

Jordan, A. A., Taylor, Jr., W. J., Meese, M. J., Nielsen, S. C. (2009). *American national security, 6th ed.* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Chapter 3 The Evolution of American National Security Policy

National security strategy and military structure are shaped by the interactions of a number of influences, many of which defy precise identification. However, there are three principal categories of variables through which the evolution of strategy and military structure can largely be traced. They are international political and military developments, domestic priorities, and technological advancements. This chapter follows these variables through the evolution of national security policy since World War II, helping to reveal patterns of continuity and change. A sound appreciation of today's prospects and challenges must take into account this history, as it goes far in explaining today's national security policy process and the capabilities and limitations of current U.S. military structure.

Before proceeding, a brief clarification of terms is necessary. As used here, the term strategy refers to an "idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives."¹ A national security strategy provides the conceptual framework within which a state pursues its security. Military structure, in contrast, refers to the size, composition, disposition, and capabilities of the armed forces. In an ideal situation, military structure would provide national policy makers with capabilities optimized to support the achievement of their strategic vision. The term national policy is used to refer to "a broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives."² Policy can therefore relate to either matters of strategy or matters of structure, depending on the issues at hand.

The National Security Environment

International Political and Military Developments. The international environment is an important and constantly changing influence on U.S. policy. U.S. strategy is largely a response to perceived threats to American interests and objectives that exist in the international arena. The United States is secure to the extent that it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, such as national independence or territorial integrity, if it wishes to avoid war and to the extent that it is able to protect those values if war breaks out.³ The perception of international threats to U.S. core values and interests is the basis for the formulation and execution of national security strategy.

One important characteristic of the international environment is the presence or absence of alliances. The defense efforts of friendly and allied states help to define U.S. security problems and the type and size of the U.S. effort required. The capability of the United States to pursue national security objectives is also conditioned by the impact of nonaligned states or nonstate actors. (For more on the role of nonstate actors in the international system, see Chapter 25.)

Domestic Politics. A nation's security policy is also heavily influenced by domestic politics. At a minimum, the internal environment determines the amount of effort that a society will devote to foreign and defense policy.⁴ Domestic goals have a great impact on the development of a state's security policy and its allocation of resources. In the United States, the impact of domestic politics is seen most directly in the budgetary process, but it is also felt in such related areas as military manpower policy. Defense budgets and programs may not determine strategy,

but national security options are heavily conditioned by the nature and extent of the resources available.

Domestic (and international) media organizations also play important roles in shaping U.S. national security policy. The tremendously varied media sources currently available to Americans provide continuous access to information and images from throughout the world. Although members of the media do not make national security policy, they can influence the agenda and frame issues for debate.

Technological Change. The impact of technological advance upon security concerns and calculations is enormous. One need only look at the carnage of World War I to see the results of policy not keeping pace with technology. A century of relative peace in Europe had left military strategy and tactics largely as they were at the time of the Congress of Vienna, yet there had been a century of unparalleled technological advancement between 1815 and 1914. The military plans of 1914 simply were not adequate for the proper employment of existing technological capabilities, and the bloody stalemate that developed on the Western front was due in large part to an inability to adapt military strategy and tactics to the new realities of war.

What is possible in American national security is in considerable part determined by the technological capabilities of both the United States and its adversaries. For much of the era following World War II, the security of the United States and its allies relied in large part upon the strength and invulnerability of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons.⁵ Perceptions abroad of U.S. capability and willingness to employ its vast nuclear arsenal are still relevant to deterring potential threats from other states today. However, the rise of nonstate armed groups that seek these or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and yet are not easily deterred by threats of U.S. nuclear retaliation has changed the nature of the challenge that they pose to national security. Nonnuclear technological advances, such as "smart weapons" and revolutionary improvements in information technology, can also have great effects on national security. One need look no further than the impressive coalition victory in the 1991 Gulf War or the rapid defeat of Iraq's armed forces in 2003 to see the tremendous advantages advanced technology can provide.

Strategy and Structure

National security strategies are largely implemented by military force structures. Because international relations and domestic politics are intertwined, national security policy (which comprises both strategic and structural policies) exists in two worlds. Decisions about strategy are made largely in response to perceived threats in the international environment; they deal primarily with commitments, deployment and employment of military forces, and the readiness and development of military capabilities. Structural decisions are more strongly influenced by domestic politics and deal primarily with the budget and decisions on defense personnel, materiel, and organization.⁶ The two types of decisions interact at all levels. Strategic decisions determine required force structures, yet the resources made available through structural decisions limit strategic options. Moreover, ongoing programs created through structural decisions can have a dynamic of their own in shaping future strategy.

The closely intertwined yet ever-changing relationship between strategy and structure aptly describes the dominant theme in the evolution of American national security policy. This chapter begins with the period immediately following World War II and progresses through each subsequent presidential administration, focusing on the relationship between strategy and structure and how international political and military developments, domestic priorities, and technological advances have affected this relationship for more than six decades.

President Harry S. Truman and the Origins of Containment

The Return to Normalcy, 1945-1946. The end of World War II saw the United States emerge as the most powerful nation on earth. Its homeland was untouched by war, and its enormous industrial potential had served as the "arsenal of democracy" for itself and its allies. The collapse of Germany and Japan led to visions of a prolonged peace implemented through the collective security machinery of the new United Nations (UN). Technologically, the United States was also in an unchallengeable position. The U.S. creation and use of the atomic bomb was probably the single most important development affecting postwar international relations.⁷

With victory came enormous public and congressional pressure for the United States to demobilize its armies and bring the troops home. This domestic political pressure led to one of the most rapid demobilizations in history. On V-J Day, the Army had more than 8 million soldiers, but less than a year after the end of the war, it was down to less than 2 million.⁸ From 1945 to 1947, the United States allowed its overall armed forces to decline from a wartime peak of 12 million soldiers, sailors, and airmen to a low of 1.4 million.⁹

This massive disarmament occurred even though the wartime alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union was being replaced by rapidly increasing tension. American policy makers, confronted with what they perceived to be aggressive Soviet intentions in Eastern Europe, Greece, Turkey, Iran, and the Far East, came to agree on the need for a tougher line. In 1947, U.S. diplomat George Kennan expressed this emerging consensus when he advocated a policy of *containment*: "The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."¹⁰

Containment became the theoretical framework that structured American strategic policy for the next four decades. Opposition to communist expansion became the fundamental principle of American foreign policy. Despite disagreements over the means to achieve this policy, there was little disagreement on the goal itself. The policy of containment led in turn to the development of the strategy of *deterrence*.

The New Strategy and the Old Military Structure. Successful implementation of the policy of containment required ready forces sufficient to deny the Soviets the ability to expand their empire. For this purpose, mobilization potential was clearly less useful than having existing forces already at hand and ready to meet immediate needs. In December 1947, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal listed the "four outstanding military facts of the world" as (1) the predominance of Russian land power in Europe and Asia, (2) the predominance of American sea power, (3) U.S. exclusive possession of the atomic bomb, and (4) American superior production capacity." The ground and air units of the United States and its allies were inadequate to contain the Soviet Union's conventional force capabilities, and the United States lacked adequate doctrine for countering this Soviet superiority with its tiny atomic arsenal. The United States could threaten the Soviet homeland with atomic attack if Soviet armies marched into Western Europe, but the atom bomb was of little help in other defense tasks, such as preserving the integrity of Iran, deterring attack on Korea, or suppressing guerrillas in Greece.¹² Conventional ground and air power seemed essential for these latter tasks, yet the U.S. force structure was weakest in precisely those respects.

Continued Reliance on Mobilization. Implementing the policy of containment raised the difficult problem of how to deal with domestic political constraints on the size of the military effort. Overriding a presidential veto, Congress passed a general income tax reduction bill in early 1948, thereby limiting the revenue available for domestic and military expenditures. Despite the president's requests, no substantial tax increases were approved until after the outbreak of the Korean War. Furthermore, because President Harry Truman was determined to

balance the budget, the administration imposed a ceiling on military expenditures consonant with the reduced resources available. Domestic political priorities ensured that there would be inadequate monies for the forces-in-being that were assessed as needed to contain Soviet power. Thus, by default, reliance on mobilization continued.

A second constraint on the successful implementation of the policy of containment was the doctrinal orientation of the military. American military thinking was still preoccupied with preparations to mobilize forces to win a major war if one should occur.¹³ The Army continued to insist that World War III would be similar to the war it had just prosecuted so successfully.¹⁴ Although the Air Force and the Navy believed the weapons of World War II were obsolete and began to push for new strategic systems, in the immediate postwar years the concept of deterrence by forces-in-being had little place in their military planning.¹⁵ The goals of each of the armed services had been set prior to the end of World War II, and because there was no unified force design or budgetary process, each service became locked into its own vision of its future role and mission. As political scientist Samuel Huntington observed, "The two great constraints of effective military planning, the doctrinal heritage from the past and the pressure of domestic needs, combined to produce a serious gap between military policy and foreign policy."¹⁶

In response to these challenges, the Truman administration secured passage of the National Security Act of 1947. Among other things, the act separated the Air Force from the Army and consolidated the military services under the Department of Defense (DoD). In addition, the act empowered the new secretary of defense to, in theory, be able to neutralize service biases by Grafting an overall strategic vision that the services would be required to support. However, despite a revision to the act in 1949 to give the secretary of defense more power, the service chiefs remained focused on their own agendas. Another key feature of the 1947 legislation was the creation of the National Security Council (NSC), which provided a potentially powerful tool for presidents to formulate and shape national security priorities.

