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INTRODUCTION: BACK TO THE FUTURE?

The conjunction of an immense military establishment and a huge arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence – economic, political, and even spiritual – is felt in every city, every state house, and every office of the federal government. In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.

*President Dwight D. Eisenhower
Farewell Address to the Nation
January 17, 1961*

CONTRARY TO INITIAL EXPECTATIONS, the military-industrial complex did not fade away with the end of the cold war. It has simply reorganized itself.

As a result of a rash of military-industry mergers encouraged and subsidized by the Clinton administration, the "big three" weapons makers—Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Raytheon—now receive among themselves over \$30 billion per year in Pentagon contracts. This represents more than one out of every four dollars that the Defense Department doles out for everything from rifles to rockets.¹

If they get their way, the new military-industrial behemoths will receive billions more in the years to come. The Clinton administration's five-year budget plan for the Pentagon calls for nearly a 50 percent increase in weapons procurement, from \$44 billion per year now to over \$63 billion per year by 2003. On issue after issue—from expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to deploying the Star Wars missile defense system, to rolling back restrictions on arms sales to repressive regimes—the arms industry has launched a concerted lobbying campaign aimed at increasing military spending and arms exports. These initiatives are driven by profit and pork-barrel politics, not by an objective assessment of how best to defend the United States in the post-cold war period.

In order to achieve an effective, affordable defense, it will be necessary to rein in the power and profits of the Pentagon and the military contractors. But before looking at the recent activities of the arms lobby, it is important to reflect on just how misguided the Pentagon's current spending priorities really are.

MISSION IMPLAUSIBLE: TWO-WAR STRATEGY AND THE UNITED STATES AS "GLOBOCOP"

President Eisenhower's warning about the "acquisition of unwarranted influence" by the military-industrial complex is as relevant today as it was in 1961. Despite the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the breakup of the Soviet Union, the U.S. military budget is higher today than it was when Eisenhower gave that speech. At \$290 billion per year, the U.S. military budget (in constant dollars) remains near the peacetime cold war average that prevailed during the prime period of U.S.-Soviet rivalry, from roughly 1950 to 1989. This is astonishing considering that

Russia has slashed its weapons procurement budget by 77 percent since 1991 and that Russian forces could barely prevail over a rebel army in Chechnya (inside its own borders), much less project force against neighboring countries.²

Absent a robust Russian military, where is the threat that justifies spending over a quarter of a trillion dollars per year on war and preparations for war? The Pentagon's answer is simple: there is no longer one powerful superpower adversary to contend with, but U.S. forces still need to be equipped to fight two major regional conflicts simultaneously against "rogue states" like Iraq and North Korea.³ And getting hundreds of thousands of troops to these faraway places requires spending almost as much as the United States spent during the cold war—or so the Pentagon claims.

This "two-war" scenario is implausible in the extreme. As Michael Klare, Director of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College, has masterfully demonstrated in his book, *Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws*, Colin Powell devised the two-war strategy once he realized that the United States was "running out of enemies" large enough to justify spending hundreds of billions on the Pentagon every year. Klare also demonstrates that the two "major regional conflicts" that are the building blocks of the Pentagon's new spending scenario both involve theoretical regional adversaries that are far better armed and equipped than existing regional powers like Iraq or North Korea.⁴

Klare is not alone in suggesting that the new threats to U.S. security have been greatly exaggerated. Pentagon budget analyst Franklin Spinney has bluntly asserted that "the Pentagon's two-war strategy is just a marketing device to justify a high budget." Merrill McPeak, who served as Air Force Chief of Staff during and after the 1991 Persian Gulf War, has also weighed in on this issue: "We should walk away from the two-war strategy. Neither our historical experience nor our common sense leads us to think we need to do this. We've had to fight three major regional contingencies in the past 45 years—Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq. One comes along every 15 years or so—two have never come along simultaneously."⁵

For those who question whether conflicts like Vietnam or the Gulf War were essential to U.S. security, McPeak's estimate of one major conflict every 15 years can be extended to one every 20 to 30 years. And, as we will discuss later, the U.S. military budget could be sharply reduced if our government would take concerted action to prevent conflict. A preventive strategy would be far cheaper and more effective than the current approach of marshaling huge, expensive forces to prepare for contingencies that are unlikely to occur. This point is borne out by the Spring 1999 war in Kosovo, where it has become painfully evident that the costly application of high-tech military force is the wrong tool for dealing with ethnic conflicts and civil wars. By forcing the withdrawal of human rights monitors and humanitarian organizations that had been operating in the province, the NATO bombing campaign actually made it easier for Serb forces to drive ethnic Albanians out of Kosovo at gunpoint. And by intervening in an internal conflict without seeking the consent of the United Nations Security Council, the United States and its NATO allies confronted one illegitimate use of force—ethnic cleansing in Kosovo—with another—NATO's unauthorized bombing campaign. Meanwhile, relatively inexpensive measures that might have stopped the killing in Kosovo sooner, such as a beefed-up monitoring presence by the woefully underfunded Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) in Europe or a well-funded UN peacekeeping effort—were cast aside in favor of an ill-considered air war.⁶

Lawrence Korb, a top official in the Reagan Pentagon who now serves as the director of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, has argued that even if one accepts the proposition that U.S. forces need to be ready to fight two major regional conflicts at once, there is still room to make major cuts in the current Pentagon budget. Korb notes that the United States currently spends 19 times more on its military forces than all of the Pentagon's so-called rogue states—Iraq, Sudan, Libya, Syria, Cuba, and North Korea—combined. (See figure 2-2.) Korb also asserts that the Pentagon completely discounts the military capabilities of such key U.S. regional allies as Israel and South Korea, which would reinforce U.S. military power in a major regional conflict in the Middle East or Asia. Once we take into account the relative weakness of the rogue states and the strength of our allies, Korb suggests that there is room to trim at least \$40 billion from our current

Pentagon budget, even if we accept the highly unlikely scenario of needing to fight two major conflicts at one time.⁷ The point about the relative strength of the United States and its allies is underscored by the fact that the United States and its key allies (NATO, Japan, and South Korea) now account for 62 percent of total global military spending, up from roughly one-half in the mid-1980s.⁸ In short, despite repeated calls for higher military spending to remedy the alleged "readiness crisis" facing U.S. forces, the United States and its allies currently account for a much higher share of global military spending than they did at the height of the Reagan military buildup in the mid-1980s.

