

Defense Monitor Staff, (1992). Militarism in America. In J. Fahey and R.

Armstrong, *A peace reader: Essential readings on war, justice, non-violence, and world order, 1st ed.* Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press.

The following essay turns away from superpower confrontation and argues that a permanent war psychology may be threatening the very freedoms the United States seeks to defend. It was written by the staff of a newsletter published by the Center for Defense Information, a Washington-based "think tank" which has been a voice of moderation in military spending since 1972. In this article, the authors point to the growing influence of the military establishment on U.S. domestic and foreign policy since World War II. Under the label of "national security," policy-making has shifted from civilian agencies and has been entrusted to the military. Besides reordering domestic priorities from civilian needs and adding significantly to the national debt, the Pentagon budget, in this view, has damaged America's high-tech industry and scientific endeavor.

The authors view with alarm the glorification of the military in American society, citing popular films and toys, advertising campaigns for military recruitment and a general loss of sensitivity to the dangers of using force to achieve national goals.

The article cites with concern the pervasiveness of the "military-industrial complex," about which President Eisenhower warned in 1961. With so many companies doing business with the military establishment, the authors envision a nation on a permanent war economy. Congressional representatives, eager to preserve their local military installation or factory, appear unresponsive to the need to limit the defense budget. Besides making allies in Congress, the Pentagon is depicted as a major force in hiding legitimate scientific achievements under the label of secrecy. According to this article, the efforts of too many engineers, scientists and university researchers have been harnessed to the nation's war machine. The authors also take aim at Reserve Officer Training Programs (ROTC) on campus and even in high schools as other instances of the "militarization of America."

The increasing sales of war toys in the past few years are another concern of the authors, as is the tremendous growth of pistols and automatic weapons in the hands of civilians.

The authors decry the impoverishment of civilian programs as a result of a bloated military budget. They call for what they consider more constructive methods to promote national interests through diplomatic, scientific, economic and cultural means.

Most Americans do not think of the United States as being particularly militaristic. We are not at war. Gun-toting soldiers do not patrol our streets. Young men are no longer drafted. In many ways, however, militarism pervades America.

Since 1945 the role of the military in American government and society has changed dramatically. Military issues have been given high priority in shaping American foreign and domestic policies. The militarization of our domestic political economy and everyday American society is an increasingly dangerous phenomenon that demands careful examination if we are to keep it in check.

In his Farewell Address to the American People in 1961, President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned Americans of the far-reaching effects of militarism when he said: "[The] conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience.

"The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this

development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society."

The Pentagon greatly influences America's foreign policy, domestic priorities, economy, and the nature of our government. The long established tradition of civilian control over the military is eroding as an increasing number of military men fill government positions previously held by civilians and our civilian leaders permit the military to play a greater role in policy-making.

Military concerns affect economic priorities nationwide. Hundreds of Billions of tax dollars are spent to support the largest peacetime military buildup in American history while social programs are cut, the debt becomes unmanageable and the probability of nuclear war increases.

In the post-WWII period military priorities have shaped American law and contributed to sweeping reorganization of the government. Defined almost exclusively in military terms, the abstraction of "*national security*" has been used to justify a broadening of the military's authority. More recently, *executive orders* and directives have been passed down from the White House taking policy-making power away from civilian agencies and entrusting it to the military.

America's lead in *high-tech* industry and the international scientific community is fading because of the reordering of national priorities to accommodate military requirements and rising levels of secrecy. Scholars and scientists are discouraged by far-reaching restrictions imposed in the interest of national security that prevent them from discussing their research with other scientists. Civilian resources—both intellectual and monetary—are being redirected to support programs like the Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars) that will yield few civilian benefits and commit the U.S. to even greater military spending.

America's increasing emphasis on the military as a means of maintaining and determining our position within today's complex world has many consequences for American society. Films like Rambo, Rocky IV, and Invasion U.S.A. urge the U.S. to impose America's will and establish world order through force. From Rambo to G.I. Joe, we are presented with the idea that Americans have the right to pursue military solutions so long as their convictions are strong and their arsenals well-stocked. Similarly, on the home front, aggressiveness and violence in society are more easily accepted as a normal means by which to achieve individual goals.

As paramilitary weapons, dress, jargon, and values are assimilated into everyday American life, we become desensitized to the dangers of employing force as a means of achieving our goals. Instead of viewing the growing influence of the military with a cautious and critical eye, we myopically see it as simply a sign of rekindled strength.

In subtle and provocative ways modern advertising calls to America's youth, portraying the Armed Services as a sort of large vocational institute offering opportunity and excitement, while calls for military reform and a definition of how U.S. forces fit in with overall national objectives remain unanswered. With new-found enthusiasm, universities and high schools across the country teach military values through the Senior and Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps. War toys and television initiate junior high and elementary school age children to state-of-the-art weaponry and military jargon.

The glorification of the military within American society has become a general trend in the United States—a trend which distorts our view of both foreign and domestic policy and raises serious concerns for the future of the democratic process in a stable, productive society.

The effects of militarism on foreign policy will be examined in a future *Defense Monitor*. This *Defense Monitor* details the rising trend of militarism in American society today and warns of the potentially dangerous consequences facing America if this trend remains unchecked.

NATIONAL SECURITY STATE

- Following World War II, the U. S. carved the world up into military regions for purposes of military planning, putting a four star general or admiral in charge of each. No other country has divided the world up in quite this way.

- The National Security Act of 1947 created the National Military Establishment (now the Department of Defense), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the main national security decision-making body, the National Security Council (NSC). The Act officially introduced the catchall abstraction "national security" that has since served to justify everything from the procurement of questionable weapons systems to the invasion of Grenada.

- NSC-68, a document drafted by the NSC in 1950, identified the "Soviet threat" as the foundation upon which to build U.S. foreign and domestic policy. NSC-68 assured Americans that, "The integrity of our system will not be jeopardized by any measures, covert or overt, violent or non-violent, which serve the purposes of frustrating the Kremlin design. ..."
Unfortunately, American society *is* being challenged and its integrity threatened. Preoccupation with military responses to the Soviet Union and rhetoric that conjures images of the "enemy" and an "evil empire" promote militarism by overstating the need for more military power. The frustration Americans feel with regard to combatting terrorism further aggravates growing militarism and promotes vigilantism within the United States.

- The military services, DoD, and the defense industries presently employ some 6.5 million people in the United States, generating well over \$146 Billion in business between the Pentagon and private companies each year.

- The U.S. now has nearly half a million military personnel abroad at more than 333 military installations in 21 different countries. The U.S. also has plans to come to the defense of over 50 nations.

National security concerns are firmly entrenched and articulated in our foreign and domestic policies. Strong emphasis on "national security" is used over and over to justify unnecessary growth of the defense establishment.

PERMANENT WAR ECONOMY

- Preparing for war in peacetime has become big business in the U. S. In the 1940's, U.S. military production was carried out in an estimated 1,600 federally-owned plants. After WW II, the government relinquished direct power over production by contracting out to private firms. The government now owns only 72 defense production plants, 14 of which are on standby status.

- Over 30,000 companies are engaged in military production. Each day military agencies sign 52,000 contracts—more than 15 million a year.

- In FY85, America spent over 27% of all federal government expenditures on the military: nearly \$1100 for each of its 234 million inhabitants. In contrast, the European NATO countries combined spent less than 10% of their government expenditures on the military, about \$250 per person in a population of over 332 million.

- Companies not normally associated with defense have redirected their production in order to get a share of defense contracting dollars. Singer, IBM, Goodyear Tire, Motorola, AT&T, and Westinghouse are just a few companies which have crossed the line from civilian to military contracting. Some 80% of the Singer Company's revenues came from the firm's aerospace electronics business in 1985, compared to 15% ten years ago. Singer's nuclear-related contracts have included work on Trident and Pershing missiles, and simulators for the B-52 bomber.

- Today, close to 70% of every federal dollar allotted for Research and Development (R&D) goes to the military establishment. Since 1981 overall military research spending has increased

by 62% above inflation, while funding for civilian research has decreased by 10%. Military R&D will rise to over \$44 Billion in FY87.

- According to President Reagan's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness, over the past twenty years the U.S. has been losing ground in seven out of ten technology-oriented industries.

Ever-expanding military spending weakens the ability of the U.S. to compete in world markets by concentrating our resources on military production instead of the development of civilian technology.

UNWARRANTED INFLUENCE

"In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex."

Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1961

- Out of 3,041 counties in the U.S., only nine received less than \$1,000 in DoD funds in 1984. Hundreds of military bases and facilities are spread across the U.S. Because people focus on short-term economic benefits resulting from weapons production, the military is often invited into communities without careful examination and questioning of the real costs involved.

- Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions from the twenty largest defense contractors have increased by 225% since the early eighties, totaling \$3.6 million during the 1984 campaign. Some \$440,000 went to members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, which authorizes funds for military spending.

- The Pentagon influences Congress through a process called legislative liaison which allows the Pentagon to maintain a permanent, active, and costly military lobby on Capitol Hill at the taxpayer's expense. The Pentagon circumvents direct lobbying restrictions by such questionable practices as offering to pay for entertainment and trips to the Paris Air Show.

- Representatives and Senators often vote in favor of weapons built within their districts regardless of whether or not those weapons fit in with national objectives. In FY83, Defense Secretary Weinberger accused Congress of tacking nearly \$3 Billion worth of unnecessary items onto the Pentagon budget in deference to constituent demands for jobs.

Members of Congress often support DoD spending on weapons systems and military bases that provide their constituents with short-term economic benefits—benefits which are often incongruent with long-term national interests. PAC monies and legislative liaison push members of Congress to vote in support of weapons more for the number of jobs they will provide than for their effectiveness in defending the nation.

RISING SECRECY

- The Reagan Administration has made many attempts to restrict the flow of information from both the executive branch and the Pentagon to the public. Executive orders have been introduced which take away oversight powers from Congress, authorize the collection of "foreign intelligence" in the U.S., and challenge the integrity of academic freedom within the international scientific community.

- The Pentagon spends massive amounts of money each year on secret or "black" projects. The Department of Defense's FY87 budget request includes more than \$22 Billion in secret funds, constituting a 300% increase in black funding since 1981. Huge secret projects include the Advanced Technology Bomber, a program whose total cost will be between \$50 and \$75 Billion, and the Advanced Cruise Missile program estimated to cost some \$7 Billion.

- To date, two space shuttle missions have been classified in order "to deny our adversaries" information about satellite launches. No information was publicly disclosed on payloads, mission objectives, exact launching times or flight duration. Networks and

newspapers were personally asked by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to suppress stories on secret space shuttle missions in the interest of national security. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) estimates that military missions will make up 25-30% of all shuttle flights over the next decade.

- The Reagan Administration is classifying more documents in a misguided attempt to improve U.S. security. The "Preliminary Joint Staff Study on the Protection of National Secrets" reveals that in FY84 "the government classified 19,607,736 documents, a 9% increase over the previous year and a 60% increase from 1973." Nearly 4 million military, civilian and contractor personnel have security clearances, 164,000 of whom have been required to sign life-long legal contracts forbidding them to publish their views or "any information" relating to "intelligence." Instead of redefining the classification system, the Administration is weakening it by classifying more documents, censoring the work of government employees, and overemphasizing the importance of polygraph tests.

- Increased secrecy has greatly affected the press' ability to inform the public. In October 1983, the press was barred from reporting on military operations in Grenada. "It seems as though the reporters are always against us," Secretary of State George Shultz has said. "They're always seeking to report something that's going to screw things up." When asked, Shultz defined "us" as "Our side militarily—in other words, all of America." New practices requiring senior officials to obtain top-level approval before giving interviews indicate broader efforts to limit press coverage. All too often the information which the Administration seeks to suppress is already known to the Soviets through their intelligence system and satellites. Muzzling the press only leaves U.S. citizens in the dark.

To ensure that exorbitant amounts of money are not misspent it is crucial that the public and Congress be kept well informed about military projects and that security concerns be weighed thoughtfully against the values of an open and democratic society.

EVER-EXPANDING PENTAGON POWERS

- Administration officials have overstated national security concerns and emphasized the need for broader Pentagon powers.

- In March 1984, President Reagan signed a directive extending DoD's powers to matters previously handled by the Department of Commerce. The Pentagon gained new authority to block the export of high-tech products (microelectronics, computers, and sophisticated instruments that could have military application) to 15 non-communist countries. The Commerce Department and many U.S. companies fear that Pentagon interference may delay "harmless" or non-controversial trade and thus needlessly handicap U.S. exports.

- DoD Directive 5525.5 establishes new ties between DoD, civilian law enforcement agencies, and the U.S. Customs Service. The Directive sets a dangerous precedent by directing the use of military equipment and personnel for the gathering of intelligence, and the apprehension of drug transporters and illegal aliens. Not since 1878 when the militia was separated from the Armed Forces by law has the military been so closely involved with the enforcement of civilian law.

- A National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-145) signed in September 1984 allows a steering committee—composed mainly of military officers, with National Security Agency Director Lieutenant General William Odom as committee head—access to computer data banks in over 1,000 federal departments, agencies, boards, and commissions. The Directive orders a complete restructuring of government computer systems, giving NSA and DoD broad powers to classify information that is security "sensitive" and to "encourage, advise, and where appropriate, assist the private sector" in identifying "sensitive non-government information, the loss of which could adversely affect the national security."

