United States be free to act without international permission? If he presents an imminent threat we would be free

to act under generally accepted understandings of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter which reserves for member states the right to act in self-defense.

If Saddam Hussein does not present an imminent threat, then is it justifiable for the Administration to be seeking by every means to precipitate a confrontation, to find a cause for war, and to attack? There is a case to be made that further delay only works to Saddam Hussein's advantage, and that the clock should be seen to have been running on the issue of compliance for a decade: therefore not needing to be reset again to the starting point. But to the extent that we have any concern for international support, whether for its political or material value, hurrying the process will be costly. Even those who now agree that Saddam Hussein must go, may divide deeply over the wisdom of presenting the United States as impatient for war.

At the same time, the concept of pre-emption is accessible to other countries. There are plenty of potential imitators: India/Pakistan; China/ Taiwan; not to forget Israel/Iraq or Israel/Iran. Russia has already cited it in anticipation of a possible military push into Georgia, on grounds that this state has not done enough to block the operations of Chechen rebels. What this doctrine does is to destroy the goal of a world in which states consider themselves subject to law, particularly in the matter of standards for the use of violence against each other. That concept would be displaced by the notion that there is no law but the discretion of the President of the United States.

I believe that we can effectively defend ourselves abroad and at home without dimming our principles. Indeed, I believe that our success in defending ourselves depends precisely on not giving up what we stand for.

Ann Coulter – Why We Hate Them

I've been too busy fretting about "why they hate us" to follow the Democrats' latest objections to the war on terrorism. So it was nice to have Al Gore lay out their full traitorous case this week. To show we really mean business, Gore said we should not get sidetracked by a madman developing weapons of mass destruction who longs for our annihilation.

Rather, Gore thinks the U.S. military should spend the next 20 years sifting through rubble in Tora Bora until they produce Osama bin Laden's DNA. "I do not believe that we should allow ourselves to be distracted from this urgent task," he said, "simply because it is proving to be more difficult and lengthy than predicted."

Al Gore wants to put the war on terrorism in a lockbox.

Gore also complained that Bush has made the "rest of the world" angry at us. Boo hoo hoo. He said foreigners are not worried about "what the terrorist networks are going to do, but about what we're going to do."

Good. They should be worried. They hate us> We hate them. Americans don't want to make Islamic fanatics love us. We want to make them die. There's nothing like horrendous physical pain to quell angry fanatics. So sorry they're angry—wait until they see American anger. Japanese kamikaze pilots hated us once too. A couple of well-aimed nuclear weapons, and now they are gentle little lambs. That got their attention.

Stewing over the "profound and troubling change in the attitude of the German electorate toward the United States," Gore ruefully noted that the German-American relationship is in "a dire crisis." Alas, the Germans hate us.

That's not all. According to Gore, the British hate us, too. Gore said Prime Minister Tony Blair is getting into "what they describe as serious trouble with the British electorate" because of his alliance with the U.S. ("Serious trouble" is British for "serious trouble.")

That same night, James Carville—the heart and soul of the Democratic Party—read from the identical talking points on "Crossfire": "The Koreans hate us. Now the Germans—you know that's one against Germany. You know what? You know what? If we had a foreign policy that

tried to get people to like us, as opposed to irritating everybody in the damn world, it would be a lot better thing." (Hillary Clinton on James Carville: "Great human being.")

Perhaps we could get Djibouti to like us if we legalized clitorectomies for little girls. America is fighting for its survival and the Democrats are obsessing over why barbarians hate us.

The Democrats' scrolling series of objections to the war is utterly contradictory. On one hand, liberals say Bush is trying to build an "empire." But on the other hand, they are cross that we haven't turned Afghanistan into the 51st state yet. This follows their earlier argument that Afghanistan would be another Vietnam "quagmire."

The "empire" argument is wildly popular among the anti-American set. Maureen Dowd said Dick Cheney and "Rummy" were seeking "the perks of empire," hoping to install "lemon fizzes, cribbage and cricket by the Tower of Babel." She warned that invading Iraq would make them hate us: "How long can it be before the empire strikes back?"

Ah yes—we must mollify angry fanatics who seek our destruction because otherwise they might get mad and seek our destruction.

Gore, too, says America will only create more enemies if "what we represent to the world is an empire." But then he complained that we have "abandoned almost all of Afghanistan"—rather than colonizing it, evidently. He seems to think it is our responsibility to "stabilize the nation of Afghanistan" and recommends that we "assemble a peacekeeping force large enough to pacify the countryside."

And then we bring in the lemon fizzes, cribbage and cricket?

After tiring themselves out all summer yapping about how Bush can't invade Iraq without first consulting Congress, now the Democrats are huffy that they might actually have to vote. On "Meet the Press" a few weeks ago, Sen. Hillary Clinton objected to having to vote on a war resolution before the November elections, saying, "I don't know that we want to put it in a political context."

Yes, it would be outrageous for politicians to have to inform the voters how they stand on important national security issues before an election.

Minority Whip Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., the ranking Democrat on the House intelligence committee, said the Democrats would not have enough information to make an informed decision on Iraq—until January. The war will have to take back seat to urgent issues like prescription drugs and classroom size until then. The Democratic Party simply cannot rouse itself to battle. Instead of obsessing over why angry primitives hate Americans, a more fruitful area for Democrats to examine might be why Americans are beginning to hate Democrats.

Michael T. Klare – Deciphering the Bush Administration's Motives

The United States is about to go to war with Iraq. As of this writing, there are 60,000 U.S. troops already deployed in the area around Iraq, and another 75,000 or so are on their way to the combat zone. Weapons inspectors have found a dozen warheads, designed to carry chemical weapons. Even before this discovery, senior U.S. officials were insisting that Saddam was not cooperating with the United Nations and had to be removed by force. Hence, there does not seem to be any way to stop this war, unless Saddam Hussein is overthrown by members of the Iraqi military or is persuaded to abdicate his position and flee the country.

It is impossible at this point to foresee the outcome of this war. Under the most optimistic scenarios—the ones advanced by proponents of the war— Iraqi forces will put up only token resistance and American forces will quickly capture Baghdad and remove Saddam Hussein from office (by killing him or placing him under arrest). This scenario further assumes that the Iraqis will decline to use their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or will be prevented from doing so by U.S. military action; that civilian casualties will be kept low and that most Iraqis will welcome their "liberation" from Saddam; that a new, pro-U.S. government will quickly and easily

be put into place; that fighting between competing ethnic factions will be limited and easily brought under control; that anti-American protests in other Muslim countries will not get out of hand; and that American forces will be withdrawn after a relatively short occupation period of six months to a year.

It is not difficult, however, to imagine less optimistic scenarios. In these scenarios, the Iraqis could put up stiff resistance and conduct house-to-house fighting in Baghdad, thereby producing significant U.S. casualties and leading in turn, to heavy U.S. air and missile strikes on populated areas, resulting in high civilian casualties. Under these scenarios, the Iraqis will use their chemical and biological weapons in a final spasm of self-destruction, producing untold civilian and combatant casualties. The surviving Iraqis will turn against their American "liberators," resulting in constant sniping and acts of terrorism. The Kurds and Shiites and Sunnis will fight over the spoils of war, producing widespread carnage and trapping U.S. forces in the middle. American troops will remain in Iraq for a generation, or more, producing hatred and resistance throughout the Muslim world and increased levels of terrorism elsewhere.

Which scenario will prevail? Nobody can be certain at this point. Those who favor a war with Iraq tend to believe that Iraqi resistance will be light and that the rest of the optimistic scenario will fall into place. But no one can guarantee that any of this will come to pass, and there are many experts who believe that the likelihood of things going awry are very great. For example, the CIA has indicated that Iraq is most likely to use its WMD in the event that Iraq is attacked and defeat appears likely. In weighing the relative merits of going to war with Iraq, therefore, one should reckon on the worst possible outcome, not the best. One must ask: are the purported benefits of war so great as to outweigh all of the possible negative repercussions?

And this leads to the most fundamental question of all: WHY are we going to war? What is really motivating President Bush and his senior advisers to incur these enormous risks?

In their public pronouncements, President Bush and his associates have advanced three reasons for going to war with Iraq and ousting Saddam Hussein: (1) to eliminate Saddam's WMD arsenals; (2) to diminish the threat of international terrorism; and (3) to promote democracy in Iraq and the surrounding areas.

These are, indeed, powerful motives for going to war. But are they genuine? Is this what is really driving the rush to war? To answer this, we need to examine each motive in turn. In doing so, moreover, it is necessary to keep in mind that the United States cannot do everything. If we commit hundreds of thousands of American troops and hundreds of billions of dollars to the conquest, occupation, and reconstruction of Iraq, we cannot easily do the same in other countries—we simply don't have the resources to invade and occupy every country that poses a hypothetical threat to the United States or is deserving of regime change. So a decision to attack Iraq means a decision to refrain from other actions that might also be important for U.S. security or the good of the world.

1 . Eliminating weapons of mass destruction: The reason most often given by the administration for going to war with Iraq is to reduce the risk of a WMD attack on the United States. To be sure, a significant WMD attack on the United States would be a terrible disaster, and it is appropriate for the President of the United States to take effective and vigorous action to prevent this from happening. If this is, in fact, Bush's primary concern, then one would imagine that he would pay the greatest attention to the greatest threat of WMD usage against the United States, and deploy available U.S. resources — troops, dollars, and diplomacy — accordingly. But is this what Bush is actually doing? The answer is no. Anyone who takes the trouble to examine the global WMD proliferation threat closely and to gauge the relative likelihood of various WMD scenarios would have to conclude that the greatest threat of WMD usage against the United States at the present time comes from North Korea and Pakistan, not Iraq.

North Korea and Pakistan pose a greater WMD threat to the United States than Iraq for several reasons. First of all, they both possess much bigger WMD arsenals. Pakistan is known to possess several dozen nuclear warheads along with missiles and planes capable of delivering them hundreds of miles away; it is also suspected of having developed chemical weapons. North Korea is thought to possess sufficient plutonium to produce one to two nuclear devices along with the capacity to manufacture several more; it also has a large chemical weapons stockpile and a formidable array of ballistic missiles. Iraq, by contrast, possesses no nuclear weapons today and is thought to be several years away from producing one, even under the best of circumstances. Iraq may possess some chemical and biological weapons and a dozen or so Scud-type missiles that were hidden at the end of the 1991 Gulf war, but it is not known whether any of these items are still in working order and available for military use. Equally important is the question of intention: how likely are these countries to actually use their WMD munitions? Nobody can answer this with any degree of certainty, of course. But there are a few things that can be said.

To begin with, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has publicly stated that he was prepared to employ nuclear weapons against India last year when New Delhi massed its forces on Pakistan's border and threatened to attack unless Pakistan curbed the activities of Islamic militants in Kashmir. This does not mean that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons against the United States, but it does indicate a readiness to employ such weapons as an instrument of war; it is also easy to imagine a scenario in which someone else comes to power who is far more anti-American than Musharraf.

Just as worrisome is the fact that the North Koreans have declared that they would consider any move by the United States and the U.N. to impose economic sanctions on North Korea as punishment for its pursuit of nuclear weapons as an act of war, to which they would respond accordingly, turning the United States into a "sea of fire." Again, this does not mean that they would actually choose to use their nuclear weapons, but it is not hard to imagine a scenario in which war breaks out and the North Koreans use their WMD in a desperate bid to stave off defeat.

On the other hand, the CIA has concluded that Saddam Hussein will not choose to use his country's WMD capabilities against the United States so long as his regime remains intact; it is only in the case of imminent U.S. conquest of Baghdad that he might be tempted to use these weapons.

The Bush administration has also indicated that war with Iraq is justified in order to prevent Iraq from providing WMD to anti-American terrorists. The transfer of WMD technology to terrorist groups is a genuine concern—but it is in Pakistan where the greatest threat of such transference exists, not Iraq. In Pakistan, many senior military officers are known to harbor great sympathy for Kashmiri militants and other extremist Islamic movements; with anti-Americanism intensifying throughout the region, it is not hard to imagine these officers providing the militants with some of Pakistan's WMD weapons and technology. On the other hand, the current leadership in Iraq has no such ties with Islamic extremists; on the contrary, Saddam has been a lifelong enemy of the militant Islamists and they view him in an equally hostile manner.

It follows from all this that a policy aimed at protecting the United States from WMD attacks would identify Pakistan and North Korea as the leading perils, and put Iraq in a rather distant third place. But this is not, of course, what the administration is doing. Instead, it has minimized the threat from Pakistan and North Korea and focused almost exclusively on the threat from Iraq. It is clear, then, that protecting the United States from WMD attack is not the primary justification for invading Iraq; if it were, we would be talking about an assault on Pakistan and/or North Korea, not Iraq.

2. Combating terrorism: The administration has argued at great length that an invasion of Iraq and the ouster of Saddam Hussein would constitute the culmination of and the greatest

success in the war against terrorism. Why this is so has never been made entirely clear, but it is said that Saddam's hostility toward the United States somehow sustains and invigorates the terrorist threat to this country. It follows, therefore, that the elimination of Saddam would result in a great defeat for international terrorism and greatly weaken its capacity to attack the United States.

Were any of this true, an invasion of Iraq might make sense from an anti-terrorism point of view. But there simply is no evidence that this is the case; if anything, the opposite is true. From what we know of Al Qaeda and other such organizations, the objective of Islamic extremists is to overthrow any government in the Islamic world that does not adhere to a fundamentalist version of Islam and replace it with one that does. The Baathist regime in Iraq does not qualify as such a regime; thus, under Al Qaeda doctrine, it must be swept away, along with the equally deficient governments in Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. It follows from this that a U.S. effort to oust Saddam Hussein and replace his regime with another secular government—this one kept in place by American military power—will not diminish the wrath of Islamic extremists but rather fuel it.