By exaggerating the current threat to U.S. security, the Pentagon is carrying on a long and dishonorable tradition. In fact, in the early 1990s it was revealed that U.S. projections of Soviet military power had been wildly overstated for years as a result of misleading intelligence supplied by people like Aldrich Ames, the CIA agent who was convicted of spying for the Soviet Union. Similarly, in the 1970s, the conservative Committee on the Present Danger pressed the CIA to do a slanted "Team B" assessment of Soviet military power that helped pave the way for Ronald Reagan's unprecedented peacetime military buildup of the 1980s.⁹

The increasing flow of illegal drugs from Latin America (See essay 2-3: Militarization of the U.S. Drug Control Program), terrorist bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (August 1998), missile tests by Iran (July 1998) and North Korea (August 1998), and NATO's air war in Kosovo (inaugurated on March 24, 1999) have prompted politicians and media pundits to demand that the Pentagon be given more money in order to beef up its national security policies. It is essential to offer a compelling alternative to the exaggerated threats and misguided spending priorities that military hawks are promoting in the hopes of dramatically increasing the Pentagon budget, bringing it back to the record-high, Reaganesque levels that prevailed in the mid-1980s.

If the current threats to U.S. interests do not justify spending \$290 billion a year on the Pentagon, much less increasing the military budget, as conservatives are suggesting, what is driving these enormous expenditures? First and most obviously, the main beneficiaries of cold war military spending—including the Pentagon, the major military contractors, and key members of Congress who routinely steer military dollars to their districts—have been working overtime to keep the military gravy train running. Beyond this institutional pressure for permanently high military spending, there is also a strategic rationale—the notion that the United States should retain the capability to serve as a sort of "globocop," charging to the rescue to restore order, stability, and "free markets" when they are threatened by the forces of evil and chaos. Although it is true that in a number of key instances, such as Somalia and Rwanda, the United States has abandoned the task of policing violent conflicts due to public concern about U.S. casualties, the Pentagon's strategy and budget remain focused on retaining a capability for global force projection. And in those areas where there are critical resources or potential U.S. investments at risk—such as the Persian Gulf and the oil-and-gas-rich former Soviet Republics of Central Asia—the Pentagon is busily at work providing arms and training, arranging access to bases, and (in the case of the Persian Gulf) prepositioning troops and equipment in readiness for a possible military intervention at some future date. If we were to abandon the outdated notion that the United States needs to maintain the capability to project force to every corner of the globe and focus instead on developing better diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with other nations, we could afford to cut tens of billions of dollars from our bloated military budget.¹⁰

NEW MILITARY MEGACOMPANIES: CORPORATE OR NATIONAL INTERESTS?

In the 1950s, when General Motors was the nation's top automaker and its chief executive officer, Charles Wilson, was tapped to be President Eisenhower's secretary of Defense, Wilson responded to critics who were concerned that he and his company had too much power by saying "what's good for General Motors is good for America." Today, the nation's top weapons maker is Lockheed Martin, which was created by merging Lockheed with Martin Marietta, Loral Defense, the General Dynamics combat aircraft division, and scores of other military companies to create a \$35 billion behemoth that received over \$18 billion in Pentagon contracts.¹¹ Lockheed has facilities in

447 cities and 45 states and operates in 56 nations and territories around the world. In recent years, Lockheed Martin and its allies in the weapons industry have pushed aggressively for favorable treatment from the federal government in the form of special subsidies, lucrative contracts for big-ticket weapons systems, and wholesale changes in U.S. policies on arms sales and military technology transfers. Given the tremendous growth of these military conglomerates, one way to look at the development of U.S. security policy as we approach the twenty-first century is to echo the question that critics raised about General Motors in the 1950s: Is what is good for Lockheed Martin good for America?

In gauging the power and influence of our new, "improved" military-industrial complex, it is instructive to look at how the military merger boom came about in the first place. Early in the Clinton administration, Defense Secretary Les Aspin and Undersecretary of Defense William Perry decided to encourage mergers of defense firms. First, at a meeting that Lockheed Martin's Norman Augustine refers to as the "last supper," Perry bluntly told industry executives that the Pentagon would not be ordering enough ships, planes, and tanks to support the number of major military contractors that had been sustained by the Reagan military buildup of the 1980s.¹² Perry's judgment reflected two realities. First, weapons procurement budgets, while still high by historical standards, were dropping significantly from the lavish levels they had reached during the Reagan years. This meant that the Pentagon budget could no longer support the same number of major contractors in the style to which they had become accustomed in the years of the Reagan military boom. And second, the Pentagon was in the process of slowing down the production lines for current-generation systems, such as the F-16 fighter and the M-1 tank, to make room for next-generation systems, such as the F-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The official rationale behind the merger movement was that it would cut overhead by reducing the number of underutilized factories in the military industry. But, as will be discussed later, companies and their allies in Congress have fiercely resisted closing weapons production lines, preferring instead to lay off workers even as industry profits hit near-record levels and industry executives earn fat bonuses and inflated salaries.