- A recent report issued by the National Academy of Sciences reveals that the Pentagon is more frequently citing national security concerns to determine which papers will be presented at scientific conferences and the direction of studies to be pursued in American universities. "The Defense Department has embarked on a course that—as patriotic and well-intentioned as it may seem—may threaten the technological supremacy of the U.S.," says Richard J. Gowan, ex-President of the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers. The unnecessarily broad application of security measures discourages scientific research.

- The Pentagon has now been given broad statutory powers to withhold unclassified technical data when responding to Freedom of Information Act requests. Seven new classification categories have been established, making it harder to obtain information on military tests and contractor performance.

In an effort to control espionage and leaks to the press, the Administration is giving DoD the power to restrict information to a degree which limits informed public debate on important military policies and programs. The Pentagon is gaining new authority in matters previously handled by civilian agencies, allowing the military to play an increasingly important role in determining foreign and domestic policy.

DoD ON CAMPUS

- Since WW II, approximately 42% of the U.S. scientific workforce has been employed in military-related projects. Today almost one-third of America's scientists and engineers are employed by the defense establishment.

- The Pentagon is pushing hard to expand its presence on campuses by calling for improved laboratory facilities and graduate and professor training programs designed to encourage scientists and engineers to undertake DoD research. In FY84, over 4,000 graduate students received Pentagon funding through university research programs. DoD has also devised a wide variety of new programs to interest undergraduate and high school students in working for the military.

- Universities are becoming more dependent on DoD as a source of funding and a provider of laboratory equipment that is not easily adaptable to non-military research. In 1983, DoD established a five-year, \$150 million program to supply equipment for research of primary concern to the military. Under this program, over 650 grants have been awarded to 152 institutions located in 47 states, DC, Guam, and Puerto Rico.

- Universities now do about half of the Pentagon's basic research. Pentagon spending for basic research has grown by 217% over the past ten years, with an estimated \$987 million going for basic research in FY87.

- Contracts involving Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research will add substantially to the growing military presence on campus. Universities pulled in some \$206 million for SDI contracts in 1985, for a total of \$254 million since 1983.

- "We're shaping research at the nation's universities in a line directed by the military," asserts physicist Vera Kistiakowsky from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Military research conducted through universities saps available resources for more widely applicable civilian research and allows military funding and objectives to determine academic priorities. Imposed levels of secrecy reduce the efficiency of scientific development and threaten academic integrity.

STUDENT SOLDIERS

- Recruiters are targeting high school and college students with new-found zeal. Packaging the military as a leadership training program, DoD is pushing hard to increase the number of students recruited.

- In the Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC) students as young as 14-years-old are instructed in military theory, the use of firearms, and military history. Students are taught to follow orders and unquestioningly accept a military curriculum which does not adequately prepare them for careers outside of the military. JROTC units may also participate in war simulations or undergo forms of basic training.

- At present 227,448 students participate in JROTC in over 1,375 high school units across the nation, up from 287 twenty years ago. In FY86 DoD's \$52.1 million budget for JROTC bought texts, arms, and uniforms while schools were expected to provide a portion of the instructors' salaries, drill areas and classroom facilities with ample storage space for arms.

- With increasing college tuition and a decreasing number of non-DoD scholarships available, more students—especially women and minorities—are joining the Senior Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). Senior ROTC is active in 530 college detachments and involves 110,872 students, up 50% from 1975.

- Skills learned in the Armed Services are difficult to market outside of the military due to differences between military and civilian applications. A study conducted at Ohio State University in 1985 concluded that only 12% of men and 6% of women in a sample study could easily transfer their skills from the military to the civilian work force.

- Although recruiting quotas have been met with great success since 1981, the Pentagon is waging an aggressive recruiting campaign which will cost the taxpayer \$1.8 Billion in FY86, with advertising budgets alone totaling over \$216 million. In 1985 the Army paid roughly \$4,000 in recruiting costs for each new recruit.

- Recruiters promise students the opportunity to pick up valuable career skills but statistics compiled by the Defense Department's Manpower Data Center state otherwise. In 1983 only 17% of Army jobs required high-tech skills while less technical jobs, such as general infantry duties, accounted for close to 50%.

- Recruiters make use of referrals, phone books, and high school yearbooks to fill quotas. Schools are legally required to supply lists of graduates in 18 states. The distribution of literature and visits by recruiters are largely unregulated with over 15,000 military personnel working to recruit—roughly one for every 185 high school seniors in the public school system.

- The Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery Test (ASVAB) has been administered in at least 14,000 schools nationwide. The test provides recruiters with information on student qualifications and aptitude for military service. Students are frequently led to believe that the test is mandatory and are often uninformed as to how test results are used in the recruiting process.

- The services have gone to slick Madison Avenue-type advertising techniques to make the military an alluring and sexy career option. For example the Pentagon spent \$60,000 to make a rock video featuring breakdancing to encourage registration for the Selective Service. The Army's Recruiting Support Command has another new gimmick in mobile units that have visited over 2,000 schools in 1984. Students are shown films about the Army and pressed to sign up for more information.

- Currently, 66 Civilian Aides to the Secretary of the Army act as recruiters and "good will ambassadors" for the military. Civilian Aides are influential members in communities who use their positions and contacts with the press to convince communities of the need for a larger military.

After being presented with a glamorous picture of the military, high school students are persuaded to make the military a career before being made aware of other career options available to them. School officials and parents have little or no control over course content yet are expected to help fund ROTC and JROTC programs at a time when other extracurricular funding is being cut.

RAMBOMANIA

- A spate of violent, militaristic films are developing cult followings, bringing military language, gear, and dress into vogue. Anti-Soviet films, commercials, and advertisements contribute to the perception that the Russians are a dehumanized enemy and that we are superior to them in every way.

- In its first 23 days "Rambo: First Blood Part II" grossed \$75.8 million at the box office—a success topped only by two other films in history.

- Rambo spin-offs have flooded the market with some 25 companies negotiating distribution rights to Rambo-related merchandise. Rambo trivia games are broadcast on the radio and Sylvester Stallone lookalikes have made a business of delivering "Rambograms." The U.S. Army displays Rambo posters outside recruitment stations to encourage young people to sign up. The President is even caught up in Rambomania. "Boy, I saw Rambo last night," he commented, "Now I know what to do the next time this [terrorist seizure of hostages] happens."

- The Coleco Company, best known for its Cabbage Patch dolls, is marketing a new Rambo doll, claiming that "the character is emerging as a new American hero, a hero that has a high degree of excitement and patriotism and a thirst for justice associated with him."

- Militaristic films like Red Dawn, Commando, Missing In Action, Iron Eagle, and Invasion U.S.A. fuse chauvinism with righteousness to promote vigilantism.

American films and fads promote a sort of war hysteria that desensitizes Americans to the gravity of military action as a means of foreign policy. Such films trivialize the use of force and promote the false idea that American might is always right.

TV AND TOYS-ARE-US

- Sales of war toys in the U.S. have increased 600% since 1982, making the war toys industry worth over \$1 Billion in 1985. More than 218 million war toys and accessories were sold in 1985, roughly five for every child in the U.S.

- The major toy companies have joined forces with television producers to air cartoons featuring war toys. The number of cartoon series publicizing such toys jumped from zero in 1983 to ten in 1985.

- According to the National Coalition on Television Violence, the average American child is now exposed to 250 cartoons with war themes, and 800 television advertisements for war toys a year.

- While G.I. Joe and his team battle "jungle-dwelling guerrillas dedicated to totalitarian world takeover" on TV, Joe is muscling his way onto the breakfast table with his new cereal, G.I. Joe Action Stars.

- Other action figures like "HeMan" and "SheRa, the Princess of Power" promote victory through force. "Transformers," robots, and dolls with names like Ripsaw, Flashfists, Twinblade, Slice, and Clawgut come equipped with multiple machine guns, particle-beam cannons, and nuclear-powered laser guns.

- By the age of sixteen, the average child will have watched some 20,000 hours of TV, taking in 200,000 acts of violence and 50,000 attempted murders—33,000 of which will involve guns.

- A report from The Center for Media and Public Affairs, in which 500 television programs were monitored over the past thirty years, documents a noticeable shift towards the use of military-style assault weaponry. Popular television series like the "A-Team" and "Miami Vice" promote the use of guns as necessary for survival.

Television programs and war toys introduce Americans to military jargon, tactics, and weaponry from a very early age, teaching war in the spirit of play.

UNDER THE GUN

- America is the largest producer of firearms in the world and has the weakest gun control laws of any western democracy. Americans now own 35-40 million pistols and revolvers and over 100,000 registered machine guns. The number of people licensed to sell machine guns has tripled since 1980.

- There are an estimated 500,000 unregistered military-style assault guns owned in the United States.

- The sale of semi-automatic machine guns, which require a separate trigger pull for each shot fired, remains completely unregulated by federal law despite an increasing number of criminal incidents involving this type of gun. Semi-automatics can be easily converted into automatic weapons capable of firing up to 1,200 rounds per minute. Such conversions are on the rise, making illegal, unregistered machine guns accessible to the public and more difficult for police to trace.

Due to increased firepower, easier concealment, and greater availability, military-style assault weapons may soon replace the handgun as the weapon of choice on American streets. Gun control laws have not been revised to effectively regulate the flood of military weapons into the civilian market.

WAR GAMES PEOPLE PLAY

- In 1981, National Survival Inc. came out with a game that allows Americans to translate their fascination with guns into action. With approximately 600 playing fields, air gun games with names like Skirmish, Combat Zone, and the Ultimate Game are sweeping the United States. The game lasts approximately two hours, costs \$20-\$25, and provides the thrill of a man-hunt for over 50,000 Americans each week. Players capture the other team's flag then retreat to their camp, gunning down members of the opposing team with air guns that shoot paint pellets.

- Shooting galleries, once limited to penny arcades, are now in vogue in the U.S. But instead of using fake rifles to shoot plastic ducks, Americans today are using high-powered automatic machine guns to blast away at "commie pins" (bowling pins painted red) and posters of the Ayatollah Khomeini. These shooting galleries, largely unregulated by federal law, introduce people to the sense of power achieved by blazing away with Uzis, MAC-10s, and other paramilitary weapons.

- A new category of guns is capturing the market. Pistols, shotguns, and an impressive line of paramilitary guns can now be purchased in the form of "soft airguns." The guns look like the "real McCoy" but shoot plastic munitions and eject fake shells.

- According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 16 American survivalist camps now provide "differing types of programs to include firearms, martial arts, survivalist techniques and paramilitary training." Paramilitary, survivalist and mercenary camps are presently operating in at least eleven states.

- Two schools in Michigan and Alabama have been described by the FBI as legal paramilitary schools. Known as the Mercenary Association, the schools train students in the use of firearms, guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations, planning, tactics, logistics, armed and unarmed combat, land navigation, and other military instruction, and provide "information to their graduates regarding foreign employment in security and mercenary positions abroad."

- Frank Camper's Alabama mercenary school received a great deal of attention when a Sikh graduate of the course put his skills to test in a plan to assassinate Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Camper says his goal is "to train mercenary soldiers in international weapons and combat techniques and do it far better than the US Army Ranger School did. We lost the war in

Vietnam. Maybe I keep fighting these wars because we lost our war there. Maybe if we had won, I could have stopped."

- Magazines like *Soldier of Fortune*, *SWAT*, *International Combat Arms*, and *Firepower* publicize mercenary camps as the place to learn or perfect survival skills before traveling to actual "hot spots" of armed conflict such as Central America or Angola. Over 500,000 people subscribe to magazines put out by the Omega Corporation, the company that publishes *Soldier of Fortune*.

- *Soldier of Fortune's* founder and current editor, Robert K. Brown, asserts: "We have been the innovators in private-sector aid to resistance groups. We were the initiators. It goes back to sending a training team to Afghanistan in the fall of 1980. Then we got involved down in Salvador in early 1983 . . . For the immediate future we'll focus on El Salvador and assisting the Nicaraguan insurgents."

War simulations, machine gun ranges, and paramilitary magazines and camps introduce the average citizen to high-tech weapons and war tactics. War is associated with fun and sport, a connection which oversimplifies and desensitizes Americans to the grave consequences of using military force as a tool of diplomacy.

CONCLUSIONS

- Militarism is on the rise in the United States. While a strong military posture is essential, overemphasis on military power within the government and American society undermines our strength as a nation and jeopardizes the democratic process in the United States.

- Huge and increasing amounts of money support military programs while civilian programs are under-funded or eliminated altogether. This diversion of resources to the military threatens the American values our military is supposed to defend.

- Military concerns dominate America's foreign and domestic policies and its economy. Americans are persuaded to accept and support military actions instead of pursuing more constructive methods to promote U.S. interests through diplomatic, economic, scientific, and cultural means.

Questions

1. Do you think that America is pervaded by militarism? Give your reasons. Can you think of any opposing facts or arguments?

2. Is the government's emphasis on "national security" a legitimate response to espionage or an excuse to keep vital information from the people? What relationship do you see between the military (defense) budget and the funding available for domestic needs? Do you think the government's present policies are justified? Why, or why not?

