The role of the public in shaping American foreign policy elicits considerable debate among scholars and analysts about its importance and its impact. Indeed, two sharply different theoretical perspectives on this relationship have dominated academic and policy discussions over the past half century. One perspective assumes that the public is largely uninterested, ill-informed, and subject to presidential leadership. In the strongest variant of this view, the public does not so much shape foreign policy; instead, it is largely shaped by it. The policy implication of this approach is that public opinion has a very limited role in shaping American foreign policy, and that the public largely adopts a 'follower' mentality, mainly driven by the president and other key foreign policy officials. A second perspective starts from the premise that the public's views are more structured and stable than suggested in the past. In this view, the public may not be fully conversant with all the details of foreign policy and may not have a sustained interest in foreign affairs, but their underlying attitudes and views are more consistent and predictive of policy positions than often contended. In the strongest variant of this view, the public can and do shape the general direction of policy, even if they do not affect every decision. The policy implication of this approach is that public opinion plays a sustaining role in shaping American foreign policy and that policy-makers are constrained by the public's view.1

In this chapter, I adopt the second perspective to address the possible linkage between public opinion and US foreign policy near the beginning of a second term of the Obama administration. First, the chapter begins by summarizing briefly these competing theoretical perspectives. Second, the research identifies several necessary and sufficient conditions required for the public to have an effect on foreign policy. Third, using some recent polling data, I summarize the public's current general orientation to foreign policy and its position on key issues. Fourth, I outline the Obama administration's foreign policy decision style and the likelihood that its style will facilitate a substantial role for the impact of public opinion on foreign policy choices.

Competing Theoretical Perspectives on Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

A Moodish Public?

Ole Holsti (1992, 2004) has aptly summarized the first perspective on the relationship between public opinion and the conduct of foreign policy through his careful assessment of the work of Walter Lippmann, Gabriel Almond, and Philip Converse. As Holsti (1992: 440-2) noted, Lippmann saw the public as not only uninterested and uninformed about foreign affairs, but as dangerous to effective foreign policymaking because they too often compelled policymakers to act in ways that were unwise through their seeming veto. Almond, by contrast, saw the public posing a somewhat different danger with 'the instability of mass moods' and 'the cyclical fluctuations [of those moods] which stand in the way of policy stability' (Almond 1950, quoted in Holsti 1992: 442). Converse's research implied the same kind of concern about the mass public. He reported that there seemed to be no 'constraint' in the public's beliefs. That is, the public's views on domestic issues did not predict to positions on foreign policy issues, and there appeared to be no ideological structure in the public's thinking on foreign affairs (Converse...
Hence, the public appeared to move from one position to another on foreign policy in a way consistent with Almond's moodish characterization.

Indeed, empirical studies over the years have provided support for these views. Considerable evidence, for instance, points to the low levels of interest and knowledge of foreign policy among the American public during the time of Almond's and Converse's writing, and the quadrennial Chicago Council of Foreign Relations (now the Chicago Council on Global Affairs) surveys of the American public since the mid-1970s largely confirm this point. Furthermore, a recent Pew Center's News IQ survey of national and international knowledge among the public (with about half of the questions on foreign affairs) found the average correct at 11.5 out of the 19 questions (about 60 per cent), with the public more successful on visual than verbal questions (Pew Research Center 2011). From this perspective, the public should not - either on normative or empirical grounds, or both - have an impact on American foreign policy.

A Structured and Stable Public?

By the 1970s and 1980s, however, this first theoretical perspective was increasingly challenged through increased conceptual and empirical work on the public opinion - foreign policy linkage. Several major assumptions and assertions from the first perspective - the volatility of the public mood, its lack of structure, and its lack of policy influence - came under increasing scrutiny and were challenged by a new set of empirically-skilled analysts. Instead, they found that, even though the American public may be relatively uninformed about foreign policy issues and susceptible to presidential leadership from time to time, the public's views are more structured, stable, and 'rational' than often assumed, and the public's mood is more discernible and less changeable than previously suggested.

Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley (1987) demonstrated how the mass publics were 'cognitive misers' on foreign policy questions. That is, the public used information shortcuts to arrive at political judgments, and in turn the public could rather consistently relate these attitudinal preferences to specific foreign policy issues. Paradoxically, then, the public can and do hold coherent views, though they may lack detailed knowledge about a wide array of foreign policy issues. In detailed analyses of public opinion surveys over a considerable length of time (from the 1930s to the 1980s), Robert Shapiro and Benjamin Page conclude that public opinion generally has changed slowly: 'When it [public opinion] has changed, it has done so by responding in rational ways to international and domestic events' (1988: 211). In this sense, public opinion does not tend to be 'volatile or fluctuate wildly', as Almond suggested. Instead, and as their later book title put it, there exists 'the rational public', both on domestic and international questions (Page and Shapiro 1992). Using another approach, Eugene Wittkopf (1990) demonstrated that the American public was divided into four underlying belief systems on foreign policy - what he labeled as those who were accommodationists, internationalists, hardliners, and isolationists - and that these belief systems were highly predictive of their positions on foreign policy issues and highly stable over time. In short, a similar message emerged from Wittkopf's analyses: the public's views are structured and consistent. In all, then, such consistency and structure are important prerequisites for policy influence.

Other studies have sought to identify the source of the stability and structure in public attitudes on foreign policy. Importantly, Ole Holsti (2004: 231-2) has systematically reviewed an array of these studies on the predictors of foreign policy beliefs (age, gender, race, education, partisanship, and ideology). His principal conclusion is particularly instructive for us: 'The closely linked attributes of ideology and party identification consistently have been the most powerful correlates of attitudes on a wide range of foreign policy issues.' Put differently, these two factors have consistently predicted the stability and coherence of public opinion on foreign policy issues over the past several decades in a variety of different studies. Indeed, Page and
Bouton (2006), through a systematic analysis of a large number of foreign policy surveys, confirmed that this stability and structure have remained.

**Identifying Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Public Impact**

While the evidence of foreign policy attitudinal structure among the public - and the centrality of ideology and partisanship as important contributors to this structure and stability - are necessary conditions for public opinion impacting policy outcomes, they are not sufficient ones. That is, the opinion of the public must have a way to enter the decision-making process and affect policy. Fortunately, there has also been some research to assess this linkage, but the conclusions over public's policy effectiveness remain divided.

In their five-decade analysis of the directional change in public opinion and public policy, Page and Shapiro (1983) found that policy followed opinion, both in domestic and foreign policy matters. On foreign policy issues specifically, they report that policy and opinion were consistent in 62 per cent of the cases examined. In a more recent study of the relationship between the views of the American public and the views of their leaders from 1974 to 2002, Page (and Jacob) with Bouton (2006) found what they describe as 'the foreign policy disconnect' between the public's view and those of their leaders. That is, the views of foreign policy leaders in three policy domains - defense policy, economic policy, and diplomatic policy - were much different from the public's views. From a fifth to a third of the time in these policy areas, a majority of the leaders surveyed took a position that was at odds with the majority of the public (2006: 213). With this disparity, they contend, it is difficult to argue that the public is getting the policy direction that it wants - or that policy is necessarily following opinion.

While these two studies are not directly comparable - since one links opinion and policy and the other examines the congruence of policy positions - both studies fail to demonstrate how much effect public opinion has on policy. In this sense, we need to go beyond the aggregate analyses or a description of the current state of opinion between leaders and the public. Ole Holsti (2004: 65) identifies the central task as the development of carefully Grafted case studies in which the role of public opinion is evaluated in the decision process - whether the decision-makers perceive it, are affected by it (or not), and how it affects the decision chosen.