The Truman Doctrine. On March 12, 1947, Truman appeared before a joint session of Congress and outlined what he believed was the necessary U.S. response to communist pressure in Greece and Turkey. In what came to be known as the *Truman Doctrine*, the president argued that the United States must help other nations to maintain their political institutions and national integrity when threatened by aggressive attempts to overthrow them and institute totalitarian regimes. This was no more than a frank recognition, Truman declared, that totalitarian systems imposed their will on free people, by direct or indirect aggression, and undermined the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.¹⁷

The Truman Doctrine represented a marked departure from the U.S. tradition of minimal peacetime involvement in international affairs. The doctrine set forth themes justifying American foreign involvements and initiated military and economic aid programs to nations resisting communist aggression. The justification it contained for American intervention in foreign lands was used repeatedly by subsequent administrations.¹⁸

The Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan, a massive U.S. economic aid program launched in 1948, was designed to help restore the war-shattered economies of Europe. American leaders believed that the ability of Europe to resist communist aggression was dependent on its rapid economic recovery.¹⁹ The Marshall Plan, taken in conjunction with the Truman Doctrine, marked the emergence of the United States as a world power bent on promoting stability in international affairs. This heralded a new U.S. willingness to expend major resources and adopt an activist role in seeing that U.S. interests abroad were protected.

Events in 1948 and 1949 solidified the U.S. view of the communist threat. The forced communization of Czechoslovakia and the blockade of surface access routes to West Berlin, both occurring in 1948, intensified Western perceptions of the Soviet Union as an overtly hostile

state. In 1949, two even more dramatic events affected the formulation of U.S. security strategy. In August, the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear device. The U.S. monopoly on atomic weapons had been broken much sooner than anticipated by U.S. planners. In late 1949, the Communist Chinese completed the conquest of the mainland, creating the appearance of a monolithic communist adversary stretching from Central Europe across the length of the Asian continent.

NSC 68 and Its Implications. The disturbing events of 1948-1949 highlighted inadequacies in U.S. military posture. Awareness of these shortcomings led to the first serious attempt to reconcile strategy with structure—that is, to balance the strategy of containment with a force designed to implement the tenets of the strategy. A joint committee of the State and Defense departments was instructed "to make an over-all review and reassessment of American foreign and defense policy."²⁰ The report, labeled NSC 68 and delivered to the NSC on April 1, 1950, advocated "an immediate and large scale build up in our military and general strength and that of our allies with the intention of righting the power balance and in hope that through means other than all out war we could induce a change in the nature of the Soviet system."²¹ NSC 68 called for a substantial increase in defense expenditures, warning that the United States must be capable of dealing with both limited and all-out war. The problem was how to sell a substantial increase in the defense budget to an administration committed to a policy of economy and balanced budgets. The problem was solved on June 25, 1950, when North Korea invaded South Korea and overran the UN observers on the border between them.

War and Rearmament. The invasion of South Korea provided the immediate crisis that generated public support for vastly increased defense spending. Expenditures for national security programs rose from \$13 billion for FY 1950 to \$50.4 billion in FY 1953." Nevertheless, important differences of opinion remained within informed American circles concerning Soviet intentions in South Korea and elsewhere. Some felt the North Korean attack was part of a general Soviet plan for worldwide expansion, while others saw it as a feint designed to divert resources from Europe.²³ Despite these differences, Communist China's entry into the war in late 1950 solidified U.S. perceptions of an aggressive, monolithic communist threat to the Free World.

The outbreak of the war found the United States with an extremely limited conventional capability. The rearmament effort was characterized by three competing, but complementary purposes: (i) immediate prosecution of the Korean War, (2) creation of a mobilization base for the long term, and (3) development of active forces to balance Soviet strength and to deter further Soviet aggression.²⁴ In short, the war in Korea made rearmament possible, but rearmament was not directed solely at the problem of fighting the war. Forces were also developed for worldwide deterrence purposes.²⁵

NATO: The Institutionalization of Containment. Soviet political pressure on its neighbors, and the Soviet Union's very large conventional forces, caused widespread and increasing concern about the security of Western Europe. As a consequence, the United States deemed it necessary to enter into a peacetime alliance with foreign states and for the first time to deploy forces on the territory of allies in the absence of armed conflict. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in April 1949, and the twelve signatories from Europe and North America agreed that an attack on one would be considered an attack on all. Europe became America's first line of defense; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was the expression of the U.S. effort to contain communism by military means.

Despite an initial goal of ninety NATO divisions (half active, half reserve) by 1954, deemed by experts and agreed upon by political leaders as necessary for conventional defense of Europe, it quickly became obvious that the goal would not be met. By 1952, European members

of NATO, less fearful of Soviet aggression in Europe, began to reduce military budgets, cut terms of service for draftees, and stretch out arms procurements. NATO members subsequently approved a drastic reduction in force goals and came to rely heavily on the tactical and strategic nuclear weapons of the United States to deter Soviet aggression.

Conflicting Priorities. With continuing casualties and costs, as well as a stalemated military situation, the American public became increasingly sour on the war in Korea. It also became evident that the war had not marked the beginning of a general Soviet assault on the West. Public resentment over military spending levels rose, and by 1952, the Truman administration made a marked shift toward domestic priorities. At the same time, however, it was accepted by U.S. policy makers' and the public that the international communist threat to U.S. and European security was real and immediate. Acceptance of the strategy of containment and the necessity for forces-in-being to implement it reflected an acknowledgement of the realities of international and technological affairs. The challenge for President Dwight Eisenhower, as he took office in 1953, was to reconcile these conflicting demands for increased spending for both domestic needs and enhanced defense.

The Eisenhower Administration, 1953-1960: Massive Retaliation and the New Look

From the outset, Eisenhower regarded the threat to U.S. security as dual—military and economic. The military threat posed by the communist powers was obvious, but Eisenhower also believed that continued high levels of defense spending threatened the stability of the U.S. economy and were, therefore, also significant long-term threats. Because the dual threat was a continuing one, domestic and military expenditures would have to be properly balanced for an extended period.

Domestic Priorities and Strategic Reassessment. To preserve U.S. economic vitality, Eisenhower was determined to reduce military expenditures and balance the federal budget. An impasse developed between the administration and the military Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who were committed to a substantial military buildup in line with NSC 68. The old JCS were replaced, and in May 1953 the new JCS assumed the task (even before they took office) of wrestling with difficult problems of strategic reassessment at which their predecessors had balked.

The NSC Planning Board, in a study labeled NSC 162, made an effort to define future national security policy in the broadest sense. The paper recommended the continuation of the policy of containment but with greater reliance on nuclear weapons and strategic air power and an expansion of capabilities to defend the continental United States from air attack. The JCS concluded its reassessment, which was called the Sequoia Study (named after the secretary of the Navy's yacht, upon which the final discussions had been held) and recommended further development of air defenses and strategic retaliatory forces, withdrawal of some U.S. forces overseas, creation of a mobile strategic reserve, reliance upon allies for their own defense buttressed by U.S. air and sea power, and strengthening of U.S. reserve forces.²⁶

The Strategic Impact of Technology and the New Look. In essence, technology provided the means by which Eisenhower escaped from the strategy versus structure box. American technological and numerical superiority in nuclear weapons systems provided strategic options that conceivably made possible the achievement of domestic goals. Technology, in the form of strategic nuclear air power and tactical nuclear weapons, would make worldwide containment affordable.

The Eisenhower *New Look* defense program made a number of assumptions about the international environment. It assumed that there would be no significant increase in international

tensions and no significant change in the relationship between U.S. and Soviet power. The key aspect of the New Look was the decision to place very high reliance upon nuclear weapons and to threaten massive retaliation in response to aggression.²⁷ Strategic air power became the mainstay of the U.S. deterrent posture, and tactical nuclear weapons were to be used to replace the reduced levels of conventional forces in forward defense areas.

The critical strategic change was expressed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on January 12, 1954: "There is no local defense which alone will contain the mighty land power of the Communist world. Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliation power."²⁸ Therefore, Dulles stated, the president had made the basic decision "to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate instantly and by means and at places of our own choosing."²⁹ In sum, America would rely on nuclear weapons to meet even those military contingencies threatening less than general war. NATO members subsequently agreed to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe and to authorize military planners to assume that nuclear weapons would be used in the event of hostilities.

Extending Containment. Extending the American military alliance system beyond NATO (and the earlier Organization of American States) became an integral part of containment strategy. Prior to the adoption of an explicit strategy of massive retaliation announced in 1954, the United States had already begun a process of expanding defense commitments worldwide with the goal of containing communism. One principal lesson of the Korean War, as perceived by U.S. policy makers in the 1950s, was that American disengagement and equivocation had tempted the communists to invade Korea. America's commitment to defend important friendly territories adjacent to communist countries must be made specific; the most obvious way to do so was through military alliances.

The network of alliances began to form soon after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. In 1951, the United States negotiated a security treaty with Japan that guaranteed the defense of Japan and granted the United States military the right to maintain military bases in Japan. A similar mutual defense treaty was signed with the Philippines. Also in 1951, the United States signed the ANZUS Treaty with Australia and New Zealand, pledging U.S. support for the security of those two states. In 1953, following the armistice, Korea and the United States signed a security pact pledging consultation in the event of armed attack and establishing the disposition of land, sea, and air forces in and around the Republic of Korea. In 1954, the United States signed a treaty with Taiwan that called for joint consultation in the event of danger of armed attack and specified the disposition of U.S. forces on Taiwan and the Pescadores.

In 1954, the United States established the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) with Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United Kingdom. Each of these members committed to "act to meet the common danger" in the event of hostilities in the treaty area. In addition to joining SEATO, the United States also sent millions of dollars in military aid to Indochina to help finance the French war with the Viet Minh. In 1954, as the French position in Vietnam became tenuous, the French government requested the commitment of American troops but was refused by Eisenhower.