3. Is the Pentagon too deeply involved on college campuses, through research projects and ROTC programs? Is there anything inherently wrong with the military services using advertising techniques ("Madison Avenue") to spur recruitment?

4. How closely related are Pentagon policies to the increase in automatic weapons, war toys and the growth of paramilitary schools?

5. What can the average citizen or student do to make sure that the U.S. does not become a highly militarized society? Give examples.

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The military draft habitually falls upon eighteen-year-olds who are poorly equipped to respond to it in an informed manner. The following considerations, by the director of the Peace Studies Program at Manhattan College, serve as an introduction to the range of options available to young people when conscription is imposed.

The formation of conscience is a complex process, involving some scientific knowledge of human nature and depending a great deal on the words and example of "educators" (almost anyone in a position to exert influence).

As conscience relates to whether one will serve in a particular war, the author outlines the three fundamental responses, which are as ancient as human history itself.

Although these responses are highly schematic, they provide a valuable outline for anyone striving to form a right conscience. Emphasis in most democratic countries centers on the just war vs. pacifist positions. But many modern wars involve totalitarian states, in which Total War is the unquestioned order of the day. Serious reflection on these three widely differing attitudes can be helpful to anyone who wishes to answer the questions: (1) What is my attitude toward war and (2) If called upon to serve, could I conscientiously assist my country in the prosecution of this war?

In the event of a national military draft, young people will have to examine their conscience to make a personal decision whether they will obey their government's order to serve in the military forces. Each man and woman must decide whether war is a moral or an immoral activity and whether his or her conscience will permit him or her to serve in this particular war.

THE PATH TO CONSCIENCE

Conscience is the innate ability to distinguish between that which is morally good, bad, and indifferent. Since conscience is more an "ability" than a fact, a great deal of education is necessary before one can have what is called a "correct" or "authentic" conscience. One must examine, for example, the nature of morality itself along with the moral nature of a specific act or command.

Many hold that morality is synonymous with authentic human behavior so that it may be stated that a moral act is a human act while an immoral act is an inhuman one. Morality must, therefore, be based on the scientific examination of human nature. An authentic conscience must be founded on the arts and sciences of biology, anthropology, history, psychology, philosophy, sociology, religion, literature, and politics. Educators are our guides to conscience. Contemporary educators include parents, teachers, films, magazines, politicians, television news, music, advertisers, religious leaders, and, of course, our friends.

Consequently, the formation of an authentic conscience is a highly complex process which demands a great deal of study on the part of an individual before he or she can make a sound decision on such a serious matter as participation in war.

THREE KINDS OF RESPONSE

How does one follow the dictates of conscience in regard to war? History can be our guide here since the question of participation in—and resistance to—war is at least six thousand years

old. Historically, there have been three broad responses to the question of conscience and war: total war, just war, and pacifist. Each position will be discussed in turn.

I. Total War. There have always been individuals who believe that the purpose of war is the absolute annihilation of their enemies. Participation in war is a glorious activity, and the warrior holds a very high social status in a society which is in a permanent state of military preparedness. This type of response to war holds that:

- (1) human society is in a perpetual state of war;
- (2) war is a natural and morally praiseworthy human activity;
- (3) war is the normal instrument of national policy and may be used as a first resort in a crisis;
- (4) offensive wars are morally legitimate;
- (5) total victory justifies the possession and use of atomic, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction;
- (6) the killing of civilians is justified (and sometimes desired) as a means to victory;
- (7) civilian and military commanders can expect unquestioning obedience of their soldiers;
- (8) the war must end in absolute victory in which the losing party must surrender unconditionally;
- (9) national security states must be formed which have a mandatory military draft and a permanent military/industrial/university complex for the research and development of new weapons systems.

Today, some nation states presume that their citizens follow most of the total war principles. Nations ask no "proof" for this kind of conscience and will demand that their soldiers strictly follow all orders to execute a war in which whole civilian populations are sometimes considered to be legitimate targets. Those who are asked to serve in the military can expect that killing—or being killed—without question and without limits will be strictly required of them.

Military Service: A person with a "total-war" conscience can serve in any branch of the military although he or she may prefer to serve in those forces which employ weapons of mass personal and ecological destruction—atomic, biological, and chemical weapons. There are no restrictions on the quality and quantity of weapons to be used in a war.

II. Just War. Throughout history some have held that war must be limited in its objectives and that strict rules must be followed both before going to war and after a war has started. The just war principles presume that war is not natural to human beings but war may be necessary due to the evil and perversity which exists in human nature. Hence, the burden of proof is on national leaders to demonstrate to their citizens that a given war is necessary.

The following are the widely regarded rules which must be followed:

- (1) Just Cause. Citizens may engage in a war only to defend the innocent. Offensive wars are not permitted. Legitimate
- (2) Authority. Only those duly constitutionally authorized may declare a war if it is to be legitimate. In the United States this power is exclusively reserved to the Congress.
- (3) Right Intention. Total victory must not be the goal of the war but rather the restoration of injured rights.
- (4) Last Resort. All nonviolent methods must be exhausted before a war can legitimately begin. This includes boycotts, mediation, arbitration, diplomacy, and the activity of international institutions such as the United Nations and the World Court.
- (5) Probability of Success. There must be a reasonable and measured hope that injured rights will be restored without disproportionate damage to any resulting peace. A war may not be fought if it is probable that the evil results will outweigh the desired good.

(6) Just Conduct. Innocent civilians may not be objects of military action. The war is to be strictly limited to combat between opposing soldiers, and even then not all weapons are permitted (such as atomic, biological, and chemical weapons).

(7) Proportionality. A war ceases to be just when it becomes evident that the evil actually committed outweighs the expected good. Proportionality always demands that any surrender will recognize legitimate conditions for surrender proposed by the losing nation.

Many experts hold that all of these conditions must be met before a nation may engage in war. Hence, national leaders must carefully demonstrate to their citizens that the war has limited objectives and that its evil consequences will not outweigh the good to be achieved by war. A soldier may not be asked to kill civilians and her or his conscience must be respected if she or he refuses to follow an immoral command. Above all, there is a prima facie moral duty to demonstrate that all nonviolent methods have been used prior to going to war.

Military Service: A person with a "just war" conscience can serve in the military but he or she may use only those weapons which guarantee discrimination between soldiers and civilians. Hence, only traditional "small arms" weapons may be used, consequently restricting military service largely to a traditional infantry unit.

III. Pacifism. Pacifism and "nonviolence" are—in Gandhi's words—"as old as the hills." Pacifism is found in almost every culture and civilization and its proponents are even found in nations which are highly militaristic in nature. Pacifism (which originates in the Latin "peacemaker") has the following characteristics:

- (1) war is an unnatural and immoral human social institution;
- (2) evil must be resisted but only the methods of nonviolent resistance are morally legitimate;
- (3) the 4,000 plus methods of nonviolence provide a more than adequate "arsenal" of defense to restore violated rights;
- (4) nonviolence is a spiritual weapon which seeks the reconciliation—not the extinction—of enemies;
- (5) nonviolent resistance and sanctions are based on the power of love to convert one's opponent;
- (6) pacifism seeks a win/win solution to a conflict rather than the win/lose strategy of war;
- (7) a world juridical community must be formed which will outlaw war and use nonviolent sanctions to prevent war.

Pacifism has largely been disregarded or ignored in our history books. Perhaps this is because many cultures and nation states make a close connection between virility and violence and because national leaders are no more schooled in the science of peacemaking than is the kindergarten child in basic arithmetic. Consequently, the pacifist can expect to be ridiculed and even persecuted for her or his beliefs.

Military Service: Under no circumstances may a pacifist serve in a military combat unit. Some pacifists choose to serve in the military but in a strictly non-combat capacity such as a medic or chaplain's assistant. Should a draft be reinstated, a pacifist—or conscientious objector (CO)—will have to document her or his beliefs in order to receive an exemption from military service. The CO will also be required to perform alternative national service in wartime.

It behooves parents, teachers, political leaders, and members of the press and media to explore with our young people the range of conscientious responses they have available to them regarding participation in war. Young people need to know how to form a conscience and what steps to take to insure that his or her conscience is followed. And, in addition, it is incumbent on citizens of every age to examine the national conscience.

Questions

1. How does the author define "conscience"? From your own reflection, the dictionary or other sources, how would you modify this definition?
2. Summarize the steps you have gone through in the formation of your own conscience, especially in relation to the use of violence against another.
3. Which of the three attitudes toward war do you think is dominant in the United States today? Do you share that attitude? Why, or why not?
4. Ethical or moral action has been described as a process of "line drawing." Where would you draw the line if you were called on to fight for your country?
5. Describe the role of public opinion in the formation of a national conscience toward war. List various ways in which you could contribute to a national debate on the morality of a particular war.

Remarque, E. M. (1992). All quiet on the Western Front. In J. Fahey and R. Armstrong, A peace reader: Essential readings on war, justice, non-violence, and world order, 1st ed. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press.

The human face of war, obscured by grand strategies and technological advances, is poignantly depicted by the author, who was wounded five times in combat during World War I. Born in Germany, he worked as a stone cutter and editor, emigrating to the United States in 1939. He died in Switzerland in 1970.

The novel tells the story of Paul Baumer and his generation on both sides of the war, as the horror of trench warfare overwhelms their youthful enthusiasm, destroying bodies and souls.

In this excerpt, Baumer encounters an enemy soldier: "I strike madly home." Having assured the death of the man who was probably already wounded, Baumer has a change of heart. The look of sheer terror on the dying man's face frightens Baumer, who wants to help. Through the hours in the heavily bombarded shell-hole, he forgets his own hunger and thirst enough to study his fellow human being. The author carefully notes his appearance and learns his identity from the dead man's wallet. He is "Gerard Duval, printer."

Already it has become somewhat lighter. Steps hasten over me. The first. Gone. Again, another. The rattle of machine-guns becomes an unbroken chain. Just as I am about to turn round a little, something heavy stumbles, and with a crash a body falls over me into the shell-hole, slips down, and lies across me—

I do not think at all, I make no decision—I strike madly at home, and feel only how the body suddenly convulses, then becomes limp, and collapses. When I recover myself, my hand is sticky and wet.

The man gurgles. It sounds to me as though he bellows, every gasping breath is like a cry, a thunder—but it is not only my heart pounding. I want to stop his mouth, stuff it with earth, stab him again, he must be quiet, he is betraying me; now at last I regain control of myself, but have suddenly become so feeble that I cannot any more lift my hand against him.

So I crawl away to the farthest corner and stay there, my eyes glued on him, my hand grasping the knife-ready, if he stirs, to spring at him again. But he won't do so any more, I can hear that already in his gurgling.

I can see him indistinctly. I have but one desire, to get away. If it is not soon it will be too light; it will be difficult enough now. Then as I try to raise up my head I see it is impossible already. The machine-gunfire so sweeps the ground that I should be shot through and through before I could make one jump.

I test it once with my helmet, which I take off and hold up to find out the level of the shots. The next moment it is knocked out of my hand by a bullet. The fire is sweeping very low to the ground. I am not far enough from the enemy line to escape being picked off by one of the snipers if I attempt to get away.

The light increases. Burning I wait for our attack. My hands are white at the knuckles, I clench them so tightly in my longing for the fire to cease so that my comrades may come.

Minute after minute trickles away. I dare not look again at the dark figure in the shell-hole. With an effort I look past it and wait, wait. The bullets hiss, they make a steel net, never ceasing, never ceasing.

Then I notice my bloody hand and suddenly feel nauseated. I take some earth and rub the skin with it; now my hand is muddy and the blood cannot be seen any more.

The fire does not diminish. It is equally heavy from both sides. Our fellows have probably given me up for lost long ago.

It is early morning, clear and grey. The gurgling continues, I stop my ears, but soon take my fingers away again, because then I cannot hear the other sound.

The figure opposite me moves. I shrink together and involuntarily look at it. Then my eyes remain glued to it. A man with a small pointed beard lies there; his head is fallen to one side, one arm is halfbent, his head rests helplessly upon it. The other hand lies on his chest, it is bloody.

He is dead, I say to myself, he must be dead, he doesn't feel anything any more; it is only the body that is gurgling there. Then the head tries to raise itself, for a moment the groaning becomes louder, his forehead sinks back upon his arm. The man is not dead, he is dying, but he is not dead. I drag myself toward him, hesitate, support myself on my hands, creep a bit farther, wait, again a terrible journey. At last I am beside him.

Then he opens his eyes. He must have heard me, for he gazes at me with a look of utter terror. The body lies still, but in the eyes there is such an extraordinary expression of fright that for a moment I think they have power enough to carry the body off with them. Hundreds of miles away with one bound. The body is still perfectly still, without a sound, the gurgle has ceased, but the eyes cry out, yell, all the life is gathered together in them for one tremendous effort to flee, gathered together there in a dreadful terror of death, of me.

My legs give way and I drop on my elbows. "No, no," I whisper.

The eyes follow me. I am powerless to move so long as they are there.

Then his hand slips slowly from his breast, only a little bit, it sinks just a few inches, but this movement breaks the power of the eyes. I bend forward, shake my head and whisper: "No, no, no," I raise one hand, I must show him that I want to help him, I stroke his forehead.