Some work has been done along these lines, but the results paint a mixed picture about the public's impact on policy choices. In his case analyses of American policy toward Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, toward Nicaragua in the 1980s, and toward the Gulf War and Bosnia in the 1990s, Richard Sobel (2001: 240) offers an upbeat conclusion about public opinion and policy: 'Public opinion has constrained the US foreign policy decision-making process over the last generation.' He acknowledges that the public's effect is more in the realm of policy restraint (the elimination of some available policy options) than in setting the policy per se (the prescription of precise policy options). By contrast, Douglas Foyle (1999) offers a more cautionary conclusion about public opinion. In a series of cases spanning the Truman through Clinton years, he found that the public's views are less effective in shaping policy. To the extent that the public's views matter, however, their impact is importantly a function of the policymakers 'belief system and the particular policy context. When the policymaker is receptive to public input and when the decision setting allows the public to affect policy, opinion matters. In this way, Foyle nicely identifies the sufficient conditions for the public's impact.

**Current Foreign Policy Issues and the Structure of Public Opinion**

With this background on the role of public opinion and foreign policy, I now turn to assess the current state of public opinion - the public mood, if you will - on key foreign policy issues roughly during the 2012 presidential campaign. In particular, I am interested in discussing the public's general orientation to foreign policy and cataloguing the public's views on key foreign
policy issues. I am also interested in assessing the degree of stability and structure in those views, especially along party and ideological lines, and whether the necessary conditions for public impact exist. I will then turn to assess the degree of receptivity by the Obama administration to the public's impact on foreign policy, and the decision style of the White House that will affect this receptivity - and thus whether the sufficient conditions are also present.

The Public and Its General Orientation to Foreign Policy

The public's general orientation to foreign policy has remained markedly stable over the past decade, but the results from 2012 Chicago Council on Global Affairs suggest that the public mood along several dimensions may be beginning to change somewhat. First, although the American public remains committed to an international role for the United States with 61 per cent of the public supporting this view, this level is down substantially from the 71 per cent of a decade earlier. In fact, only two earlier surveys (in 1978 and 1982) had lower levels of commitment to 'an active role in world affairs' for the United States at 59 and 54 per cent, respectively, and only one survey (1998) matched this 61 per cent level in 23 surveys utilizing this question from 1947 to the present (Smeltz 2012: 8).

Consistent with earlier results, however, the public does not support a unilateral role with these international involvements, and the public does not believe that the United States should serve as the world's policeman. Indeed, the public now believes that the United States should adopt a more 'selective engagement' foreign policy approach, although it remains committed to a multilateral approach toward solving international problems. Second, the American public continues to embrace the view that the leading foreign policy goals for the United States should be ones that combine national security and economic security for the American people. Since 9/11, of course, the public recognizes the threat of international terrorism and the spread of nuclear weapons (although the percent listing those items has dropped), and it remains equally concerned about protecting the jobs of American workers, reducing American dependence on oil supplies from abroad, and 'maintaining superior military power worldwide' (Smeltz 2012: 14). Third, the instruments of American foreign policy favored by the American public reflect both continuity and change from the recent past. The American public now calls for scaling back American bases abroad and favors selective cuts in the military. Further, the public now supports more limited use of force abroad (but it continues to favor multilateral approaches to the use of such force), and remains 'broadly supportive of nonmilitary forms of international engagement and problem solving' (Smeltz 2012: 20).

What is important about this portrait of the public's orientation to foreign policy is to understand both the degree of stability and change in this current mood. Neither the overall role that the United States should play, the key goals that it should pursue, nor the policy instruments that it should utilize have changed appreciably. Yet some adjustment is clearly taking place. In order to begin both to unravel this stability and change and to understand the magnitude of current differences on foreign policy within the American public, I now turn to explore the public's foreign policy orientation by party and ideology as well as the public's view on current foreign policy issues with these dimensions. These two dimensions were chosen because, as Ole Holsti reminded us a decade ago, these are the two crucial predictors of foreign policy attitudes and hence may assist us in assessing the degree of change taking place.

