

**Zealotry and Revolution: Political Change and the Cycle of Extremism**

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### **Abstract**

Renowned linguistics professor, political theorist, and self-described Anarchist Noam Chomsky argues in his 1970 speech entitled “Government in the Future” that the political structure in the United States has been gradually moving away from libertarian capitalism and towards an increasingly more authoritarian form of capitalism. Additionally, he adds that the U.S should have instead moved closer to libertarian socialism, but nature of industrial capitalism resulted in the infiltration of commercially powerful individuals and the corporations that represent them into the political sphere and prevented this Socialist reality from materializing. This essay will attempt to critically deconstruct Chomsky’s speech and the views expressed within them while simultaneously scrutinizing the trans-national legitimacy of libertarian socialism. Finally, it will call into question the entire foundation of a globally Euro-centric political structure and attempt to critically examine the viability of political and economic globalization founded upon an international acceptance of Americanized free-market capitalism based on continued deprivation of limited natural resources for financial gain.

### **Zealotry and Revolution: Political Change and the Cycle of Extremism**

Humanity in the 21st century appears to be on the tip of the precipice. Geopolitics is entering a state of increasingly unpredictable flux as political revolutions and social upheaval threatens to shatter the thin veneer of global security and perceived political normalcy established by the dominant American hegemony following the collapse of the Soviet Union. According to renowned political theorist Noam Chomsky, libertarian socialism is the political ideology that mankind is inclined to strive for and will eventually achieve. However, he argues that successive American administrations have gradually institutionalized increasingly authoritarian methods of governance, both domestically and internationally. In Chomsky's opinion, the American political system should have moved towards an increasingly less authoritarian system instead of a more centralized, autocratic one. According to Chomsky, it should have moved towards libertarian socialism.

After logically criticizing the hypocrisy of the American political structure, Chomsky concludes that the age of draconian and centralized state authority is approaching its final hour, and humanity may be fast approaching a new anarchist renaissance. "One might argue, at least I would argue, that council communism—in the sense of the long quotation that I read—is the natural form of revolutionary socialism in an industrial society" (Chomsky, 1970, 5). His fact-based analysis regarding the increasingly imperial tendencies of the United States is certainly well evidenced, but his fervent libertarian socialist beliefs appear to lead him to distort almost all forms of government control and hierarchy as inherently against human nature and therefore unacceptable. While Chomsky succeeds at providing a logical argument detailing the crippling flaws of authoritarian capitalism and its accompanying oligarchic nature, he fails to comprehensively acknowledge the inherent drawbacks of his own concept of a decentralized and stateless anarchist institution. He also lacks a "revolutionary blueprint" or a methodology designed to achieve a system that requires a seemingly inordinate amount of human organization

and mutually beneficial cooperation in an age of extreme political and ideological polarity. Noam Chomsky's controversial speech "Government in the Future" presents a fascinating argument that frames the emergence of an increasingly authoritarian form of state capitalism in the United States as an unnatural political regression orchestrated by private interference. However, he emphasizes his argument by advocating for a political doctrine that is rooted entirely in the hope that if mankind is collectively left to individual self-determination, they will organize in a way that is largely un-hierarchical. This is a highly impractical assumption that does not hold weight in our current time due to a historic human proclivity to organize during times of hardship under impractical revolutionary ideals embodied by a charismatic leader.

### **The Fraudulence of "-isms"**

In the search for the most effective way to organize large groups of individuals, countless "isms" have emerged that boast to have uncovered a model formula for political structure. What is interesting about these countless "isms" is that they not only offer varying systems of political organization, they also each seem to have a different end goal, or ideal that they are pursuing. When these "isms" merge with each other and evolve through trial and error, they are generally more successful at adapting to each unique society's present needs and characteristics. Unfortunately, political change almost never results in nuanced approaches to leadership. Revolution is often dogmatic, usually adopting one specific "ism" and adhering to it with puritanical zeal. These revolutionary movements certainly have local variations; Italian fascism possessed slightly different characteristics from its German variant, and in turn Bolshevism was far different from Maoist communism. However, what all these regimes have in common is that they express themselves as the only truly authentic practitioners of their respective "ism".