The strategy that Perry and his Pentagon colleague, John Deutch, who went on to direct the CIA during 1995-96, chose for consolidating the weapons industry was dubbed "payoffs for layoffs" by such critics as Representative Bernie Sanders (I-VT). At the urging of then Martin Marietta CEO Norman Augustine, in the summer of 1993 Perry and Deutch signed off on a new policy under which the Pentagon would partially underwrite defense industry mergers by picking up the costs of moving equipment, dismantling factories, and providing golden parachutes for top executives. In a classic example of the "revolving door" between the defense industry and the Pentagon, Perry and Deutch had to get a conflict-of-interest waiver from Secretary Aspin before they could give the green light to the new merger subsidy policy. (Both men had worked as paid consultants for their old friend Norman Augustine at Martin Marietta just prior to joining the Clinton administration.) Augustine himself became the new CEO and received \$8.2 million in bonus money as a result of the Lockheed/Martin Marietta merger, which was announced just three months after Perry and Deutch cleared the new merger subsidy policy. Augustine's lobbying for the merger subsidies, which has yielded his company over \$855 million in taxpayer money, prompted one former Pentagon official to observe "when it comes to corporate welfare, you'd better look out for St. Norman Augustine."¹³

The Pentagon claims that using taxpayer money to subsidize military mergers will cut overhead and save money by, as Augustine puts it, allowing companies to run "three full factories instead of six half-full factories." In reality, as research by Harvey Sapolsky of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has demonstrated, the Pentagon has not shut down a single major weapons production line since the end of the cold war. And even if Lockheed Martin cuts some overhead costs by closing factories and laying off workers, there is no guarantee that the same company that brought us the \$600 toilet seat in the 1980s and pioneered in the arts of bribery and influence peddling in the 1970s is going to pass on its savings on overhead to U.S. taxpayers. So, while it may never provide lower weapons prices for the Pentagon, the 1990s bout of government-backed merger mania in the military industry has accomplished one thing: it has resulted in a slightly

leaner, considerably meaner, and much more politically powerful corporate military sector. As John Pike of the Federation of American Scientists has noted, a company like Boeing, which since its absorption of McDonnell Douglas has over 250,000 employees, leaves a huge "political footprint" that gives the company immense clout on Capitol Hill. Similarly, after the Lockheed/Martin Marietta merger was consummated, Lockheed Martin put out a slick brochure that bragged openly about its "facilities in all 50 states."¹⁴

The geopolitical reach of the new defense megafirms has been reinforced by millions of dollars in campaign cash. In 1997-98 the top six U.S. military companies spent over \$6 million in contributions to candidates and political parties, and Lockheed Martin was "leader of the PACs" (political action committees) among weapons contractors. In fact, from 1991 to 1997, defense companies made more political donations than that other well-known merchant of death, the tobacco lobby, by a margin of \$32.3 million to \$26.9 million. In addition to these hefty campaign donations, America's six biggest defense contractors spent an astonishing \$51 million on lobbying in 1997 and 1998. These lobbying funds go for items like maintaining armies of lobbyists and public relations people in Washington, producing slick materials to present to Congress, and running ads touting company products in Capitol Hill publications.¹⁵

Last but not least, the consolidation of the weapons sectors gives arms companies greater leverage over the Pentagon, because the Department of Defense has so few options left when it comes to purchasing a major weapons system. In the spring of 1998, when the Pentagon awarded a \$1.6 billion contract to do the so-called systems architecture for a National Missile Defense system (the latter-day successor to Ronald Reagan's Star Wars plan), the competition pitted Boeing against a partnership called United Missile Defense, which was a teaming arrangement composed of Lockheed Martin, TRW, and Raytheon. When Boeing won the competition, TRW and Raytheon immediately switched teams and became major subcontractors for Boeing on the project. Given the fact that three of the four major players were going to have a big payday regardless of which company won the competition, how likely is it that TRW and Raytheon officials were racking their brains for innovative approaches to the problem at hand?¹⁶

Similarly, in the field of combat aircraft, Boeing is a partner with Lockheed Martin on one major system (the Air Force's F-22 stealth fighter plane) and a competitor on another (the next-generation Joint Strike Fighter). These interlocking business relationships create a climate in which it often makes more sense for the defense megafirms to team up and use their unprecedented political clout to increase the Pentagon budget pie than to compete to produce cost-effective systems for existing programs. And that's just what they've been doing.

BUYING WEAPONS THAT THE PENTAGON NEVER REQUESTED

One way that firms such as Lockheed Martin and Boeing fatten their bottom lines at the expense of our long-term security is by using their connections on Capitol Hill to force the Pentagon to buy weapons that were not included in the department's original budget request. This add-on game is a bipartisan pursuit. Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich always kept an eye out for Lockheed Martin, which has a plant near his former district in Marietta, Georgia, but House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt has been just as aggressive in seeking funds for the Mc-Donnell Douglas division of Boeing, the largest employer in his St. Louis area district. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott was a master at steering military projects to his home state of Mississippi, but Democratic Senator Daniel Inouye of Hawaii almost matched Lott's lobbying prowess: Inouye inserted 31 projects for his home state—worth over \$258 million—into the FY 1999 Pentagon budget.¹⁷