In addressing this matter, moreover, it is necessary to keep the Israeli-Palestinian struggle in mind. For most Arab Muslims, whatever their views of Saddam Hussein, the United States is a hypocritical power because it tolerates (or even supports) the use of state terror by Israel against the Palestinians while making war against Baghdad for the same sort of behavior. It is this perception that is fueling the anti-American current now running through the Muslim world. An American invasion of Iraq will not quiet that current, but excite it. It is thus exceedingly difficult to see how a U.S. invasion of Iraq will produce a stunning victory in the war against terrorism; if anything, it will trigger a new round of anti-American violence. Hence, it is very difficult to conclude that the administration is motivated by anti-terrorism in seeking to topple Hussein.

3. The promotion of democracy: The ouster of Saddam Hussein, it is claimed, will clear the space for the Iraqi people (under American guidance, of course) to establish a truly democratic government and serve as a beacon and inspiration for the spread of democracy throughout the Islamic world, which is said to be sadly deficient in this respect. Certainly, the spread of democracy to the Islamic world would be a good thing, and should be encouraged. But is there any reason to believe that the administration is motivated by a desire to spread democracy in its rush to war with Iraq?

There are several reasons to doubt this. First of all, many of the top leaders of the current administration, particularly Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney, were completely happy to embrace the Saddam Hussein dictatorship in the 1980s when Iraq was the enemy of our enemy (that is, Iran) and thus considered our *de facto* friend. Under the so-called tilt toward Iraq, the Reagan-Bush administration decided to assist Iraq in its war against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88. As part of this policy, Reagan removed Iraq from the list of countries that support terrorism, thus permitting the provision of billions of dollars' worth of agricultural credits and other forms of assistance to Hussein. The bearer of this good news was none other than Donald Rumsfeld, who traveled to Baghdad and met with Hussein in December 1983 as a special representative of President Reagan. At the same time, the Department of Defense, provided Iraq with secret satellite data on Iranian military positions. This information was provided to Saddam even though U.S. leaders were informed by a senior State Department official on November 1, 1983 that the Iraqis were using chemical weapons against the Iranians "almost daily," and were aware that U.S. satellite data could be used by Baghdad to pinpoint CW attacks on Iranian positions. Dick Cheney, who took over as Secretary of Defense in 1989, continued the practice of supplying Iraq with secret intelligence data. Not once did Messrs. Rumsfeld and Cheney speak out against Iraqi CW use or suggest that the United States discontinue its support of the Hussein dictatorship during this period. So there is no reason

whatsoever to believe that the current leadership has a principled objection to dictatorial rule in Iraq—it is only when Saddam is threatening us instead of our enemies that they care about his tyrannical behavior.

There is another reason to be skeptical about the Bush administration's commitment to democracy in this part of the world, and that is the fact that the administration has developed close relationships with a number of other dictatorial or authoritarian regimes in the area. Most notably, the United States had developed close ties with the post-Soviet dictatorships in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. Each of these countries is ruled by a Stalin-ist dictator who once served as a loyal agent of the Soviet empire: Heydar Aliyev in Azerbaijan, Nursultan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan, and Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan. Only slightly less odious than Saddam Hussein, these tyrants have been welcomed to the White House and showered with American aid and support. And there certainly is nothing even remotely democratic about Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, two of America's other close allies in the region. So it is hard to believe that the Bush administration is motivated by a love of democracy, when it has been so quick to embrace patently undemocratic regimes that have agreed to do its bidding.

So, if concern over WMD proliferation, or the reduction of terrorism, or a love of democracy do not explain the administration's determination to oust Saddam Hussein, what does?

I believe that the answer is a combination of three factors, all related to the pursuit of oil and the preservation of America's status as the paramount world power. Ever since the end of the cold war, American policymakers (whether Democratic or Republican) have sought to preserve America's "sole superpower" status and to prevent the rise of a "peer competitor" that could challenge U.S. paramountcy on anything approaching equal terms. At the same time, American leaders have become increasingly concerned over the country's growing dependence on imported oil, especially oil from the Persian Gulf. The United States now relies on imported oil for 55% of its requirements, and this percentage is expected to rise to 65% in 2020 and keep growing thereafter. This dependency is the "Achilles heel" for American power: unless Persian Gulf oil can be kept under American control, our ability to remain the dominant world power would be put into question.

These concerns undergird the three motives for a U.S. invasion of Iraq. The first derives from America's own dependence on Persian Gulf oil and from the principle, formally enshrined in the Carter Doctrine, that the United States will not permit a hostile state from ever coming into a position where it can threaten America's access to the Gulf. The second is the pivotal role played by the Persian Gulf in supplying oil to the rest of the world: whoever controls the Gulf automatically maintains a stranglehold on the global economy, and the Bush administration wants that to be the United States and no one else. And the third is anxiety about the future availability of oil: the United States is becoming increasingly dependent on Saudi Arabia to supply its imported petroleum, and Washington is desperate to find an alternative to Saudi Arabia should it ever be the case that access to that country is curtailed — and the only country in the world with large enough reserves to compensate for the loss of Saudi Arabia is Iraq. Let us examine each of these three factors in turn.

First, on U.S. dependence on Persian Gulf oil and the Carter Doctrine. Ever since World War II, when American policymakers first acknowledged that the United States would someday become dependent on Middle Eastern petroleum, it has been American policy to ensure that the United States would always have unrestrained access to Persian Gulf oil. At first, the United States relied on Great Britain to protect American access to the Gulf, and then, when Britain pulled out of the area in 1971, the U.S. chose to rely on the Shah of Iran. But when, in 1979, the Shah was overthrown by Islamic militants loyal to the Ayatollah Khomeini, Washington decided that it would have to assume responsibility on its own to protect the oil flow. The result was the Carter Doctrine of January 23, 1980, which states that unrestricted access to Persian Gulf is a vital interest of the United States and that, in protection of that interest, the United States will employ "any means necessary, including

military force."

This principle was first invoked in 1987, during the Iran-Iraq War, when Iranian gunboats fired on Kuwaiti oil tankers and the U.S. Navy began escorting Kuwaiti tankers through the Gulf. It was next invoked in August 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait and posed an implied threat to Saudi Arabia. President Bush the elder responded to that threat by driving the Iraqis out of Kuwait, in Operation Desert Storm; he did not, however, continue the war into Iraq proper and remove Saddam Hussein himself. Instead, the U.S. engaged in the "containment" of Iraq, entailing an air and sea blockade.

Now, President Bush the younger seeks to abandon containment and pick up Operation Desert Storm where it left off in 1991. The reason being given for this is that Saddam is making more progress in the development of WMD, but the underlying principle is still the Carter Doctrine: Iraq under Saddam poses an implied threat to U.S. access to Persian Gulf oil, and so must be removed. As noted by Vice President Dick Cheney on August 26, 2002, in his important speech before the Veterans of Foreign Wars, "Armed with these weapons of terror and a seat at the top of 10% of the world's oil reserves, Saddam Hussein could then be expected to seek domination of the entire Middle East, take control of a great portion of the world's energy supplies, directly threaten America's friends throughout the region, and subject the United States or any other nation to nuclear blackmail." Stripped to its essence, this is a direct invocation of the Carter Doctrine.

To underscore this, it is useful to compare Cheney's VFW speech to his comments 12 years earlier, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, before the Senate Armed Services Committee: "Iraq controlled 10% of the world's reserves prior to the invasion of Kuwait. Once Saddam Hussein took Kuwait, he doubled that to approximately 20% of the world's known oil reserves. . . . Once he acquired Kuwait and deployed an army as large as the one he possesses [on the border of Saudi Arabia], he was clearly in a position to dictate the future of worldwide energy policy, and that gave him a stranglehold on our economy and on that of most of the other nations of the world as well." The atmospherics may have changed since 1990, but we are still dealing with the Carter Doctrine: Saddam must be removed because of the potential threat he poses to the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to the U.S. and its allies.

The second administration objective springs from the language employed by Cheney in his 1990 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee: whoever controls the flow of Persian Gulf oil has a "stranglehold" not only on our economy but also "on that of most of that of the other nations of the world as well." This is a powerful image, and perfectly describes the administration's thinking about the Gulf area, except in reverse: by serving as the dominant power in the Gulf, WE maintain a "stranglehold" over the economies of other nations. This gives us extraordinary leverage in world affairs, and explains to some degree why states like Japan, Britain, France, and Germany—states that are even more dependent on Persian Gulf oil than we are—defer to Washington on major international issues (like Iraq) even when they disagree with us.

Maintenance of a stranglehold over Persian Gulf oil is also consistent with the administration's declared goal of attaining permanent military superiority over all other nations. If you read administration statements on U.S. national security policy, you will find that one theme stands out above all others: the United States must prevent any potential rival from ever reaching the point where it could compete with the United States on something resembling equal standing. As articulated in "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America" (released by President Bush in September 2002), this principle holds that American forces must be "strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States."

One way to accomplish this, of course, is to pursue advances in technology that allow the United States to remain ahead of all potential rivals in military systems—which is what the administration hopes to accomplish by adding tens of billions of dollars to the Department of

Defense budget. Another way to do this is maintain a stranglehold on the economy of potential rivals, so that they will refrain from challenging us out of fear of being choked to death through the denial of vital energy supplies. Japan and the European countries are already in this vulnerable position, and will remain so for the foreseeable future; but now China is also moving into this position, as it becomes increasingly dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf. Like the U.S., China is running out of oil, and, like us, it has nowhere to go to make up the difference except the Gulf. But since WE control access to the Gulf, and China lacks the power to break our stranglehold, we can keep China in a vulnerable, subordinate position indefinitely. As I see it, then, the removal of Saddam Hussein and his replacement by someone beholden to the United States is a key part of a broader U.S. strategy aimed at assuring permanent American global dominance. Or, as Michael Ignatieff put it in his seminal essay on America's emerging empire, the concentration of so much oil in the Gulf "makes it what a military strategist would call the empire's center of gravity" ("The Burden," *The New York Times Magazine*, January 5, 2003).

And finally, there is the issue of America's long-term energy dilemma. The problem is as follows: The United States relies on oil to supply about 40% of its energy requirements, more than any other source. At one time, this country relied almost entirely on domestic oil to supply its needs; but our need for oil is growing all the time and our domestic fields—among the oldest in the world—are rapidly being exhausted. So our need for imported oil will grow with each passing year. And the more we turn to foreign sources for our oil, the more we will have to turn to the Persian Gulf, because most of the world's untapped oil—at least two-thirds of it—is located in the Gulf area. We can of course rip up Alaska and extract every drop of oil there, but that would reduce our dependence on imported oil by only about 1-2 percentage points—an insignificant amount. We could also rely for a share of our oil on non-Gulf suppliers like Russia, Venezuela, the Caspian Sea states, and Africa, but they have much less oil than the*-Persian Gulf countries and they are using it up faster. So, the more you look into the future, the greater will become our dependence on the Gulf.

Now, at the current time, U.S. dependence on Persian Gulf oil means, in all practical terms, American dependence on Saudi Arabia, because Saudi Arabia has more oil than everyone else—about 250 billion barrels, or one-fourth of world reserves. That gives Saudi Arabia a lot of indirect influence over our economy and our way of life. And, as you know, there are many people in this country who are resentful of the Saudis because of their financial ties to charities linked to Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. More to the point, Saudi Arabia is a major backer of OPEC and tends to control the global availability of oil—something that makes American officials very nervous, especially when the Saudis use their power to put pressure on the United States to alter some of its policies, for example with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

For all of these reasons, American leaders would like to reduce America's dependence on Saudi Arabia. But there is only ONE way to permanently reduce America's reliance on Saudi Arabia: by taking over Iraq and using it as an alternative source of petroleum. Iraq is the ONLY country in the world with sufficient reserves to balance Saudi Arabia: at least 112 billion barrels in proven reserves, and as much as 200-300 billion barrels of potential reserves. By occupying Iraq and controlling its government, the United States will solve its long-term oil-dependency dilemma for a decade or more. And this, I believe, is a major consideration in the administration's decisionmaking about Iraq.

It is this set of factors, I believe, that explain the Bush administration's determination to go to war with Iraq—not concern over WMD, terrorism, or the spread of democracy. But having said this, we need to ask: do these objectives, assuming they're the correct ones, still justify a war on Iraq? Some Americans may think so. There are, indeed, advantages to being positioned on the inside of a powerful empire with control over the world's second-largest supply of untapped petroleum. If nothing else, American motorists will be able to afford the gas for their SUVs, vans, and pick-up trucks for another decade, and maybe longer. There will also be lots of jobs in the

military and in the military-industrial complex, or as representatives of American multinational corporations (although, with respect to the latter, I would not advise traveling in most of the rest of the world unless accompanied by a small army of bodyguards). But there will also be a price to pay. Empires tend to require the militarization of society, and that will entail putting more people into uniform, one way or another. It will also mean increased spending on war, and reduced spending on education and other domestic needs. It will entail more secrecy and intrusion into our private lives. All of this has to be entered into the equation. And if you ask me, empire is not worth the price.

Kenneth Pollack – Can We Really Deter A Nuclear-Armed Saddam?

Saddam Hussein is one of the most reckless, aggressive, violence-prone, risk-tolerant, and damage-tolerant leaders of modern history. While he may not be insane, he is often delusional in constructing fantastic conceptions of how his actions are likely to play out. He is driven by paranoia over his internal situation, which makes him insensitive and rash in his external actions. All of these traits have been boldly displayed throughout his years as Iraq's leader. They do not seem to make him impossible to deter, but they do appear to make him difficult to deter in most circumstances and impossible to deter in some. For example, given Saddam's concerns about his internal position and his incredible set of misconceptions about the United States, it is doubtful that he could have been deterred from invading Kuwait in 1990.

Although it is unwise to predict what Saddam Hussein will not do, it does seem unlikely that he would employ nuclear weapons as soon as he got them—to wipe out Tel Aviv, for example. Saddam generally uses violence instrumentally, rather than gratuitously—with the important exception being cases of revenge. Again, based on what we know of his thinking, he would likely understand that a nuclear attack on Tel Aviv would invite his own incineration. Some Israeli analysts have noted that the Iraqi regime has staged large-scale evacuations of Baghdad and that some Iraqi military officers have talked as if they believed they could survive a nuclear retaliation from Israel. However, if nothing else, Saddam's behavior during the Gulf War indicates that he is wary enough of nuclear weapons that he probably will not deliberately court a nuclear attack on Baghdad by launching one of his own—at least not out of the blue. Instead, as his own thinking and actions demonstrate (as best we understand them), the much greater threat is that he will believe that his possession of nuclear weapons will allow him to carry out lesser acts of aggression because the United States, Israel, and anyone else would themselves be deterred from responding effectively.