The problem with all ideological political movements that threaten to upend the status quo is that the ideals these movements adhere to tend to either begin as regimented and

unyielding (see Fascism in Europe) or become increasingly more concrete and extreme as the movement gains in strength and followers (see Communism in Russia or Islamism in the Middle East). These dogmatic ideologies often succeed in overturning political systems because they offer a highly organized alternative to the stagnation that symbolizes the status quo (Tsarist despotism, the Weimar Republic's feebleness, general lawlessness in Afghanistan) and they find strength in pure manpower united by collective unflinching loyalty to a set of ideals.

In the United States today, those that dogmatically espouse a return to a perceived methodology of the founders garner much public support. These movements argue that the American revolutionary leaders were devout Christians and staunch free-market capitalists that unequivocally opposed executive power. These modern movements advocate a return to these highly fictionalized fundamentals. The truth, as always, is far more complicated. The quarrelsome founding fathers were divided over almost every issue their new country faced, and it was this tolerance of disagreement that led to a more flexible and nuanced political system that adopted primarily liberal concepts, but left the door open to ideological evolution and constitutional and legal revision. "Instead of bequeathing to posterity a set of universally shared opinions, engraved in marble, the founders shaped a series of fiercely fought debates that reverberate down to the present day" (Chernow, 2010). There was no vitriolic adherence to any chosen "ism", and it was this openminded approach to political evolution that allowed the long-term survival of the American political system by adapting to deal with specific crisis. However, in our troubled time many Americans have chosen to accept this dogmatic and incomplete image of the founders and the American Constitution.

Today, in contrast to the politically unfiltered days of the founders, the realm the of American politics is polluted by absolutes and has been operating within an extremely narrow ideological field. Chomsky blames this engineered streamlining of American politics on state capitalism itself and the increasingly tyrannical pairing of state and private power.

In short, the democratic system at best functions within a narrow range in a capitalist democracy, and even within this narrow range its functioning is enormously biased by the concentrations of private power and by the authoritarian and passive modes of thinking that are induced by autocratic institutions such as industries (Chomsky, 1970, 9)

Chomsky further explains that the reason why this ideological restriction continues to take place is because industrial corporate capitalism is incompatible with truly democratic institutions and leads inevitably to tyranny. He emphasizes the difference between the classical liberal tenets that the United States is supposedly founded upon and the authoritarian industrial form of capitalism taking root today. Chomsky argues that classical liberalism should lead to libertarian socialism, as classical liberal theory “seeks to eliminate social fetters and to replace them with social bonds, and not with competitive greed, predatory individualism, and not, of course, with corporate empires—state or private” (Chomsky, 1970, 3). All strains of liberal thought, whether classical or otherwise, “take individual freedom - or liberty - as a fundamental value” (Hoffman and Graham, 2015, 171), while simultaneously presuming that all people should essentially be perceived as equals. So, in essence, liberal societies should perceive their end goal as a socially egalitarian society that grants the highest possible amount of individual freedom to each individual.

In the United States, however, the system is essentially built upon social inequality, as a minute oligarchic class has a monopoly over the majority of the wealth and capital. Movements striving to generate social equality along economic lines are demonized by the public and political sphere as being too socialist, as a public phobia of anything Socialist still pervades American culture, a remnant of the absolutist, good vs. evil rhetoric of the Cold War.

With this in mind, the United States cannot be defined as following the classical liberal model. However, the United States does in fact promote classical liberal’s ideals of free trade and a free market, but it is a freedom defined as the freedom of corporations to acquire capital in any way

necessary, even if that means suppressing smaller competition and attaining nearly limitless amounts of political power. As stated previously, Chomsky describes classical liberalism as being at odds with private tyranny as well as the possessive individualism that accompanies private tyranny (Chomsky, 1970, 4). For this reason, Chomsky appears to see classical liberalism almost as a means to an end, and that end for Chomsky is libertarian socialism.

Libertarian socialism, at least along Chomsky's terms, is defined by a rejection of both state and private tyranny in favor of mutual cooperation amongst the working class. The enemy of libertarian socialism is monopolized state control over the means of production. Democracy, according to Chomsky, is not truly representative and cannot exist in an industrial capitalist society that will inevitably develop an upper oligarchic crust of economically powerful individuals that truly determine national policy. Instead of utilizing a political or corporate hierarchy to dictate the sequences of state power, libertarian socialism advocates for "[d]irect popular control over all institutions by those who participate in-as well as those who are directly affected by-the workings of these institutions" (Chomsky, 1970, 6). Capitalism is viewed as a stage in human history, a necessary stage, but a stage that must be replaced by an utter removal of the oppressive forms of tyranny state capitalism naturally produces.