In 1959, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), which the United States expressly supported but did not formally join, was also launched. The alliance, intended to prevent Soviet expansion southward, linked the UK, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. Additionally, the United States signed bilateral defense agreements with Pakistan and Iran. Given the widespread concern in the United States about communist aggression, the presumption that American nuclear weapons could and would serve to deter both large and small aggressions, and the policy of a balanced budget, it appeared to make sense in the 1950s to strengthen governments on the periphery of the communist bloc by doing the following:

- Pledge U.S. support to prevent or stop communist-inspired aggression

- Provide military assistance to strengthen the defenses of governments bordering the communist bloc
- Provide economic or military assistance to preserve or to help create political and economic stability for governments that were allies in the anticommunist cause
- Train and support foreign troops in their own country because it was less expensive than maintaining American troops abroad
- Establish basing rights as the quid pro quo of assistance

In short, the United States included Asia in its ring of containment and, attempting to prevent another Korea, sought to knit the states of the region into a network of military alliances under U.S. leadership.

The New New Look, 1956. In 1954, when the policy of massive retaliation was formally established, the United States possessed the ability to destroy the military forces of the Soviet Union with little likelihood of serious retaliatory damage in return. By 1956, however, this was no longer clearly the case. Major Soviet catch-up efforts and technological innovations had led to an arms spiral; in an astonishingly short time, mutual vulnerability to nuclear devastation had apparently become a fact.³⁰ The rapid growth of Soviet strategic nuclear power had undermined the New Look's two key assumptions: that the earlier ratio of Soviet-to-American nuclear power would not be radically altered and that U.S. nuclear retaliatory forces would deter both large and small aggressions. Even at the outset, the doctrine of massive retaliation had been criticized by analysts who argued that the threat of massive nuclear retaliation would not be effective in deterring local, ambiguous wars because it was not believable. Only conventional forces, they held, could deal effectively with such relatively low-level conflicts.

The administration began to look for a strategy that permitted greater flexibility. The resulting *New New Look* adjusted existing programs without increasing military expenditures. The dominant characteristics of the New New Look included (1) continuing efforts to stabilize military spending; (2) downgrading of mobilization, readiness, and reserve forces; (3) accepting that U.S. strategic retaliatory capability was sufficient, but only sufficient, to deter a direct attack on U.S. territory or equally vital interests; and (4) recognizing, if only grudgingly, the need to build and maintain capabilities for limited war.³¹

It should be noted that the New New Look continued to emphasize that tactical nuclear weapons were a credible means of waging limited war. Indeed, one of the major distinctions of the new approach was the direct mating of tactical nuclear weapons with the strategy of limited war.³² Writing in the October 1957 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Dulles explained that "in the future it may ... be feasible to place less reliance upon deterrence of vast retaliatory power" because the "nations which are around the Sino-Soviet perimeter can possess an effective defense [through tactical nuclear warfare] against full-scale conventional attack."³³

Eisenhower's programs were shaped by the twin pressures of Soviet and American technological achievement and an American economy that was plagued by both continuing recession and inflation. Largely as a result of inflation, defense costs were rising. Confronted with a choice between increasing the national debt and reducing military spending, the Eisenhower administration chose the latter. In constant dollar terms, military spending was less in 1960 than it had been in any year since 1951.³⁴

The final years of the Eisenhower presidency saw a number of international and technological pressures brought to bear on U.S. national security policy. In August 1957, the Soviets announced the successful test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). In October of that year, the Soviets launched the first artificial satellite, Sputnik, causing an intense

reexamination of U.S. strategic programs. The Gaither Committee, appointed early in 1957 by Eisenhower to study a fallout shelter program for the United States, presented its report shortly after the launching of Sputnik. Defining its mandate very broadly, the committee recommended a substantial increase in the defense budget, aimed primarily at improving U.S. strategic posture.³⁵ Though the committee's recommendations were largely rejected, the discussion of strategic capabilities that it evoked helped provoke the "missile-gap" controversy that became an issue in the 1960 presidential campaign.

The Kennedy-Johnson Years, 1961-1968: Flexible Response

As the new decade began, changes in both the external environment and technology dictated a serious reappraisal of military strategy. The growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities cast increasing doubt upon the wisdom and credibility of U.S. retaliatory threats, and the missile-gap controversy raised questions about the adequacy of U.S. nuclear force levels. Western awareness of the increasingly bitter dispute between China and the Soviet Union aggravated the problem of deterrence as China came to be viewed as a potential power center and threat in its own right.

Changes in weapons technology and force structure also made a reexamination of U.S. policy imperative. Reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, particularly in Europe, was increasingly viewed as dangerous for two main reasons. First, in view of the relatively weakened U.S. strategic position, deterrence could fail. If it did, escalation to all-out nuclear war would be hard to check because there is no discernible firebreak between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. Second, should a crisis arise, shortages of conventional forces created the ultimate dilemma of choosing between nuclear retaliation and inaction. Turbulence in the developing countries of the world also demonstrated the shortcomings of U.S. retaliatory strategy. The Soviet Union and China were giving military and economic assistance to "wars of national liberation" in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Massive retaliation was inadequate to deal with these complexities. Just a few years earlier, technology was seen as a panacea capable of ensuring containment while limiting military spending. Now, however, the domestic political debate focused on the potential dangers of reliance on nuclear technology.

Military Structure and the McNamara Pentagon. When Robert McNamara became President John Kennedy's secretary of defense in 1961, despite the goals of the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent reforms, the missions of the country's armed services were still largely determined independently. Monies were allocated on a "fair share" basis, and each armed service developed programs within its budget constraints with little regard for what the others were doing. National strategies and priorities were supposedly set forth in an agreed NSC document called the Basic National Security Policy. However, this document was a vague compromise that provided little real guidance. General Maxwell Taylor summarized the document's weaknesses: "The sharp issues in national defense ... have been blurred . . . the Basic National Security Policy document means all things to all people and settles nothing."³⁶ Given vague guidance, the armed services had a great deal of latitude to continue to develop their own programs.

McNamara, when he came into office, was appalled: "The Army planning, for example, was based, largely, on a long war of attrition, while the Air Force planning was based, largely, on a short war of nuclear bombardment."³⁷ Strategic nuclear programs were also developed independently by each service. For example, Navy briefings to McNamara in 1961 on the number of Polaris missile submarines it required never mentioned the existence of the U.S. Air Force or any of its strategic retaliatory forces. When the Air Force analyzed how many Minutemen missiles were required, it simply assumed that the number of Polaris submarines would remain constant.³⁸ McNamara was determined to control and rationalize the development

of U.S. military forces. He received two instructions from the president: "Develop the force structure necessary to our military requirements without regard to arbitrary or predetermined budget ceilings. And secondly . . . procure it at the lowest possible cost."³⁹

Before the formal elaboration of a new strategy, McNamara applied a number of "quick fixes" to the U.S. force structure. He accelerated the procurement schedule for the submarine-launched ballistic missile (the Polaris), doubled the production capacity for Minutemen ICBMs, and placed one-half of the bombers of the Strategic Air Command on a quick-reaction alert.⁴⁰ Improvements began immediately in airlift and sealift capabilities, and the Army, Marine Corps, and the tactical Air Forces were expanded.⁴¹ McNamara's purpose was to increase U.S. combat strength measurably and quickly while developing a new military strategy.

Flexible Response. The strategy of flexible response was developed to give the president the capability to respond effectively to any challenge with the appropriate level of force. Flexible response within the strategic nuclear posture provided policy makers the options of massive retaliation, limited nuclear countervalue (i.e., city) attacks, and counterforce strikes. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations greatly increased the strategic inventory dramatically, developing the capability to inflict "unacceptable damage" on the Soviet Union even after absorbing a surprise first strike.⁴² At the other end of the force spectrum, it also focused on increased attention to counterinsurgency.

Though these changes were significant, it was in the area of conventional forces that the doctrine of flexible response differed most drastically from that of massive retaliation. To provide adequate options, conventional force capabilities had to be improved and modernized. The Army was increased from twelve to sixteen divisions, the Navy surface fleet was enlarged, and the reserves and National Guard were revitalized. Special operations forces were also enhanced. In general, the United States sought a "two-and-a-half war posture—that is, the United States sought to be capable of fighting simultaneously a large-scale war in Europe, another sizable war somewhere else in the world, and a third, smaller-scale conflict.

American efforts to introduce flexible response doctrine into NATO initially encountered Allied resistance. Early reliance on conventional forces caused uneasiness among Europeans, who feared erosion of the nuclear deterrent. Whereas the Eisenhower administration had asserted that nuclear weapons might well be used, by the end of the Johnson administration, the United States was reluctant to contemplate the use of nuclear weapons in limited wars.

Conventional Forces and Intervention. Improvements in conventional capabilities were not matched by the development of clear doctrine governing intervention and the application of force. In his inaugural address, Kennedy had made his famous pledge: "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, or oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty."⁴³ Such an open-ended commitment was, of course, unrealistic, for it did not provide any useful guidance for deciding when the use of force was in the national interest and when it was not. In 1965, the United States deployed ground combat troops to the Republic of Vietnam and also intervened in a civil upheaval in the Dominican Republic. As the Vietnam involvement lengthened and deepened, popular dissatisfaction grew, and domestic dissent and economic pressure began to play a significant role in the formulation of U.S. strategy. By FY 1968, defense spending had climbed to \$78 billion, \$20 billion of which represented the direct cost of the war in Vietnam.⁴⁴ The incoming Nixon administration was faced with the prospects of stalemate on the nuclear level and an unpopular, costly war on the conventional level.

The Nixon and Ford Administrations, 1969-1976: Strategy of Realistic Deterrence

By 1969, the national consensus on U.S. national security policy had seriously weakened. The prolonged and seemingly unsuccessful U.S. intervention in Vietnam called into question the ability of the United States to deal with insurgencies around the world, and the nature of the strategic balance dictated a reassessment of American defense policy. The policy of containment, practically unchallenged for several decades, came under increasingly critical scrutiny. It no longer seemed to reflect a realistic appraisal of the international situation.