If Saddam had nuclear weapons, especially weapons deliverable by ballistic missiles (which is his goal), Iraq's geographic location at the head of the Persian Gulf would allow him to threaten the destruction of a number of targets of great importance to the United States. Iraq's al-Husseini missiles can reach all of Israel, Jordan, and Syria; northeastern Saudi Arabia, including Riyadh, Dhahran, and virtually all of the Saudi oil fields; western Iran, including Tehran and the Iranian oil fields in Khuzestan; and eastern Turkey. The Saudi oil fields are a particularly worrisome target. A single well-placed nuclear weapon or several less well-targeted nuclear weapons could wipe out 75 to 95 percent of all Saudi oil production. Moreover, because of the extent of both the immediate damage and the long-term radiation from a nuclear blast, it is entirely unclear when that capacity could be restored: it could take decades. At present, Saudi Arabia accounts for 15 percent of global oil production (and Iraq and Kuwait together account for another 7 percent). The world has never experienced a supply shock anything like the instantaneous loss of 15 to 22 percent of global oil production. By way of comparison, the 1973 oil embargo withdrew only 2.75 percent of global oil production from the market, and the Iranian revolution withdrew 5.68 percent. Although economists and oil experts caution that we cannot foresee all of the grievous ramifications of such an event, there is widespread agreement that it

would cause a global recession probably on the scale of the Great Depression of the 1930s, if not worse.

The problem is not so much U.S. dependence on Iraqi and Saudi oil (although both are now among the top five exporters to the United States) but global economic dependence on cheap oil. The loss of so much of the world's oil—and so much of the world's spare production capacity, most of which is in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait—would drive oil prices to astronomical levels in the short run, causing massive recessions in every nation's economy because oil is so critical both directly as an input into their transportation, heating, and manufacturing sectors, and also indirectly because of its importance to the advanced Western powers that dominate the world's trade. Nor could the strategic petroleum reserves of the United States, Europe, and Japan do more than cushion the blow for a brief period of time. The roughly 1 billion barrels in all of these reserve holdings would make up for the loss of Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Iraqi oil for only about two months at current production rates. Eventually, the global economy would find ways to adapt, conserve, and employ alternative fuels, but this would take years. In the meantime, the world would endure a nightmarish transition.

As Saddam's enumeration of his Gulf War mistakes makes clear, he is well aware of the importance of Persian Gulf oil production to the entire world, particularly the West. This knowledge, plus his ability to target so many other cities of important U.S. allies, would create opportunities for great mischief if he chose to hold the oil fields or those cities hostage to his designs. It is not hard to devise scenarios in which a future, nuclear-armed Iraq could pose terrible choices for the United States:

- At a future date when U.S. forces in the Gulf region have been drawn down (a likely outcome if the United States opts for deterrence because the Saudis will likely insist on it) and Gulf state politics are sensitive to charges of pandering to Washington, Saddam could again mass his forces near Kuwait, counting on the political climate to delay a Gulf Cooperation Council invitation to the United States to reinforce its presence in the region. Saddam could then invade Kuwait and perhaps continue driving on to the Saudi oil fields (assuming Iraqi logistics could handle the operation), threatening to wipe out the oil fields with one or more well-placed nuclear explosions if the United States intervened. This would certainly be in keeping with our understanding of his views regarding the mistakes he made during the Gulf War. The United States and its allies would be faced with the choice of intervening anyway and risking the loss of 22 percent of global oil production, possibly permanently, or giving Saddam control of that same share of the world's oil wealth.

- At some point, Saddam might try to take advantage of instability in the fragile Kingdom of Jordan—or manufacture it using his economic leverage and large intelligence presence—to topple the government in Amman. The new government might then invite in Iraqi troops to help it secure control. Who knows why Saddam might want to do such a thing—to gain a better position to influence the Arab-Israeli dispute, to reassert his bid to Arab leadership, or for some other reason known only to himself—but his invasions of Kuwait and Iran were equally mystifying at the time. The problem is that Jordan's current economic and political frailty creates the opportunity for him to do so. In the past, such an Iraqi move would have crossed an Israeli "red line" for the use of force and likely would have provoked an American military response as well. Saddam might again calculate that by threatening the Saudi oil fields, Tel Aviv, or other regional targets with nuclear weapons he could preclude such a response.

- Since the death of Hafiz al-Asad in 2000, the stability of the Syrian regime has also been a question mark. If the Alawis who rule in Damascus fell to feuding, Saddam might be tempted to intervene to install a government more to his liking. Alternatively, Iraq has nurtured a long-standing rivalry with its fellow Baathists in Syria, and it is plausible that the relationship could

sour again in the future, prompting a resort to force as Saddam has done so many times in the past. Although neither the United States nor many of our allies would mourn the loss of the Syrian regime, no one would be pleased to have it replaced by a pro-Iraqi government that might move Iraqi troops to the borders of Jordan and Israel, and possibly into Lebanon. Once again, if Saddam possessed nuclear weapons, the available evidence indicates that he might believe he could deter Israel and/or the United States from intervening if he chose such a course of action.

- Finally, a nuclear-armed Saddam would also raise fears for NATO ally Turkey. Ankara and Baghdad have generally enjoyed good relations over the years, but with Saddam at the helm in Iraq there is no reason to believe this might not change overnight. After all, it was widely believed that Iraq enjoyed reasonably good relations with Kuwait until the spring of 1990. Differences could arise between them over water, the Kurds, Syria, Israel (with which Turkey has an informal alliance), or U.S.-Iraqi relations, to name only the most obvious. It is conceivable that in the future if Turkey chose to draw more water from the Tigris and Euphrates to meet its own needs, Saddam might decide to respond with force—by occupying the upper reaches of the rivers or destroying some of the Turkish dams—again believing that his own nuclear arsenal would not only limit the Turkish response but also deter the United States and Israel from intervening.

Saddam was born in 1937 or 1939 and is in distressingly good health as far as anyone outside himself and his doctor knows. He could easily live to be seventy-five, eighty, or even older. Consequently, we should not expect him to die before he can either acquire nuclear weapons or make further mischief in the region.

This raises another important question: What will happen at the end of Saddam's life if he has nuclear weapons? Let us imagine that we are able to successfully deter him for the remainder of his life because he does decide not to risk his own survival by starting down the path of nuclear confrontation with the United States or Israel (or Iran, once it acquires nuclear weapons). What bizarre notions would run through his mind as he confronted his own mortality without having achieved any of his grandiose visions? We could not rule out the possibility that he would decide to choose the time and place of his own demise by ordering a nuclear strike on Tel Aviv so that he could go down in history as the Arab leader who finally obliterated the state of Israel. Saddam's former Mukhabbarat chief, Wafiq al-Samarra'i, told PBS's *Frontline*, "Perhaps now, I'm seriously considering that Saddam might use this weapon when he's about to die. Perhaps he will use it before he dies. And perhaps he would say to himself that he will be immortalized in history textbooks." Just because this makes little sense to a Westerner does not mean it would not make perfect sense to "the leader of the days of Arab glory."

Saddam is unpredictable, but this is not to suggest that he is inexplicable. It is usually possible to figure out why Saddam did something after the fact, but it is hard to predict ahead of time what he might do. What's more, because the most important catalyst in his thinking is often exaggerated internal threats that the world knows nothing about—since Iraq is such a heavily guarded police state—we do not always know when Saddam is even considering a momentous action. Consequently, the United States cannot always count on having time to bolster its deterrent posture to prepare for a challenge from Saddam. This is likely to be even more true in the future as Iraq takes advantage of the liberalization of the economic sanctions to restore its logistical capability, thereby enhancing Saddam's ability to deploy large conventional forces quickly.

Would Saddam be willing to employ nuclear weapons? Would he be willing to vaporize part or all of the Saudi oil fields in pursuit of an objective? We don't know. To a Westerner, there might be little in such a course of action that would make sense. The risks might seem too great. But the key question is: Can we trust Saddam to reach the same conclusions? Given his

track record, it would be foolhardy to do so. Saddam Hussein has repeatedly demonstrated that he thinks in strange and convoluted ways that often contradict what any Westerner—or even any other Iraqi—might think sensible. There is little in Saddam's personality or his history in power to suggest that he would feel a need for prudence or restraint once he acquired nuclear weapons. Instead, all of the evidence that we have indicates that he would feel emboldened by them to pursue his more grandiose objectives.

Would the United States be willing to intervene if Iraq possessed nuclear weapons and threatened one of its neighbors with a lesser degree of violence? And how would Saddam react if we did? Again, we don't know. The answers are probably irrelevant. Given Saddam's propensity to violence, constant miscalculations, willingness to accept terrible damage in pursuit of a goal, unwillingness to back down unless he has actually suffered terrible damage, and belief in his own messianic destiny, we could not and should not rule out any reaction from him. He would be the most dangerous leader in the world with whom to get into a nuclear confrontation.

What About His Biological and Chemical Arsenals?

This article has focused principally on the threat posed by Saddam's ultimate, and probably inevitable, acquisition of nuclear weapons. The obvious "elephant in the living room" that it has so far overlooked is the arsenal of deadly biological and chemical weapons that he is believed to possess already. And the obvious question lying out there unanswered is: Don't they create similar threats for the United States and our regional allies?

Biological and chemical warfare agents in Saddam's hands are unquestionably very dangerous. It would be much, much better for the region, the United States, and the whole world if he did not possess those weapons. If employed properly, VX gas could kill thousands of people, and some of Iraq's biological agents could kill millions. Many analysts fear that at some point in time, Saddam may be able to acquire biological agents (such as smallpox) that could potentially kill far more people than could a nuclear weapon.

However, there are some important differences between the threats posed; by chemical and biological agents and those posed by nuclear weapons—differences that continue to place nuclear weapons in a category by themselves. First of all, it is much harder to kill huge numbers of people with CW and BW weapons. It is not impossible, but it requires a vulnerable population under the right set of conditions and with the right mechanism to deliver the agents. Introducing VX into the air-conditioning system of a large office building or spraying a small city with BW in a crop duster on a cool day with only a mild breeze can produce catastrophic results. In addition, because of the fear they produce, CW and BW can kill a lot of people just from overreactions due to panic.

By the same token, if a would-be mass murderer lacks those conditions and that access, chemical and biological agents can produce disappointing results. CW and BW agents are dangerous to handle. Chemical warfare agents degrade over time—and in ways very dangerous to those storing or handling them—while biological warfare agents can die if not stored properly. Chemical warfare agents can evaporate if it's too hot, and both can dissipate quickly if it is too windy. Countermeasures are often possible, in the form of protective clothing for chemical warfare and vaccines or antidotes for biological warfare. What's more, both are relatively tough to deliver promptly at strategic distances (i.e., hundreds of kilometers). This is hardest to do by missile, and, as noted, Iraq is not known to have solved its problems with missile delivery of CW and BW agents. The Iraqi Air Force is in pathetic shape at present and is likely to be the last of Iraq's military services to revive. Even then, U.S. air defenses so outmatch even potential Iraqi Air Force capabilities that Saddam could not have any real confidence that a CW- or BW-armed aircraft would reach its target. Terrorist methods are the best means of delivering CW and BW, and Saddam is leery of international terrorists, who are largely beyond his control, while his

own intelligence services have thus far shown little ability to perform sophisticated terrorist operations. Again, this is not to suggest that we should ignore these threats, only that the risk is appreciably less than with a nuclear weapon, which only has to be near enough people when it is detonated to kill millions.

Second, the concept of thousands of civilian deaths from chemical warfare, let alone millions from biological warfare, remains in the realm of conjecture. No one has actually ever seen this happen. It is theoretically possible, but most people also recognize that there are means of defense—gas masks and inoculations or antidotes. Gruesome as it may sound, until a chemical or biological attack does cause mass casualties, these weapons will not provoke the same degree of fear as is caused by nuclear weapons—against which no defense is possible and for which we have the legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to remind us of the scale of devastation they cause. This point is important because it makes chemical and biological weapons much less useful to Saddam as deterrents of his own. As long as the world believes that nuclear weapons trump chemical and biological weapons, Saddam will be more cautious about his foreign adventures.

Saddam himself recognizes this distinction. His order to start a crash program to build a single nuclear weapon in August 1990, and his admission after the war that it was a mistake to have invaded Kuwait until he had nuclear weapons, both speak clearly to this point. Whatever his own reasoning, Saddam understands that his existing arsenal lacks the deterrent power of nuclear weapons. This is critical to U.S. policy because it strongly suggests that Saddam will be less likely to undertake new foreign adventures while all he has are his extant capabilities. Thus the potential for a crisis with Saddam is much lower if all he has is chemical and biological weapons, as is the risk that such a crisis could result in the death of millions. There is no question that the world would be better off if Saddam did not have these weapons, but the danger is considerably less than if Saddam were allowed to acquire nuclear weapons, which he believes will deter the United States and Israel and thereby would encourage him to engage in the kind of foreign aggression that would be likely to provoke a nuclear crisis.

Gambling with Our Future

Deterrence is a policy with terrible costs. It means condemning the Iraqi people to decades more terror and torture under Saddam's totalitarianism. Unlike containment, deterrence also means giving up our ability to protect the Kurds. Human Rights Watch argues that Saddam's Anfal campaign constituted genocide against the Kurds. Certainly, it was horrific, with as many as 200,000 killed, 4,000 villages razed, and widespread and indiscriminate use of chemical warfare against Kurdish civilians. If we opt for deterrence, there will be no one to restrain Saddam should he decide to solve his Kurdish "problem" once and for all.

In addition, those who argue for deterrence for fear of the costs of an invasion, and, particularly, fear of Iraqi WMD use and terrorism, are setting a very dangerous precedent. They are, in effect, suggesting that the United States is already deterred by the weak arsenal of weapons of mass destruction Saddam already possesses and his similarly weak terrorist capabilities. In other words, a policy of deterrence toward Iraq not only is based on the belief that Saddam can be deterred but starts from the assumption that the United States already is. If the United States can be deterred from taking military action against Iraq given its current modest capabilities, every rogue state in the world will have little to do to ensure its security and will likely be emboldened to greater aggression. We would be allowing our hands to be tied with very weak string.