Chomsky's numerous examples of the drawbacks of state capitalism are all noteworthy and made apparent by his fact-based analysis, but the question remains. Is libertarian socialism truly a viable political structure in the 21st century? It certainly alludes to a more rational and mutually beneficial coexistence than more centralized authoritarian models in theory, as every individual is more or less promised autonomy. However, in order to replace the decrepit Capitalist structure of the modern world with an anarchist model, a perfect sequence of widespread voluntary cooperation must be matched by a popular denunciation of the inevitable hierarchical opposition that will quickly arise and organize to oppose the infantile collectivist society. Hierarchical opposition finds its strength in regimented social organization and an

ability to mobilize militarily much quicker than a system based upon ideas of individual autonomy. This was the quandary that the libertarian socialist P.O.U.M movement of Republican Spain found themselves in, as their disunited fighting style proved inefficient against a highly regimented fascist adversary that possessed something they did not: hierarchical organization organized under a charismatic figurehead. P.O.U.M possessed an ideal worth fighting and dying for, but the ideal itself was constantly evolving with popular opinion and could not be weaponized in the way that Fascism could. The unorganized anarchical state of the P.O.U.M militias frustrated many of its members that came to believe that libertarian socialism would be crushed by Franco due to its inability to effectively wage war. This predicament led many to join the Communist Party, who offered a more hierarchical, dogmatic, and idealistic route to the emancipation of the working class. This political tendency away from utilitarian rationality in favor of violent idealistic zealotry in times of crisis is a pattern that runs rampant across the pages of history and provides the most convincing case against the plausibility of the formation of a large-scale Libertarian Socialist realm in the 21st century.

### **Rationality vs. Idealism**

Planet Earth is now populated by almost 8 billion independent human beings, each rationally acting upon a compilation of factors, such as genetics, familial upbringing, cultural tendencies, political surroundings, etc. Miraculously, almost all of these individuals possess some form of larger sense of loyalty, either to a tribe, family, culture, society, theology or nation-state. Human loyalty is almost always rooted in deference to higher powers, such as family heads, tribal leaders, God, presidents, etc. Ethnic and national collectives often find unity in mythical figureheads or political leaders. These individuals are referred to by renowned psychologist Vamik Volkan as “ethnic poles”, large-group organizers that hold up the “ethnic tent” or loosely unified ethnic or cultural mass. These political leaders serve to unite disorganized warring factions in times of crisis and bring them under one agreeable cause or



ideal. The ideal in question can be essentially anything as long as people are willing to sacrifice material comforts and preexisting political norms in order to preserve and promote it. After the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, a loosely interconnected kingdom of Serbs, Slovenes, Bosnians and Croats known as Yugoslavia was on the brink of division over ethnic and political lines. Communist leader Marshall Josep Broz Tito gave the citizens of Yugoslavia a national identity to rally around, and it was this concept of the “Yugoslav man” who puts being a Yugoslav citizen above his ethnic or religious identity that was primarily responsible for maintaining peace and restraining sectarianism. Tito was the ethnic pole, and upon his death Yugoslavia descended into an orgy of ethnic and religious chaos resulting in its split into several sovereign states. The splintering of Yugoslavia can be seen as a testament to authoritarianism’s continued utility as a means of dissuading sectarianism, but, in retrospect, it becomes apparent that Tito’s Yugoslav man was merely a stopgap solution to the problem. In the Middle East, there are numerous examples of leaders that have brought warring factions together through unifying rhetoric. Pan-Arabism was the concept that all Arabs, regardless of religious creed or tribal affiliation, are part of a single ethnic and cultural group. Leaders such as Gamal Abdel Nasser and Muammar Gaddafi served as the figurehead for this unifying movement. The failure of this ideology lies in the lack of success of its leaders and its inability to truly govern Muslim societies. It borrowed Western ideas of nationalism and adopted them into societies that for hundreds of years found unity in religious fraternalism as a form of cohesion. The result of secular Pan-Arab governance was almost always tyrannical dictatorship