More specifically, such analyses will allow us to address three important questions. First, we can begin to determine whether the incipient changes in the foreign policy mood is a reflection of the deepening divisions that have been evident on domestic policy, or whether the foreign policy orientation and issue positions have occurred more uniformly across party and ideology. Second, these analyses will allow us to make some judgments about the stability of the current mood and thus its potential for affecting American foreign policy. Third, these analyses will also
provide an important window for us to assess whether the public's mood is largely in sync or in opposition to the foreign policy positions of the Obama administration.

Assessing the Stability in the Current Foreign Policy Mood

In order to make the assessment of the current public mood and the public's views on key issues more manageable, I selected several questions from the most recent (2012) Chicago Council on Global Affairs that tap this mood and that touch on the principal foreign policy issues today.1 Then proceeded to analyze the public's responses on those questions by self-described party affiliation (Republican, Democrat, or Independent) and by self-defined ideological position (liberal, moderate, or conservative).2 These analyses form the basis for the subsequent discussion.

Partisan and Ideological Differences in Foreign Policy Orientation

Tables 11.1 and 11.2 summarize the results when we analyze three questions dealing with the foreign policy orientation of the public by party and ideology. Table 11.1 reports the partisan and ideological differences on the public attitudes toward the role of the United States in world affairs and whether the United States is being too much of a 'global policeman'. On the first question, some differences exist. Sixty per cent of the Democrats and 56 per cent of the Independents are supportive of an active role for the United States, but these levels are somewhat less than the 70 per cent support among Republicans. Self-identified liberals and conservatives at 67 per cent are much more supportive of an active role than political moderates at 52 per cent. By contrast, the results for the second question in Table 11.1 reveal that there is generally strong agreement among the partisan and ideological groups that the United States plays more of a policeman role than it should. Political moderates especially feel that way at 83 per cent.

Table 11.2 summarizes the partisan and ideological differences and similarities on the use of force for seven hypothetical situations. Although there are surely some differences - and slightly more often by party than ideology - what is important to note is that there are considerable similarities in position across many of these situations - whether dealing with issues concerning North Korea, Taiwan, or humanitarian crises. Even when there are differences by ideology or party, the divisions are generally quite narrow. Just barely a majority of Republicans are willing to use American troops with a North Korean invasion of South Korea, while the other groupings are opposed; slightly less than a majority of independents and conservatives are willing to support a peacekeeping force in the Middle East, even as the others give majority approval to such actions; and independents and liberals do not give majority support to using force to ensure America's oil supply, but the other groupings would do so. Somewhat surprisingly, each of the partisan and ideological groupings provides strong support for the use of troops in addressing humanitarian crises. The biggest gap among the groupings occurs over coming to Israel's aid if it were attacked by its neighbors: Republicans and conservatives show generally robust support for Israel, but only slightly more than 40 per cent is the norm for the other groups in these data.

Tables 11.3 and 11.4 extend these initial analyses and examine public support for some diplomatic, economic, and military instruments of foreign policy that also comprise part of the current public mood. As shown in Table 11.3, across party and ideology, the public is largely supportive of meeting and talking with adversaries such as Iran, North Korea, and Cuba. Majority support appears less fully across the groupings for meeting and talking with the Taliban or with Hamas. In fact, only about 40 per cent of Republicans and conservatives favor such contacts.
Table 11.4, however, largely shows much more support across parties and ideologies for several military measures to combat international terrorism as well as two economic and diplomatic actions. To be sure, some variations in levels of support are evident, but, in only one instance (the level of support among liberals for use of ground troops against terrorist training camps) does the support fall below 50 per cent.