Deterrence also runs terrible risks. Although the alternatives are considerably more costly, deterrence is the riskiest of all the policy options available to the United States. We would be betting that we could deter a man who has proven to be hard (at times, impossible) to deter and who seems to believe that if he possessed nuclear weapons, it is the United States that would

be deterred. If we were to make this bet and lose, the results would be catastrophic. Moreover, while deterrence is difficult enough, we would actually be trying to employ extended deterrence to Iraq's neighbors—deterring Iraq from attacking Kuwait, Jordan, or Saudi Arabia, rather than simply protecting ourselves. Patrick Morgan, one of the architects of Cold War deterrence theory, observes that "it is hard to make an extended deterrence threat to use WMD credible, particularly if the 'challenger' is also armed with them."

The use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world would be terrible. Their use on the Persian Gulf oil fields; against Tel Aviv, Ankara, Riyadh, or another regional city; or against U.S. military forces in the region is unimaginable. This would be no academic exercise or Pentagon war game to decide how many people one side could lose in the pursuit of victory; regardless of what else happened, such an event would be a tragedy and a disaster. Beyond this, Saddam Hussein with nuclear weapons has the potential to push the world into a second Great Depression while killing millions of people. His track record argues that if we allow him to acquire nuclear weapons, we are likely to find ourselves in a new crisis with him in which we will not be able to predict what he will do, and his personality and his history can only lead us to expect the worst. Leaving Saddam free to acquire nuclear weapons and then hoping that in spite of his track record he can be deterred would be a terrifically dangerous gamble.

John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt – An Unnecessary War

In the full-court press for war with Iraq, the Bush administration deems Saddam Hussein reckless, ruthless, and not fully rational. Such a man, when mixed with nuclear weapons, is too unpredictable to be prevented from threatening the United States, the hawks say. But scrutiny of his past dealings with the world shows that Saddam, though cruel and calculating, is eminently deterrable.

Should the United States invade Iraq and depose Saddam Hussein? If the United States is already at war with Iraq when this article is published, the immediate cause is likely to be Saddam's failure to comply with the new U.N. inspections regime to the Bush administration's satisfaction. But this failure is not the real reason Saddam and the United States have been on a collision course over the past year.

The deeper root of the conflict is the U.S. position that Saddam must be toppled because he cannot be deterred from using weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Advocates of preventive war use numerous arguments to make their case, but their trump card is the charge that Saddam's past behavior proves he is too reckless, relentless, and aggressive to be allowed to possess WMD, especially nuclear weapons. They sometimes admit that war against Iraq might be costly, might lead to a lengthy U.S. occupation, and might complicate U.S. relations with other countries. But these concerns are eclipsed by the belief that the combination of Saddam plus nuclear weapons is too dangerous to accept. For that reason alone, he has to go.

Even many opponents of preventive war seem to agree deterrence will not work in Iraq. Instead of invading Iraq and overthrowing the regime, however, these moderates favor using the threat of war to compel Saddam to permit new weapons inspections. Their hope is that inspections will eliminate any hidden WMD stockpiles and production facilities and ensure Saddam cannot acquire any of these deadly weapons. Thus, both the hard-line preventive-war advocates and the more moderate supporters of inspections accept the same basic premise: Saddam Hussein is not deterrable, and he cannot be allowed to obtain a nuclear arsenal.

One problem with this argument: It is almost certainly wrong. The belief that Saddam's past behavior shows he cannot be contained rests on distorted history and faulty logic. In fact, the historical record shows that the United States can contain Iraq effectively—even if Saddam has nuclear weapons—just as it contained the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Regardless of

whether Iraq complies with U.N. inspections or what the inspectors find, the campaign to wage war against Iraq rests on a flimsy foundation.

Is Saddam a Serial Aggressor?

Those who call for preventive war begin by portraying Saddam as a serial aggressor bent on dominating the Persian Gulf. The war party also contends that Saddam is either irrational or prone to serious miscalculation, which means he may not be deterred by even credible threats of retaliation. Kenneth Pollack, former director for Gulf affairs at the National Security Council and a proponent of war with Iraq, goes so far as to argue that Saddam is "unintentionally suicidal."

The facts, however, tell a different story. Saddam has dominated Iraqi politics for more than 30 years. During that period, he started two wars against his neighbors—Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990. Saddam's record in this regard is no worse than that of neighboring states such as Egypt or Israel, each of which played a role in starting several wars since 1948. Furthermore, a careful look at Saddam's two wars shows his behavior was far from reckless. Both times, he attacked because Iraq was vulnerable and because he believed his targets were weak and isolated. In each case, his goal was to rectify Iraq's strategic dilemma with a limited military victory. Such reasoning does not excuse Saddam's aggression, but his willingness to use force on these occasions hardly demonstrates that he cannot be deterred.

The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-88

Iran was the most powerful state in the Persian Gulf during the 1970s. Its strength was partly due to its large population (roughly three times that of Iraq) and its oil reserves, but it also stemmed from the strong support the shah of Iran received from the United States. Relations between Iraq and Iran were quite hostile throughout this period, but Iraq was in no position to defy Iran's regional dominance. Iran put constant pressure on Saddam's regime during the early 1970s, mostly by fomenting unrest among Iraq's sizable Kurdish minority. Iraq finally persuaded the shah to stop meddling with the Kurds in 1975, but only by agreeing to cede half of the Shatt al-Arab waterway to Iran, a concession that underscored Iraq's weakness.

It is thus not surprising that Saddam welcomed the shah's ouster in 1979. Iraq went to considerable lengths to foster good relations with Iran's revolutionary leadership. Saddam did not exploit the turmoil in Iran to gain strategic advantage over his neighbor and made no attempt to reverse his earlier concessions, even though Iran did not fully comply with the terms of the 1975 agreement. Ruhollah Khomeini, on the other hand, was determined to extend his revolution across the Islamic world, starting with Iraq. By late 1979, Tehran was pushing the Kurdish and Shiite populations in Iraq to revolt and topple Saddam, and Iranian operatives were trying to assassinate senior Iraqi officials. Border clashes became increasingly frequent by April 1980, largely at Iran's instigation.

Facing a grave threat to his regime, but aware that Iran's military readiness had been temporarily disrupted by the revolution, Saddam launched a limited war against his bitter foe on September 22, 1980. His principal aim was to capture a large slice of territory along the Iraq-Iran border, not to conquer Iran or topple Khomeini. "The war began," as military analyst Efraim Karsh writes, "because the weaker state, Iraq, attempted to resist the hegemonic aspirations of its stronger neighbor, Iran, to reshape the regional status quo according to its own image."

Iran and Iraq fought for eight years, and the war cost the two antagonists more than 1 million casualties and at least \$ 150 billion. Iraq received considerable outside support from other countries—including the United States, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and France—largely because these states were determined to prevent the spread of Khomeini's Islamic revolution. Although the war cost Iraq far more than Saddam expected, it also thwarted Khomeini's attempt to topple

him and dominate the region. War with Iran was not a reckless adventure; it was an opportunistic response to a significant threat.

The Gulf War, 1990-91

But what about Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990? Perhaps the earlier war with Iran was essentially defensive, but surely this was not true in the case of Kuwait. Doesn't Saddam's decision to invade his tiny neighbor prove he is too rash and aggressive to be trusted with the most destructive weaponry? And doesn't his refusal to withdraw, even when confronted by a superior coalition, demonstrate he is "unintentionally suicidal"?

The answer is no. Once again, a careful look shows Saddam was neither mindlessly aggressive nor particularly reckless. If anything, the evidence supports the opposite conclusion.

Saddam's decision to invade Kuwait was primarily an attempt to deal with Iraq's continued vulnerability. Iraq's economy, badly damaged by its war with Iran, continued to decline after that war ended. An important cause of Iraq's difficulties was Kuwait's refusal both to loan Iraq \$ 10 billion and to write off debts Iraq had incurred during the Iran-Iraq War. Saddam believed Iraq was entitled to additional aid because the country helped protect Kuwait and other Gulf states from Iranian expansionism. To make matters worse, Kuwait was overproducing the quotas set by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, which drove down world oil prices and reduced Iraqi oil profits. Saddam tried using diplomacy to solve the problem, but Kuwait hardly budged. As Karsh and fellow Hussein biographer Inari Rautsi note, the Kuwaitis "suspected that some concessions might be necessary, but were determined to reduce them to the barest minimum."

Saddam reportedly decided on war sometime in July 1990, but before sending his army into Kuwait, he approached the United States to find out how it would react. In a now famous interview with the Iraqi leader, U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie told Saddam, "[W]e have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait." The U.S. State Department had earlier told Saddam that Washington had "no special defense or security commitments to Kuwait." The United States may not have intended to give Iraq a green light, but that is effectively what it did.

Saddam invaded Kuwait in early August 1990. This act was an obvious violation of international law, and the United States was justified in opposing the invasion and organizing a coalition against it. But Saddam's decision to invade was hardly irrational or reckless. Deterrence did not fail in this case; it was never tried.

But what about Saddam's failure to leave Kuwait once the United States demanded a return to the status quo ante? Wouldn't a prudent leader have abandoned Kuwait before getting clobbered? With hindsight, the answer seems obvious, but Saddam had good reasons to believe hanging tough might work. It was not initially apparent that the United States would actually fight, and most Western military experts predicted the Iraqi army would mount a formidable defense. These forecasts seem foolish today, but many people believed them before the war began.

Once the U.S. air campaign had seriously damaged Iraq's armed forces, however, Saddam began searching for a diplomatic solution that would allow him to retreat from Kuwait before a ground war began. Indeed, Saddam made clear he was willing to pull out completely. Instead of allowing Iraq to withdraw and fight another day, then U.S. President George H.W. Bush and his administration wisely insisted the Iraqi army leave its equipment behind as it withdrew. As the administration had hoped, Saddam could not accept this kind of deal.

Saddam undoubtedly miscalculated when he attacked Kuwait, but the history of warfare is full of cases where leaders have misjudged the prospects for war. No evidence suggests Hussein did not weigh his options carefully, however. He chose to use force because he was

facing a serious challenge and because he had good reasons to think his invasion would not provoke serious opposition.

Nor should anyone forget that the Iraqi tyrant survived the Kuwait debacle, just as he has survived other threats against his regime. He is now beginning his fourth decade in power. If he is really "unintentionally suicidal," then his survival instincts appear to be even more finely honed.

History provides at least two more pieces of evidence that demonstrate Saddam is deferrable. First, although he launched conventionally armed Scud missiles at Saudi Arabia and Israel during the Gulf War, he did not launch chemical or biological weapons at the coalition forces that were decimating the Iraqi military. Moreover, senior Iraqi officials—including Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz and the former head of military intelligence, General Wafiq al-Samarrai—have said that Iraq refrained from using chemical weapons because the Bush Sr. administration made ambiguous but unmistakable threats to retaliate if Iraq used WMD. Second, in 1994 Iraq mobilized the remnants of its army on the Kuwait border in an apparent attempt to force a modification of the U.N. Special Commission's (UNSCOM) weapons inspection regime. But when the United Nations issued a new warning and the United States reinforced its troops in Kuwait, Iraq backed down quickly. In both cases, the allegedly irrational Iraqi leader was deterred.

Saddam's Use of Chemical Weapons

Preventive-war advocates also use a second line of argument. They point out that Saddam has used WMD against his own people (the Kurds) and against Iran and that therefore he is likely to use them against the United States. Thus, U.S. President George W. Bush recently warned in Cincinnati that the Iraqi WMD threat against the United States "is already significant, and it only grows worse with time." The United States, in other words, is in imminent danger.

Saddam's record of chemical weapons use is deplorable, but none of his victims had a similar arsenal and thus could not threaten to respond in kind. Iraq's calculations would be entirely different when facing the United States because Washington could retaliate with WMD if Iraq ever decided to use these weapons first. Saddam thus has no incentive to use chemical or nuclear weapons against the United States and its allies—unless his survival is threatened. This simple logic explains why he did not use WMD against U.S. forces during the Gulf War and has not fired chemical or biological warheads at Israel.

Furthermore, if Saddam cannot be deterred, what is stopping him from using WMD against U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf, which have bombed Iraq repeatedly over the past decade? The bottom line: Deterrence has worked well against Saddam in the past, and there is no reason to think it cannot work equally well in the future.

President Bush's repeated claim that the threat from Iraq is growing makes little sense in light of Saddam's past record, and these statements should be viewed as transparent attempts to scare Americans into supporting a war. CIA Director George Tenet flatly contradicted the president in an October 2002 letter to Congress, explaining that Saddam was unlikely to initiate a WMD attack against any U.S. target unless Washington provoked him. Even if Iraq did acquire a larger WMD arsenal, the United States would still retain a massive nuclear retaliatory capability. And if Saddam would only use WMD if the United States threatened his regime, then one wonders why advocates of war are trying to do just that.

Hawks do have a fallback position on this issue. Yes, the United States can try to deter Saddam by threatening to retaliate with massive force. But this strategy may not work because Iraq's past use of chemical weapons against the Kurds and Iran shows that Saddam is a warped human being who might use WMD without regard for the consequences.

Unfortunately for those who now favor war, this argument is difficult to reconcile with the United States' past support for Iraq, support that coincided with some of the behavior now being

invoked to portray him as an irrational madman. The United States backed Iraq during the 1980s—when Saddam was gassing Kurds and Iranians—and helped Iraq use chemical weapons more effectively by providing it with satellite imagery of Iranian troop positions. The Reagan administration also facilitated Iraq's efforts to develop biological weapons by allowing Baghdad to import disease-producing biological materials such as anthrax, West Nile virus, and botulinal toxin. A central figure in the effort to court Iraq was none other than current U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who was then President Ronald Reagan's special envoy to the Middle East. He visited Baghdad and met with Saddam in 1983, with the explicit aim of fostering better relations between the United States and Iraq. In October 1989, about a year after Saddam gassed the Kurds, President George H.W. Bush signed a formal national security directive declaring, "Normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East."