Spreading Pentagon contracts around to the districts of powerful legislators has been a routine practice for decades, but defense budget politics have taken a unique twist in the 1990s. Since 1994, when the Republicans took control of both Houses of Congress, Congress has added billions to the Pentagon budget every year beyond what the Department of Defense requested. This is a role reversal from the Reagan years, when liberals in Congress were always trying to shave a few billion off from the President's Pentagon budget request. According to the nonpartisan

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Congress added a total of roughly \$20 billion to the Pentagon budget during fiscal years 1996 to 1998. And despite cries from the military and Pentagon budget hawks regarding the "readiness crisis" that is afflicting U.S. forces, three-quarters of this \$20 billion windfall was earmarked for weapons projects that benefit major arms makers, not for maintenance, training, pay, or other items that would improve the safety and quality of life of our men and women in uniform.¹⁸

The add-on game is designed to increase the revenues of major contractors by extending the production runs of weapons systems that the Pentagon had hoped to terminate. The payback for legislators is twofold: not only do they get hundreds of thousands of dollars in campaign contributions from the contractors, but they also get to claim credit for high-profile, job-producing weapons projects in their districts. This self-serving process has serious costs. First, it wastes billions of dollars in taxpayer funds that could be put to more productive uses rebuilding our schools or restoring our environment. Second, it undermines our security by distorting the spending patterns within the Pentagon budget.

Take the C-130 transport plane, which is built by Lockheed Martin just outside of Gingrich's Marietta, Georgia, district. Since 1978, the U.S. Air Force has requested a total of just five C-130s, but Congress has purchased 256 of them. This ratio of 50 planes purchased for every one requested by the Pentagon may well be a record in the annals of pork-barrel politics. Senator John McCain (R-AZ) has remarked that Congress has purchased so many surplus C-130s that "we could use them to house the homeless." The C-130 has been promoted over the years by everyone from former Senate Armed Services Committee chair Sam Nunn (D-GA) to former National Guard and National Reserve subcommittee chair Sonny Montgomery (R-MS) to House Speaker Gingrich to Senate Majority Leader Lott. The added planes are generally placed with National Guard units based in the states of key members. For example, of the more than two dozen C-130s that Congress has added to the budget in recent years, more than half of them will be based at Kessler Air Force Base in Lott's home state of Mississippi.¹⁹

The C-130 add-on is an example of "the waste that keeps on wasting." For one thing, Congress has been buying them at such a rapid clip that since 1991, the Air Force has been forced to retire 13 perfectly usable C-130s with more than a dozen years of useful life left. Second, because Congress does not budget funds to operate the added C-130s, the Pentagon will have to come up with over \$1 billion to maintain the unrequested C-130s over the next six years, funds that may have to deplete allocations for pay, or training, or other so-called readiness accounts of the sort that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been claiming are underfunded.²⁰

The C-130 is one of dozens of unnecessary items that members of Congress from key committees have been cramming into the Pentagon budget during the Clinton/Gingrich era. Even in 1998, when Congress was allegedly operating under a balanced budget agreement that was supposed to cap the military budget at roughly \$270 billion, Trent Lott managed to slip in a down payment on a \$1.5 billion helicopter carrier for the Marines (to be built in his hometown of Pascagoula, Mississippi) and \$94 million for a spaced-based laser program that he hopes to have located in the state. The Texas delegation slipped in a few more F-16 fighters (built at Lockheed Martin's Fort Worth facility), and Connecticut will benefit from the addition to the Army's budget of no fewer than eight extra Sikorsky Black Hawk helicopters. In June 1998, Senator McCain released a list of \$2.5 billion in unrequested projects dial members of the Senate had added to the Pentagon's FY 1999 budget; he described the add-ons as the "worst pork" that he had witnessed in the Pentagon budget process in years. In the last-minute maneuvering between the White House and Capitol Hill on the FY 1999 federal budget, the congressional leadership added an astounding \$9 billion to the Pentagon's funding, including an extra \$1 billion for Star Wars research. Then, to add insult to injury, in May of 1999 Congress more than doubled President Clinton's already generous \$6 billion supplemental budget request to pay for the war in Kosovo, adding billions in unrequested military funds that had nothing to do with sustaining NATO's bombing campaign and everything to do with opening up room in the budget for more military pork targeted to the states and districts of key members of Congress.²¹

SHAPING POLICY, OR HOW TO WRITE YOUR OWN TICKET

Beyond joining with key legislators to insert specific items into the Pentagon budget, companies like Lockheed Martin are also actively engaged in the business of shaping U.S. foreign and military policies to meet their needs. This more sinister form of lobbying can involve changing the terms under which major contractors are reimbursed, such as the payoffs-for-layoffs subsidies for defense industry mergers that Norman Augustine engineered prior to the Lockheed/Martin Marietta merger; or eliminating royalty fees that foreign arms customers had been paying to reimburse the U.S. Treasury for the cost of weapons systems that were developed at taxpayer expense (a move that is costing the Treasury roughly \$500 million per year); or creating billions of dollars of new grants and government-guaranteed loans to support the export of U.S. weaponry; or lifting long-standing arms control curbs, such as the ban on the sale of advanced combat aircraft to Latin America. In other instances, contractors have weighed in heavily in favor of controversial programs or policies that stand to benefit them. The most immediate examples of this land of lobbying are the Star Wars missile defense program, which has received on average an extra \$1 billion per year as a result of lobbying by Pentagon contractors and conservative research and advocacy groups, and the push for NATO expansion, which benefited from considerable time, effort, and money from Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Textron, which see expanding NATO as a golden opportunity to open up a new, government-approved, taxpayer-subsidized market for their wares. A few examples of specific industry lobbying campaigns will illustrate how the big three arms makers have been using their newfound political clout.