In sum, then, the partisan and ideological divisions on these questions dealing with foreign policy orientation and the use of particular foreign policy instruments are quite modest. In this sense, the partisan and ideological gaps often attributed to American domestic politics do not seem to have permeated the public's orientation to the conduct of foreign policy. Instead, and to the extent that we are witnessing any change in foreign policy orientation, it appears to have occurred more systematically across groupings. In this sense, the foreign policy mood is quite consonant among the public. Finally, and importantly, the public's foreign policy mood remains generally in sync with the direction of the Obama administration with some notable exceptions - public support for talking with Hamas and public support for using ground troops against terrorist training camps.

Partisan and Ideological Differences on Key Foreign Policy Issues

Does this public mood and support for the Obama approach also hold for actions on current key foreign policy issues? The next series of analyses seek to answer that question. In particular, Tables 11.5 to 11.8 assess the degree of ideological and partisan divisions over policy toward Afghanistan, North Korea, Iran, and Syria among the American public.

Among the three options for withdrawing American forces from Afghanistan (see Table 11.5), the preponderant plurality position of the public (albeit not a majority position) is to 'bring all of its combat troops home as scheduled by 2014'. The only exception is that political independents slightly prefer removing combat troops before 2014. In general, though, the consistency of these results reveals support for the Obama administration's current policy position. At the same time, these results point to something of a public barrier to the administration seeking to leave combat troops behind after 2014: Democrats, independents, liberals, and moderates provide 16 per cent or less support to this option, and Republicans and conservatives provide only 28 and 26 per cent, respectively, for this option. While the administration has indicated that no decision has been made on that aspect of the post-2014 American military presence in Afghanistan, these results indicate that there is little appetite for that option among the public - at least when compared to the two other options on withdrawal from Afghanistan.

On the issue of North Korea and nuclear weapons, the public, whatever their partisan or ideological stripe, is fully divided between supporting some diplomatic and sanctioning measures versus opposing a number of military actions by American forces. As Table 11.6 reports, Democrats, Republicans, and independents strongly support continued diplomatic efforts to address North Korea's nuclear program as do liberals, moderates, and conservatives. Equally strong majorities of the public, across the political spectrum, endorse stopping and searching North Korean vessels for nuclear materials, a position consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) and a position supported by the Obama administration. Military measures of either air strikes against North Korea or sending US ground troops never receive majority support from the public. About a third or less of Democrats, independents, liberals, and moderates favor air strikes and Republicans and conservatives provide 43 to 47 per cent support. Less than 20 per cent of the public across the groupings support the use of American ground troops.

In dealing with the nuclear threat posed by Iran (Table 11.7), though, the public is seemingly not divided as it is over actions toward North Korea. The only exception is over the question of whether to side with Israel if that nation should attack Iran's nuclear facilities. Across parties and
ideological groups, there is limited (and not majority) support for a military strike against Iran, although there is up to a 20 or more percentage point gap between Democrats (at 18 per cent) and liberals (at 20 per cent) as compared to Republicans (at 41 per cent) and conservatives (33 per cent). Among the various groups, most give majority support (or just slightly less) to allowing Iran to produce nuclear power if UN inspectors were granted full access to such facilities. This result is a policy position consistent with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and a position that the Obama administration would likely support.

The largest gulf by party and ideology is over whether to side with Israel if it would attack Iran. A majority of Republicans and conservative support doing so, but a third or less of the American public who identify themselves as Democrats, independents, liberals, or moderates do so. If such an attack were to come about, the Obama administration would thus likely face significant opposition from many of its domestic supporters if it were to side with Israel.