If Saddam's use of chemical weapons so clearly indicates he is a madman and cannot be contained, why did the United States fail to see that in the 1980s? Why were Rumsfeld and former President Rush then so unconcerned about his chemical and biological weapons? The most likely answer is that U.S. policymakers correctly understood Saddam was unlikely to use those weapons against the United States and its allies unless Washington threatened him directly. The real puzzle is why they think it would be impossible to deter him today.

Saddam With Nukes

The third strike against a policy of containment, according to those who have called for war, is that such a policy is unlikely to stop Saddam from getting nuclear weapons. Once he gets them, so the argument runs, a host of really bad things will happen. For example, President Rush has warned that Saddam intends to "blackmail the world"; likewise, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice believes he would use nuclear weapons to "blackmail the entire international community." Others fear a nuclear arsenal would enable Iraq to invade its neighbors and then deter the United States from ousting the Iraqi army as it did in 1991. Even worse, Saddam might surreptitiously slip a nuclear weapon to al Qaeda or some like-minded terrorist organization, thereby making it possible for these groups to attack the United States directly.

The administration and its supporters may be right in one sense: Containment may not be enough to prevent Iraq from acquiring nuclear weapons someday. Only the conquest and permanent occupation of Iraq could guarantee that. Yet the United States can contain a nuclear Iraq, just as it contained the Soviet Union. None of the nightmare scenarios invoked by preventive-war advocates are likely to happen.

Consider the claim that Saddam would employ nuclear blackmail against his adversaries. To force another state to make concessions, a blackmailer must make clear that he would use nuclear weapons against the target state if he does not get his way. But this strategy is feasible only if the blackmailer has nuclear weapons but neither the target state nor its allies do.

If the blackmailer and the target state both have nuclear weapons, however, the blackmailer's threat is an empty one because the blackmailer cannot carry out the threat without triggering his own destruction. This logic explains why the Soviet Union, which had a vast nuclear arsenal for much of the Cold War, was never able to blackmail the United States or its allies and did not even try.

But what if Saddam invaded Kuwait again and then said he would use nuclear weapons if the United States attempted another Desert Storm? Again, this threat is not credible. If Saddam initiated nuclear war against the United States over Kuwait, he would bring U.S. nuclear warheads down on his own head. Given the choice between withdrawing or dying, he would almost certainly choose the former. Thus, the United States could wage Desert Storm II against a nuclear-armed Saddam without precipitating nuclear war.

Ironically, some of the officials now advocating war used to recognize that Saddam could not employ nuclear weapons for offensive purposes. In the January/February 2000 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, for example, National Security Advisor Rice described how the United States should react if Iraq acquired WMD. "The first line of defense," she wrote, "should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence—if they do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration." If she believed Iraq's weapons would be unusable in 2000, why does she now think Saddam must be toppled before he gets them? For that matter, why does she now think a nuclear arsenal would enable Saddam to blackmail the entire international community, when she did not even mention this possibility in 2000?

What About Nuclear Handoff?

Of course, now the real nightmare scenario is that Saddam would give nuclear weapons secretly to al Qaeda or some other terrorist group. Groups like al Qaeda would almost certainly try to use those weapons against Israel or the United States, and so these countries have a powerful incentive to take all reasonable measures to keep these weapons out of their hands.

However, the likelihood of clandestine transfer by Iraq is extremely small. First of all, there is no credible evidence that Iraq had anything to do with the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon or more generally that Iraq is collaborating with al Qaeda against the United States. Hawks inside and outside the Bush administration have gone to extraordinary lengths over the past months to find a link, but they have come up empty-handed.

The lack of evidence of any genuine connection between Saddam and al Qaeda is not surprising because relations between Saddam and al Qaeda have been quite poor in the past. Osama bin Laden is a radical fundamentalist (like Khomeini), and he detests secular leaders like Saddam. Similarly, Saddam has consistently repressed fundamentalist movements within Iraq. Given this history of enmity, the Iraqi dictator is unlikely to give al Qaeda nuclear weapons, which it might use in ways he could not control.

Intense U.S. pressure, of course, might eventually force these unlikely allies together, just as the United States and Communist Russia became allies during World War II. Saddam would still be unlikely to share his most valuable weaponry with al Qaeda, however, because he could not be confident it would not be used in ways that place his own survival in jeopardy. During the Cold War, the United States did not share all its WMD expertise with its own allies, and the Soviet Union balked at giving nuclear weapons to China despite their ideological sympathies and repeated Chinese requests. No evidence suggests Saddam would act differently.

Second, Saddam could hardly be confident that the transfer would go undetected. Since September 11, U.S. intelligence agencies and those of its allies have been riveted on al Qaeda and Iraq, paying special attention to finding links between them. If Iraq possessed nuclear weapons, U.S. monitoring of those two adversaries would be further intensified. To give nuclear materials to al Qaeda, Saddam would have to bet he could elude the eyes and ears of numerous intelligence services determined to catch him if he tries a nuclear handoff. This bet would not be a safe one.

But even if Saddam thought he could covertly smuggle nuclear weapons to bin Laden, he would still be unlikely to do so. Saddam has been trying to acquire these weapons for over 20 years, at great cost and risk. Is it likely he would then turn around and give them away? Furthermore, giving nuclear weapons to al Qaeda would be extremely risky for Saddam—even if he could do so without being detected—because he would lose all control over when and where they would be used. And Saddam could never be sure the United States would not incinerate him anyway if it merely suspected he had made it possible for anyone to strike the United States with nuclear weapons. The U.S. government and a clear majority of Americans are already deeply suspicious of Iraq, and a nuclear attack against the United States or its allies

would raise that hostility to fever pitch. Saddam does not have to be certain the United States would retaliate to be wary of giving his nuclear weapons to al Qaeda; he merely has to suspect it might.

In sum, Saddam cannot afford to guess wrong on whether he would be detected providing al Qaeda with nuclear weapons, nor can he afford to guess wrong that Iraq would be spared if al Qaeda launched a nuclear strike against the United States or its allies. And the threat of U.S. retaliation is not as farfetched as one might think. The United States has enhanced its flexible nuclear options in recent years, and no one knows just how vengeful Americans might feel if WMD were ever used against the U.S. homeland. Indeed, nuclear terrorism is as dangerous for Saddam as it is for Americans, and he has no more incentive to give al Qaeda nuclear weapons than the United States does—unless, of course, the country makes clear it is trying to overthrow him. Instead of attacking Iraq and giving Saddam nothing to lose, the Bush administration should be signaling it would hold him responsible if some terrorist group used WMD against the United States, even if it cannot prove he is to blame.

Vigilant Containment

It is not surprising that those who favor war with Iraq portray Saddam as an inveterate and only partly rational aggressor. They are in the business of selling a preventive war, so they must try to make remaining at peace seem unacceptably dangerous. And the best way to do that is to inflate the threat, either by exaggerating Iraq's capabilities or by suggesting horrible things will happen if the United States does not act soon. It is equally unsurprising that advocates of war are willing to distort the historical record to make their case. As former U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson famously remarked, in politics, advocacy "must be clearer than truth."

In this case, however, the truth points the other way. Both logic and historical evidence suggest a policy of vigilant containment would work, both now and in the event Iraq acquires a nuclear arsenal. Why? Because the United States and its regional allies are far stronger than Iraq. And because it does not take a genius to figure out what would happen if Iraq tried to use WMD to blackmail its neighbors, expand its territory, or attack another state directly. It only takes a leader who wants to stay alive and who wants to remain in power. Throughout his lengthy and brutal career, Saddam Hussein has repeatedly shown that these two goals are absolutely paramount. That is why deterrence and containment would work.

Christopher Hitchens – Why I Am For Regime Change

Dear brothers and sisters, boys and girls, comrades and friends,

The editor of this rag told me of your upcoming "Potlucks for Peace" event and invited my comments, and at first I couldn't think of a thing to say. For one thing, why should I address a Seattle audience (or even suppose that I have a Seattle audience, for that matter)? I daresay that I can claim a tenuous connection, because I have always had a good crowd when reading at the splendid bookstores of the city, and because it was in Seattle that I stayed when grounded on September 11, 2001, a date that now makes some people yawn.

I had been speaking to the students of Whitman College in Walla Walla about the crimes of Henry Kissinger and had told them that 11 September—which was then tomorrow—was a symbolic date. On that day in 1973, the civilian government in Chile had been drowned in blood by an atrocious military coup. On the same day in 2001, a group of Chilean survivors proposed to file a lawsuit against Kissinger in a federal court in Washington, D.C. I showed a film illustrating this, made some additional remarks, and closed by saying that the date would be

long remembered in the annals of the struggle for human rights. I got some pretty decent applause—and this from the alma mater of Henry "Scoop" Jackson, whose family was present. On the following morning I got a very early call from my wife, who was three hours ahead of me. She told me to turn on the TV, and she commented mordantly that the anti-Kissinger campaign might have to be on hold for a while. (Oddly enough, and as recent events have shown, she was mistaken about that.) Everyone knows what I saw when I turned on the TV.

Now hear this. Ever since that morning, the United States has been at war with the forces of reaction. May I please entreat you to reread the preceding sentence? Or perhaps you will let me restate it for emphasis. The government and people of these United States are now at war with the forces of reaction.

This outcome was clearly not willed, at least on the American side. And everybody with half an education seems to know how to glibly dilute the statement. Isn't Saudi Arabia reactionary? What about Pakistani nukes? Do we bomb Sharon for his negation of Palestinian rights? Weren't we on Saddam's side when he was at his worst? (I am exempting the frantic and discredited few who think or suggest that George W. Bush fixed up the attacks to inflate the military budget and abolish the Constitution.) But however compromised and shameful the American starting point was—and I believe I could make this point stick with greater venom and better evidence than most people can muster—the above point remains untouched. The United States finds itself at war with the forces of reaction.

Do I have to demonstrate this? The Taliban's annihilation of music and culture? The enslavement of women? The massacre of Shiite Muslims in Afghanistan? Or what about the latest boast of al Qaeda—that the bomb in Bali, massacring so many Australian holidaymakers, was a deliberate revenge for Australia's belated help in securing independence for East Timor? (Never forget that the Muslim fundamentalists are not against "empire." They fight proudly for the restoration of their own lost caliphate.) To these people, the concept of a civilian casualty is meaningless if the civilian is an unbeliever or a heretic.

Confronted with such a foe—which gladly murders Algerians and Egyptians and Palestinians if they have any doubts about the true faith, or if they happen to be standing in the wrong place at the wrong time, or if they happen to be female—exactly what role does a "peace movement" have to play? A year or so ago, the "peace movement" was saying that Afghanistan could not even be approached without risking the undying enmity of the Muslim world; that the Taliban could not be bombed during Ramadan; that a humanitarian disaster would occur if the Islamic ultra-fanatics were confronted in their own lairs. Now we have an imperfect but recovering Afghanistan, with its population increased by almost two million returned refugees. Have you ever seen or heard any of those smart-ass critics and cynics make a self-criticism? Or recant?

To the contrary, the same critics and cynics are now lining up to say, "Hands off Saddam Hussein," and to make almost the same doom-laden predictions. The line that connects Afghanistan to Iraq is not a straight one by any means. But the oblique connection is ignored by the potluck peaceniks, and one can be sure (judging by their past form) that it would be ignored even if it were as direct as the connection between al Qaeda and the Taliban. Saddam Hussein denounced the removal of the Sunni Muslim—murdering Slobodan Milosevic, and also denounced the removal of the Shiite-murdering Taliban. Reactionaries have a tendency to stick together (and I don't mean "guilt by association" here. I mean GUILT). If the counsel of the peaceniks had been followed, Kuwait would today be the 19th province of Iraq (and based on his own recently produced evidence, Saddam Hussein would have acquired nuclear weapons). Moreover, Bosnia would be a trampled and cleansed province of Greater Serbia, Kosovo would have been emptied of most of its inhabitants, and the Taliban would still be in power in Afghanistan. Yet nothing seems to disturb the contented air of moral superiority that surrounds those who intone the "peace movement."

There are at least three well-established reasons to favor what is euphemistically termed "regime change" in Iraq. The first is the flouting by Saddam Hussein of every known law on genocide and human rights, which is why the Senate—at the urging of Bill Clinton—passed the Iraq Liberation Act unanimously before George W. Bush had even been nominated. The second is the persistent effort by Saddam's dictatorship to acquire the weapons of genocide: an effort which can and should be thwarted and which was condemned by the United Nations before George W. Bush was even governor of Texas. The third is the continuous involvement by the Iraqi secret police in the international underworld of terror and destabilization. I could write a separate essay on the evidence for this; at the moment I'll just say that it's extremely rash for anybody to discount the evidence that we already possess. (And I shall add that any "peace movement" that even pretends to care for human rights will be very shaken by what will be uncovered when the Saddam Hussein regime falls. Prisons, mass graves, weapon sites . . . just you wait.)

None of these things on their own need necessarily make a case for an intervention, but taken together—and taken with the permanent threat posed by Saddam Hussein to the oilfields of the region—they add up fairly convincingly. Have you, or your friends, recently employed the slogan "No War for Oil"? If so, did you listen to what you were saying? Do you mean that oil isn't worth fighting for, or that oil resources aren't worth protecting? Do you recall that Saddam Hussein ignited the oilfields of Kuwait when he was in retreat, and flooded the local waterways with fire and pollution? (Should I patronize the potluckistas, and ask them to look up the pictures of poisoned birds and marine animals from that year?) Are you indifferent to the possibility that such a man might be able to irradiate the oilfields next time? OF COURSE it's about oil, stupid.

To say that he might also do all these terrible things if attacked or threatened is to miss the point. Last time he did this, or massacred the Iraqi and Kurdish populations, he was withdrawing his forces under an international guarantee. The Iraqi and Kurdish peoples are now, by every measure we have or know, determined to be rid of him. And the hope, which is perhaps a slim one but very much sturdier than other hopes, is that the next Iraqi regime will be better and safer, not just from our point of view but from the points of view of the Iraqi and Kurdish peoples. The sanctions policy, which was probably always hopeless, is now quite indefensible. If lifted, it would only have allowed Saddam's oligarchy to re-equip. But once imposed, it was immoral and punitive without the objective of regime change. Choose. By the way, and while we are choosing, if you really don't want war, you should call for the lifting of the no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq. These have been war measures since 1991.