The eyes shrink back as the hand comes, then they lose their stare, the eyelids droop lower, the tension is past. I open his collar and place his head more comfortably.

His mouth stands half open, it tries to form words. The lips are dry. My water bottle is not there. I have not brought it with me. But there is water in the mud, down at the bottom of the crater. I climb down, take out my handkerchief, spread it out, push it under and scoop up the yellow water that strains through into the hollow of my hand.

He gulps it down. I fetch some more. Then I unbutton his tunic in order to bandage him if it is possible. In any case I must do it, so that if the fellows over there capture me they will see that I wanted to help him, and so will not shoot me. He tries to resist, but his hand is too feeble. The shirt is stuck and will not come away, it is buttoned at the back. So there is nothing for it but to cut it open.

I look for the knife and find it again. But when I begin to cut the shirt the eyes open once more and the cry is in them again and the demented expression, so that I must close them, press them shut and whisper: "I want to help you, Comrade, camerade, camerade, camerade—" eagerly repeating the word, to make him understand.

There are three stabs. My field dressing covers them, the blood runs out under it, I press it tighter; there; he groans.

That is all I can do. Now we must wait, wait.

These hours. . . . The gurgling starts again—but how slowly a man dies! For this I know—he cannot be saved, I have, indeed, tried to tell myself that he will be, but at noon this pretence breaks down and melts before his groans. If only I had not lost my revolver crawling about, I would shoot him. Stab him I cannot.

By noon I am groping on the outer limits of reason. Hunger devours me, I could almost weep for something to eat, I cannot struggle against it. Again and again I fetch water for the dying man and drink some myself.

This is the first time I have killed with my hands, whom I can see close at hand, whose death is my doing. Kat and Kropp and Muller have experienced it already, when they have hit someone; it happens to many, in hand-to-hand fighting especially—

But every gasp lays my heart bare. This dying man has time with him, he has an invisible dagger with which he stabs me: Time and my thoughts.

I would give much if he would but stay alive. It is hard to lie here and to have to see and hear him.

In the afternoon, about three, he is dead.

I breathe freely again. But only for a short time. Soon the silence is more unbearable than the groans. I wish the gurgling were there again, gasping hoarse, now whistling softly and again hoarse and loud.

It is mad, what I do. But I must do something. I prop the dead man up again so that he lies comfortably, although he feels nothing any more. I close his eyes. They are brown, his hair is black and a bit curly at the sides.

The mouth is full and soft beneath his moustache: the nose is slightly arched, the skin brownish: it is now not so pale as it was before, when he was still alive. For a moment the face seems almost healthy;—then it collapses suddenly into the strange face of the dead that I have so often seen, strange faces, all alike.

No doubt his wife still thinks of him: she does not know what has happened. He looks as if he would have often have written to her:— she will still be getting mail from him—Tomorrow, in a week's time —perhaps even a stray letter a month hence. She will read it, and in it he will be speaking to her.

My state is getting worse, I can no longer control my thoughts. What would his wife look like? Like the little brunette on the other side of the canal? Does she belong to me now? Perhaps by this act she becomes mine. I wish Kantorek were sitting here beside me. If my mother could see me—. The dead man might have had thirty more years of life if only I had impressed the way back to our trench more sharply on my memory. If only he had run two yards farther to the left, he might now be sitting in the trench over there and writing a fresh letter to his wife.

But I will get no further that way; for that is the fate of all of us: if Kemmerich's leg had been six inches to the right: if Haie Westhus had bent his back three inches further forward—

The silence spreads. I talk and must talk. So I speak to him and to say to him: "Comrade, I did not want to kill you. If you jumped in here again, I would not do it, if you would be sensible too. But you were only an idea to me before, an abstraction that lived in my mind and called forth its appropriate response. It was that abstraction I stabbed. But now, for the first time, I see you are a man like me. I thought of your hand-grenades, of your bayonet, of your rifle; now I see your wife and your face and our fellowship. Forgive me, comrade. We always see it too late. Why do they never tell us that you are poor devils like us, that your mothers are just as anxious as ours, and that we have the same fear of death, and the same dying and the same agony— Forgive me, comrade; how could you be my enemy? If we threw away these rifles and this uniform you could be my brother just like Kat and Albert. Take twenty years of my life, comrade, and stand up—take more, for I do not know what I can even attempt to do with it now."

It is quiet, the front is still except for the crackle of rifle fire. The bullets rain over, they are not fired haphazard, but shrewdly aimed from all sides. I cannot get out.

"I will write to your wife," I say hastily to the dead man. "I will write to her, she must hear it from me. I will tell her everything I have told you, she shall not suffer, I will help her, and your parents too, and your child—"

His tunic is half open. The pocket-book is easy to find. But I hesitate to open it. In it is the book with his name. So long as I do not know his name perhaps I may still forget him, time will

obliterate it, this picture. But his name, it is a nail that will be hammered into me and never come out again. It has the power to recall this forever, it will always come back and stand before me.

Irresolutely I take the wallet in my hand. It slips out of my hand and falls open. Some pictures and letters drop out. I gather them up and want to put them back again, but the strain I am under, the uncertainty, the hunger, the danger, these hours with the dead man have made me desperate, I want to hasten the relief, to intensify and to end the torture, as one strikes an unendurably painful hand against the trunk of a tree, regardless of everything.

There are portraits of a woman and a little girl, small amateur photographs taken against an ivy-clad wall. Along with them are letters. I take them out and try to read them. Most of it I do not understand, it is so hard to decipher and I scarcely know any French. But each word I translate pierces me like a shot in the chest:—like a stab in the chest.

My brain is taxed beyond endurance. But I realize this much, that I will never dare to write to these people as I intended. Impossible. I look at the portraits once more; they are clearly not rich people. I might send them money anonymously if I earn anything later on. I seize upon that, it is at least something to hold on to. This dead man is bound up with my life, therefore I must do everything, promise everything in order to save myself; I swear blindly that I mean to live only for his sake and his family, with wet lips I try to placate him—and deep down in me lies the hope that I may buy myself off in this way and perhaps even get out of this; it is a little stratagem: if only I am allowed to escape, then I will see to it. So I open the book and read slowly:—Gerard Duval, compositor.

With the dead man's pencil I write the address on an envelope, then swiftly thrust everything back into his tunic.

I have killed the printer, Gerard Duval. I must be a printer, I think confusedly, be a printer, printer—

Questions

1. How does the author set the scene for his grisly discovery?
2. Why cannot Baumer leave the shell-hole? What effect do the long hours with a dying man have on his attitude toward "the enemy"?
3. What happens when the protagonist learns that his enemy is not dead? How does he try to comfort him?
4. How does the fact that the two soldiers do not speak the same language heighten the tension?
5. Discovering the man's name and occupation deals the final blow to any lingering warlike feelings in Paul Baumer. What conclusions can the reader draw from this "human face of war"?

Muste, A.J. (1992). The individual conscience. In J. Fahey and R. Armstrong, A peace reader: Essential readings on war, justice, non-violence, and world order, 1st ed. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press.

As Robert Jay Lifton, in another section, gives voice to a secular faith in a non-nuclear world, A.J. Muste here expresses his religious pacifism. When he wrote the following excerpt (taken from his 1952 book, *Holy Disobedience*), there was much debate in the country about the draft, and certain exceptions to it.

Muste, a minister of the Reformed Church, counsels his fellow pacifists not to be taken in by proposed provisions in a draft (conscription) law that would allow alternative service for conscientious objectors. This, he feels, would serve only a narrow attitude, helping only the few who would seek such status.

His concern is for the eighteen year olds to be drafted en masse, young men rarely "capable of making a fully rational and responsible choice." He agrees in part with the French author Bernanos who felt that universal conscription, instituted in the French Revolution, pointed to the end of "the man created by western or Christian civilization."

While feeling that Bernanos' opinion was oversimplified, Muste points to the linkage between conscription, totalitarianism, depersonalization and war. He calls for resistance (*Holy Disobedience*) to show the government that not everybody goes along with the exercise of such power. He praises people willing to publicly oppose the draft as the core of any future movement against war and for peace. In the 1960s, those who opposed the Vietnam War—and its conscription policies—looked to Muste for inspiration and support.

Drawing on his religious tradition, the author tells the story of St. Stephen who was stoned for his unpopular views. In the crowd that day was Saul, who was converted to Stephen's beliefs and carried on his work. Such is the power, Muste feels, of the individual conscience.

Participation in alternative service is quite often defended on the ground that our opposition is to war rather than conscription; except in the matter of war we are as ready to serve the nation as anybody; therefore, as long as we are not drafted for combat or forced against our will into the armed services, we are ready to render whatever service of a civilian character may be imposed upon us.

Is this a sound position? Let me emphasize that it is conscription for war under the conditions of the second half of the twentieth century that we are talking about. The question as to whether sometime and under some circumstances we might accept conscription for some conceivable purpose not related to war, is not here at stake. It is academic and irrelevant. The question with which we are dealing is that of conscripting youth in and for modern war.

As pacifists we are opposed to all war. Even if recruitment were entirely on a voluntary basis, we would be opposed. It seems to me we might infer from this that we should be *a fortiori* opposed to military conscription, for here in addition to the factor of war itself, the element of coercion by government enters in, coercion which places young boys in a military regime where they are deprived of freedom of choice in virtually all essential matters. They may not have the slightest interest in the war, yet they are made to kill by order. This is surely a fundamental violation of the human spirit which must cause the pacifist to shudder.

The reply is sometimes made that pacifists are *not* being conscripted for military purposes and therefore—presumably—*they* are not faced with the issue of the nature of military conscription. I shall later contend that it is not really possible to separate conscription and war, as I think this argument does. Here I wish to suggest that even if the question is the conscription

of non-pacifist youth, it is a fundamental mistake for pacifists ever to relent in their opposition to this evil, ever to devote their energies primarily to securing provisions for COs in a draft law or to lapse into a feeling that conscription has somehow become more palatable if such provisions are made by the State. It is not our own children if we are pacifist parents, our fellow-pacifist Christians if we are churchmen, about whom we should be most deeply concerned. In the first place, that is a narrow and perhaps self-centered attitude. In the second place, pacifist youths have some inner resources for meeting the issue under discussion. The terrible thing which we should never lose sight of, to which we should never reconcile our spirits, is that the great mass of 18-year-olds are drafted for war. They are given no choice. Few are at the stage of development where they are capable of making fully rational and responsible choice. Thus the fathers immolate the sons, the older generation immolates the younger, on the altar of Moloch. What God centuries ago forbade Abraham to do even to his own son—'Lay not thy hand upon the lad, neither do thou anything unto him'—this we do by decree to the entire youth of a nation.

We need to ask ourselves whether such conscription is in any real sense a lesser evil. As we have already said, the pacifist is opposed to war and we have all sensed the danger of arguing against conscription *on the ground that* the nation could raise all the troops it needed by voluntary enlistment. Nevertheless, there is a point to an impassioned argument which George Bernanos makes in the book we mentioned at the outset, *Tradition of Freedom*. He states that the man created by western or Christian civilization 'disappeared in the day conscription became law . . . the principle is a totalitarian principle if ever there was one—so much so that you could deduce the whole system from it, as you can deduce the whole of geometry from the propositions of Euclid'.

To the question as to whether France, the Fatherland, should not be defended if in peril, he has the Fatherland answer: 'I very much doubt whether my salvation requires such monstrous behavior' as defense by modern war methods. If men wanted to die on behalf of the Fatherland, moreover, that would be one thing but 'making a clean sweep, with one scoop of the hand of an entire male population' is another matter altogether: 'You tell me that, in saving me, they save themselves. Yes, if they can remain free; no, if they allow you to destroy, by this unheard of measure, the national covenant. For as soon as you have, by simple decree, created millions of French soldiers, it will be held as proven that you have sovereign rights over the persons and the goods of every Frenchman, that there are no rights higher than yours and where, then will your usurpations stop? Won't you presently presume to decide what is just and what is unjust, what is Evil and what is Good?'

It is pretty certainly an oversimplification to suggest, as Bernanos here does, that the entire totalitarian, mechanized 'system' under which men today live or into which they are increasingly drawn even in countries where a semblance of freedom and spontaneity remains, can be traced to its source in the military conscription which was instituted by the French Revolution in the eighteenth century. But what cannot, it seems to me, be successfully denied is that today totalitarianism, depersonalization, conscription, war, and the conscripting, war-making power-state are inextricably linked together. They constitute a whole, a 'system'. It is a disease, a creeping paralysis, which affects all nations, on both sides of the global conflict. Revolution and counter-revolution, 'peoples' democracies' and 'western democracies', the 'peace-loving' nations on both sides in the war, are cast in this mold of conformity, mechanization and violence. This is the Beast which, in the language of the Apocalypse, is seeking to usurp the place of the Lamb.

We know that 'war will stop at nothing' and we are clear that as pacifists we can have nothing to do with it. But I do not think that it is possible to distinguish between war and conscription, to say that the former is and the latter is not an instrument or mark of the Beast.