Reassessment of the Strategic Environment. By 1968, the Soviet Union had achieved rough nuclear parity with the United States. Both sides could inflict unacceptable damage on one another even after absorbing an enemy's first strike. Under these conditions, the United States and the Soviet Union seemed to realize that it was in their best interest to limit the possibilities of confrontation. From such reasoning, at least on the U.S. side, came the concept of *detente* and the associated Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).

At least two other important factors informed thinking about U.S. military policy. First, public and congressional disenchantment with the war in Vietnam dictated a reevaluation of where and how U.S. conventional forces might be used. Second, economic constraints also had an impact. The position of the dollar in the world economy deteriorated as wartime inflation proceeded, and domestic social and economic problems seemed to demand greater investment. Yet, in FY 1964, the last pre-Vietnam War budget, defense spending represented 41.8% of the federal budget; roughly a decade later, in FY 1975, defense expenditures accounted for just 27.1% of federal outlays.⁴⁵ This defense-spending decline was not just relative but also absolute when measured in constant dollars.

Strategic Sufficiency. Given the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal and its demonstrated ability and willingness to respond to improvements in American strategic forces, the Nixon administration concluded that nuclear superiority would be impossible to maintain.⁴⁶ Any attempt to do so would only escalate the arms race without increasing security for either side. However, President Richard Nixon was also unwilling to allow the Soviet Union to achieve a position of nuclear dominance. Planning for U.S. forces thus focused on "strategic sufficiency." Reflecting an acceptance of nuclear parity, this doctrine included a number of precepts:

- *Assured destruction:* The United States would maintain three separate and independent offensive systems—ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM)s, and manned bombers—which would ensure that the United States would be able to inflict unacceptable levels of damage on the enemy through destruction of its population and economy even in the event that the United States had been struck first.⁴⁷

- *Flexible nuclear options:* Flexibility of forces and targets would allow the president to tailor any U.S. strategic response to the nature of the provocation.

- *Crisis stability:* Enhanced and flexible response capabilities would reduce Soviet willingness to stage a less than all-out attack and eliminate a Soviet incentive to strike first.⁴⁸

- *Perceived equality:* A rough balance of strategic capabilities would prevent coercion or intimidation of the United States or its allies.

Conventional Force Policy. In 1974, the Nixon administration's appraisal of conventional war policy reaffirmed one traditional commitment and modified another. The U.S. commitment to NATO was reaffirmed and strengthened following the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. Although

the overall size of the U.S. Army was reduced by 50%, U.S. NATO forces—which had been stripped of personnel and equipment during the Vietnam War—were strengthened and re-equipped. Additionally, the United States abandoned the so-called two-and-a-half war strategy and began to maintain forces based on a one-and-a-half war strategy. (In reality, the change was not that dramatic, for the United States had never approached the level of forces needed for two-and-a-half wars.) The NATO commitment became the primary planning contingency for structuring U.S. conventional forces.

A major reappraisal of U.S. policy was also made concerning the feasibility of deterring or fighting local conflicts and insurgencies in developing countries. The resulting policy, known as the Nixon Doctrine, concluded that the United States would no longer automatically intervene against externally supported insurgencies. The Nixon Doctrine could be expressed as three essential principles: self-help, primary regional responsibility, and residual U.S. responsibility.⁴⁹ The principle of *self-help* dictated that the country being threatened must take responsibility for its own security. Further, in the case of insurgency, the United States would expect the local government to initiate vigorous programs of economic and political development.⁵⁰ Experience had taught that military action alone could not defeat an insurgency; it must be accompanied by political and social programs. The second principle, *regional responsibility*, meant that the United States expected neighboring countries to work together to eliminate or deal with causes of instability in their areas. If military operations were required, the neighbors of the country under attack would provide at least some of the forces.⁵¹ Finally, the principle of *residual U.S. responsibility* indicated that the United States might provide military assistance but would intervene directly only if vital American interests were threatened. President Gerald Ford and later President Jimmy Carter endorsed this policy of strictly limited U.S. involvement as the basis for U.S. action in dealing with insurgencies in developing nations.

The Carter Administration, 1977-1981: Strategic Reassessment

As customarily occurs with the advent of a new administration, Carter initiated a reappraisal of U.S. national security policy when he took office in January 1977. Such reappraisal was clearly warranted, for much had changed. Turning first to the international environment, the steady strengthening of Soviet nuclear forces had underscored the momentum of the strategic arms race and the importance of moving forward with arms control. A second important dynamic involved the People's Republic of China. Nixon's reestablishment of the U.S.-China dialogue in 1972 had reversed a longstanding policy of treating that country as a prime danger. A final trend related to the proliferation of newly independent countries since World War II and the increasing demands made by these countries for a more just international order.

Another important cause for reassessment concerned past U.S. policy. A central theme of the Nixon administration's approach to foreign affairs, detente, had been discredited. The original goal of detente had been to lessen tension and hostility between the superpowers. By the beginning of the Carter administration, however, it appeared that the Soviet Union had interpreted detente as mere acknowledgment of the new power balance and a license to expand its influence. Although the earlier SALT negotiations (SALT I) institutionalized the policy of detente at one level, they seemed only to encourage Soviet expansionism at other levels. Americans were unhappy with a policy that seemed incapable of checking the adventurism of the Soviet Union and its allies in the noncommunist world.

Domestically, the United States had also changed dramatically. The wars in Korea and Vietnam seemed to illustrate the reduced utility of military force, feeding renewed skepticism about defense spending and worldwide military deployments. The recession of 1974-1975 reemphasized domestic priorities and raised further questions about the extent to which resources should be channeled into expensive defense programs. Then presidential candidate Carter emphasized his intent to reduce military spending in favor of domestic priorities. Despite

evidence of a continuing, massive Soviet military buildup, there was sufficient uncertainty to permit both presidential candidates in 1976 to downplay the specter of future Soviet adventurism.

Technology also had, to some extent, restructured the security environment. Continued technological advancements—such as multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) for nuclear weapons; cruise missiles; and anti-satellite capabilities—threatened to upset perceptions of nuclear stability. Improvements in such conventional weapons as TV-guided bombs and laser-guided artillery shells had enhanced military capabilities with less than fully understood consequences for the stability of conventional force balances.⁵²

As a consequence of the factors discussed above, and in light of its own comprehensive assessment of the comparative strengths of the United States and the Soviet Union, the Carter administration set forth the main lines of its strategy in a series of announcements and policy initiatives during the course of 1977. It reaffirmed the importance of maintaining a balance in strategic nuclear forces, choosing the label of *essential equivalence*. It continued to rely upon the doctrine of "mutually assured destruction" but appeared to back away from any concept of even limited counterforce capabilities or any plans for the so-called limited nuclear options with which the Nixon administration had tinkered. Also, in the context of essential equivalence, the Carter administration picked up the lagging SALT II talks and pressed them vigorously. The subsequent treaty signed by Carter and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in Vienna in 1979, though never ratified by the U.S. Senate, continued to define the upper limits of essential equivalence into the 1980s.

With regard to Europe, the Carter administration underscored the key role of NATO and reaffirmed the existing forward strategy. The overall concept of having forces sufficient to simultaneously fight a major war in Europe and a smaller war elsewhere—the one-and-a-half war strategy of the Nixon administration—was endorsed as the guiding principle behind the size and character of the defense forces. Special attention was focused on the Persian Gulf as the possible site of the one-half war. Although measures to create the kind of force projection capability required for such an area as the Persian Gulf were slow to get under way, the administration at least staked out a declaratory policy that accorded the region higher and more explicit priority than it had earlier received.

In a bid to stabilize the power balance in Asia and to create a more satisfactory framework for U.S.-Soviet relations, the administration proceeded with the normalization of American relations with the People's Republic of China. Formal recognition was accomplished in early 1979, immediately preceding the visit to the United States by Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping. Also, in fulfillment of the president's campaign promises, the administration began preparations to withdraw American ground forces from the Republic of Korea. Congressional opposition, however, forced the administration to reverse its course in the matter.

In terms of overall national security policy, the decade of the 1970s ended on a somewhat surprising note. The Soviet Union's impressive and continuing defense buildup, its invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and its gains in a number of other regions—generally propelled by Soviet arms and advisers and sometimes by Cuban proxies—had so alarmed large sectors of the public and Congress that a stronger defense policy and increased spending were pressed on a reluctant president. This was further exacerbated by the Islamic revolution in Iran earlier in 1979 that saw an American hostage crisis as well as the loss of a U.S. ally in a strategic region. President Carter's final defense budget and five-year defense plan were marked by substantial increases.

The Reagan Administration, 1981-1988: Redressing the Military Balance and Reform

America entered the 1980s with a new administration committed to strengthening U.S. power, to resisting further Soviet-supported communist expansion, and to leaving Marxism-

Leninism on "the ash heap of history." From 1981 to 1988, the U.S. defense budget almost doubled—the largest peacetime military buildup in American history. The United States moved rapidly to deploy a new-generation triad of strategic nuclear systems, to expand the U.S. naval fleet toward 600 ships, and to modernize U.S. conventional land and air forces. One of the more dramatic developments in U.S. national security policy during this period came in March 1983 when the president called for the development of a system to defend the United States against ballistic missile attack. Such a system could radically alter the forms of future military confrontation.⁵³

In the developing world, the Reagan administration turned to a more activist policy of American support for noncommunist insurgencies against Soviet-supported communist regimes. This policy, generally known as the Reagan Doctrine, enjoyed several successes. It probably contributed to the Soviet Union's decision to withdraw its support for the Marxist government in Angola and, in part, to the Soviet decision to withdraw from Afghanistan in 1989. In Central America, support for the anticommunist contras led to free elections and the demise of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, setting the stage for the eventual settlement of the communist-backed insurgency in El Salvador. U.S. military intervention in 1983 also stopped the threat of a communist-supported takeover in Grenada.

The emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev as the leader of the Soviet Union in 1985 presented the opportunity for beginning a new dialogue with the Soviets in the midst of confrontation. The Reagan administration's strategy of deferring major efforts at arms control until it was in a position to negotiate from strength began to pay off in a series of Soviet concessions that eventually led to the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987. With subsequent dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and the breakup of the Warsaw Pact, other negotiations yielded the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty of 1990 and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991.

Gorbachev's policies of *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (restructuring) and the sheer force of his personality, combined with deep domestic economic problems and erosion of the Soviet empire, led to the end of the Cold War by 1989 and, ultimately, to the demise of the Soviet Union. The United States and its allies had effectively contained the Soviet Union for forty years. After an aborted putsch in Moscow in August 1991 aimed at overthrowing Gorbachev and his reforms, the old Soviet Union was finished, although the future of its fifteen former republics remained to be settled.

Goldwater-Nichols. Although the preceding decades had seen numerous shifts in national security policy as the threat evolved, many in Congress and the executive branch believed the formulation and communication of national security strategy were flawed. Also, past national security policies had generally failed to provide adequate focus in pursuing national values, interests, and goals. Moreover, these strategies still did not provide the integration that the 1947 National Security Act was meant to foster. In response, Congress passed the most significant legislation on national security since the 1947 law. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 required the president to report the administration's national security strategy to Congress on an annual basis. In this document, the president would codify the values, national interests, and key objectives that would drive security and defense policies. The report would also allow Congress to evaluate the coherence and feasibility of the administration's reconciliation of ends, ways, and means.

In addition to providing focus, Goldwater-Nichols also sought to better integrate the different service components of the DoD. Despite the intent of the 1947 legislation and McNamara's reforms, interservice rivalry still dominated discussions on budget allocation, weapons programs, and the planning and execution of military operations. In response, the 1986 act strengthened mechanisms for integrating service-specific budget programs and streamlined the operational chain of command from the president through the secretary of defense to theater

commanders. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff became the principal adviser to the president, and the respective service chiefs were no longer in the operational chain of command.⁵⁴ Instead, theater combatant commanders gained unified control over all service elements within their areas of operations. The Goldwater-Nichols legislation also addressed weaknesses in joint war-fighting capabilities, revealed in a failed attempt to rescue U.S. hostages in Iran in 1980 and during 1983 military operations in Grenada, by mandating improved service interoperability. (For more on the role played by Congress in U.S. national security affairs, see Chapter 5.)

The George H. W. Bush Administration, 1989-1992: Toward a New World Order

The NSC staff under President George H. W. Bush began a national security strategy review right after he took office in 1989, but events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were moving so fast that publication of the administration's national security strategies was delayed in 1990 and 1991. Both reports received considerable criticism for their lack of precise guidance. Yet, the 1991 report did point to fundamental changes:

More than preceding reports, this one attempted to broaden the definition of national security. In purely military terms, it proclaimed regional conflict as the organizing principle for American military forces, and suggested that new terms of reference for nuclear deterrence would shortly be needed. Politically, it attempted to turn the compass on arms control from east-west to north-south for a much expanded discussion of policy to retard proliferation. Even more than the previous reports, the document attempted to communicate the idea that American economic well-being was included in the definition of national security, even though discussions of specific programs to improve competitiveness or to combat trade and budget deficits were generally lacking.⁵⁵

Reflecting new realities and anxious to satisfy domestic cravings for a "peace dividend" in the wake of the Cold War, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell appeared before the Senate budget committee in January 1991, during the Gulf War, to propose a multi-year 25% reduction in American forces from 1990 levels. By 1995, those cuts would reduce active-duty Army divisions from eighteen to twelve, the Air Force from thirty-six fighter wing equivalents to twenty-six, the Navy from 546 ships to 451, and reserve forces and DoD civilian employees by over 200,000 each. In addition, Cheney and Powell announced plans to cancel one hundred weapons programs and to close or realign over two hundred bases and facilities worldwide. In the words of Secretary Cheney, "The cuts would reduce the U.S. military to its lowest end strength since before the Korean War; they would cut our share of the Federal budget, once as high as 57%, to 18%, the lowest level in forty years. The defense budget would fall by 1997 to 3.4% of GNP, by far the lowest level since before Pearl Harbor."⁵⁶

The new military strategy guiding this "defense build-down" reflected the shift from containing the spread of communism and deterring Soviet aggression to a more variegated, flexible strategy. The major elements were:

- Strategic deterrence and defense, requiring a reliable warning system, modern nuclear forces, the capability and flexibility to support a spectrum of response options, and a defensive system for protection against limited strikes.

- Forward but reduced presence of U.S. conventional land, sea, and air forces at a high level of readiness in regions vital to U.S. national interests; in this context, strengthened alliances as well.

- The ability to respond to regional crises that could arise on very short notice involving U.S. forces unilaterally or as part of a multilateral effort.

- A force reconstitution capability against major military threats based on longer warning time and involving the formation, training, and fielding of new fighting units, mobilization of previously trained manpower, and activation of the U.S. defense industrial base, which would maintain the capability for technological superiority.⁵⁷

Some of the impetus for reorienting defense posture was created by the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Although Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 was a surprise to the Bush administration, it responded with firm diplomatic and military action. With the support of a UN Security Council resolution, the U.S. led a coalition of over thirty states that included over 500,000 American troops to a swift and decisive defeat of the Iraqi Army and liberation of Kuwait. In the aftermath of this operation, the Bush administration felt confident that its words and deeds against armed aggression would prove to be an effective deterrent. Also during this time, George H. W. Bush interpreted international humanitarian crises as creating a potential threat to the national interest, as evidenced by the U.S. deployment of forces to Somalia in the waning months of the administration. In 1992, as the FY 1993 defense budget was being debated on Capitol Hill, it appeared that Congress largely agreed with the administration—for the time being—that U.S. military capabilities would not be allowed to plummet as had occurred after earlier wars.

The Clinton Years, 1993-2000: Cautious Change

President Bill Clinton's first secretary of defense, William Perry, sought to respond to the complexities of a post-Cold War World with a defense strategy organized along three basic lines. First, the United States would prevent threats from emerging; second, the United States would deter threats that did emerge; and third, if the first two lines of defense failed, the United States would have the capability to defeat threats using military force. In the first category, threat prevention, Perry emphasized a range of confidence-building measures and the strengthening of democratic societies, as well as the maintenance of strong alliances, efforts to counter the spread of WMD, the forging of a pragmatic partnership with Russia, engagement in multilateral security dialogues, and the pursuit of comprehensive engagement with China.

On the second line of defense, deterrence, Perry asserted that only the United States could deter threats worldwide. To do so, the United States required a reduced but effective nuclear force; strong, ready, forward-deployed conventional forces with a clear power projection capability; and the demonstrated will to use those forces when vital interests were threatened. Third, on the final line of defense, Secretary Perry stressed the need for U.S. dominance built on readiness, high technology weapons, and superior information systems to ensure victory.⁵⁸

Military Structure. To implement this strategy, the Clinton administration did not make any dramatic changes to military force guidance or structure. Beginning in 1993, the defense drawdown begun by the preceding administration continued as defense spending remained relatively stable. The Clinton administration's two major reviews of defense policy, the Bottom-Up Review of 1993-1994 and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 1996-1997, basically enshrined the status quo. The core planning guide in both reviews was the need to be able to fight two nearly simultaneous major theater wars, such as a second Persian Gulf War as well as a war on the Korean peninsula, without major allied assistance. Force structure and budgetary requirements flowed from this concept. The DoD proposed to fight these wars along conventional lines, funding each military service in fairly traditional percentages and avoiding major doctrinal changes.

Critics found much to dislike in this thoroughly customary approach to defense planning. Initially, some worried about a major mismatch between forces and budgets. Projected budgets could not provide sufficient new tanks, planes, ships, and other hardware to keep the overall force in fighting trim. These observers began to worry about the "coming defense train wreck" that would occur when the current generation of military hardware reached its maximum service life and there was no new generation to take its place.⁵⁹ Other critics pointed to a so-called revolution in military affairs underway in defense technology and strategy—a revolution based on real-time, battlefield intelligence; precision sensors and strike systems; information warfare; new weapons, such as unmanned aerial vehicles and nearly automated stealth ships; and other elements—and claimed that the Clinton administration was doing nothing to make it a reality for the U.S. military. Some worried the United States was doing what all leading powers had done through history—assuming that the next war would be like the last. Finally, a host of critics from across the political spectrum argued that the Clinton administration was not doing enough to reverse the Cold War nuclear arms race that had left each side with thousands of nuclear weapons. They called for faster action before the continuing U.S.-Russian nuclear standoff served to undermine East-West relations once again.