What would the lifting of the no-fly zones mean for the people who live under them? I recently sat down with my old friend Dr. Barham Salih, who is the elected prime minister of one sector of Iraqi Kurdistan. Neither he nor his electorate could be mentioned if it were not for the no-fly zones imposed—as a result of democratic protest in the West—at the end of the last Gulf War. In his area of Iraq, "regime change" has already occurred. There are dozens of newspapers, numerous radio and TV channels, satellite dishes, Internet cafes. Four female judges have been appointed. Almost half the students at the University of Sulaimaniya are women. And a pro al Qaeda group, recently transferred from Afghanistan, is trying to assassinate the Kurdish leadership and nearly killed my dear friend Barham just the other day . . . Now, why would this gang want to make that particular murder its first priority?

Before you face that question, consider this. Dr. Salih has been through some tough moments in his time. Most of the massacres and betrayals of the Kurdish people of Iraq took place with American support or connivance. But the Kurds have pressed ahead with regime change in any case. Surely a "peace movement" with any principles should be demanding that the United States not abandon them again. I like to think I could picture a mass picket in Seattle, offering solidarity with Kurdistan against a government of fascistic repression, and opposing any attempt to sell out the Kurds for reasons of realpolitik. Instead, there is a self-satisfied isolationism to be found, which seems to desire mainly a quiet life for Americans. The option of

that quiet life disappeared a while back, and it's only coincidence that for me it vanished in Seattle. The United States is now at war with the forces of reaction, and nobody is entitled to view this battle as a spectator. The Union under Lincoln wasn't wholeheartedly against slavery. The USA under Roosevelt had its own selfish agenda even while combating Hitler and Hirohito. The hot-and-cold war against Stalinism wasn't exactly free of blemish and stain. How much this latest crisis turns into an even tougher war with reaction, at home or abroad, could depend partly upon those who currently think that it is either possible or desirable to remain neutral. I say "could," even though the chance has already been shamefully missed. But a mere potluck abstention will be remembered only with pity and scorn.

Dilip Hiro – The Post-Saddam Problem

After several postponements, a U.S.-sponsored meeting of Iraqi opposition groups and individuals took place in London on December 14—15, 2002.

The main resolutions adopted by some 330 delegates to the Iraqi Open Opposition Conference reiterated their often-repeated commitment to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the introduction of democracy in Iraq.

"It was not the opposition Iraqis but the Americans who needed this gathering, eager to show they had broad support among diverse opposition groups," says Dr. Mustafa Alani of the Royal United Services Institute, London. "Whatever show of unity the opposition leaders managed to project will be short-lived. They will go back to devoting more space in their publications to attacking one another than Saddam."

Before the conference had begun, even Kanan Makiya, chairman of the State Department-sponsored committee that issued the document "The Transition to Democracy in Iraq," acknowledged that "no Iraqi Arab political organization on the scene today has been tested and can be said to be truly representative." The assessment of most nonpartisan Iraqis in London was that the U.S.-funded exercise was a thinly disguised attempt by the White House to provide itself with a political cover for invading Iraq.

As Alani notes, "Aside from Sharif Ali bin al Hussein [of the Movement for Constitutional Monarchy], the conference did not have a single Sunni Arab leader, even though Sunnis are a third of the Arab population. "The absence of Sunnis, who have ruled Iraq since 1638—first as part of the (Sunni) Ottoman Empire, and later as an independent state, from 1932 to the present—foreshadows trouble in the post-Saddam era, in which a newly empowered Shiite majority may choose to settle old scores with the Sunnis. What's more, like other ruling classes and ethnic groups throughout history, the Sunnis are unlikely to give up power without a fight—and thus they are a force that must be reckoned with in any post-Saddam Iraq.

In reality, so much of the debate in the opposition ranks—whether or not to form a provisional government, and whether to choose its leadership on the basis of ethnicity and sect or sheer merit—was just hot air. These options are predicated on the fate of Saddam. That will be decided by the Pentagon. And gatherings such as the one in London make not an iota of difference to its plans.

How the American invasion of Iraq proceeds will determine what happens after Saddam. Consider three scenarios: optimistic, pessimistic and in-between.

The Pentagon's optimistic scenario envisages the bulk of Saddam's military surrendering or deserting en masse at the end of two to three weeks of continuous bombing, the operation costing \$1.5 billion to \$3 billion a week, with the population welcoming the "liberating" American soldiers. The brevity of the conflict insures unity in the opposition ranks. The loss of Iraqi oil—now 2—2.5 percent of the global total—is amply compensated for by Saudi Arabia, with its

spare capacity amounting to 6 percent of the world aggregate, and Iraq's oilfields will remain unharmed.

The military logic behind this scenario, released under different guises by the Pentagon's hawkish civilian bosses and meant to reassure the American public, is based primarily on the testimony of Iraqi defectors. The unreliability of such sources is widely known, the most glaring example of this, for the United States, being the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba, in which the CIA relied on false information from defectors. This is of great concern in the case of Iraq—as was explained by a British lawyer of Iraqi origin in London, the haven for more notable Iraqi exiles than all other cities and countries combined. "When these Iraqis arrive at a Western airport, they seek political asylum," he says. "For this they must show that they are important, and that they have acted so seriously against the Saddam regime that if returned, they would be jailed, tortured or executed. So these guys lie. And over time they become expert at inventing stories." It is on this foundation that the U.S.-British alliance has built the body of its "intelligence" over the past twelve years, which underlies the Pentagon's sunny scenario.

This scenario also ignores two pre-eminent facts of recent Iraqi history. One, Iraqis have a strong nationalist sense that was enhanced when they fought the eight-year war with Iran. Two, almost invariably, Iraqi civilians blame Washington for the sanctions, which have reduced them to penury. Judging from the opinions expressed to me by ordinary citizens during my visit to Iraq in 2000, so deep is the resentment and hostility toward America and Americans that for the bulk of Iraqis, it is unimaginable that any good can come to them from Washington—especially if that would be at the end of massive bombing by the Pentagon of their weakened country and society.

They are therefore unlikely to welcome conquering U.S. soldiers with the warmth the Pentagon expects.

On November 19 the "Iraqi military defects en masse" scenario received a grievous setback. That day the Danish government arrested Nizar al Khazraji, former (Sunni) Iraqi Army chief of staff, living in the town of Soroe, and charged him with crimes against humanity and war crimes for his alleged role in the 1988 Anfal campaign against the Kurds, consisting of mass executions, razing of scores of villages and use of chemical weapons, involving some 100,000 deaths. Before his defection in 1996, Khazraji was a special adviser to Saddam, after having served him as the army chief of staff during 1987—90. "His arrest will make it that much harder to encourage other [Iraqi] officers to defect if they fear they will be charged too," said an opposition leader. Though released on bail, Khazraji has been ordered to remain in Denmark so that special prosecutor Birgitte Vestberg can complete her criminal investigations. She is unmoved by Khazraji's pleas that he is a victim of false accusations by Saddam's agents or by the prospect of upsetting the Anglo-American geopolitical plans, in which Khazraji may figure as the new leader of Iraq. Her sole task, she says, is to determine whether he has committed the alleged crimes, and that could take a year or longer.

There are other problems. Gen. Najib al Salhi, leader of the U.S.-sponsored Iraqi Military Alliance, said the Pentagon's threats to destroy Iraq's conventional weapons risked alienating military elements who might otherwise be receptive to a regime change imposed by the United States. Other generals also warned against purging the army of Saddam supporters, saying there will be a backlash if senior Iraqi officers are punished arbitrarily.

At the other end of the Pentagon's spectrum is its pessimistic scenario. This envisions intense urban fighting in Iraq, where every household has a gun, with the conflict lasting several months. During the fighting, oil wells in Iraq are torched and those elsewhere in the region are damaged by Saddamist saboteurs, as unrest spreads throughout the Middle East and the body bags of U.S. soldiers fuel an antiwar movement in America.

In turn, George W. Bush takes a strong stand, true to his recent declaration to Bob Woodward that as the President he is "the calcium in the backbone" of America. His

Administration decides on a long-term occupation and reconstruction of Iraq, at the cost of \$160 billion a year, according to Yale economist William Nordhaus.

Even if the worst-case scenario does not come to pass, a military occupation of Iraq remains a serious option, with senior Administration officials frequently alluding to the 1945-52 U.S. occupation of Japan under Gen. Douglas MacArthur. They glibly ignore the numerous differences between postwar Japan in 1945 and postwar Iraq in 2003. Japan under Emperor Hirohito associated with the sun by tradition and therefore revered as a demigod, surrendered unconditionally, with the Emperor personally endorsing the victors, thus allowing MacArthur to rule by fiat to implement carefully devised policies. There is no sign that Saddam will follow Hirohito's example, or that the Bush White House has put much thought into such policies. Moreover, since MacArthur inherited wholesale the administrative infrastructure of Emperor Hirohito, the reform of the political/economic/educational system progressed smoothly. Nobody expects the institutions of the Baathist regime in Iraq to survive Saddam's defeat. So any reform will be hard to implement.

Despite the fact that policing was left to the Japanese authorities, Washington deployed 100,000 troops for more than six years to implement reform in Japan. By contrast, U.S. planners now envisage the stationing of 75,000—100,000 troops at the cost of \$16 billion a year. This is unrealistic. In Northern Ireland, with a population of 1.7 million, the British government stationed close to 20,000 troops with an equal number of loyal armed policemen and an army reserve of the same size, thus committing 60,000 troops and armed police to tackle about 1,000 members of the Irish Republican Army, most of them in jail at any one time. In addition, the loyalist Protestant majority outnumbered the rebellious Catholic population by 2 to 1.

Unlike highly homogeneous Japan, Iraq is a heterogeneous society. The traditional religious, ethnic and tribal animosities will break out in postwar Iraq once the iron hand of Saddam is removed, with civil conflict erupting along ethnic and sectarian lines, the deadliest one being between Sunnis and Shiites who share the Mesopotamian plain.

Last, Japan lacks natural resources and does not share land borders with neighbors. By contrast, Iraq, possessing the second-largest oil deposits in the world, is surrounded by six intrusive neighbors, each with its own agenda, and is located in a region that has been the most volatile and violent since World War II.

Turkey has its eye on the oil region of Kirkuk in the north. The Saudi royals want to insure that the contagion of "Western-style democracy" does not take root in Iraq and then spread to their kingdom. Iran wants its co-religionist Shiites to assert their power at the expense of the Sunni minority. Syria will do its utmost to see that the new rulers in Baghdad do not turn themselves into Washington's vassals.

Finally, there is the in-between scenario, in which the fighting lasts up to three months. This will strain the fragile unity among opposition groups, as the death and destruction of Iraqi Muslims, shown on Arab and Muslim television channels, will make the continued membership of the Teheran-based Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) in the U.S.-sponsored opposition untenable.

Observers agree that SCIRI's clerics have merely taken out an insurance policy: If Saddam is overthrown, they want their share of power. Alani says, "This opportunistic alliance is more embarrassing to the United States than to Iran or SCIRI, to have a body with 'Islamic Revolution' in its name in a U.S.-sponsored alliance."

But then again, those on the inside track of the Bush Jr. Administration know well that what ultimately counts is the puppet master, not the puppet. As one well-placed American observer at the London conference said, "Eighty percent of the people here won't have any role to play in a post-Hussein government." To that figure, one should probably add another 19 percent.

Chapter 14

The Future of Pax Americana

"The new imperialists think they are different. All empires do."

—*Todd Gitlin, writing in Mother Jones, January-February 2003*

"Has 'oderint dum metuant' ['let them hate so long as they fear'] really become our motto?"

—*Career diplomat John Brady Kiesling, in a letter explaining his resignation in protest from the U.S. foreign service, February 27, 2003*

"The impending war against Iraq represents a point of no return. Should the United States go it alone and attack Iraq without broader international support, it will cease to be a model for the world and instead be seen as a dangerous Goliath that needs to be tamed. . . . The victory will be a Pyrrhic one. Without the court of world opinion on its side, America will soon find that its long reign as the respected and trusted leader of the free world has come to an end."

—*Charles Kupchan, author of The End of the American Era*

"Two years from now only the Brits may be with us. . . . At some point, we may be the only ones left. That's okay with me. We are America."

—*President Bush, on the war on terrorism, quoted in Bob Woodward's Bush at War*

Charles Krauthammer

The Unipolar Moment Revisited: America, the Benevolent Empire

In late 1990, shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was clear that the world we had known for half a century was disappearing. The question was what would succeed it. I suggested then that we had already entered the "unipolar moment." The gap in power between the leading nation and all the others was so unprecedented as to yield an international structure unique to modern history: unipolarity.

At the time, this thesis was generally seen as either wild optimism or simple American arrogance. The conventional wisdom was that with the demise of the Soviet empire the bipolarity of the second half of the 20th century would yield to multipolarity. The declinist school, led by Paul Kennedy, held that America, suffering from "imperial overstretch," was already in relative decline. The Asian enthusiasm, popularized by (among others) James Fallows, saw the second coming of the Rising Sun. The conventional wisdom was best captured by Senator Paul Tsongas: "The Cold War is over; Japan won."

They were wrong, and no one has put it more forcefully than Paul Kennedy himself in a classic recantation published earlier this year. "Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing," he said of America's position today. "Charlemagne's empire was merely western European in its reach. The Roman empire stretched farther afield, but there was another great empire in Persia, and a larger one in China. There is, therefore, no comparison." Not everyone is convinced. Samuel Huntington argued in 1999 that we had entered not a unipolar world but a "uni-multipolar world." Tony Judt writes mockingly of the "loud boasts of unipolarity and hegemony" heard in Washington today. But as Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth argue in a recent review of the subject, those denying unipolarity can do so only by applying a ridiculous standard: that America *be* able to achieve all its goals everywhere all by itself. This is a standard not for unipolarity but for divinity. Among mortals, and in the context of the last half millennium of history, the current structure of the international system is clear: "If today's American primacy does not constitute unipolarity, then nothing ever will."