From the ashes of Pan-Arabism came “Pan-Islamism”, a multifaceted theological movement that sought to reject imported European concepts of state governance and societal organization. The Islamist movement is incredibly diverse and requires an essay in itself just to cover the basic ideological foundations of political Islam. Despite its complexity, most Islamist movements are based upon a rejection of the “isms” that originated in Europe and have

dominated the political world for multiple centuries thanks both to forcible colonization by European powers and willing appropriation by native populations. Interestingly enough, most Islamic political movements, whether peaceful or retributive, generally resort to the same authoritarian tactics employed by their “infidelic” Western counterparts. The Islamic State claims to have modeled its makeshift caliphate upon the Rashidun (prophetic successor) example, but its puritanical attempt to reformulate and weaponize the lands, people, and financial capital they conquer is a quintessentially Fascist concept. It bears little resemblance to the representative democratic nature of the early caliphates that held the Islamic concept of Shura, or the belief that all administrative decisions must be made by the Muslim community at large. Abu A’la Maududi, a 20th century Pakistani Islamist writer, describes the concept of Shura as such. “The Islamic State would have a president, an elected shura council (consisted of Muslims electing other Muslims), an independent judiciary and a cabinet.” (Maqsood, 2010).

Today, the most notable Islamist groups rally around stern, divinely selected figureheads and rampage through Muslim lands in a paranoid attempt to destroy perceived idolatry, apostasy, or politically Western ideas. The idea of a 21st organized gang masquerading as a caliphate whose ideology is founded upon the necessary slaughter of fellow Muslims that have committed “apostasy” is almost as absurd as the idea of a supposedly democratic liberal nation invading and violently occupying another sovereign country in the name of instituting “freedom” through the barrel of a gun.

Despite the failures of modern Islamist movements to model themselves after their more egalitarian ancestors, it certainly is worth putting in perspective the fact that politics as it is known today entirely rests on the basis that a handful of European enlightenment scholars possessed infallible knowledge of how to formulaically organize society and distribute resources. While there can be no discounting the political significance of the Enlightenment period and the importance of the humanistic ideals that emerged, it must be understood that Enlightenment

ideas were borne from a specifically European melting pot of political disfunction and popular resentment that allowed these nascent ideas to embed themselves in Europe. The Enlightenment marked a rejection of accepted monarchical despotism and a desire for representative government embodying the humanistic ideals of the Enlightenment. However, the Enlightenment did nothing to stop radical charismatic leaders from carrying out profoundly anti-humanist atrocities in the name of their political ideology.

What is extremely fascinating about the intense outpouring of support that is often shown to these leaders and their resolute ideals is that the ideals themselves are often completely irrational and ahistorical, and certainly will not immediately benefit the individuals that sacrifice material goods or even their own lives for them. For example, Japanese society during World War II was almost entirely mobilized towards the nation's imperial military struggles. Intrinsic cultural concepts such as shame, honor, and duty were all utilized by the authorities and directed towards the war effort. Kamikaze pilots willingly sacrificed their lives simply because they were told that their sacrifice would benefit the cause of Japanese predominance. Their death obviously was not in their best interest, and the fact that hundreds of young Japanese men so gleefully flew to their deaths sparks an interesting argument against the capitalist idea of an intrinsically self-serving human nature. Today, the countless numbers of suicide bombers that blow themselves up to achieve temporary tactical advantage emphasizes this point as well.

If individuals are this easily weaponized and deluded by empty ideals, Chomsky's vision for an egalitarian and non-hierarchical system of organization seems increasingly less realistic. He laid out counterarguments against his anarchistic vision as follows: either a free society is against human nature, or it is incompatible with the demands of efficiency (Chomsky, 1970, 7). The human nature argument holds the most historical weight, but Chomsky appears to frame the argument as one of lack of popular willpower by saying that people are condemned to a lifetime of tyranny due to their own proclivity for servitude and lack of willingness to collectively

assume the responsibilities formerly dealt with by the state. The global cycle of begrudging acceptance of despotic leaders seems to support this conclusion, as does the fact that those that angrily overturn the despots are often more rigidly authoritarian and despotic as their predecessor. This reality hints that it is not out of laziness that humans willingly accept and even idolize brutally repressive authority. It appears more likely that human nature simply tends towards idealism, and organizations or human beings that actively embody popular cultural ideals tend to find themselves up atop the societal hierarchy as supporters rally beneath them. Or, if a politically ambitious individual has a lot of financial capital, they can even reshape society in their own form to accept their status atop the hierarchy, as is seen in the United States. However, the former offers a more disturbing route towards authoritarianism as a popularly supported choice in a politically fractured or culturally humiliated environment. The violence and zealotry that epitomizes these harsh environments are often carried to the top of the political or revolutionary hierarchy, pushing moderate voices further and further down until they are drowned out by a raucous call for blood and retribution.