Clinton administration officials had ready answers to these criticisms. Beginning in the mid-1990s, they added money to defense budgets to help redress the force structure-budget imbalance and argued that it made little sense to embark on a new round of equipment modernization before the new, revolutionary generation of hardware was fully ready. They suggested that they were experimenting with radical new equipment and tactics, but that integrating them into the military in a stable and effective way would naturally take some years. Finally, they pointed out that the United States and Russia could only destroy so many nuclear warheads in any given year, and that their nuclear reductions were proceeding as fast as technology allowed. In a retrospective defense of the Clinton administration's stewardship of the armed forces, defense analyst Michael O'Hanlon argues, "The Clinton Pentagon oversaw the most successful defense drawdown in U.S. history—cutting military personnel by 15% more than the previous administration had planned while retaining a high state of readiness and a strong global deterrence posture. It enacted a prescient modernization program. And the military it helped produce achieved impressive successes in Bosnia and Kosovo."⁶⁰

Military Intervention. Although the Clinton administration took a cautious approach to structural change of the armed forces, it was more activist in its willingness to use force abroad. Though Clinton inherited the Somalia intervention from his predecessor, he later intervened with U.S. armed forces in humanitarian crises and postconflict situations in Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1995), and Kosovo (1999). Many critics questioned whether these interventions represented a wise use of U.S. military power given the questionable relationship between developments in these situations and vital U.S. national interests. Others were concerned about the legitimacy of these endeavors given the norm of state sovereignty, which militates against intervention in another state's domestic affairs. Finally, from a U.S. domestic perspective, there were concerns over cost and the impact of a greatly increased pace of operations on a smaller, all-volunteer military that was still structured largely along Cold War lines. This debate became louder during the 2000 presidential election season.⁶¹

As the twentieth century came to a close, U.S. defense policy was clearly in transition. Debates on the significance of international political developments, the ensuing tension between competing forces within domestic politics, and the impact of technology all continued to play significant roles in national security policy. However, without a clearly defined threat or a unifying crisis, these debates were not subject to easy resolution.

The George W. Bush Administration, 2001-2008: Crisis and Transformation

Much like those of the preceding two presidents, the incoming Bush administration struggled to articulate U.S. national security policy goals in the post-Cold War environment. As a presidential candidate, Governor George W. Bush formulated a modest agenda and sought to scale back the foreign policy activism of the Clinton years. Key advisors to his campaign criticized the Clinton administration for failing to prioritize international affairs, for overusing the military to the point that "thinly stretched armed forces came close to a breaking point," and for embracing multilateralism at the expense of the U.S. national interest.⁶² In an April 2000 debate, George W. Bush promised to pursue a "humble" foreign policy.⁶³ However, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, suddenly presented the United States with a genuine crisis and a concrete threat. This event galvanized the American people and spurred the U.S. government to take a new approach to national security.

New Threats and a New Strategy. Surprise attacks on U.S. territory are rare in American history. As historian John Lewis Gaddis points out, the only other examples are "the British burning of the White House and Capitol in 1814 and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941." Gaddis also argues that such attacks can set the stage for radically new national security strategies by seeming to show that previous policies had failed.⁶⁴ Throughout the Cold War and into the 1990s, the policy of containment and the strategy of deterrence informed U.S. national security policy. In the aftermath of devastating terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, and given challenges from nonstate armed groups and the risk of WMD proliferation, these traditional approaches appeared obsolete. In his May 2002 graduation speech at West Point, President Bush was explicit: "New threats also require new thinking." He went on to assert, "deterrence . . . means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those -weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies."⁶⁵ Responding to these concerns, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* issued in September 2002 represented a shift in U.S. national security policy. Bush summarized his approach by saying, "We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent."⁶⁶

An important element of this new approach was an effort on the part of the Bush administration to redefine the doctrine of *preemption*. Preemption has traditionally been seen as justified under international law, reflecting the right of a state to defend itself by acting first in the face of an imminent danger. In effect, the Bush administration argued that the standard of imminence should be relaxed when the threat of concern related to WMD: "In an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world's most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather."⁶⁷ Critics responded by arguing that the Bush administration was really just talking about classic preventive war: acting now to prevent a potential future threat. An American embrace of preventive war would challenge American traditions and set a bad precedent for countries around the world. In the eyes of these critics, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 showed the risks of preventive war, as WMD were not found and the invasion's aftermath proved more dangerous and complex than U.S. planners had apparently expected. (For more on American traditional approaches to national security, see Chapter 2.)

The debate on this element of the Bush national security strategy continues. Robert Jervis identifies three challenges to the Bush approach. First, it is inherently difficult to predict future threats. Second, important and relevant intelligence on past behavior and capabilities can be both scarce and difficult to interpret. Third, it may be difficult to sustain both domestic support and international legitimacy when using force based on problematic information.⁶⁸ Gaddis,

however, argues that, although this doctrine is controversial, it may have been successful in thwarting subsequent terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. Gaddis also supports the Bush administration's view that the traditional definitions of preemption and prevention are no longer relevant in the face of new threats.⁶⁹

In addition to fighting terrorists and tyrants, the other two elements of the Bush national security strategy related to building positive relationships with great powers and fostering democracy. In practice, these aspects of the national security strategy proved difficult to implement consistently. Though the United States sought good relations with other great powers, it also resisted the inevitable constraints associated with seeking international consensus or support for its actions. And despite a desire to foster democratic development, the United States found itself working with many nondemocratic regimes in its struggle against international terrorists. The tensions have been classic ones. With regard to cooperation with other great powers, the freedom of unilateralism must be weighed against the advantages in capability and legitimacy provided by multilateralism. With regard to democracy promotion, U.S. values must at times be weighed against material national security interests. These challenges are likely to prove enduring.

The Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Over the long term, a strategy is likely to be judged by its perceived consequences. Evaluations of the national security policy of the Bush administration are likely to be most strongly defined by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. For this reason, even as these wars continue, a brief review of their origins and conduct is useful here.

Afghanistan. Within one month of the attacks of 9/11, U.S. forces, with substantial assistance from CIA paramilitary operators, launched combat operations to invade Afghanistan. The purpose of the operation was to target the al-Qa'ida central leadership, including Osama bin Laden, and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that had supported al-Qa'ida's operations. After several months of fighting, in which U.S. conventional and Special Operations forces worked closely with the indigenous Northern Alliance militias, the Taliban were defeated.⁷⁰ The UN sponsored a series of meetings in Bonn, Germany, which eventually led to an interim government led by a Pashtun leader, Hamid Karzai. Karzai was appointed as the interim President of Afghanistan and became the first democratically elected President of Afghanistan on October 9, 2004.

Since the initial defeat of the Taliban, military operations to support the newly formed Afghan government and to impede al-Qa'ida operations in the region have continued. Consolidating national power in Afghanistan has been difficult and al-Qa'ida operatives, reportedly including Osama bin Laden, continue to operate in remote areas of Afghanistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of neighboring Pakistan. Beginning in August, 2003, NATO initiated its first operation outside the Euro-Atlantic area and created the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to "assist the government of Afghanistan and the international community in maintaining security."⁷¹ U.S. forces have worked with the ISAF, but the amount of U.S. military power that can be committed to Afghanistan has been constrained by the total amount of forces available, especially after operations began in Iraq. (See also Chapter 19 for more on the war in Afghanistan.)

Iraq. In response to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's evasiveness regarding the enforcement of UN Security Council Resolutions relating to suspected WMD programs, and in line with the emphasis the Bush administration placed on the danger from "unbalanced dictators" with WMD in a world plagued by transnational terrorists, U.S. forces led an invasion of Iraq in March 2003. In three weeks, the U.S.-led coalition toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein in a series of synchronized military operations that demonstrated American military

dominance over the Iraqi Army. Most Iraqi leaders fled and were eventually captured or killed, with Saddam Hussein being captured in December 2003, eight months after the invasion.

The political challenge of establishing a new representative government in place of an authoritarian regime proved to be much more difficult than the military operation required to defeat that regime. For the first fourteen months, until July 2004, the United States established a Coalition Provisional Authority, led by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer that administered Iraq and worked toward the creation of democratically-based government structures in a state where little tradition of democratic governance had ever existed.⁷² Some initial decisions, such as limiting the number of U.S. forces deployed for stabilization operations, disbanding the Iraqi Army, and excluding senior members of Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party from government, were criticized as contributing to the post-war disorder and lawlessness that developed in many parts of Iraq. Despite the U.S. transfer of sovereignty back to Iraqi leaders on July 1, 2004, the situation did not improve. In fact, as the U.S. military attempted to develop the Iraqi army and police forces, insurgents that opposed the government and U.S. forces increased their attacks and violence spread in many of Iraq's provinces. This violence received additional fuel from external forces, including al-Qa'ida and Iran, both of which saw Iraq as an opportunity to embroil the U.S. in a long-term conflict. After the bombing of the Golden Dome Mosque in Samarra in February 2006, the situation evolved into a sectarian civil war with over 3000 Iraqis killed per month in November-December 2006. In response to these developments, Congress appointed a bipartisan Iraqi Study Group to attempt to chart a new way forward.⁷³ By December 2006, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, and the U.S. Commander, General George Casey, concluded that the current strategy was not working and that "the coalition was failing to achieve its objectives."⁷⁴

In January 2007, the President Bush announced a new strategy, which included a "surge" of five brigades of the U.S. Army and two Marine battalions, a concomitant surge of Iraqi forces (Iraqi military and police forces increased by more than 100,000 in 2007), a focus on the Baghdad area, and additional diplomatic, political, and economic pressure. The surge was implemented by a new commander, General David Petraeus, who employed a counterinsurgency strategy that emphasized partnerships with Iraqi Security Forces and focused on protecting the Iraqi population. At the same time, political overtures toward moderate tribes, initially in Anbar and then throughout Iraq, took advantage of the extent to which al-Qaida in Iraq and other violent extremist groups had overplayed their hand and alienated themselves from local populations. This "awakening" of the tribes led over 100,000 former insurgents to join organizations called "Sons of Iraq," which worked with the coalition and Iraqi forces to provide local security. This movement also had the potential to serve as a step toward political reconciliation to the extent that it served as a means for integrating the former insurgent groups into a peaceful political process. (See also Chapter 20 for more on the war in Iraq.)