DISOBEDIENCE BECOMES IMPERATIVE

Non-conformity, Holy Disobedience, becomes a virtue and indeed a necessary and indispensable measure of spiritual self-preservation, in a day when the impulse to conform, to acquiesce, to go along, is the instrument which is used to subject men to totalitarian rule and involve them in permanent war. To create the impression at least of outward unanimity, the impression that there is no 'real' opposition, is something for which all dictators and military leaders strive assiduously. The more it seems that there is no opposition, the less worthwhile it seems to an ever larger number of people to cherish even the thought of opposition. Surely, in such a situation it is important not to place the pinch of incense before Caesar's image, not to make the gesture of conformity which is involved, let us say, in registering under a military conscription law. When the object is so plainly to create a situation where the individual no longer has a choice except total conformity or else the concentration camp or death; when reliable people tell us seriously that experiments are being conducted with drugs which will paralyze the wills of opponents within a nation or in an enemy country, it is surely neither right nor wise to wait until the 'system' has driven us into a corner where we cannot retain a vestige of self-respect unless we can say No. It does not seem wise or right to wait until this evil catches up with us, but rather to go out to meet it—to *resist*—before it has gone any further.

As Bernanos reminds us, 'things are moving fast, dear reader, they are moving very fast'. He recalls that he 'lived at a time when passport formalities seemed to have vanished forever'. A man could 'travel around the world with nothing in his wallet but his visiting card'. He recalls that 'twenty years ago, Frenchmen of the middle class refused to have their fingerprints taken; fingerprints were the concern of convicts'. But the word 'criminal' has 'swollen to such prodigious proportions that it now includes every citizen who dislikes the Regime, the Party, or the man who represents them. . . . The moment, perhaps, is not far off when it will seem natural for us to leave the front-door key in the lock at night so that the police may enter at any hour of the day or night, *as it is to open our pocket-books to every official demand*. And when the State decides that it would be a practical measure ... to put some outward sign on us, why should we hesitate to have ourselves branded on the cheek or on the buttock, with a hot iron, like cattle? The purges of "wrong-thinkers", so dear to the totalitarian regimes, would thus become infinitely easier.'

To me it seems that submitting to conscription even for civilian service is permitting oneself thus to be branded by the State. It makes the work of the State in preparing for war and in securing the desired impression of unanimity much easier. It seems, therefore, that pacifists should refuse to be thus branded.

In the introductory chapter to Kay Boyle's volume of short stories about occupied Germany, *The Smoking Mountain*, there is an episode which seems to me to emphasize the need of Resistance and of not waiting until it is indeed too late. She tells about a woman, professor of philology in a Hessian university who said of the German experience with Nazism: 'It was a gradual process.' When the first *Jews Not Wanted* signs went up, 'there was never any protest made about them, and, after a few months, not only we, but even the Jews who lived in that town, walked past without noticing any more that they were there. Does it seem impossible to you that this should have happened to civilized people anywhere?'

The philology professor went on to say that after a while she put up a picture of Hitler in her class-room. After twice refusing to take the oath of allegiance to Hitler, she was persuaded by her students to take it. 'They argued that in taking this oath, which so many anti-Nazis had taken before me, *I was committing myself to nothing, and that I could exert more influence as a professor than as an outcast in the town.*'

She concluded by saying that she now had a picture of a Jew, Spinoza, where Hitler's picture used to hang, and added: 'Perhaps you will think that I did this ten years too late, and perhaps you are right in thinking this. *Perhaps there was something else we could all of us have*

done, but we never seemed to find a way to do it, either as individuals or as a group, we never seemed to find a way.' A decision by the pacifist movement in this country to break completely with conscription, to give up the idea that we can 'exert more influence' if we conform in some measure, do not resist to the uttermost—this might awaken our countrymen to a realization of the precipice on the edge of which we stand. It might be the making of our movement.

THE RECONCILING RESISTANCE

Thus to embrace Holy Disobedience is not to substitute Resistance for Reconciliation. It is to practice both Reconciliation and Resistance. In so far as we help to build up or smooth the way for American militarism and the regimentation which accompanies it, we are certainly not practising reconciliation toward the millions of people in the Communist bloc countries against whom American war preparations, including conscription, are directed. Nor are we practising reconciliation toward the hundreds of millions in Asia and Africa whom we condemn to poverty and drive into the arms of Communism by our addiction to military 'defense'. Nor are we practising love toward our own fellow-citizens, including also the multitude of youths in the armed services, if, against our deepest insight, we help to fasten the chains of conscription and war upon them.

Our works of mercy, healing and reconstruction will have a deeper and more genuinely reconciling effect when they are not entangled with conscript service for 'the health, safety and interest' of the United States or any other war-making State. It is highly doubtful whether Christian mission boards can permit any of their projects in the Orient to be manned by men supposed to be working for 'the health, safety and interest' of the United States. The Gospel of reconciliation will be preached with a new freedom and power when the preachers have broken decisively with American militarism. It can surely not be preached at all in Communist lands by those who have not made that break. It will be when we have gotten off the back of what someone has called the wild elephant of militarism and conscription on to the solid ground of freedom, and only then, that we shall be able to live and work constructively. Like Abraham we shall have to depart from the City-which-is in order that we may help to build the City-which-is-to-be whose true builder and maker is God. It is, of course, possible, perhaps even likely, that if we set ourselves apart as those who will have no dealings whatever with conscription, will not place the pinch of incense before Caesar's image, our fellow-citizens will stone us, as Stephen was stoned when he reminded his people that it was they who had 'received the law as it was ordained by angels, and kept it not'. So may we be stoned for reminding our people of a tradition of freedom and peace which was also, in a real sense, 'ordained by angels' and which we no longer keep. But, it will thus become possible for them, as for Paul, even amidst the search for new victims to persecute, suddenly to see again the face of Christ and the vision of a new Jerusalem.

Some one may at this point reflect that earlier in this paper I counseled against people too readily leaving the normal path of life and that I am now counseling a policy which is certain to create disturbance in individual lives, families and communities. That is so. But to depart from the common way in response or reaction to a conscription law, in the attempt to adapt oneself to an abnormal state of society, is one thing. To leave father, mother, wife, child, yea and one's own life also, at the behest of Christ or conscience is quite another. Our generation will not return to a condition under which every man may sit under his own vine and fig tree, with none to make him afraid, unless there are those who are willing to pay the high cost of redemption and deliverance from a regime of regimentation, terror and war.

Finally, it is of crucial importance that we should understand that for the individual to pit himself in Holy Disobedience against the war-making and conscripting State, wherever it or he be located, is not an act of despair or defeatism. Rather, I think we may say that precisely this individual refusal to 'go along' is now the beginning and the core of any realistic and practical

movement against war and for a more peaceful and brotherly world. For it becomes daily clearer that political and military leaders pay virtually no attention to protests against current foreign policy and pleas for peace when they know perfectly well that when it comes to a showdown, all but a handful of the millions of protesters will 'go along' with the war to which the policy leads. All but a handful will submit to conscription. Few of the protesters will so much as risk their jobs in the cause of 'peace'. The failure of the policy-makers to change their course does not, save perhaps in very rare instances, mean that they are evil men who want war. They feel, as indeed they so often declare in crucial moments, that the issues are so complicated, the forces arrayed against them so strong, that they 'have no choice' but to add another score of billions to the military budget, and so on and on. Why should they think there is any reality, hope or salvation in 'peace advocates' who when the moment of decision comes also act on the assumption that they 'have no choice' but to conform?

Precisely in a day when the individual appears to be utterly helpless, to 'have no choice', when the aim of the 'system' is to convince him that he is helpless as an individual and that the only way to meet regimentation is by regimentation, there is absolutely no hope save in going back to the beginning. The human being, the child of God, must assert his humanity and his sonship again. He must exercise the choice which he no longer has as something accorded him by society, which he 'naked, weaponless, armourless, without shield or spear, but only with naked hands and open eyes' must create again. He must understand that this naked human being is the one *real* thing in the face of the mechanics and the mechanized institutions of our age. He, by the grace of God, is the seed of all the human life there will be on earth in the future, though he may have to die to make that harvest possible. As *Life* magazine stated in its unexpectedly profound and stirring editorial of 20 August 1945, its first issue after the atom bombing of Hiroshima: 'Our sole safeguard against the very real danger of a reversion to barbarism is the kind of morality which compels the individual conscience, be the group right or wrong. The individual conscience against the atomic bomb? Yes. There is no other way/

Questions

1. Why does the author advise pacifists not to press for exceptions in the military draft law for conscientious objectors?
2. Has it worked out in practice that draft laws have totally subjected the individual conscience to the state? If not, why not?
3. What evidence do you find for a system in the U.S. that links depersonalization, conscription and war? Give examples of the results to which such a system can lead.
4. Those who publicly protest military operations are accused of having an influence far out of proportion to their numbers. How does this fit in with Muste's views, as expressed in this article?
5. The author repeatedly returns-to "the human being, the child of God" as the seed of all human life. What personal consequences could this have on a person opposed to military operations?

Kruegler , C. & Parkman, P. (1992). Identifying alternatives to political violence:

An educational imperative. In J. Fahey and R. Armstrong, *A peace reader:*

Essential readings on war, justice, non-violence, and world order, 1st ed.

Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press.

Somewhat like the weather, violence is something everybody complains about, but few do much to change. The authors ask themselves—and the reader—why governments and movements still "cling to its use." They conclude that the efficacy of violence as a means of resolving disputes is overrated and they give their reasons why they believe this to be so.

Kruegler and Parkman cite the world's current trouble spots as instances of the stalemate and simmering revolts that remain even after the introduction of massive force—Vietnam and Afghanistan being two outstanding examples.

The authors develop their thesis for non-violent problem-solving from the history of successful political change through other than military means: the 1944 general strike in El Salvador, the 1905 "first" Russian revolution and the Danish resistance to Nazism during World War II. Though each of these movements had its mixture of success and failure, the authors issue this reminder: "When violent sanctions fall short of achieving their objectives, we do not usually conclude that violence has been tried and found wanting." They ask for equal treatment of non-violence.

Their final plea is for educators to do far more empirical research on the strategy and tactics of non-violence, with the goal of helping people to "envision credible alternatives to armed conflict."

Few would disagree that organized political violence has had disastrous consequences for human life and civilization in this century. War, dictatorship, terrorism, genocide, and systems of social oppression have conspired to take millions of lives, divert precious economic resources from other human enterprises, and place the continued existence of humanity in question.¹

Yet, while we conclude rationally that we may not survive our collective dependence on violence, both nation-states and insurgent movements cling to its use. In the absence of the international rule of law or a just world order, organized violence appears to be the ultimate recourse against intolerable conditions and grave threats to our lives, interests, and values. It persists, on the one hand, because of a widespread but largely unexamined belief that it "works" and, on the other, because there are no generally recognized alternative means of resolving those critical conflicts in which one or both parties perceive the stakes as too high to permit compromise.²

In this article, we argue that the efficacy of organized violence is overrated and, more important, that nonviolent sanctions offer a greatly underrated and underdeveloped source of political power which could replace armed force and free humanity from its heavy costs and incalculable dangers. We see a major role for educators in breaking down the cultural conditioning that perpetuates reliance on violence and in making nonviolent sanctions more effective, and therefore, more relevant to the critical conflicts of our time.

To say that the efficacy of organized violence is overrated is not to say that it never works, but merely that its recent history is not one of unqualified success. On a tactical level, superior armed force can control many, if not all, situations. Any act of resistance that is limited in time and place can be negated by sufficiently ruthless opponents. On the strategic and political levels, however, the probable effects of violence become less easy to calculate. Most armed

struggles involve at least one clear loser. Moreover, victory is often achieved at terribly high or unanticipated costs. Finally, stalemate must be considered as a possible outcome. These less desirable outcomes for one or both protagonists waging violent struggle have been frequent enough to warrant a serious investigation of nonviolent alternatives.

Political scientist John Stoessinger has observed that "no nation that *began* a major war in this century emerged a winner."³ Aside from possible disagreement over which wars should be classified as "major," it is correct that those powers which have struck first in the larger wars of this century have met military defeat, despite the range of possible outcomes described above. Stoessinger analyzes the moments of decision when statesmen chose either war or escalation and finds that these moments were almost always characterized by mutual misperception of each other's intentions and capabilities and the potential risks of armed conflict. Thus, he suggests, war functions as a sort of reality therapy in which expectations are most often adjusted in a context of defeat or stalemate.⁴

The complete failure of military power to secure policy objectives is perhaps best typified by the U.S. experience in Vietnam, and the same fate may well await the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. These are examples of asymmetrical conflicts: the vast preponderance of power, conventionally understood, appears to be on one side. In such conflicts, the ostensibly weaker parties are sometimes able to control the political aspects of the conflict and turn even military defeats to their own advantage. Thus the Tet offensive of 1968, technically a military victory for the United States, became a watershed for American antiwar sentiment simply because the opponent was still able to mount a major offensive at that point in the struggle. The My Lai massacre stands as another tactical "victory," whose counterproductive political effects far outweighed its military value.

If the Vietnam War demonstrates the limits of military methods for a superpower like the United States, does it not conversely support a case for successful use of unconventional warfare by Vietnam? Here, the question of costs becomes relevant. Although Vietnam can claim that it won, as many as two million of its people died. Its countryside is poisoned with chemical toxins and defaced by some twenty million bomb craters.⁵ Independence of a sort was achieved, but for the foreseeable future Vietnam will probably be a military, economic, and political dependent of the Soviet Union. Vietnam's authoritarian regime, a product of thirty years of warfare, has alienated many of its citizens. Continuing regional conflict is another legacy of this war.