PEDDLING WEAPONS ABROAD: LIFTING THE LATIN ARMS BAN, PROMOTING NATO EXPANSION

As the Reagan weapons-buying binge of the 1980s begins to wind down, U.S. weapons manufacturers began to focus more attention on foreign markets as a way to sustain their profit margins. Because foreign sales often involve transfers of more "mature" technologies in which the bugs have been worked out of the production process, and because the research, development, and initial production runs on the system have been paid for by U.S. taxpayers (in the form of Pentagon contracts), weapons exports are often more profitable than sales of weaponry to the Pentagon. This quest for easy profits has driven virtually all major weapons producing companies worldwide to make a concerted effort to boost their exports. U.S. companies have fared the best, cornering 40 percent to more than 50 percent of the total global arms market in the 1990s. Given this impressive market dominance, companies like Lockheed Martin and Boeing have found that the only way to expand their exports beyond current levels is to change U.S. government policy. The changes they want involve either opening up new markets, by eliminating existing restrictions based on the human rights or proliferation record of potential recipient states, or seeking new government subsidies that can be used to create more cash-paying customers (i.e., foreign clients that use U.S.-taxpayer-supplied "cash" to buy U.S. weapons).

The industry's successful campaign to lift a 20-year-old ban on exports of advanced U.S. combat aircraft to Latin America is a prime example of how its lobbying machine operates. First the industry prevailed on Defense Secretary Perry to advocate that the Clinton administration lift the ban and send U.S. Air Force F-16s to do demonstration flights at the March 1996 air show in Santiago, Chile. Prior to the show, the Pentagon had also arranged for some Brazilian generals to do test flights in F-16 planes deployed with the Puerto Rican National Guard. Then aerospace lobbyists generated letters to then Secretary of State Warren Christopher from 38 senators and 78 members of the House of Representatives urging him to support the lifting of the ban. *Time* magazine reporter Douglas Waller described the lobbying letters as the "more million-dollar letters," because the members of the House and Senate who signed onto the appeal to Christopher received a total of more than \$1 million in PAC contributions from major weapons-exporting companies. The industry representatives followed up by holding White House meetings with presidential counselor and confidant Mack McLarty and an aide to Vice President Al Gore.²²

According to an account by Merrill Goozner of the *Chicago Tribune*, a Lockheed Martin brochure touting the Latin arms market as "a \$3 to \$15 billion opportunity over the next 10 years" was even slipped under the hotel door of former Costa Rican president and Nobel Peace Prize winner Oscar Arias during one of his business trips. Dr. Arias has been working with the Carter Center, the Council for a Livable World, and a coalition of DC-based public interest groups to promote a moratorium on new sales of advanced weaponry to Latin America as a first step toward promoting regional discussions on conflict prevention and force reductions. But so far, the power and money of the arms lobby has sidetracked this commonsense proposal, which would do far more for the future security and stability of Latin America than would hawking expensive military hardware.²³

On the issue of NATO expansion, the role of U.S. contractors was not to change administration policy but rather to reinforce a questionable policy decision. The Clinton administration decided to expand NATO for a variety of reasons, such as consolidating free market democratic reforms in East and Central Europe and recruiting new allies to help keep the peace in Bosnia and other hot spots. But given the obvious downsides of expanding the alliance—such as alienating Russia, stalling further efforts at U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reductions, and initiating an open-ended, costly commitment to rearm the new member states—the Clinton administration needed allies to help it sell the NATO expansion concept to Congress and the public. By far the most important players in the pro-NATO expansion lobby were organizations of Polish, Hungarian, and Czech Americans along with major arms manufacturers including Lockheed Martin and Textron, who took an aggressive stance in support of this costly new commitment.

Corporate lobbying for NATO expansion took several forms. Most important, Lockheed Martin lent out one of its vice presidents, Bruce Jackson, to serve as president of the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO, a lobbying and public education group housed at the offices of the conservative American Enterprise Institute. The committee sponsored ad campaigns, congressional briefings, speeches, articles, and white papers promoting the "widest possible" expansion of NATO. Jackson claims that his role at the Committee to Expand NATO is a "hobby," but the nature of his work suggests otherwise. For example, in the summer of 1997, when the U.S. Committee sponsored a dinner at which 12 U.S. senators were briefed on NATO expansion by Secretary of State Albright, Jackson invited Lockheed Martin board member Bernard Schwartz, who, coincidentally, was the largest individual donor of soft money to the Democratic Party during the 1995-96 election cycle. Schwartz's presence was a clear signal to the senators present that supporting NATO expansion would be a good way to garner support for their campaign coffers. To reinforce that message, a few weeks after the NATO dinner Schwartz sent a \$50,000 check to the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee.

Other pro-NATO expansion activities pursued by U.S. weapons firms included financial contributions by Lockheed Martin, Textron, and McDonnell Douglas to proexpansion ethnic organizations like the American Friends of the Czech Republic and several Romanian foundations promoting that nation's candidacy for NATO membership; political funding to help pass the public referendum on NATO expansion that was held in Hungary in 1997; and all manner of wheeling and dealing in East and Central Europe in order to convince the top leadership in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania, and other NATO "wannabe" nations that buying U.S. weapons would be the best way to curry favor with the U.S. government and win its support for their NATO candidacies. It is important to note that many people in East and Central Europe, including democratic leaders such as Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic and Lech Walesa of Poland, were supportive of NATO expansion based on long-standing fears of Russia, which made them a receptive audience for the NATO expansion proposal.