Though as of late 2008, the ultimate outcomes of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are uncertain; already the cost and difficulty of these wars have exceeded initial estimates. The development of these conflicts reinforces several themes that will be identified later in this book: the importance of diplomatic, information, and economic power—beyond just the military instrument—are discussed in Chapters 11 and 12. The inherent uncertainty and challenges of using military power and the criteria that should be considered before using it are discussed in Chapter 13. The specific principles of and challenges with counter-insurgency warfare are discussed in Chapter 16. These two major military operations of the Bush administration reinforce the importance of carefully understanding, developing, and implementing national security policy in way takes into consideration the long-term interests of the United States and the inherent difficulty in implementing policy. As discussed later in the section on defense transformation, the Afghanistan and Iraq wars also once again widened the gap between an administration's strategy and the less flexible structure available to support that strategy.

Nuclear Weapons and Space Policy. Although it identified the limits of deterrence in the face of new threats, the Bush national security policy acknowledged the continued relevance of nuclear weapons for strategic deterrence against potential state adversaries. Its *New Triad* of nuclear deterrence consisted of conventional and nuclear offensive strike systems, active and passive defenses that emphasized ballistic missile defense, and a responsive nuclear infrastructure.⁷⁵ Each of these elements relies heavily on the technological advantages the United States continues to hold over its competitors. Despite the absence of a Soviet threat during the years since the end of the Cold War, the United States has largely maintained its nuclear weapons capability. In terms of weapons available, some analysts even posit the United States will soon have a degree of nuclear superiority it has not enjoyed since the end of World War II and are concerned with the potentially destabilizing effects of future arms races motivated by a desire to counter U.S. capabilities in this area.⁷⁶ On the other hand, recent problems involving the surety of nuclear weapons indicated that U.S. nuclear competence has eroded. A 2008 Task Force appointed by the Secretary of Defense concluded that "there has been an unambiguous, dramatic, and unacceptable decline in the Air Force's commitment to perform the nuclear mission and, until very recently, little has been done to reverse it."⁷⁷ Unless it is corrected, the U.S. may face a significant security dilemma—other nations developing technology to counter U.S. nuclear superiority and a loss of the means and tradecraft required to safely maintain that superiority. The Bush administration also undertook a more activist policy toward space. Acknowledging the importance of using space for security and economic purposes, the national space policy asserts "freedom of action in space is as important to the United States as air power and sea power."⁷⁸ The administration saw U.S. national security as being dependent upon space capabilities, believed that this dependence would only grow, and hoped to retain U.S. space primacy. Thus, much to the chagrin of such states as China and Russia, the U.S. showed reluctance to support international agreements that could in any way threaten American preeminence beyond the Earth's atmosphere.

Defense Transformation. As the Bush administration sought to think beyond the traditional parameters of containment and deterrence in its national security policy, it focused heavily on transforming the military to respond to new threats. Even before the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld returned to lead the Pentagon after a twenty-five year absence with transformation as his mandate. Creating a special Office of Force Transformation, Rumsfeld sought to focus not only on high-technology, precision weapons but also on new ways of fighting enemies who would attempt to challenge American hegemony asymmetrically. In the 2001 QDR, the Pentagon shifted away from the previous "two major theater war" force design construct. Rumsfeld also sought to eliminate many military bases in Europe and East Asia that were established during the Cold War. His goal was the creation of a lean, effective, joint force that could deploy rapidly anywhere in the world on short notice.⁷⁹

Many of these elements of transformation were showcased effectively during the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan in 2001-2002. Small land forces worked closely with coalition partners, utilizing unmanned aircraft. This joint collaboration with U.S. air assets from temporary bases in neighboring Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan seemed to epitomize the efficacy of transformation as well as the administration's success in rapidly changing the culture of a huge governmental institution. The strengths of transformation were again highlighted in the buildup and execution of the U.S. overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Nevertheless, as postconflict operations in Iraq and Afghanistan relied less on advanced technology and more on sustaining large, expensive ground forces, the focus of transformation initiatives seemed increasingly distant from current national security needs. Once again, strategy and structure began to appear out of alignment. Although the 2006 QDR still highlighted transforming the military into a more agile and expeditionary force, it readily admitted it was not a programmatic or budget document.⁸⁰ Instead, the 2007 defense budget of \$439 billion (up 7% from 2006 and 48% from 2001)

highlighted more traditional goals of maintaining soldier readiness and procuring conventional and nuclear weapons systems.⁸¹

A final issue of national security structure that became more salient during the Bush administration relates to the interagency processes of the U.S. government. Since the Goldwater-Nichols reforms of 1986, the DoD has made significant strides in integrating the military services in order to improve their capabilities and effectiveness in joint military operations. However, these efforts focused solely on the DoD. As the landscape changed in the early twenty-first century, it became clear that the United States would require more than effective armed forces to meet its national security needs. It would need to combine the expertise of various agencies and departments in the U.S. government to deal effectively with new challenges, such as a catastrophic terrorist attack on the U.S. homeland, or postconflict reconstruction abroad. Despite increasing calls for another such landmark reform as Goldwater-Nichols or the National Security Act of 1947, it seems unlikely that the challenges associated with making the interagency process work more effectively will be resolved in the near term.⁸² (For more on this topic, see Chapter 10.)

Looking to the future, it is likely that many of the characteristics of the strategic environment to which the Bush administration responded will endure. The proliferation of WMD and activities of transnational terrorist groups are likely to be of growing serious concern. Whether future administrations will adopt key tenets of the Bush administration's national security policy as an appropriate response to these challenges remains to be seen.

Discussion Questions

1. What international and technological developments caused the United States to abandon its longstanding reliance on a policy of mobilization? How does a strategy based on deterrence differ from one based on mobilization?
2. The policy of containment was based on the perception of an aggressive, monolithic communist bloc of nations. What events of the late 1940s and early 1950s caused the United States to take this view of the communist threat? What impact did such an assessment have on established U.S. political and military policies?
3. How do domestic considerations make foreign and security policies different than they would be on the basis of international and strategic considerations alone?
4. How have technological innovations affected the evolution of U.S. security policy since the end of World War II? To what extent can it be said that technology determines strategy?
5. Should the United States maintain its current high level of investment in nuclear capabilities? What are the potential advantages and disadvantages of such a policy?
6. Given changes in technology as well as the rising importance of security threats posed by nonstate actors, is there a meaningful distinction between *preemption* and *prevention* in the current strategic landscape? What are the national security implications of attacking threats before they are fully formed?
7. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act was a watershed reform effort that greatly influenced American national security policy. Given the increased complexity of today's challenges, does the United States need another major reform of the national security bureaucracy?
8. One of the enduring themes in the evolution of U.S. national security policy is the tension between strategy and structure. Does current policy achieve a successful reconciliation between these two?
9. Since 9/11, the United States has identified the spread of Islamic fundamentalism to be a threat to U.S. national interests and global prosperity. Is this a long-term threat? How can the United States deal effectively with this problem?

Recommended Reading

- Dougherty, James E., and Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr. *American Foreign Policy: FDR to Reagan*. New York: Harper & Row, 1986. Fukuyama, Francis. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press, 1992.
- . *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006. Gaddis, John Lewis. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.
- . *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. George, Alexander, and Smoke, Richard. *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Common Defense*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. Jervis, Robert. *American Foreign Policy in a New Era*. New York: Routledge, 2005.
- Kennan, George. *American Diplomacy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963.
- Kissinger, Henry A. *American Foreign Policy*. 3rd ed. New York: W. W. Norton, 1977.
- Leffler, Melvyn. *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992.
- Lippmann, Walter. *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1943.
- Osgood, Robert. *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953.
- Reagan, Ronald. President Reagan: Speech to the House of June 8, 1982. Available at: <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/rnod/i982reagani.html>.
- Tucker, Robert. *The Purposes of American Power*. New York: Praeger, 1981.

Internet Resources

The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/avalon.htm National Security Council, www.whitehouse.gov/nsc NSC Historical List of Policy Documents, <http://clinton4.nara.gov/textonly/WH/EOP/> NSC/html/historical U.S. Department of Defense, www.defenselink.mil

Notes

Chapter 3: The Evolution of American National Security Policy

1. DOD Dictionary of Terms, "strategy," www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/s/05200.html.
2. DOD Dictionary of Terms, "national policy," www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/n/O3629.html.
3. Walter Lippmann, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1943), 51.
4. Henry Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974), 13.
5. *Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1983), passim.
6. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 3-4.
7. Henry T. Nash, *American Foreign Policy: Response to a Sense of Threat* (Home-wood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1973), 19.

8. Huntington, *Common Defense*, 41.
9. Nash, *American Foreign Policy*, 19.
10. George Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* 25, no. 4 (194?): 575-576.
11. Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking Press, 1951), 350.
12. Huntington, *Common Defense*, 41.
13. *Ibid.*, 43.
14. Chief of Staff, *Final Report*, United States Army, February 7, 1948, 11-12.
15. Huntington, *Common Defense*, 45.
16. *Ibid.*, 47.
17. President Harry S. Truman, address delivered to a joint session of Congress, March 12, 1947, reprinted in Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1955), 272.
18. Nash, *American Foreign Policy*, 25.
19. *Ibid.*, 29.
20. Warner Schilling, Paul Hammond, and Glenn Snyder, *Strategy, Politics, and the Defense Budget* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 292.
21. Paul H. Nitze, "The Need for a National Strategy" (address delivered at Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, August 27, 1958).
22. Huntington, *Common Defense*, 54.
23. For a discussion of U.S. perceptions of communist intentions, see Morton Halperin, *Limited War in the Nuclear Age* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1963), chap. 3.
24. Huntington, *Common Defense*, 88.
25. *Ibid.*, 56.
26. *Ibid.*, 73-74.
27. Jerome Kahan, *Security in the Nuclear Age* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1975), 28.
28. "Text of Dulles' Statement on Foreign Policy of Eisenhower Administration," *New York Times*, January 13, 1954, 2.
29. John Foster Dulles, "The Evolution of Foreign Policy," *Department of State Bulletin* 30 (January 25, 1954): 108.
30. Huntington, *Common Defense*, 88.
31. *Ibid.*, 92.
32. *Ibid.*, 96-97.
33. Morton Halperin, *Defense Strategies for the Seventies* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 46.
34. Huntington, *Common Defense*, 105.
35. John Foster Dulles, "Challenge and Response in U.S. Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 36, no. i (October 1951): 31.
36. Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York: Harper, 1959), 82-83.
37. William W. Kaufmann, *The McNamara Strategy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 29.
38. Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much Is Enough?* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 21.
39. House Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Military Posture*, 85th Cong., 2nd sess., 1962, 3162.
40. Kaufmann, *McNamara Strategy*, 53-54.
41. *Ibid.*, 71.
42. What constituted unacceptable damage to an adversary could not be measured precisely. However, the planning figure accepted by U.S. authorities was 25% to 33% of Soviet population and about 75% of Soviet industrial capacity. This judgment was influenced primarily by the demographics of Soviet population distribution and by the rapidly diminishing marginal

returns beyond a certain level of retaliatory attack. For a more complete explanation of assured destruction criteria, see Enthoven and Smith, *How Much Is Enough?*, 207.