Hidden costs may also accrue to the winners of less significant conflicts. Both the British victory in the Falklands/Malvinas crisis and the recent invasion of Grenada by the United States were hailed by their architects as unequivocal triumphs. The former victory, however, obliged the Thatcher government to commit itself to an indefinite and expensive military presence in another hemisphere, while the latter reaped for the United States the dubious political prestige that results from defeating such a small opponent.

Stalemate is an outcome that appears to be occurring with increasing frequency. The Korean War is probably the clearest example of a large-scale, painful struggle that ended in the frustration of both sides' objectives. The interminable wars of the Middle East, in which the local participants draw encouragement and support from their big-power sponsors, have also been inconclusive. Fifteen years of paramilitary struggle in Northern Ireland have not significantly changed the balance of power in favor of the separatist forces in that country, while military occupation, special police powers, and other repressive measures on the part of the British government have failed either to restore the status quo ante or to remove the threat of terror.

Despite this record, news media, history books, and popular culture consistently focus on the results achieved by violence. Moreover, they give more attention to violent struggles that fail to achieve their objectives than to nonviolent struggles that succeed. Hence, few people are aware of the alternative ways to wage serious conflict that have been widely used for centuries.

THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF NONVIOLENT SANCTIONS

Nonviolent sanctions are those punishments and pressures which do not kill or threaten physical harm but which, nonetheless, thwart opponents' objectives and cause them to alter their behavior.⁶ The power of nonviolent sanctions is essentially that of denying opponents the support or cooperation which they need to attain their objectives. Many people associate nonviolent action exclusively with the work of Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. While the contributions of these men and their followers are extremely important, they do not encompass or exhaust the potential of this form of power. Its use does not require a commitment to nonviolence as an ethical principle, although its most effective deployment does require an understanding of the special dynamics of nonviolent struggle.

There is, in fact, a vast hidden history of nonviolent sanctions.⁷ Much of this history has simply been overlooked because of the selective perception noted above. Nonviolent sanctions have also gone unrecognized because they were not consciously chosen and identified as such. In many cases they have been used side by side with violent sanctions. Lacking a conceptual framework from which to do so, historians have often failed to ask questions or collect data that would enable us to assess the significance of the nonviolent facets of a conflict.

Of the hundreds of conflicts in which nonviolent action has played a significant role, only a few have been sufficiently researched to assess the strategic effect of nonviolent sanctions. The three cases that follow are among those which have received such study. They challenge common stereotypes about the conditions under which nonviolent sanctions can be effective. In none of the three were the nonviolent protagonists committed to nonviolence as an ethical principle, nor were their opponents liberal democratic governments. On the contrary, the opponent in each case was a dictatorship with a record of ruthlessness, and in two cases the opponent responded to the nonviolent action with violent repression.

Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez was El Salvador's most notorious dictator, best known for the massacre of 1932 which followed a brief, easily suppressed peasant uprising. Estimates of the number of people executed in cold blood range from eight thousand to thirty thousand in a country that, at the time, had a total population of about one million. The Martinez regime then suppressed the fledgling labor movement and all political parties except its own.

Twelve years of one-man rule gradually alienated many people who initially supported Martinez, including the majority of the big landowners, businessmen, professionals, and junior military officers. On April 2, 1944, the small Salvadoran air force and two army regiments took up arms against the government. The revolt quickly became a tragicomedy of overconfidence, bungling, and division among the insurgent leaders. Troops loyal to the president crushed the revolt within forty-eight hours.

Two weeks later, with the surviving opposition leaders imprisoned, in exile, or in hiding, university students, women, and collaborators in various occupational groups began to organize a completely nonviolent general strike that escalated rapidly from May 5-8. At the height of the action, buses and taxis disappeared from the streets of the capital city. Market stalls, shops, banks, and professional offices were closed. Government employees abandoned their work. The nation's railroads stopped running, and the strike began to spread to other cities.

Taken by surprise, divided, and demoralized, the government took no effective action to counter the strike. When a frightened or trigger-happy policeman shot and killed a boy on May 7, angry, though peaceful, crowds filled the streets. Martinez' cabinet panicked and resigned. After hours of negotiations on May 8, Martinez announced his decision to give up the presidency. The next morning the National Assembly received the president's resignation and named his successor.⁸

How has the memory of these events been preserved in El Salvador? April 2—not May 9—was declared a national holiday. As late as 1976, ceremonies still commemorated a botched military coup. Salvadoran periodical literature abounds with memoirs by participants of the April

2 uprising and gives detailed reconstructions of the fighting, while the civilian movement which actually dislodged Martinez is rarely mentioned. The only book on the revolution of 1944 devotes thirty-five pages to the events of April 2—4, another twenty-two to the trials and executions of a number of the participants, and eight to a woefully inaccurate and incomplete account of the general strike.⁹

The first Russian Revolution of 1905 is not commonly understood as nonviolent. Indeed, it was accompanied by a great deal of politically motivated violence, mostly in the form of assassinations and peasant riots. On October 17, 1905, however, it was not violence that forced Tsar Nicholas II of Russia to take an unprecedented and, for him, repugnant step.¹⁰ When Nicholas created Russia's first representative assembly, or Duma, he did so in response to a massive general strike, which has been described as one of the most complete in history, and a campaign of public defiance of civil laws that mobilized nearly the entire urban population of Russia.¹¹

In addition to strikes, the nonviolent methods employed in this movement included the holding of political banquets during which petitions were drafted; mass demonstrations, processions, and demonstration funerals; the withholding of taxes; the usurpation of governmental prerogatives by illegal bodies; defiance of censorship laws; refusal of conscription; and the refusal of troops to carry out orders. Most of these methods were used in an improvised fashion. In the course of the struggle, new organizations such as unions, Soviets, or workers' councils, and illegal political parties with a variety of orientations were formed. These gained invaluable experience during the revolution, and many of them persisted after it had run its course. Labor unions, for example, won the right to exist legally as a result of the struggle and continued to function openly for several years.

The Duma, which Nicholas called for in his manifesto of October 17, represented the first legal limitation on the autocratic power of the tsar. Its creation did not by any means constitute a complete victory over the tsarist system, but it was certainly a major step toward the disintegration of that system.¹²

The Danish response to occupation by Nazi Germany from 1940 to 1945 employed various forms of social, political, and economic noncooperation to preserve the integrity of Danish life and institutions in the face of a concerted attempt to integrate them into Hitler's New Order. Open resistance was not initially condoned by the Danish government, which remained nominally in power until August 28, 1943. Instead, the civil service and government officials who retained their positions worked to mitigate the effects of the occupation on the Danish people.

In this period, resistance mainly took the form of *schweikism*, or obstructionism disguised as apparent cooperation.¹³ Government officials, for example, concealed increases in food production from the German authorities, leaked information about repressive actions to the intended victims, and generally slowed down orders which might have hampered other resistance activities.¹⁴ German concerts were boycotted in favor of community songfests featuring traditional Danish music. German soldiers and their collaborators were ostracized. Danish national symbols and pro-Allied symbols became widely used as a means of expressing opposition at comparatively little risk.¹⁵ Subtle forms of noncooperation prevented Nazi penetration of Danish governmental institutions for three years, during which time a psychological climate conducive to open resistance, by both violent and nonviolent means, was developed.

In August of 1943, an industrial strike movement, accompanied by widespread sabotage, provoked a crisis. Government officials resigned rather than implement the severe repressive measures demanded by German authorities. The Danish government dissolved, leaving no legitimate authority in its place and removing the legal barrier to open resistance. Among the most notable achievements of the nonviolent branch of the resistance was the rescue of approximately seven thousand Danish Jews from Nazi persecution by means of clandestine evacuation routes to Sweden, thus frustrating the implementation of Hitler's "final solution."¹⁶

Later, early in the summer of 1944, the German occupation authorities gave in to demands to revoke a series of repressive measures when they found that they could not control a general people's strike in Copenhagen, although they had killed over one hundred Danes in the attempt to do so.¹⁷

It is important to note the catalytic role played by violent sabotage in eliciting the repression which stimulated the governmental crisis of August 1943. This illustrates the sometimes complex relationship between violent and nonviolent sanctions when they are used in the same conflict by the same protagonists.¹⁸ The degree to which the two types of sanctions are, or are not, compatible under specific circumstances is a matter which has yet to receive serious and systematic study.¹⁹

In these three cases, nonviolent sanctions achieved a great deal. These examples do not, however, lead to the conclusion that nonviolent sanctions offer a ready-made panacea to those looking for a means of waging conflict. Indeed, examination of the outcomes brings to light the limitations of these and many similar movements.

While the Danish resistance made Germany's military and economic exploitation of Denmark less efficient than it would otherwise have been, neither the nonviolent sanctions nor the combination of violent and non-violent sanctions stopped that exploitation. The opposition to Martinez failed in its attempt to establish democratic government in El Salvador, which soon succumbed to a new military dictatorship. Similarly, analysts of the 1905 general strike in Russia have pointed out that the coalition of forces which frightened the tsar into issuing the manifesto of October 17 did not act effectively to consolidate its new position. Instead, it became embroiled in its own internal struggles for power and ideological leadership. It was unable to respond with a unified program when the autocracy began to renege on promised reforms, to limit the powers of the Duma, and to invoke harsh repressive measures in the months that followed.²⁰

When violent sanctions fall short of achieving their objectives we do not usually conclude that violence has been tried and found wanting. We ask what conditions favored the winner and what did the loser do wrong. Nonviolent struggle should be judged by the same standards. Given the nature of the forces involved in the examples above, there is no reason to think that the nonviolent protagonists would have achieved more with violent sanctions. We can, on the other hand, see their weaknesses. In each case nonviolent sanctions were improvised under harsh conditions with little or no advance preparation on the part of those using them. The Salvadoran opponents of Martinez had no strategy for pursuing longer-range goals beyond his resignation, and the opposition to the tsar suffered from lack of agreed-upon leadership and mechanisms for decision making.

Analysis of these and other cases of nonviolent struggle ought to suggest ways in which nonviolent sanctions could be made more effective, just as military strategists learn from the study of past victories and defeats. Over the past three decades a small group of researchers has begun a systematic study of nonviolent sanctions which should lead to a much better understanding of both their limits and their potential.²¹

POTENTIAL OF NONVIOLENT SANCTIONS

Nonviolent sanctions are already used with great regularity and proficiency in certain types of conflicts. Both sides in most labor disputes, for example, are skilled in the use of a variety of coercive yet nonviolent methods for attaining their ends. Domestic protest movements and civil rights movements in many countries rely heavily on nonviolent sanctions to advance their causes. The question before us now is whether, on the basis of historical experience and creative new thinking, it is possible to extend deliberately the range of issues and problems for which they are relevant and to which they can be applied with confidence.

It has been suggested that nonviolent sanctions might provide the basis of an alternative means of national defense.²² This possibility was recently explored in a three-year study conducted by Britain's Alternative Defence Commission. The Commission's report, *Defence without the Bomb*, argues that British national security would be enhanced by a reduced role in NATO, unilateral nuclear disarmament, and the adoption of a two-tiered defense system, combining elements of both conventional military defense and prepared nonviolent resistance by civilians. The six-teen-member commission felt that conventional coastal and anti-aircraft defenses could extract a high entry price from a hypothetical invader, and that this might have some dissuasive power. Should an invasion be accomplished, however, the best defense might be achieved by withholding any form of cooperation from the opponent and waging a protracted resistance against the invaders by exclusively nonviolent means.²³

For many small countries, any degree of armed resistance against their prospective opponents might be futile, if not suicidal. For these countries, a purely "civilian-based defense" may well offer the best alternative to surrender, on the one hand, and devastating armed conflict against much larger powers, on the other.²⁴ Such a defense policy would entail, in times of national crisis, the transformation of all of society's ordinary institutions and organizations into resistance organizations, thus denying the opponents effective political control and ultimately forcing them to withdraw. Naturally, the adoption of a civilian-based defense policy would imply considerable knowledge of, and confidence in, the non-violent sanctions that would be its principal weapons.

Nonviolent sanctions are also being looked at with renewed interest by people who find themselves faced with various forms of social, political, and economic oppression. The assertion that armed struggle is the only effective method of changing or removing oppressive regimes is open to question. As the cases described above demonstrate, even the most repressive governments are dependent to some degree on the cooperation and acquiescence of the people they rule. When this cooperation is withdrawn in a systematic way, the power base of the oppressive authorities may erode very quickly. A struggle of this type inevitably involves violent repression against those wielding the nonviolent sanctions. Thus, participants must organize themselves at the outset to endure hardships and to continue the resistance despite repression, as they would have to do in a violent struggle. Nonviolent struggles are currently being waged in a number of repressive states, including Poland, Chile, and the Philippines. Nonviolent sanctions might also play a meaningful role in many other societies if their dynamics were better understood.

AN AGENDA FOR EDUCATORS

Developing the potential of nonviolent sanctions requires much more empirical research on their successes and failures, as well as theoretical work on questions of strategy and tactics. This is a task for institutions of higher learning. At the present time, Harvard University's Program on Nonviolent Sanctions in Conflict and Defense is the only program in the world, of which the authors are aware, that is specifically dedicated to research in this field, and it has only two full-time researchers. A handful of students have produced useful case studies as theses and dissertations, but many more are needed.