Frantz Fanon, a Marxist advocate of global violent decolonization efforts, argued that “violence frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect” (Fanon, 1965, 51). This certainly offers an explanation for the crazed glorification and reverence of violence seen in political revolutions that have taken place in parts of the world hit hardest by colonial occupation. Maoist China and modern day Iraq seem to support Fanon’s analysis. However, irrational political violence instigated by authoritarian institutions does not have a hegemony in what is referred to today as the “Third World.”

Popular galvanization towards war in the name of an abstract ideal can also be seen in American history. Mobilization against the “Communist threat” was espoused by the U.S government during consecutive wars in Korea and Vietnam and throughout the entirety of the

Cold War. Freedom was the buzzword used by the United States to unite distinctly unfree and unequal societies against a Communist enemy that was given an almost mystical dimension of evil. However, the United States was unable to maintain popular local support for its militaristic defense of capitalist ideology in Vietnam due to the fact that the tactful words of encouragement from the American authorities began to ring hollow after years of fighting a neighboring enemy that possessed a far more resolute ideology.

The freedom that the U.S propagated truly referred to that of the market and economic system and had nothing to do with freedom from authoritarian dominance. This can be further illustrated by the brutal policies of American puppet Ngo Dinh Diem, a Catholic dictator whose brutal secret police decimated the peasant populace and increased local support for the Communist insurgency. Freedom was also an ideal held closely to the chest of the Communist leadership, but it was freedom on a national scale, a freedom from what they correctly saw as foreign occupation, not the market or individual freedom that capitalist theories extol. The NVA and Viet Cong, despite being militarily defeated by an infinitely more powerful American military time and time again, continued to fight with increased ferocity while the American fighting force steadily lost moral as their ideal of being the upholders of freedom collapsed around them. While U.S faced a loss of interest and eventually active protests at home and amongst its soldiers, the Vietnamese insurgency rallied around ethnic pole Ho Chi Minh and mobilized to preserve national identity and liberate their countrymen from a tangible foreign enemy. What is worth noting is that the American soldiers (at least the volunteers) did not fight necessarily for state capitalism, or libertarian capitalism, or any “ism” at all. Most seemed to believe to be fighting for a largely abstract ideal of freedom, hence the popular (and utterly meaningless) saying “they to preserve our freedom”, as if freedom and violence are inexorably intertwined. Equivalently, the Viet Cong guerrillas did not necessarily fight for the ideology of state communism. Their tenacity was rooted in their loyalty to the ongoing purely Vietnamese

cause of expelling occupiers and achieving national sovereignty. This ideal was embodied by Ho Chi Minh, the ethnic pole.

In order to relate the seemingly unrelated concepts of ethnic poles, tents, Vietnam, and popularity of extremely irrational ideals to Chomsky's speech, it must be remembered that Chomsky is basing his entire argument not only on the fact that humanity is inclined to desire freedom, but also on the idea that freedom, defined as widespread voluntary cooperation replacing the institutionalized tyranny of hierarchy, is inherently preferable as opposed to tyranny of both the state and in the form of private power. What he does not allude to is the fact that history proves time and time again that populations are unlikely to collectively mobilize against power that works against their interest unless the conflict is framed in a polarizing manner, as a conflict pitting the righteous against a clear, definable enemy. Almost every contemporary political insurgency has featured absolutist rhetoric and has featured a distinctly charismatic face of leadership for the discontented to rally behind. Such is the nature of expeditious political change in our time. From Hitler to Churchill, Chairman Mao to Ayatollah Khomeini, ethnic poles have risen and carried their tents with them. The tendency of political revolution towards zealotry is by no means a universal truth, nor does it entirely discount Chomsky's dream of anarchist reorganization that rejects hierarchy and therefore cannot rely on charismatic leadership. However, it certainly is dissuading to realize that every anarchist commune has been thoroughly destroyed by authority figures without significant public backlash, something Chomsky himself partially acknowledges.