A second feature of this new post-Cold War world, I ventured, would be a resurgent American isolationism. I was wrong. It turns out that the new norm for America is not post-World War I withdrawal but post-World War II engagement. In the 1990s, Pat Buchanan gave 1930s isolationism a run. He ended up carrying Palm Beach.

Finally, I suggested that a third feature of this new unipolar world would be an increase rather than a decrease in the threat of war, and that it would come from a new source: weapons of mass destruction wielded by rogue states. This would constitute a revolution in international relations, given that in the past it was great powers who presented the principal threats to world peace.

Where are we twelve years later? The two defining features of the new post-Cold War world remain: unipolarity and rogue states with weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, these characteristics have grown even more pronounced. Contrary to expectation, the United States has not regressed to the mean; rather, its dominance has dramatically increased. And during our holiday from history in the 1990s, the rogue state/WMD problem grew more acute. Indeed, we are now on the eve of history's first war over weapons of mass destruction.

Unipolarity After September 11, 2001

There is little need to rehearse the acceleration of unipolarity in the 1990s. Japan, whose claim to power rested exclusively on economics, went into economic decline. Germany stagnated. The Soviet Union ceased to exist, contracting into a smaller, radically weakened Russia. The European Union turned inward toward the great project of integration and built a strong social infrastructure at the expense of military capacity. Only China grew in strength, but coming from so far behind it will be decades before it can challenge American primacy—and that assumes that its current growth continues unabated.

The result is the dominance of a single power unlike anything ever seen. Even at its height Britain could always be seriously challenged by the next greatest powers. Britain had a smaller army than the land powers of Europe and its navy was equaled by the next two navies combined. Today, American military spending exceeds that of the next *twenty* countries combined. Its navy, air force and space power are unrivaled. Its technology is irresistible. It is dominant by every measure: military, economic, technological, diplomatic, cultural, even linguistic, with a myriad of countries trying to fend off the inexorable march of Internet-fueled MTV English.

American dominance has not gone unnoticed. During the 1990s, it was mainly China and Russia that denounced unipolarity in their occasional joint communique's. As the new century dawned it was on everyone's lips. A French foreign minister dubbed the United States not a superpower but a hyper-power. The dominant concern of foreign policy establishments everywhere became understanding and living with the 800-pound American gorilla.

And then September 11 *heightened* the asymmetry. It did so in three ways. First, and most obviously, it led to a demonstration of heretofore latent American military power. Kosovo, the first war ever fought and won exclusively from the air, had given a hint of America's quantum leap in military power (and the enormous gap that had developed between American and European military capabilities). But it took September 11 for the United States to unleash with concentrated fury a fuller display of its power in Afghanistan. Being a relatively pacific, commercial republic, the United States does not go around looking for demonstration wars. This one was thrust upon it. In response, America showed that at a range of 7,000 miles and with but a handful of losses, it could destroy within weeks a hardened, fanatical regime favored by geography and climate in the "graveyard of empires."

Such power might have been demonstrated earlier, but it was not. "I talked with the previous U.S. administration," said Vladimir Putin shortly after September 11,

and pointed out the bin Laden issue to them. They wrung their hands so helplessly and said, 'the Taliban are not turning him over, what can one do?' I remember I was surprised: If they are not turning him over, one has to think and do something.

Nothing was done. President Clinton and others in his administration have protested that nothing could have been done, that even the 1998 African embassy bombings were not enough to mobilize the American people to strike back seriously against terrorism. The new Bush Administration, too, did not give the prospect of mass-casualty terrorism (and the recommendations of the Hart-Rudman Commission) the priority it deserved. Without September 11, the giant would surely have slept longer. The world would have been aware of America's size and potential, but not its ferocity or its full capacities. (Paul Kennedy's homage to American power, for example, was offered in the wake of the Afghan campaign.)

Second, September 11 demonstrated a new form of American strength. The center of its economy was struck, its aviation shut down, Congress brought to a halt, the government sent underground, the country paralyzed and fearful. Yet within days the markets reopened, the economy began its recovery, the president mobilized the nation, and a united Congress immediately underwrote a huge new worldwide campaign against terror. The Pentagon started planning the U.S. military response even as its demolished western facade still smoldered.

America had long been perceived as invulnerable. That illusion was shattered on September 11, 2001. But with a demonstration of its recuperative powers—an economy and political system so deeply rooted and fundamentally sound that it could spring back to life within days—that sense of invulnerability assumed a new character. It was transmuted from impermeability to resilience, the product of unrivaled human, technological and political reserves.

The third effect of September 11 was to accelerate the realignment of the current great powers, such as they are, behind the United States. In 1990, America's principal ally was NATO. A decade later, its alliance base had grown to include former members of the Warsaw Pact. Some of the major powers, however, remained uncommitted. Russia and China flirted with the idea of an "anti-hegemonic alliance." Russian leaders made ostentatious visits to pieces of the old Soviet empire such as Cuba and North Korea. India and Pakistan, frozen out by the United States because of their nuclear testing, remained focused mainly on one another. But after September 11, the bystanders came calling. Pakistan made an immediate strategic decision to join the American camp. India enlisted with equal alacrity, offering the United States basing, overflight rights and a level of cooperation unheard of during its half century of Nehruist genuflection to 'anti-American non-alignment. Russia's Putin, seeing both a coincidence of interests in the fight against Islamic radicalism and an opportunity to gain acceptance in the Western camp, dramatically realigned Russian foreign policy toward the United States. (Russia has already been rewarded with a larger role in NATO and tacit American recognition of Russia's interests in its "near abroad.") China remains more distant but, also having a coincidence of interests with the United States in fighting Islamic radicalism, it has cooperated with the war on terror and muted its competition with America in the Pacific.

The realignment of the fence-sitters simply accentuates the historical anomaly of American unipolarity. Our experience with hegemony historically is that it inevitably creates a counterbalancing coalition of weaker powers, most recently against Napoleonic France and Germany (twice) in the 20th century. Nature abhors a vacuum; history abhors hegemony. Yet during the first decade of American unipolarity no such counterbalancing occurred. On the contrary, the great powers lined up behind the United States, all the more so after September 11.

The American hegemon has no great power enemies, an historical oddity of the first order. Yet it does face a serious threat to its dominance, indeed to its essential security. It comes from

a source even more historically odd: an archipelago of rogue states (some connected with transnational terrorists) wielding weapons of mass destruction.

The threat is not trivial. It is the single greatest danger to the United States because, for all of America's dominance, and for all of its recently demonstrated resilience, there is one thing it might not survive: decapitation. The detonation of a dozen nuclear weapons in major American cities, or the spreading of smallpox or anthrax throughout the general population, is an existential threat. It is perhaps the only realistic threat to America as a functioning hegemon, perhaps even to America as a functioning modern society.

Like unipolarity, this is historically unique. WMD are not new, nor are rogue states. Their conjunction is. We have had fifty years of experience with nuclear weapons—but in the context of bipolarity, which gave the system a predictable, if perilous, stability. We have just now entered an era in which the capacity for inflicting mass death, and thus posing a threat both to world peace and to the dominant power, resides in small, peripheral states.

What does this conjunction of unique circumstances—unipolarity and the proliferation of terrible weapons—mean for American foreign policy? That the first and most urgent task is protection from these weapons. The catalyst for this realization was again September 11. Throughout the 1990s, it had been assumed that WMD posed no emergency because traditional concepts of deterrence would hold. September 11 revealed the possibility of future WMD-armed enemies both undeterrable and potentially undetectable. The 9/11 suicide bombers were undeterrable; the author of the subsequent anthrax attacks has proven undetectable. The possible alliance of rogue states with such undeterrables and undetectables—and the possible transfer to them of weapons of mass destruction—presents a new strategic situation that demands a new strategic doctrine.

The Crisis of Unipolarity

Accordingly, not one but a host of new doctrines have come tumbling out since September 11. First came the with-us-or-against-us ultimatum to any state aiding, abetting or harboring terrorists. Then, pre-emptive attack on any enemy state developing weapons of mass destruction. And now, regime change in any such state.

The boldness of these policies—or, as much of the world contends, their arrogance—is breathtaking. The American anti-terrorism ultimatum, it is said, is high-handed and permits the arbitrary application of American power everywhere. Pre-emption is said to violate traditional doctrines of just war. And regime change, as Henry Kissinger has argued, threatens 350 years of post-Westphalian international practice. Taken together, they amount to an unprecedented assertion of American freedom of action and a definitive statement of a new American unilateralism.

To be sure, these are not the first instances of American unilateralism. Before September 11, the Bush Administration had acted unilaterally, but on more minor matters, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention, and with less bluntness, as in its protracted negotiations with Russia over the ABM treaty. The "axis of evil" speech of January 29, however, took unilateralism to a new level. Latent resentments about American willfulness are latent no more. American dominance, which had been tolerated if not welcomed, is now producing such irritation and hostility in once friendly quarters, such as Europe, that some suggest we have arrived at the end of the opposition-free grace period that America had enjoyed during the unipolar moment (A Sky News poll finds that even the British public considers George W. Bush a greater threat to world peace than Saddam Hussein. The poll was conducted September 2-6, 2006).

In short, post-9/11 U.S. unilateralism has produced the first crisis of unipolarity. It revolves around the central question of the unipolar age: Who will define the hegemon's ends?

The issue is not one of style but of purpose. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld gave the classic formulation of unilateralism when he said (regarding the Afghan war and the war on terrorism, but the principle is universal), "the mission determines the coalition." We take our friends where we find them, but only in order to help us in accomplishing the mission. The mission comes first, and we decide it.

Contrast this with the classic case study of multilateralism at work: the U.S. decision in February 1991 to conclude the Gulf War. As the Iraqi army was fleeing, the first Bush Administration had to decide its final goal: the liberation of Kuwait or regime change in Iraq. It stopped at Kuwait. Why? Because, as Brent Scowcroft has explained, going further would have fractured the coalition, gone against our promises to allies and violated the U.N. resolutions under which we were acting. "Had we added occupation of Iraq and removal of Saddam Hussein to those objectives," wrote Scowcroft in *The Washington Post* on October 16, 2001, ". . . our Arab allies, refusing to countenance an invasion of an Arab colleague, would have deserted us." The coalition defined the mission.

Who should define American ends today? This is a question of agency but it leads directly to a fundamental question of policy. If the coalition—whether NATO, the wider Western alliance, *ad hoc* outfits such as the Gulf War alliance, the U.N., or the "international community"—defines America's mission, we have one vision of America's role in the world. If, on the other hand, the mission defines the coalition, we have an entirely different vision.

Liberal Internationalism

For many Americans, multilateralism is no pretense. On the contrary: It has become the very core of the liberal internationalist school of American foreign policy. In the October 2002 debate authorizing the use of force in Iraq, the Democratic chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Carl Levin, proposed authorizing the president to act only with prior approval from the U.N. Security Council. Senator Edward Kennedy put it succinctly while addressing the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies on September 27: "I'm waiting for the final recommendation of the Security Council before I'm going to say how I'm going to vote."

This logic is deeply puzzling. How exactly does the Security Council confer moral authority on American action? The Security Council is a committee of great powers, heirs to the victors in the Second World War. They manage the world in their own interest. The Security Council is, on the very rare occasions when it actually works, *realpolitik* by committee. But by what logic is it a repository of international morality? How does the approval of France and Russia, acting clearly and rationally in pursuit of their own interests in Iraq (largely oil and investment), confer legitimacy on an invasion?

That question was beyond me twelve years ago. It remains beyond me now. Yet this kind of logic utterly dominated the intervening Clinton years. The 1990s were marked by an obsession with "international legality" as expressed by this or that Security Council resolution. To take one long forgotten example: After an Iraqi provocation in February 1998, President Clinton gave a speech at the Pentagon laying the foundation for an attack on Iraq (one of many that never came). He cited as justification for the use of force the need to enforce Iraqi promises made under post-Gulf War ceasefire conditions that "the United Nations demanded—not the United States—the United Nations." Note the formulation. Here is the president of the most powerful nation on earth stopping in mid-sentence to stress the primacy of commitments made to the U.N. over those made to the United States.

This was not surprising from a president whose first inaugural address pledged American action when "the will and conscience of the international community is defied." Early in the Clinton years, Madeleine Albright formulated the vision of the liberal internationalist school then in power as "assertive multilateralism." Its principal diplomatic activity was the pursuit of a dizzying array of universal treaties on chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear testing,

global environment, land mines and the like. Its trademark was consultation: Clinton was famous for sending Secretary of State Warren Christopher on long trips (for example, through Europe on Balkan policy) or endless shuttles (uncountable pilgrimages to Damascus) to consult; he invariably returned home empty-handed and diminished. And its principal objective was good international citizenship: It was argued on myriad foreign policy issues that we could not do X because it would leave us "isolated." Thus in 1997 the Senate passed a chemical weapons convention that even some of its proponents admitted was unenforceable, largely because of the argument that everyone else had signed it and that failure to ratify would leave us isolated. Isolation, in and of itself, was seen as a diminished and even morally suspect condition.

A lesson in isolation occurred during the 1997 negotiations in Oslo over the land mine treaty. One of the rare hold-outs, interestingly enough, was Finland. Finding himself scolded by his neighbors for opposing the land mine ban, the Finnish prime minister noted tartly that this was a "very convenient" pose for the "other Nordic countries" who "want Finland to be their land mine."

In many parts of the world, a thin line of American GIs is the land mine. The main reason we oppose the land mine treaty is that we need them in the DMZ in Korea. We man the lines there. Sweden and France and Canada do not have to worry about a North Korean invasion killing thousands of their soldiers. As the unipolar power and thus guarantor of peace in places where Swedes do not tread, we need weapons that others do not. Being uniquely situated in the world, we cannot afford the empty platitudes of allies not quite candid enough to admit that they live under the umbrella of American power. That often leaves us "isolated."