One reason for the paucity of research is lack of attention to nonviolent sanctions in the instructional programs of colleges and universities. While the World Policy Institute's curriculum guide, *Peace and World Order Studies*, does not necessarily give a complete picture of what is offered, it is probably representative. Of the thirty-one undergraduate peace studies programs surveyed, only eight appear to offer one or more courses on nonviolent action.²⁵

The need is not simply to increase course offerings, however. As educators at all levels have become sensitive to the presence of race and gender stereotypes in what is taught—often implicitly rather than explicitly— we should ask how the existing curriculum perpetuates the

assumption that violence "works" and how it treats the role of nonviolent sanctions in human life. A critical examination of curriculum guides, textbooks, and audiovisual materials from this point of view would show us where the deficiencies are and what is needed in the way of new materials. To our knowledge no such study has been proposed or undertaken. This is new subject matter for most teachers, which again argues for course offerings on nonviolent sanctions in colleges and universities, as well as in in-service training programs.

Education is not only what goes on in schools. A total of perhaps two-dozen informal study groups have used either a draft study guide on civilian-based defense or *U.S. Defense Policy: Mainstream Views and Non-violent Alternatives*, which gives substantial attention to civilian-based defense.²⁶ The fall 1984 catalogue of the Pittsburgh Peace Institute offers an imaginative workshop on "The Nonviolent Defense of Pittsburgh." Interest in such adult education offerings is clearly growing and presents a challenge for the development of more and better materials.

To meet this interest, library holdings on nonviolent sanctions must be expanded. There is an urgent need for the translation of the best literature into languages other than the original, and for publication of new literature as it is developed.

The entertainment industry also has a role to play. Nonviolent struggle is drama. Its history abounds in stories of courage, suspense, and victory against formidable odds. Yet for every *Gandhi*, how many fantasies like *Red Dawn* unrealistically glorify violence? Why should films and television not bring us the excitement of, say, the rescue of the Danish Jews from Nazi persecution? And why should fiction not explore the as yet untried possibilities of the eminently human power of nonviolence?

We began by citing the threat to human survival posed by the technology of organized violence. That threat poses a challenge to educators, and central to the challenge is the need to help people envision credible alternatives to armed conflict. The development of nonviolent sanctions points the way to one such alternative.

Notes

1. This assessment of the problem, and much of the analysis which follows, draws heavily on Gene Sharp's *Social Power and Political Freedom* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1980), ch. 9 and 11 in particular.
2. This point was first made by Walter Lippmann in "The Political Equivalent of War," *Atlantic Monthly*, Aug. 1928, p. 181.
3. Stoessinger, *Why Nations Go to War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 123. Emphasis added.
4. Stoessinger, *Why Nations Go to War*, pp. 227-231.
5. Stoessinger, *Why Nations Go to War*, p. 136.
6. Sharp, *Social Power and Political Freedom*, p. 289.
7. For a list of eighty-five major cases, see Sharp, *Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1971), pp. 115-123.
8. For a detailed reconstruction and analysis of this case, see Patricia Parkman, "Insurrection Without Arms: The General Strike in El Salvador, 1944" Diss. Temple University, 1980.
9. Francisco Moran, *Las jornadas cívicas de abril y mayo de 1944*. (San Salvador: Editorial Universitaria, Universidad de El Salvador, 1979), pp. 61-96, 105-127, 127-136.
10. By the Julian calendar, used in Russia until 1918, thirteen days behind the Gregorian calendar used in the West.
11. Alan Moorhead, *The Russian Revolution* (New York: Harper, 1958), p. 58.
12. Only Peter Ackerman's "Strategic Aspects of Nonviolent Resistance Movements," Diss. Tufts University, 1976, and Sharp's, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973), pp. 78-79, treat the specifically nonviolent character of this revolution.

13. This technique takes its name from the bungling soldier in Jaroslav Hasek's *The Good Soldier Schweik* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1951). This is a reprint of the posthumously published work, which Hasek had not completely finished at the time of his death in 1923.

14. Paul Wehr, "Aggressive Nonviolence," in *Response to Aggression*, ed. Arnold P. Goldstein, Edward G. Carr, William S. Davidson II, and Paul Wehr (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), p. 485.

15. Jeremy Bennett, "The Resistance Against the German Occupation of Denmark 1940-1945," in *Civilian Resistance as a National Defence*, ed. Adam Roberts (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969), pp. 187-189.

16. Wehr, "Aggressive Nonviolence," p. 488. It is estimated that only 450 of Denmark's 8,000 Jews were actually apprehended.

17. Wehr, "Aggressive Nonviolence," pp. 489-490.

18. There is a lively discussion in the literature as to whether sabotage is by definition violent, and whether it is ever compatible with nonviolent struggle. See esp. Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, pp. 608-611; and Bennett, "The Resistance Against the German Occupation of Denmark 1940-1945," pp. 190-197. In this context, we refer primarily to bombings at industrial and military sites.

19. In addition to the sources cited above, further material on nonviolent resistance in Denmark can be found in Jorgen Haestrup's *European Resistance Movements, 1934-5: A Complete History* (Westport: Meckler, 1981).

20. Ackerman, "Strategic Aspects of Nonviolent Resistance Movements," pp. 371-376.

21. See esp. the work of Sharp, Adam Roberts, Theodor Ebert, Johan Galtung, Anders Boserup, and Andrew Mack on this subject. Boserup and Mack's *War without Weapons* (New York: Schocken, 1975) provides a useful bibliography of the major works.

22. The National Conference of Catholic Bishops, to cite one example, called for the development of nonviolent means of national defense in its 1983 pastoral letter, *The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response* (Washington: United States Catholic Conference, 1983).

23. The Alternative Defence Commission, *Defence Without the Bomb* (London, Taylor & Francis, 1983), pp. 11, 204-205, 243.

24. Sharp, *Social Power and Political Freedom*, p. 232 ff., offers a definition and thorough discussion of this policy.

25. Barbara J. Wein, ed., *Peace and World Order Studies* (New York: World Policy Institute, 1984), pp. 629-667. Sample syllabuses can be found on pp. 70-126, although these are not all clearly focused on nonviolent sanctions as an alternative form of power.

26. Bob Irwin, *U.S. Defense Policy: Mainstream Views and Nonviolent Alternatives (A Macro-Analysis Seminar Manual)* (Waltham, MA: International Seminars on Teaching for Nonviolent Action, 1982).

Questions

1. How great a role does cultural conditioning play in the common acceptance of violence as an acceptable way of resolving conflicts? Give examples from your everyday experience.

2. Why do the authors say that violence is overrated? Do you agree or disagree? State your reasons.

3. What were some of the factors in the limited success of the three non-violent movements cited by the authors?

4. What is the authors' assessment of peace studies programs? How could they be strengthened?

5. What role does the entertainment industry play in the promotion of the cult of violence? Give examples from your own experience.

Galtung, J. (1992). Scientists and the peace movement: Some notes on the relationship. In J. Fahey and R. Armstrong, *A peace reader: Essential readings on war, justice, non-violence, and world order*, 1st ed. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press.

As the founder of the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, Johan Galtung has spent much of his professional life exploring the relation between peace activists and the scientific community. He notes the increasing tendency of scientists to ally themselves with political advocates of nuclear disarmament and other initiatives.

Will the scientists be "on top" of such popular-based movements or "on tap" to answer specific questions he asks. Galtung comes out in favor of the democratic concept that "people should have the final say, not the experts." He calls for a partnership between the two groups. The role of scientific experts in popular movements, in his view, are: (1) data (the facts, within one's field of competence); (2) values (the consequences of actions in such areas as health and rational thought); (3) theories (the contribution of fresh ideas and policies).

Galtung asserts that the peace movement is in special need of the third form of assistance, observing that it "is good in criticism, not bad on empiricism, but very poor on constructivism, on designing desirable and viable alternatives." He warns against excessive optimism on the role of scientists because their rational arguments do not always lead to change and their statements tend to be ignored by authorities. He stresses the need for more than negative statements by peace activists: "Most people want vision, hope—not to be told that they are doomed."

Galtung thinks that scientists have much to learn from the peace, movement: (1) they are exposed to new data; (2) they are exposed to an intense level of value commitment, which may force them to "do their homework"; (3) they are forced to be constructive and perhaps humbled in the process. He does not go so far as to predict that the joining of scientists to peace movements will result in a "happy marriage." But, despite all the pitfalls, he regards such a wedding as "a unique training in the values of democracy—and isn't that also what the peace movement is about?"

1. The Democratic Injunction

We have recently witnessed a considerable increase in the size and the impact of the peace movement, even if the peace movement as an anti-missile movement in Western Europe has suffered a certain defeat, certainly to be expected when the deployment of the missiles nevertheless took place in fall 1983. We have for a long time had a rate of increase in the production of scientists (of all kinds, natural science, social sciences, humanities) possibly sooner or later approaching a saturation point. Naturally, there has been a spill-over from one to the other: scientists as such, physicians, physicists and engineers, social scientists of all kinds, historians, lawyers, theologians are making statements and aligning themselves in various ways with the broad popular movement to avert nuclear war. The interesting point is that they no longer do so as committed individuals only, accepting some very general principles, but try to bring their scientific expertise to bear on their position in favor of the peace movement and its causes. This is my point of departure.

I think there is a basic problem here that needs some exploration: What does it mean to the democratic character of a political process when scientists in great numbers join a popular movement, presumably as experts? Will they try to be in command of the movement, legitimizing a leadership position by reference to superior knowledge? Will they be experts on

top, in other words, or be satisfied to remain experts 'on tap', counting one vote only if elections and votes are on the agenda, but at the same time making their knowledge-based insights available?

In a sense the answer is easy: in a democracy, as opposed to an expertocracy, people should have the final say, not the experts. It is pressure from the people rather than from the experts that should lead to course corrections, whether these corrections are carried out by the executive power directly or mediated through the pressures exercised by a popular assembly, parliament. Experts may err, and so may people. In war-peace issues the parliaments and governments of aligned member countries certainly err, if the experience from the past century is a valid guide. Offensive weaponry leads to arms races in offensive weapons; arms races tend to lead to wars. And the consequences of all these errors in the course charted for society as a whole are visited upon the people and not only on the military experts, parliamentarians and governmental bureaucrats. Hence the responsibility should also rest with the people. Societies are not constructed in such a way that only people high up pay the consequences; usually they get off more easily than the people in general. Nor should people abdicate from responsibility. Democracy is based on the principle of and by the people, simply because what happens may not only be for, but also against the people.

The peace movement is an expression of this sentiment. It is the obvious outcome of a situation where it is possible, like in the Federal Republic of Germany, to make a decision with extremely serious potential consequences, such as the deployment of the Euromissiles November 1983, with only a 55% majority in the parliament and probably with not more than 5% of the population at that time really supporting the decision. The peace movement not only stands for, or rather against, a certain course of action; it is also an expression of the democratic urge in large sections of the population to step in where they feel that experts, parliamentarians and bureaucrats fail. In other fields there may be discontent, but nevertheless a feeling that by and large the self-correcting mechanisms of the establishment are sufficient. In the field of security politics this is no longer the case, and the peace movement is one answer to the gap in credibility, even legitimacy.

From this it should follow that it would be very unwise for the peace movement to abdicate to its own experts, the scientists who join. The peace movement should not become an exercise in liberation from one set of experts, only to end up in the arms of another set, certainly with a position closer to that of the peace movement at some place, at some time, but otherwise not differing much from experts in general. The peace movement should keep its distance, listen to all experts carefully (including those from the Establishment), sift the chaff from the wheat, use the experts, and really squeeze them. But there should be no abdication; any leadership should be democratically elected, not selected because of some status in the knowledge hierarchy. It should be remembered that democracy *is* based on the faith that the insights of everybody concerned can be added up in some meaningful manner, particularly provided a dialogue has taken place, and that the expert's deep insight at some points in the spectrum of knowledge is compensated by the non-expert's intuitions over a wider range. Partnership is the way to democracy, which is neither 'parliamentocracy', nor 'expertocracy', nor 'populocracy'.

2. WHAT THE SCIENTISTS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THE PEACE MOVEMENT

It seems to me that in a popular movement like the peace movement the scientists have three quite clear tasks, based on data, values and theories respectively.¹

(1) Empirically, to give the data, the facts, in connection with policies chosen or recommended. This, however, they should above all do within their range of competence, not trying to step outside that range, which is often quite narrow.

It is equally painful listening to a social scientist trying to behave like a nuclear scientist as it is listening to a nuclear scientist who believes that he is a social scientist, pontificating on peace

and war. As a regular peace movement member he is, of course, free to do so—but then it should not necessarily be assumed automatically that his insights are particularly deep or valid. They may be, but that will have to be tested. The Pugwash movement, at some time dominated by the superpowers and the nuclear scientists, and particularly by superpower nuclear scientists, had some of this faith built into it, particularly in the first twenty years.