### **Conclusion: Breaking the Cycle**

When revolutions and insurgencies are purely based on reorganizing internal political issues, they tend to be far messier as there is no external evil to rally against. In the United States today as in 1970, the corporate villains are not only shielded by immeasurable personal capital, they also hide behind rhetoric that defines individual freedom as the unrestricted ability to use

one's capital however one sees fit. This concept has allowed corporate magnates to exercise great influence over the nation's political system. Politicians are recruited to push policies forward that seek to benefit trans-national corporations at the expense of the average American citizen, contributing to the increasingly dysfunctional environment of American politics. "Major political change has become more difficult. When major legislation does pass, it is increasingly an incoherent set of compromises necessary to buy the support of a wide range of particular interests" (Drutman, 2015, 3).

This state of affairs cannot be allowed to continue. Free speech is only relevant if that speech has the potential be reflected in leadership should it grow loud enough. Once it is established that the state as it currently exists is cancerous to its citizens wellbeing, it becomes a prime target for popular removal and the defunct state becomes fertile ground for revolutionary spirit. The United States is moving in this direction, as multinational corporations increasingly test the limits of their political abilities to engineer a world designed to maximize their own company's profit. A side effect of this is not only the gradual dehumanization and moral depletion of the American public, but also a literal and measurable depletion of natural resources.

Through such multinational corporations, Ball suggests, it has become possible to use the world's resources with "maximum efficiency." These multinational corporations, he says, are the beneficiary of the mobilization of resources by the federal government and its worldwide operations and markets, and are backed ultimately by American military force (Chomsky, 1970, 10). Chomsky's path to popular liberation away from this corporatized dystopia lies with his libertarian socialist theories. Unfortunately, his theories rest on the notion that people must collectively rise up and act in a way that is both rational and mutually beneficial. He fails to acknowledge the historic human propensity towards demagoguery in times of social breakdown. The patterns of extremism and rigidity in political change are well documented throughout history, as people search for an ideal that will lift them from their

destitute state of being. In order for Chomsky's anti-hierarchical ideal to be realized, the basic concepts of libertarian socialism must be given time to matriculate outside of existing radical spheres and into public discourse. Most importantly, the revolution must not begin catalytically behind yet another charismatic sociopath seeking to unite the masses under another vague ideal adorned with outwardly spectacular but internally hollow rhetoric.

The 13th century Tunisian historian Ibn Khaldun observed that all civilizations are born possessing the seeds of their own downfall, and it is only a matter of time before these seeds begin to manifest themselves. He argues that civilizations are born out of intense social cohesion often formed through conflict, and it is in this cohesion that the society draws its strength. However, once the civilization, or state, is well-established, its citizens and leadership become increasingly overindulgent and individualistic, as social cohesion is no longer a necessity to maintain the state's immediate survival. Eventually, the civilization as a political force collapses into a state of factionalism and individualistic pursuits. Finally, a new, more cohesive civilization will inevitably rise to replace the former (Fromherz, 2010, 139). The continued relevance of Khaldun's civilizational life cycle over 600 years after it was first formulated is a testament to the necessity of a comprehensive reformulation of human organization. "Isms" rise and capture the imagination of disgruntled populations that unite under the banner of their respective ideal. The revolution becomes more radical over time as power becomes increasingly closer. Upon taking power, the revolutionaries generally will eventually begin to embody the authoritarian ideals that their predecessor laid down before them. Over time, the ideology becomes increasingly more concrete in order to artificially preserve its legitimacy. Perhaps in order to break this deadly cycle, the new hierarchies that emerge to replace the old must also be done away with as a way to create a society truly based on the values of liberty and freedom of choice. While it is certainly difficult to imagine a revolution tossing aside the entire concept of societal hierarchy, Chomsky extends a ray of hope to the dejected revolutionary.



Conceivably, the classical liberal ideals as expressed and developed in their libertarian socialist form is achievable. But if so, only by a popular revolutionary movement, rooted in the wide strata of the population, and committed to the elimination of repressive and authoritarian institutions, state and private. To create such a movement is a challenge we face and must meet if there is to be an escape from contemporary barbarism (Chomsky, 1970, 13)

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