When the Senate finally voted on NATO expansion in early 1998, it passed by a vote of 81 to 19. But due to public concerns about the costs of future NATO expansion—by one estimate the total cost of multiple rounds of expansion could reach as much as \$500 billion over 12 to 15 years, or at least \$2,500 for every American household—the next round of NATO entrants may not be invited to join until 2001, not 1999 as originally planned. This delay offers critics of NATO expansion an important political opening to marshal the forces that will be needed to hold back the

arms lobby and the executive branch from going further down the dangerous and costly path of expanding a cold war alliance that has no clear purpose in the post-cold war world.²⁴

By the time that NATO held its fiftieth anniversary celebrations in Washington in April of 1999, the costs of expanding the alliance had been outpaced by the price tag for the air war against Yugoslavia, which has been costing roughly \$1 billion per month. Restocking the U.S. and allied arsenal with Raytheon Tomahawk cruise missiles, Boeing Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), and Lockheed Martin F-16 and F-22 fighter planes will provide billions in new contracts for the big three weapons makers; and if the public does not demand that the president and the Congress pursue a preventive strategy in the wake of the Kosovo fiasco, these billions in replacement contracts may be just the down payment on a massive feeding frenzy for the military industrial complex. The weapons manufacturers are mindful of the "benefits" of the Kosovo conflict; in fact, Lockheed Martin vice president Bruce Jackson took to the pages of the Capitol Hill newspaper *Roll Call* to urge Congress to amply fund the war effort. Meanwhile, back at the arms bazaar, Boeing, Raytheon, and United Technologies plunked down \$250,000 each to serve on the official "Host Committee" for the April 1999 NATO fiftieth anniversary meetings in Washington, as a way to get the inside track on meeting the NATO foreign policy bureaucrats and defense ministers who will be making the decisions on whether to stock up on U.S. military hardware in the years to come.²⁵

PUSHING WEAPONS AT HOME: THE STAR WARS LOBBY

One of the most amazing lobbying stories of recent times involves the work done by the Pentagon, contractors such as Lockheed Martin and Boeing, and right-wing think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation and the Center for Security Policy (founded by former Reagan Pentagon official Frank Gaffney) to keep Reagan's Star Wars program alive—despite radical changes in the world security environment, which have rendered its original mission obsolete, and a string of uninterrupted technical failures. Fifteen years and \$55 billion have gone down the drain since Reagan first gave his Star Wars speech in March 1983, and the Soviet Union, whose nuclear missiles were supposed to be the main target of Reagan's cherished missile defense system, no longer exists. Undaunted, the Star Warriors have devised a new mission for missile defenses: to protect us against attacks by "rogue states" like Iraq and North Korea, which do not even have missiles that can reach American territory. And even when a major component of Star Wars fails—such as Lockheed Martin's troubled Theater High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD), which two foreign in tests conducted during this decade—the Star Wars lobby in Congress shouts for more money.²⁶

The nerve center of the Star Wars lobby is Gaffney's Center for Security Policy (CSP), a think tank and advocacy organization that puts out roughly 200 press releases per year (under the more authoritative name of "national security decision briefs") touting missile defenses, increases in the military budget, and other stock right-wing themes. Since its inception in 1988, Gaffney's group has received over \$2 million in corporate donations, mostly from companies such as Lockheed Martin and Boeing, which are major Star Wars contractors. Gaffney's CSP also has no fewer than five Lockheed Martin executives on its board, not to mention vintage Star Warriors such as weapons physicist Edward Teller and his protege, George Keyworth, who served as Reagan's science advisor when the Star Wars scheme was first being hatched. The CSP also has close links to other conservative think tanks like the Heritage Foundation and Empower America, both of which have representatives on the CSP board. During the fall of 1998, the Star Wars lobby made a concerted effort to win over one more senator to Mississippi Senator Thad Cochran's Defend America Act, which would require deployment of a National Missile Defense system. Toward that end, Empower America ran misleading radio ads in the State of Nevada in an effort to convince residents that the reluctance of their two Democratic senators, Harry Reid and Richard Bryan, to vote for a largely useless and massively expensive missile defense system meant that they were against "defending our families" from nuclear attack. In the short term, these prodigious efforts on the part of the Star Wars lobby were in vain. Due in part to a public backlash against the tactics used by special prosecutor Kenneth Starr and the Republican congressional leadership in the Monica Lewinsky

scandal, the Republicans failed to pickup a seat in the Senate in the 1998 elections, and Democratic incumbents such as Harry Reid and Barbara Boxer of California, who had been specifically criticized for opposing Star Wars, were reelected.

Despite these apparent setbacks in the 1998 elections, the Star Wars lobby did not give up; by the spring of 1999, both the Senate and the House had been persuaded to pass legislation modeled on the Cochran bill which stated that it is the policy of the U.S. government to deploy a National Missile Defense as soon as it is "technologically feasible." While arms control advocates such as Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) tried to soften the blow by sponsoring amendments calling for the United States to continue to pursue nuclear weapons reductions with Russia, the passage of the two Star Wars resolutions were clearly a major propaganda victory for conservative missile defense boosters and their corporate sponsors.²⁷

FIGHTING BACK: PROMOTING A PREVENTIVE STRATEGY

The best way to fight back against the arms lobby's new push for increases in military spending and arms export subsidies is by promoting an alternative strategy for preventing conflicts and limiting the violence level at which they are waged. To do so means uniting behind concrete, commonsense demands.