To this it may be objected that scientists are surrounded by an aura anyhow, and this can be utilized and capitalized upon by the peace movement. I doubt it. I think physicians are particularly effective when they pronounce themselves in their capacity as physicians and end up with conclusions underpinning positions taken by the peace movement; not when they pronounce themselves on any and all matters outside their field of competence. On the contrary, others would not fail to pay attention to such mannerisms, and may also make use of such pronouncements in order to illegitimize the specialists, even when they are clearly within their field of competence. Of course, that kind of debating trick will probably be made use of anyhow, and should not be taken too seriously. But the difficulty remains that when the scientists are inside their field of competence the novelty of what they say may not be acknowledged in any case, because people are so used to their positions, which are usually of a pessimistic kind, even apocalyptic. 'Nuclear winter' may be an example here.

(2) Critically, being explicit in their evaluation of courses of action, again within their field of competence. But at this point a new element enters: the scientists not only say what the consequences will be but also deplore them, speak out against them, utter clear warnings. To do so there has to be an element of value commitment, not only good data or reasonable predictions about the empirical consequences of a course of action. Some scientists are better trained in combining empirical projections with a value commitment than others; physicians bring in the supreme value of health, engineers the supreme value of (scientific and economic) rationality. Both commitments are much heralded in our civilization and bring in their wake no particular difficulties to the members of these professions. The same could be the case for peace, particularly when coupled with such other honor words as 'security' and 'freedom'—but we are not yet quite at that stage. However, some scientists have reached that point more than others and do criticize; they do engage in criticism.

It should be pointed out that when they do so they are not outside their realm of competence as scientists, provided they make the value-orientation they use reasonably explicit. The value to which they are committed is trivial, at least as long as we stay within the examples quoted above. What they do is simply to read off the consequences, on which they are presumably experts, on a screen with a value dimension on it. Actually, it is not even required of them that they believe in health, rationality or peace—all they do is spell out the consequences in these terms. If they want to make this very clear, all that is needed is to preface their statements with an 'if: 'If peace is what you want, then this course of action will probably rather bring you the opposite for the following reasons ...' Very simple, and doing so in no way interferes with their qualities as scientists. It is only unusual in the sense that many of them are trained in the university to believe that values and facts do not mix at all, in which case medical science and engineering would be impossible. Staying within their empirical field of competence, there should be no problem in this connection, explicitness being compatible with competence.

(3) Constructively, contributing new ideas, suggesting new policies. Here a new element is brought in as there is no longer any solid empirical base. The new courses of action would be located in the interface between theory and value, the values indicating the ends and the theories the means (of course a simplification since the two are rather interrelated). But physicians and engineers, like architects and medical people, are doing this every day, as an obvious part of their professional activities. Lawyers are doing so, often more with a view to preventing wrong courses of action than encouraging the right ones. Hence, this is not so revolutionary either and could safely be engaged in by many more people. Whether one does it well or badly is another matter.

In the three points just mentioned, there is a clear past-present-future dimension. The empirical approach would obviously have to be based on data from the past, since only the past yields data—although projections into the future may be entertained. A critical approach will usually be about current politics, and the scientist will become an actor in the political field. The constructive activity would be with a view to preparing blue-prints for tomorrow, inspiring the peace movement to new vistas.²

It goes without saying that some scientists are better at documentation, others at criticism, and still others at proposal-making. It is also obvious that the three activities do not exclude each other. They can be found in the same person, at least two of them if not all three (all three would demand much expertise in one scientist, and for that reason better obtained through dialogue processes in groups, collectively). The peace movement is in need of all three types of activities, singly and combined, which is just another way of saying that scientists are indispensable to the peace movement. Usually the peace movement is good in criticism, not bad on empiricism, but very poor on constructivism, on designing desirable and viable alternatives.

However, from this it does not follow that the peace movement will necessarily make more headway the more scientists there are. In fact, this might be an occasion to warn against two sources of excessive optimism:

—that in an open society rational arguments, and people's movements, will eventually lead to course corrections;

—that strong, warning statements by scientists will eventually lead to , course corrections, or at least be heeded.

As to the first assumption we have reasonably open societies in Western Europe; there has been no scarcity of warning voices, nor any absence of movements and demonstrations. It has even been clearly brought to the attention of everybody that the majority of the population in the five Euromissile countries is against deployment. Yet deployment has happened, for the simple reason that however important peace issues are to many people, the peace movement has not yet succeeded in making peace the number one priority issue for the majority of the population. The moment that such is the case, people would vote in favor of a peace party even if that means choosing a party that does not favor the economic policy they themselves would like to see implemented. But that kind of voting hardly takes place to any significant extent today. On the contrary, I think Eastern European countries in general, and the Soviet Union in particular, could learn from the West that they have nothing to fear from the open society; just let people organize, write petitions and thick books, walk any number of kilometers in a straight line or in a circle, with or without torches. All one has to do is not to pay too much attention unless such demonstrations show up in parliament. And there, as the last resort, there is always the possibility of exercising strong idea power, exchange power, or threat power—convincing, buying, cajoling recalcitrant 'dissidents'. Very last resort: a military coup.

As to the second assumption, I am not convinced that science-based stern warnings, and pessimistic predictions, will really bring about change. Rather, I think there are reasons to believe that political establishments accept criticism the moment they see a constructive alternative that is acceptable to them for other reasons. In other words, criticism alone, however well it is backed up by empirical data, will not change the course of action, only marginally modify that course, as I can easily imagine in connection with the 'nuclear winter'. If the prediction is that a certain megatonnage will whirl so much dust into the atmosphere that sunshine will be blocked out with disastrous consequences, then one alternative would not be to ban nuclear war, but to go in for smaller bombs with lower yields, more dispersed, and precise enough to hit targets that do not generate too much dust in the atmosphere. But that was hardly what those emitting those warnings had in mind, nor the peace movement.

It is, therefore, the constructive alternative, coupled to a critical assessment of the current course of action, asserted forcefully and with a tinge of optimism, that probably will win out—if

not in the shorter, at least in the longer run. And this also has something to do with the way in which policies are criticized and proposed. That negativism, criticism and pessimism do not necessarily attract more votes than a positive attitude, constructivism and optimism, can be clearly seen from some recent elections: Mondale vs. Reagan in the United States, November 1984 (and November 1980 against Carter also, for that matter); or Kohl vs. Vogel in the Federal Republic of Germany in March 1983 (another example would be the elections for the office of mayor of West Berlin, May 1985). What holds for such elections probably holds for politics in general, and may be one very important reason why the peace movement does not make a more significant breakthrough. When proposals are put forward these are usually in terms of limitation, cuts, 'freeze', disarmament and control—not about something new and expansive, even if it also has to be expensive. Which is just another way of saying that criticism, at least in change and progress-oriented societies like ours, has to be combined with constructivism, with new horizons—not only stopping action, back to status quo ante. Most people want vision, hope—not to be told that they are doomed.

What has just been said are some reasons why the fault may not necessarily be with society if the peace movement is not sufficiently listened to and its proposals are not accepted. There may also be something wrong with the whole style of the peace movement. Similarly, if the peace experts find that the peace movement does not accept their way of thinking in general, and their specific advice in particular, it may not necessarily be the fault of the peace movement. In a democracy scientists should never be arrogant relative to a popular movement, but they should not be submissive either. We have more than enough of submissive intelligentsia who for a salary/honorarium offer the 'advice' the weighty institutions in society want to hear anyhow. Similarly, nobody is served by 'scientists' who give up their precious capacity always to continue asking 'But is that really so?', and instead become the call girls of the tiny peace movement commissariat—differing from those kept by the establishment mainly in not even being paid. But, since the scientist can never predict where unceasing questioning will lead him, there may be conflicts of loyalty—part of the social dialectic.

3. WHAT THE SCIENTISTS CAN LEARN FROM THE PEACE MOVEMENT

The other side of the coin of the scientist/peace movement relationship is often forgotten: what the scientists get out of that relationship. I would like to mention three particular points, all of them from my own experience.

First, a scientist is exposed through the peace movement to new data, to combinations of events in the past, the present, and possibly also the future that he would hardly have come up against had he just been engaged in conventional library research. Of course, this is the case whenever a scientist enters some kind of consultancy relationship; the 'client' presents him with situations that are new, if not to the 'client', at least to the scientist. I can only mention the example that gave rise to my own book *There Are Alternatives*: I was questioned by one particular peace-minded person (my own son), 'Where in Europe is it safest to live in case an atomic war should break out?' In all academic settings, such general but basic questions are overshadowed by a plethora of specialised, less basic problems.

Second, the scientist is exposed to a more intense level of value commitment than he usually has himself. Also, he may be exposed to conflicting value commitments, at least if the movement is diverse enough. These values are held with an intensity that makes the problems much more pressing, particularly as there are demands for answers, rewards for good answers and some punishment for the scientist who hedges, who never comes out with anything like a clear answer. Suddenly the scientist realises not only that an answer is requested of him, and if he cannot come up with one, it is not necessarily because he is 'scientific' in the sense of not jumping to conclusions, but simply because he has not done his homework, so that he becomes able to jump to valid conclusions, if jump he must!

Third, the scientist is exposed to the need to be constructive, to propose some alternative and not only to use his knowledge to present and project data, possibly in a critical manner. Only parts of the peace movement will demand this constructive activity of him; most of the movement will be more than satisfied if he can help the movement buttress their essentially critical argumentation against establishment policies engaged in or proposed. The scientist can solve the problem by keeping away from such movements or parts of movements, or demand of them in advance that such pressures should not be exercised. But he will also find himself rejuvenated as a scientist by accepting the pressures, and perhaps become more humble, facing his inability to supply the goods demanded, trying to do something about it. What a challenge to face people who ask difficult, precisely because not 'academic', questions where knowledge of literature and quotations will get you nowhere!

These are high rewards for the scientist, although they are not in monetary terms. Of course they are only rewards for a scientist who feels some kind of basic alignment with the peace movement, its ideas and ideals. He cannot do as the establishment scientist who may be even repelled, or feel aversion in connection with establishment goals but comforts himself that at least he is well paid, his family well fed and clothed and sheltered, and that 'such is life' and 'if I don't do it, somebody else will' and 'I have a mortgage to pay'.

The peace movement might do well to understand that they can keep their scientists particularly happy, and also filter out the scientists less valuable to the movement, by maintaining a certain pressure on them to deliver intellectual goods and services. It is not a bad idea to have a scientist introduce a working group, but only if the questions have been relatively precise and well-formulated, and sufficiently difficult. If a general talk is needed, then a generalist rather than a specialist might be asked to deliver it; in fact, the opposite would be not only abuse but also bad utilization of the specific talents of a scientist.

4. CONCLUSION: A HAPPY MARRIAGE?

Not necessarily. To assume this is to be far too optimistic. There are plenty of scientists who feel hurt, even insulted, when 'common people' fail to accept their advice; there are very many 'common people' who much too easily accept what is said by a 'famous' expert. Much of this comes from a lack of inner faith in democratic ideas and ideals, a search for authority and the authority's search for somebody who accepts them in a more unquestioning manner than their colleagues are likely to do.

Further, scientists used to performing brilliantly when relating data to theories and vice versa may become very inadequate when asked just to present the data, relate the data to values critically, or relate the values to theories constructively. They are simply not trained in these activities and often do not even realize that something new is going on. They stick to their old ways, insensitive to the signals of apathy, incomprehension or protestations of irrelevance.

When, even in an open society, the critical prophesies pronounced by scientists and carried into every nook and cranny of society, on the backs of a broad-shouldered popular movement, are not sufficiently paid attention to, scientists might be inclined to blame the peace movement. The movement was not quantitatively big or qualitatively deep enough, or something like that. It may not occur to the scientists that their message was only half of what people want to hear and that the constructive half was missing. Moreover, however brilliant the scientists, they may not be very good at the game of politics and power play. The political establishment will pick those scientists, and take whatever they can use from any scientist which is consistent with their policies. Whatever is incompatible will not even be listened to, or if listened to not understood, or if understood not paid attention to, or if paid attention to used in the wrong way. Except for the very, very rare occasion.

Finally, the scientist, more likely than not, will view the relationship as a one-way relationship where the scientist is 'giving' something to the movement, for instance his valuable time—and

he may be reflecting on the opportunity costs, articles not written, books not produced, lectures not given (honoraria not received). It may not occur to him that he perhaps receives more from the thousands or even millions in the movement than he is able or even willing to give, because he has been trained only to perceive experts as real people, and the rest as 'masses'. Listening too much to colleagues may have made him deaf to what others have to say. Hence, a unique training in basic values of democracy—and isn't that also what the peace movement is about?

Notes

1. See my *Methodology and Ideology*, Ejlers, Copenhagen 1977, Ch. 3 for an exploration of this theme.

2. My own book *There Are Alternatives!* (German, English, Dutch, Spanish editions 1984; Norwegian, Swedish, Italian, Japanese editions 1985) is actually a mix of all three—how successful is another issue.

Questions

1. How might scientists abuse their authority when they take public positions on political issues?

2. Why must scientists be willing to learn as well as teach?

3. Why is the peace movement long on criticism of governments and short on constructive proposals?

4. The author thinks that the "nuclear winter" issue (Jonathan Schell in *The Fate of Earth*) has been overblown. Do you think he is right? Why?

5. What are some of the responsibilities of the scientist as a citizen?