Finally, Table 11.8 summarizes the levels of support for taking various actions against the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. The American public, regardless of party or ideology, supports diplomatic and economic sanctions and a no-fly zone enforcement over Syria and opposes more direct and sustained military involvement such as aiding anti-government forces, bombing Syrian air defenses, and sending American troops into Syria. For the former two measures, majorities (and usually robust majorities) favor these actions. For the latter three measures, only about a fifth to a quarter of the public, across the political spectrum, favor arming anti-government forces in Syria or bombing Syrian air defenses. As with North Korea, support for sending American troops to Syria receives support from less than 15 per cent of the public, whether Democrats, Republicans, or independents and whether liberals, moderates, or conservatives. Public support and opposition to these various forms of actions against Syria are largely consistent with the Obama administration's current policy, but American Secretary of State John Kerry has committed the United States to providing more aid to the Syrian opposition, including such 'non-lethal' assistance with armored vehicles and military training (Chu and McDonnell 2013; Mainville 2013).

In short, and with the analysis for the public orientation, the public's views are quite consistent across key issues. Once again, some differences are detectable as we have outlined, but the gulfs on foreign policy are markedly modest - with more consensus than dissensus being the norm.

**Future Foreign Policy Direction and the Public Mood**

One important policy change that the Obama administration initiated during the last year of its first term was the 'pivot' of American policy toward Asia with a lessening of an emphasis on Europe and the Middle East. Has this action also met with public support across the political spectrum as have some of the other policy issues? Table 11.9 summarizes the degree of support for the policy initiative. As the results for the specific pivot question show, the public across the partisan and ideological groupings generally support this change in direction. Democrats and independents provide about equal levels of support at 57 per cent, but Republicans narrowly support this shift as well at 49 per cent. Liberals (at 65 per cent) are chief of staff for the second term. Further, McDonough reportedly 'has played a central role in assembling Mr. Obama's second-term national security team' (Landler 2013).

Yet a third analysis confirms the dominance of those in the White House in shaping foreign policy as well. A close Obama advisor is quoted in this way on the policy formulation question: 'It is fair to say the conceptual framing of Obama's foreign policy has taken place within the White House and not within the State Department' (Glasser 2012: 80). Moreover, the role of the first Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, was described by McDonough as an implementer, not a formulator, of policy: 'She's really the principal implementer' (quoted in Glasser 2012: 80). In
short, foreign policy formulation is primarily elsewhere than the State Department - and that is in the White House.

If this characterization of the decision process for the first term is largely accurate, the decision process on foreign policy may be even more narrowly circumscribed and closed for the second term. The national security team for the second term - including the new Secretary of State John Kerry, the new Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, the new National Security Advisor Susan Rice, and newly-confirmed CIA Director John Brennan - seems especially a team of friends and long-time confidants - and hardly a team of opposing views.

At the same time, virtually all observers agree that Obama listens to a wide array of views in making his decisions, and he is quite calculating in the choices that he makes. In this sense, he leaves some room for public input. Journalist Ryan Lizza (2012) illustrates this component of Obama's decision style through his analysis of decision-making over Egypt and Libya at the height of the 'Arab Spring' in early 2011. As Lizza argues, Obama operates primarily as a foreign policy 'consequentialist' in which he selects 'his response to every threat on its own merits' (quoted in McCormick 2012: 330). Although Obama ultimately moved to a more idealist position for dealing with Egypt and Libya, his foreign policy position evolved in both instances from his initial realist impulse. In this sense, Obama is less driven by ideological views and more so by the 'facts on the ground' (McCormick 2012:331).

Still, with this seemingly closed decision process by the Obama administration and with a close-knit set of foreign policy advisers, public opinion may have a difficult time gaining access. In this sense, public opinion appears to have limited impact on the process. At the same time, the President's apparent openness to differing views and the length of the decision time in making decisions - as well as his sensitivity to maintaining public approval -leave some avenue for public input. In short, the sufficient conditions required for the impact of public opinion may be partially, albeit only partially available, in the Obama administration's foreign policymaking process.

**Structural and Process Factors and the Public's Impact**

While the personal characteristics and decision style of the president will surely affect the role of public opinion in shaping foreign policy, other structural and process conditions will also impact whether the sufficient conditions criterion may be met.