Stopping the Spread of Deadly Weaponry

The International Campaign to Ban Land Mines, whose key organizer, Jodie Williams, won the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize, is a prime example of what nongovernmental organizations can do to shape the international security agenda in a positive direction. When the campaign was launched less than a decade ago, few people had even heard of the land mine problems. But after a few years of persistent campaigning and public education by veterans groups, organizations of handicapped individuals, human rights advocates, doctors, relief organizations, and arms control groups, more than 100 governments were persuaded to support the Oslo agreement to eliminate antipersonnel land mines. (By the spring of 1999, 81 nations had already ratified the accord, enough to make it an official treaty.) The campaign was given a huge boost by the work of Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), who prevailed upon his colleagues in the Senate to impose a moratorium on U.S. exports of antipersonnel land mines. The land mines campaign succeeded because it was able to drive home the immense human consequences of these senseless and indiscriminate weapons. The millions of innocent civilians who have been killed and wounded by land mines finally found their voice in the land mines campaign, which was largely championed by citizen organizations, with important assistance from key governments such as Canada and Norway.

The same organizations that have put the land mines issue squarely on the international agenda are now zeroing in on so-called small arms or light weapons—the rifles, hand grenades, and light vehicles that are the stock-in-trade of the world's ethnic killing fields. Because small arms are standard issue with most armed forces of the world, and because the issue intersects with the controversial issue of domestic gun control, the small arms fight will no doubt be longer and more complex than the land mines campaign. But to the extent that progress can be made in limiting the access of combatants to their weapons of choice, the cause of peace and disarmament will be advanced exponentially. At a May 1999 peace conference in the Hague, the global campaign to curb small arms was officially launched under the umbrella of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA).²⁸

A second strand of work against the arms trade is the global campaign for a Code of Conduct on arms sales. The Code of Conduct, which is embodied in legislation sponsored by Representative Cynthia McKinney (D-GA) and Representative Dana Rohrabacher (D-CA), calls for sharp restrictions on arms sales to human rights abusers, undemocratic governments, and nations involved in aggression against their neighbors. In the United States, the bill passed the House of Representatives in the summer of 1997 and has been championed in the Senate by Senator John Kerry (D-MA). In the meantime, the European Union (EU) has passed its own Code of Conduct,

which, although lacking the specifics some arms control advocates were seeking, nonetheless represents a first step toward making human rights a priority in the arms sales decisions of EU members. Last but not least, Oscar Arias has created a Nobel Laureates Commission (including other peace prize winners such as Elie Wiesel, Betty Williams, Jose Ramos Horta, and the Dalai Lama) that is pressing for an international Code of Conduct on arms sales modeled on the McKinney/Rohrabacher bill.²⁹

Abolish Nuclear Weapons

Building on the work of the Canberra Commission—a panel of former government officials and top military personnel that included General Lee Butler, the former head of the U.S. Strategic Air Command—the movement to abolish nuclear weapons has gained new momentum in recent years. Galvanized by Jonathan Schell's latest book, *The Gift of Time: The Case for Abolishing Nuclear Weapons*, the Abolition 2000 campaign has rallied around the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons as soon as is practically possible.

In the United States, the campaign is supporting legislation to eliminate funding for so-called subcritical nuclear weapons testing—a \$40 billion, ten-year program that would allow the U.S. government to violate the spirit of the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty by designing new weapons by computer—and is encouraging a sense of Congress resolution that would press the executive branch to move toward abolition of U.S. nuclear forces. The value of the nuclear abolition movement lies not only in progress toward eliminating existing arsenals of mass destruction but also in providing the best hope of establishing a higher international norm to mitigate against the development of future nuclear weapons and be persuasive to new nuclear powers such as India and Pakistan, countries that have long pointed to the hypocrisy of the U.S. government's "Do as I say, not as I do" approach to the development and possession of nuclear weapons.³⁰

Cut the Military Budget

Nearly a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the U.S. military budget is still \$276 billion, which equals the peacetime cold war average. This excessive spending causes two kinds of problems: first, it depletes scarce funds that could be used for more worthwhile purposes such as education, healthcare, transportation, and other job-creating activities with far more economic payoff than building weapons. Second, when the most powerful nation in the world continues to put the majority of its surplus resources into outmoded weapons instead of preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, or other more constructive approaches, it sends the wrong signal by implying that force is still the ultimate arbiter of international disputes.

Efforts to reduce the military budget are now gathering force on two fronts. In the United States, an organization called Business Leaders for Sensible Priorities has brought together 500 business executives to work on a multiyear publicity campaign designed to achieve a \$40 billion reduction in the Pentagon budget by the year 2001, with the resulting funds to be invested in more pressing domestic needs. On a global scale, Oscar Arias has been working with organizations such as the Washington-based Center for International Policy and the New York-based Council on Economic Priorities to promote reductions in military spending worldwide. This effort is linked to a series of UN-supported security talks aimed at reducing arms and increasing mutual cooperation and confidence among potential rivals in regions of tension.

And a new proposal has emerged from the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, the World Order Models Project, and the Union of Concerned Scientists under the ambitious title "Global Action to Prevent War." The proposal outlines a series of four treaties that would be phased in over a 40- to 50-year period with the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, radically reducing conventional arms production and sales, and establishing a global mechanism for cooperative peacekeeping and conflict prevention designed to render war obsolete. Ambitious as it may be, the unique strength of the Global Action to Prevent War proposal is that it provides a long-term vision for peace and security that can compete for public attention with the dire worst-case

scenarios that the Pentagon and the weapons contractors have been using to drive up weapons spending and fuel arms races for the past five decades. Until the international community learns how to plan for peace rather than prepare for war, the arms makers and military hawks will always have the upper hand in debates about how to use our common resources.³¹

All of these campaigns—to limit the arms trade, to abolish nuclear weapons, and to reduce global military spending—are examples of conflict prevention in practice. If they can be linked to new ways of solving security dilemmas—both through international law, as embodied in a World Court and an International Criminal Court that should have the support of all of the world's major powers and through international cooperation, utilizing better-funded, more democratically structured arrangements for international and regional peacekeeping—then the era of stockpiling weapons to "solve" security problems may be brought to an end. The sooner all this happens, the better.