Multilateralism is the liberal internationalist's means of saving us from this shameful condition. But the point of the multilateralist imperative is not merely psychological. It has a clear and coherent geopolitical objective. It is a means that defines the ends. Its means—internationalism (the moral, legal and strategic primacy of international institutions over national interests) and legalism (the belief that the sinews of stability are laws, treaties and binding international contracts)—are in service to a larger vision: remaking the international system in the image of domestic civil society. The multilateralist imperative seeks to establish an international order based not on sovereignty and power but on interdependence—a new order that, as Secretary of State Cordell Hull said upon returning from the Moscow Conference of 1943, abolishes the "need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power."

Liberal internationalism seeks through multilateralism to transcend power politics, narrow national interest and, ultimately, the nation-state itself. The nation-state is seen as some kind of archaic residue of an anarchic past, an affront to the vision of a domesticated international arena. This is why liberal thinkers embrace the erosion of sovereignty promised by the new information technologies and the easy movement of capital across borders. They welcome the decline of sovereignty as the road to the new globalism of a norm-driven, legally-bound international system broken to the mold of domestic society.

The greatest sovereign, of course, is the American superpower, which is why liberal internationalists feel such acute discomfort with American dominance. To achieve their vision, America too—America especially—must be domesticated. Their project is thus to restrain America by building an entangling web of interdependence, tying down Gulliver with myriad strings that diminish his overweening power. Who, after all, was the ABM treaty or a land mine treaty going to restrain? North Korea?

This liberal internationalist vision—the multilateral handcuffing of American power—is, as Robert Kagan has pointed out, the dominant view in Europe. That is to be expected, given Europe's weakness and America's power. But it is a mistake to see this as only a European view. The idea of a new international community with self-governing institutions and self-enforcing norms—the vision that requires the domestication of American power—is the view of the Democratic Party in the United States and of a large part of the American foreign policy establishment. They spent the last decade in power fashioning precisely those multilateral ties to restrain the American Gulliver and remake him into a tame international citizen. The

multilateralist project is to use—indeed, to use up—current American dominance to create a new international system in which new norms of legalism and interdependence rule in America's place—in short, a system that is no longer unipolar.

Realism and the New Unilateralism

The basic division between the two major foreign policy schools in America centers on the question of what is, and what should be, the fundamental basis of international relations: paper or power. Liberal internationalism envisions a world order that, like domestic society, is governed by laws and not men. Realists see this vision as hopelessly Utopian. The history of paper treaties— from the prewar Kellogg-Briand Pact and Munich to the post—Cold War Oslo accords and the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea—is a history of naivete and cynicism, a combination both toxic and volatile that invariably ends badly. Trade agreements with Canada are one thing. Pieces of parchment to which existential enemies affix a signature are quite another. They are worse than worthless because they give a false sense of security and breed complacency. For the realist, the ultimate determinant of the most basic elements of international life—security, stability and peace—is power.

Which is why a realist would hardly forfeit the current unipolarity for the vain promise of goo-goo one-worldism. Nor, however, should a realist want to forfeit unipolarity for the familiarity of traditional multipolarity. Multipolarity is inherently fluid and unpredictable. Europe practiced multipolarity for centuries and found it so unstable and bloody, culminating in 1914 in the catastrophic collapse of delicately balanced alliance systems, that Europe sought its permanent abolition in political and economic union. Having abjured multipolarity for the region, it is odd in the extreme to then prefer multipolarity for the world.

Less can be said about the destiny of unipolarity. It is too new. Yet we do have the history of the last decade, our only modern experience with unipolarity, and it was a decade of unusual stability among all major powers. It would be foolish to project from just a ten-year experience, but that experience does call into question the basis for the claims that unipolarity is intrinsically unstable or impossible to sustain in a mass democracy.

I would argue that unipolarity, managed benignly, is far more likely to keep the peace. Benignity is, of course, in the eye of the beholder. But the American claim to benignity is not mere self-congratulation. We have a track record. Consider one of history's rare controlled experiments. In the 1940s, lines were drawn through three peoples—Germans, Koreans and Chinese—one side closely bound to the United States, the other to its adversary. It turned into a controlled experiment because both states in the divided lands shared a common culture. Fifty years later the results are in. Does anyone doubt the superiority, both moral and material, of West Germany vs. East Germany, South Korea vs. North Korea and Taiwan vs. China? (This is not to claim, by any means, a perfect record of benignity. America has often made and continues to make alliances with unpleasant authoritarian regimes. As I argued recently in *Time* ("Dictatorships and Double Standards," September 23, 2002), such alliances are nonetheless justified so long as they are instrumental (meant to defeat the larger evil) and temporary (expire with the emergency): When Hitler was defeated, we stopped coddling Stalin. Forty years later, as the Soviet threat receded, the United States was instrumental in easing Pinochet out of power and overthrowing Marcos. We withdrew our support for these dictators once the two conditions that justified such alliances had disappeared: The global threat of Soviet communism had receded, and truly democratic domestic alternatives to these dictators had emerged).

Benignity is also manifest in the way others welcome our power. It is the reason, for example, that the Pacific Rim countries are loath to see our military presence diminished: They know that the United States is not an imperial power with a desire to rule other countries—which is why they so readily accept it as a balancer. It is the reason, too, why Europe, so seized with complaints about American high-handedness, nonetheless reacts with alarm to the occasional

suggestion that America might withdraw its military presence. America came, but it did not come to rule. Unlike other hegemonies and would-be hegemonies, it does not entertain a grand vision of a new world. No Thousand Year Reich. No New Soviet Man. It has no great desire to remake human nature, to conquer for the extraction of natural resources, or to rule for the simple pleasure of dominion. Indeed, America is the first hegemonic power in history to be obsessed with "exit strategies." It could not wait to get out of Haiti and Somalia; it would get out of Kosovo and Bosnia today if it could. Its principal aim is to maintain the stability and relative tranquility of the current international system by enforcing, maintaining and extending the current peace.

The form of realism that I am arguing for—call it the new unilateralism—is clear in its determination to self-consciously and confidently deploy American power in pursuit of those global ends. Note: global ends. There is a form of unilateralism that is devoted only to narrow American self-interest and it has a name, too: It is called isolationism. Critics of the new unilateralism often confuse it with isolationism because both are prepared to unashamedly exercise American power. But isolationists *oppose* America acting as a unipolar power not because they disagree with the unilateral means, but because they deem the ends far too broad. Isolationists would abandon the larger world and use American power exclusively for the narrowest of American interests: manning Fortress America by defending the American homeland and putting up barriers to trade and immigration.

The new unilateralism defines American interests far beyond narrow self-defense. In particular, it identifies two other major interests, both global: extending the peace by advancing democracy and preserving the peace by acting as balancer of last resort. Britain was the balancer in Europe, joining the weaker coalition against the stronger to create equilibrium. America's unique global power allows it to be the balancer in every region. We balanced Iraq by supporting its weaker neighbors in the Gulf War. We balance China by supporting the ring of smaller states at its periphery (from South Korea to Taiwan, even to Vietnam). Our role in the Balkans was essentially to create a microbalance: to support the weaker Bosnian Muslims against their more dominant neighbors, and subsequently to support the weaker Albanian Kosovars against the Serbs.

Of course, both of these tasks often advance American national interests as well. The promotion of democracy multiplies the number of nations likely to be friendly to the United States, and regional equilibria produce stability that benefits a commercial republic like the United States. America's (intended) exertions on behalf of pre-emptive non-proliferation, too, are clearly in the interest of both the United States and the international system as a whole.

Critics find this paradoxical: acting unilaterally but for global ends. Why paradoxical? One can hardly argue that depriving Saddam (and potentially, terrorists) of WMD is not a global end. Unilateralism may be required to pursue this end. We may be left isolated in so doing, but we would be acting nevertheless in the name of global interests—larger than narrow American self-interest and larger, too, than the narrowly perceived self-interest of smaller, weaker powers (even great powers) that dare not confront the rising danger.

What is the essence of that larger interest? Most broadly defined, it is maintaining a stable, open and functioning unipolar system. Liberal internationalists disdain that goal as too selfish, as it makes paramount the preservation of both American power and independence. Isolationists reject the goal as too selfless, for defining American interests too globally and thus too generously.

A third critique comes from what might be called pragmatic realists, who see the new unilateralism I have outlined as hubristic, and whose objections are practical. They are prepared to engage in a pragmatic multilateralism. They value great power concert. They seek Security Council support not because it confers any moral authority, but because it spreads risk. In their

view, a single hegemon risks far more violent resentment than would a power that consistently acts as *primus inter pares*, sharing rule-making functions with others.

I have my doubts. The United States made an extraordinary effort in the Gulf War to get U.N. support, share decision-making, assemble a coalition and, as we have seen, deny itself the fruits of victory in order to honor coalition goals. Did that diminish the anti-American feeling in the region? Did it garner support for subsequent Iraq policy dictated by the original acquiescence to the coalition?

The attacks of September 11 were planned during the Clinton Administration, an administration that made a fetish of consultation and did its utmost to subordinate American hegemony and smother unipolarity. The resentments were hardly assuaged. Why? Because the extremist rage against the United States is engendered by the very structure of the international system, not by the details of our management of it.

Pragmatic realists also value international support in the interest of sharing burdens, on the theory that sharing decision-making enlists others in our own hegemonic enterprise and makes things less costly. If you are too vigorous in asserting yourself in the short-term, they argue, you are likely to injure yourself in the long-term when you encounter problems that require the full cooperation of other partners, such as counter-terrorism. As Brooks and Wohlforth put it, "Straining relationships now will lead only to a more challenging policy environment later on."

If the concern about the new unilateralism is that American assertiveness be judiciously rationed, and that one needs to think long-term, it is hard to disagree. One does not go it alone or dictate terms on every issue. On some issues such as membership in and support of the WTO, where the long-term benefit both to the American national interest and global interests is demonstrable, one willingly constricts sovereignty. Trade agreements are easy calls, however, free trade being perhaps the only mathematically provable political good. Others require great skepticism. The Kyoto Protocol, for example, would have harmed the American economy while doing nothing for the global environment. (Increased emissions from China, India and Third World countries exempt from its provisions would have more than made up for American cuts.) Kyoto failed on its merits, but was nonetheless pushed because the rest of the world supported it. The same case was made for the chemical and biological weapons treaties—sure, they are useless or worse, but why not give in there in order to build good will for future needs? But appeasing multilateralism does not assuage it; appeasement merely legitimizes it. Repeated acquiescence to provisions that America deems injurious reinforces the notion that legitimacy derives from international consensus, thus undermining America's future freedom of action—and thus contradicting the pragmatic realists' own goals.

America must be guided by its independent judgment, both about its own interest and about the global interest. Especially on matters of national security, war-making and the deployment of power, America should neither defer nor contract out decision-making, particularly when the concessions involve permanent structural constrictions such as those imposed by an International Criminal Court. Prudence, yes. No need to act the superpower in East Timor or Bosnia. But there is a need to do so in Afghanistan and in Iraq. No need to act the superpower on steel tariffs. But there is a need to do so on missile defense.

The prudent exercise of power allows, indeed calls for, occasional concessions on non-vital issues if only to maintain psychological good will. Arrogance and gratuitous high-handedness are counterproductive. But we should not delude ourselves as to what psychological goodwill buys. Countries will cooperate with us, first, out of their own self-interest and, second, out of the need and desire to cultivate good relations with the world's superpower. Warm and fuzzy feelings are a distant third. Take counterterrorism. After the attack on the U.S.S. *Cole*, Yemen did everything it could to stymie the American investigation. It lifted not a finger to suppress terrorism. This was under an American administration that was obsessively accommodating and multilateralist. Today, under the most unilateralist of administrations, Yemen has decided to assist in the war on terrorism. This was not a result of a sudden attack of goodwill toward

America. It was a result of the war in Afghanistan, which concentrated the mind of heretofore recalcitrant states like Yemen on the costs of non-cooperation with the United States (The most recent and dramatic demonstration of this newfound cooperation was the CIA killing on November 4, 2002, of an Al-Qaeda leader in Yemen using a remotely operated Predator drone). Coalitions are not made by superpowers going begging hat in hand. They are made by asserting a position and inviting others to join. What "pragmatic" realists often fail to realize is that unilateralism is the high road to multilateralism. When George Bush senior said of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, "this will not stand," and made it clear that he was prepared to act alone if necessary, that declaration—and the credibility of American determination to act unilaterally—in and of itself created a coalition. Hafez al-Asad did not join out of feelings of goodwill. He joined because no one wants to be left at the dock when the hegemon is sailing.

Unilateralism does not mean *seeking* to act alone. One acts in concert with others if possible. Unilateralism simply means that one does not allow oneself to be hostage to others. No unilateralist would, say, reject Security Council support for an attack on Iraq. The nontrivial question that separates unilateralism from multilateralism—and that tests the "pragmatic realists"—is this: What do you do if, at the end of the day, the Security Council refuses to back you? Do you allow yourself to be dictated to on issues of vital national—and international—security?

When I first proposed the unipolar model in 1990, I suggested that we should accept both its burdens and opportunities and that, if America did not wreck its economy, unipolarity could last thirty or forty years. That seemed bold at the time. Today, it seems rather modest. The unipolar moment has become the unipolar era. It remains true, however, that its durability will be decided at home. It will depend largely on whether it is welcomed by Americans or seen as a burden to be shed—either because we are too good for the world (the isolationist critique) or because we are not worthy of it (the liberal internationalist critique).

The new unilateralism argues explicitly and unashamedly for maintaining unipolarity, for sustaining America's unrivaled dominance for the foreseeable future. It could be a long future, assuming we successfully manage the single greatest threat, namely, weapons of mass destruction in the hands of rogue states. This in itself will require the aggressive and confident application of unipolar power rather than falling back, as we did in the 1990s, on paralyzing multilateralism. The future of the unipolar era hinges on whether America is governed by those who wish to retain, augment and use unipolarity to advance not just American but global ends, or whether America is governed by those who wish to give it up—either by allowing unipolarity to decay as they retreat to Fortress America, or by passing on the burden by gradually transferring power to multilateral institutions as heirs to American hegemony. The challenge to unipolarity is not from the outside but from the inside. The choice is ours. To impiously paraphrase Benjamin Franklin: History has given you an empire, if you will keep it.