First, the salience of foreign policy issues has generally been on the increase in recent presidential elections with ten per cent or more voting on the basis of these issues (see Ninicic 2012 on these recent trends). (This pattern, however, was not the case in 2012 when, in two different exit polls, only five or four per cent of the public identified foreign policy as the most important issue in their vote - see, for example, Fox News 2012; Von Kanel 2012.) Yet, presidents do take policy initiatives based upon their electoral successes, and some issues that are particularly salient to the public may thus drive those actions. For instance, the public's views on the development of nuclear weapons by Iran, the degree of American support for Israel, or the perception of the public on the rise of China, for example, could reasonably have an overall effect in the wake of a successful election.

Second, the magnitude of public opinion on particular foreign policy issues matters in driving public access to policymakers. Previous political research on foreign policy suggests that the public's position on an issue must garner a 60 per cent or higher level of support before necessarily impacting policy. In particular, political scientist Thomas Graham (1994: 196) noted that 'public opinion on a foreign policy issue must reach at least consensus levels (60 per cent or higher) before it begins to have a discernible effect on decision making'. Needless to say, some foreign policy issues have reached that level or nearly so, and thus they have the possibility to have an impact.
Third, the distribution of power within the Congress also matters. With the House and Senate divided in control between Republicans and Democrats, the president would seemingly have some decision latitude. Yet, as the controversies over several recent issues (e.g., Benghazi, national security appointments, drone policy) demonstrate, Congress can still reduce or limit such latitude - or at least make the decision process more difficult if the public expresses any concern about such issues.

Finally, even if an administration is not wholly responsive to the policy options sought by the public immediately, it will have its decision latitude considerably reduced in the foreign policy realm by the pull of public opinion and by the requirements of electoral politics in a democratic setting over time, especially as the salience of some foreign policy issues comes to the forefront of the policy agenda.

Conclusions

In this chapter, we began by identifying the two principal theoretical perspectives for understanding the role of public opinion in affecting American foreign policy direction - one that sees the public's views as uninformed and moodish, the other that sees the public's views as structured and stable. Utilizing the second perspective, we identified the necessary and sufficient conditions for public opinion to have a foreign policy impact. In turn, we assessed whether the necessary and sufficient conditions are present in the current public mood.

For the necessary conditions, we argued that the public's general orientation toward foreign policy and its stances on key foreign policy issues are largely stable and are generally structured by the effects of party and ideology - and have been for some time. Furthermore, the public mood appears to be generally in accord with the views of the Obama administration. For the sufficient conditions, the receptivity to public opinion by leaders, and the degree of access to the policy process for the public, the analysis is more speculative, based upon the decision style of the Obama administration. In general, the closed foreign policy decision structure of the Obama administration reduces the prospect of the sufficient conditions being satisfied, although the wide range of views that the president seeks and the longer decision time may afford some public input. Yet the public's input may be still be impeded or enhanced by other structural and process factors that are wholly imbedded within the American political system and also need to be addressed in considering the sufficient conditions for the role of public opinion. Still, what remains unclear and what remains unmeasured is the magnitude of the effect of public opinion even if the necessary and sufficient conditions for input are satisfied. In this sense, careful and detailed case studies of presidential foreign policymaking and the impact of public opinion remain an important prescription for more fully analyzing the Obama administration or any other.

Notes

1 On these theoretical perspectives, see McCormick (2014: 507-33) from which I draw here and later in this chapter.

2 Thanks to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs for sharing the raw data with me and allowing me to analyze its dataset to obtain the results that I report in the tables.

3 The question was actually a seven-point scale asking the respondents to characterize their views as either extremely liberal, liberal, slightly liberal, moderate or middle of the road, slightly conservative, conservative, and extremely conservative. The results were recoded to a three-point scale of liberal, moderate, or conservative with the three liberal characterizations and the three conservative characterizations collapsed into either liberal or conservative.
References


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