NOTES

1. William D. Hartung, "Military Monopoly," *The Nation*, January 13/20, 1997.
2. U.S. budget figures are from Elizabeth Hecter and Steven Kosiak, "Conference Report on the FY2000 Appropriations Bill," Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, October 18, 1999, and the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY1998* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, March 1997). Estimates on Russian military spending in the post-cold war period vary considerably, but the figures on massive cuts in weapons procurement have been widely cited. As the conservative International Institute for Strategic Studies has noted in its most recent analysis: "The major threat to the Russian armed forces in 1997 was not military, but financial. A dire lack of funding was compounded by delays and genuine difficulties in implementing urgently needed structural reforms." See International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1991-98* (London: ESS, 1997), p. 101.
3. William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, May 1997).
4. Michael T. Klare, *Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America's Search for a New Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1995).
5. The quotes from Franklin Spinney and Merrill McPeak are from Mark Thompson, "Why the Pentagon Gets a Free Ride," *Time*, June 5, 1995.
6. On the prospects for cutting military spending dramatically under a more cooperative, preventive approach to security, see Janne E. Nolan, ed., *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994). On the costs of the war in Kosovo and the benefits of preventive approaches, see William D. Hartung, "Beyond Kosovo: Preventive Diplomacy," *The Nation*, May 10, 1999.
7. Lawrence J. Korb, "Our Overstaffed Armed Forces," *Foreign Affairs*, November/ December 1995, pp. 22-34.
8. Statistics on the share of global military spending accounted for by the United States and its allies are calculated by the author based on data contained in annual reports of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*, Department of State, Washington, DC, from the editions covering 1987 and 1998.
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10. On increased U.S. troop presence in the Persian Gulf since the 1991 war with Iraq, see Caryle Murphy, "Engulfed in a War That Won't End," *Washington Post*, July 30, 1995; on U.S. efforts to increase capabilities for projecting force into Central Asia, see David Brindley, "Asia's Big Oil Rush: Count Us In, GIs Arrive in Longest Airborne Mission Ever," *U.S. News and World Report*, September 29, 1997, which describes a U.S. military exercise that involved parachuting the 82nd Airborne Division and the chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command into Kazakhstan as a way to show the flag.
11. Figures are from Lockheed Martin's annual report for 1996. For further background on the

Lockheed Martin merger, see William D. Hartung, "St. Augustine's Rules: Norman Augustine and the Future of the American Defense Industry," *World Policy Journal*, Summer 1996, pp. 65-73.

12. Norman R. Augustine, "Reshaping an Industry: Lockheed Martin's Survival Story," *Harvard Business Review*, May-June 1997, pp. 83-94.

13. The quote is from Hartung, "St. Augustine's Rules"; for the full story on the "payoffs for layoffs" phenomenon, see the excellent series of articles by Patrick J. Sloyan in *Newsday*, including "Sweet Deal from Pentagon: Top Brass OK \$60 Million Break to Ex-Employer, Martin Marietta," June 30, 1994; "Layoff Payoff: Pentagon Pays \$31 Million to Bosses for Merger that Wipes Out Jobs," March 17, 1995; and "Big Blunders, Then Big Bonus: Defense Firms Rewarded After \$2.3 Billion in Disasters," November 1, 1995. For statistics on the relative fate of production workers and executives in the military industry as a result of the merger boom, see Charles M. Sen-nott, "CEO Salaries Rise as Jobs Are Lost," *Boston Globe*, February 11, 1996, p. B-12.

14. See Hartung, "Military Monopoly" and "St. Augustine's Rules"; and Lockheed Martin, "Investor's Fact Sheet," Spring 1996.

15. On campaign spending and lobbying by defense contractors, see Katharine Q. Seelye, "Arms Contractors Spend to Promote an Expanded NATO," *New York Times*, March 30, 1998; and William D. Hartung, *Peddling Arms, Peddling Influence: Exposing the Arms Export Lobby* (New York World Policy Institute, October 1996), and *Peddling Arms, Peddling Influence Update* (New York World Policy Institute, April 1997).

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17. On add-ons, see Business Leaders for Sensible Priorities, "Midnight Pork: It's What's for Dinner," fact sheet, September 1998; John Isaacs, Council for a Livable World, "Items of Interest in the Omnibus Appropriations Bill," memorandum, October 22, 1998; Taxpayers for Common Sense, "\$50 Million for Mississippi Pork," *The Waste Basket*, Vol. 3, No. 25, August 3, 1998; Charles R. Babcock, "Congress Fattens Defense Bill with \$4 Billion in Pork," *Washington Post*, August 15, 1998; and Pat Towell, "No Chance for a Nonfat Bill as Special Projects Flourish," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, August 22, 1998, p. 2292.

18. Data on add-ons provided by Steven Kosiak, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, based on analysis of the relevant appropriations and authorization bills in the House and Senate during the FY 1996 to 1998 time frame.

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The Hidden Costs of NATO Expansion (New York World Policy Institute, 1998), pp. 223-30; or two magazine pieces summarizing this material: William D. Hartung, "NATO Boondoggle," *Progressive*, May 1998, pp. 22-24; or William D. Hartung, "Pentagon Welfare: The Corporate Campaign for NATO Expansion," *Multinational Monitor*, March 1998, pp. 9-13.

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