43. John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address given in Washington, D.C., January 20, 1961, www.jfklibrary.org/Historical-t-Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK7oo3P OFo3Inauguralo 1201961.htm.

44. Edward R. Fried et al, *Setting National Priorities: The igj4 Budget* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1973), 292.

45. *U.S. Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1975* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), 22.

46. Halperin, *Defense Strategies for the Seventies*, 52.

47. Alton H. Quanback and Barry M. Blechman, *Strategic Forces: Issues for the Mid-Seventies* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1973), 6-7.

48. *Ibid.*, 9.

49. Halperin, *Defense Strategies for the Seventies*, 126.

50. *Ibid.*

51. *Ibid.*, 127.

52. Bernard Brodie, "Technology, Politics, and Strategy," *Adelphi Papers*, 9, no. 55 (March 1969): 22.

53. See John Lewis Gaddis, *How Relevant Was U.S. Strategy in Winning the Cold War?* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 14.

54. John Lewis Gaddis, "A Grand Strategy of Transformation," *Foreign Policy* 133 (November/December 2002): 53.

55. See Don M. Snider, *The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 14.

56. See "Statement of the Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney before the Senate Budget Committee, February 3, 1992," I.

57. See *National Military Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1992), 6-10.

58. William J. Perry, "Defense in an Age of Hope," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 6 (November/December 1996): 64-79.

59. See for example, Don M. Snider, "The Coming Defense Train Wreck," *Washington Quarterly* 19, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 89-102.

60. For a defense of President Clinton's stewardship of the armed forces, see Michael O'Hanlon, "Clinton's Strong Defense Legacy," *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 6 (November/ December 2003): 126.

61. For a discussion reflecting campaign issues, see Lawrence Korb, Condoleezza Rice, and Robert B. Zoellick, "Money for Nothing: A Penny Saved, Not a Penny Earned, in the U.S. Military," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 2 (March/April 2000): 149-152.

62. Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 1 (January/February 2000): 51.

63. See the second presidential debate, *Online News Hour with Jim Lehrer*, PBS, October ii, 2000, www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/election/20oodebates/2ndebate2.html.

64. Gaddis, "A Grand Strategy of Transformation," 50.

65. George W. Bush, "Address Delivered to the West Point Graduating Class" (June i, 2002), www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2oo2/o6/2oo2o6oi-3.html.

66. The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), iv.

67. *Ibid.*, 15.

68. Robert Jervis, *American Foreign Policy in a New Era* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 85.

69. See John Lewis Gaddis, "Grand Strategy in the Second Term," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 1 (January/February 2005): 2-15.

70. Stephen Biddle, *Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for the Army and Defense Policy* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002).
71. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO in Afghanistan," www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/04o628-factsheet.htm.
72. L. Paul Bremer, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope* (New York: Threshold Editions, 2006)
73. Iraq Study Group, *The Iraq Study Group Report* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2006), www.usip.org/isg/.
74. David H. Petraeus, "Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq," September 2007, www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Petraeus-Testimony2oo709io.pdf.
75. *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, 2006, 22.
76. Keir A. Leiber and Daryl G. Press, "The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006): 52-53.
77. Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, *Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management*, (Washington: Department of Defense, September 2008), 2.
78. As quoted by Marc Kaufman, "Bush Sets Defense As Space Priority," *The Washington Post*, October 18, 2006, Aoi.
79. See Donald Rumsfeld, "Against the Unknown: Armed Forces Transformation for the 21st Century," *Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly* (Autum 2002): 6-15.
80. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 6, 2006), v-vi.
81. *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2007*, www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/defense.html.
82. See "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase II Report" (Washington, DC: CSIS, July 2005), www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=i849.

Chapter 14

Asymmetric Conflict, Terrorism, and Preemption

Perhaps the most significant development in U.S. national security in the past decade has been a broad recognition of the significant way in which terrorism can threaten U.S. national security. Instead of challenging U.S. military strength directly, terrorists and other adversaries can use asymmetric means to exploit U.S. weaknesses and to gain strategic political objectives. While the concepts of asymmetry and terrorism have increased in importance, the basic idea is far from new. Writing more than two thousand years ago, military theorist Sun Tzu argues that "an army may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army avoids strengths and strikes weaknesses."¹ By focusing on specific vulnerabilities and avoiding strengths, a much weaker enemy can inflict extraordinary damage.

In the modern era, the greatest danger faced by the United States stems from the nexus of two forms of asymmetry: technological and organizational.² A *technological* asymmetric threat uses unique technologies in innovative ways either to disrupt conventional military organizations, or to target other specific technological, social, economic, or political vulnerabilities of an adversary. Adversaries that use unorthodox organizational structures and techniques to circumvent the military power of an enemy represent *organizational* asymmetric threats.

After September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush argued that the most dangerous threat to the United States was asymmetric when he said it stemmed from a terrorist organization or rogue state willing and able to strike directly at the U.S. population with weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Although estimates of the probability of this scenario vary, policy makers deemed the threat dire enough to warrant a complete rethinking of U.S. strategy (see Chapter 3). One of the most significant consequences has been the adoption of preemption as a strategic response to asymmetric threats. In examining the irregular challenge of terrorism and the catastrophic challenge of WMDs, this chapter focuses on the upper left and upper right quadrants of the national security challenges chart used by defense planners and explained near the end of the previous chapter (see Figure 13-2).

Asymmetry

The first official U.S. use of the term *asymmetry* was in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). This document provides a practical definition of asymmetrical threats and an explanation for why adversaries would seek to develop such capabilities:

U.S. dominance in the conventional military arena may encourage adversaries to use ... asymmetric means to attack our forces and interests overseas and Americans at home. That is, they are likely to seek advantage over the United States by using unconventional approaches to circumvent or undermine our strengths while exploiting our vulnerabilities. Strategically, an aggressor may seek to avoid direct military confrontation with the United States, using instead means such as terrorism, NEC [nuclear, biological, and chemical] threats, information warfare, or environmental sabotage to achieve its goals. If, however, an adversary ultimately faces a conventional war with the United States, it could also employ asymmetric means to delay or deny U.S. access to critical facilities; disrupt our command, control, communications, and intelligence networks; deter allies and potential coalition partners from supporting U.S. intervention; or inflict higher than expected U.S. casualties in an attempt to weaken our national resolve.³

One of the critical elements identified by the QDR is that adversaries will resort to asymmetric tools because of American conventional military strength. Despite the fact that potential U.S. competitors, such as China, have made vast improvements in their conventional

militaries, the United States retains the most capable conventional military forces. Indeed, George W. Bush made dissuading other states from seeking to challenge the United States in a symmetric fashion part of his 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS).⁴ U.S. conventional dominance confers numerous advantages for American national security policy, but it also means that adversaries will seek asymmetric means to challenge U.S. power.

Technological Asymmetry. The Defense Department's 1997 QDR identifies terrorism and WMDs as key asymmetric threats facing the United States, but the U.S. defense community was not immediately reoriented toward these particular threats. Instead, the asymmetric threats that the U.S. defense community focused on before 9/11 were those to American advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C⁴ISR) capabilities. The QDR report states:

Areas in which the United States has a significant advantage over potential opponents and increasing capabilities (e.g., space-based assets; command, control, communications, and computers; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) could also involve inherent vulnerabilities that could be exploited by potential opponents (e.g., attacking our reliance on commercial communications) should we fail to account for such challenges. Dealing with such asymmetric challenges must be an important element of U.S. defense strategy, from fielding new capabilities to adapting how U.S. forces will operate in future contingencies.⁵

Increased attention to U.S. technological vulnerability in the realm of information technology was appropriate, even though—in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks—it was clearly overly narrow.

Networked information systems not only are essential to the functioning of today's U.S. armed forces but also are critical infrastructures for the functioning of society and government. Such critical infrastructures include public and private networks that provide telecommunications services, financial services, transportation, water, energy, and even emergency services. These systems have greatly increased economic growth, improved quality of life, and enhanced U.S. national security capabilities, but they have also created important vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities were recognized by the administration of President Bill Clinton, who began focused U.S. government efforts to redress them with his 1998 Presidential Decision Directive 63 on critical infrastructure protection. Such efforts require the support of government actions at all levels as well as close cooperation between the public and private sectors, because the majority of U.S. critical infrastructure rests in the hands of the private sector.⁶ The challenge of information security in many ways reflects other forms of warfare; in *cyber warfare*, there is a daily interaction between attackers and defenders and a constant evolution in tactics, techniques, and procedures.⁷

Technological asymmetry comes in a variety of forms. It might be a unique military technology that confers an overwhelming advantage or even a low-tech method for destroying or disrupting a U.S. technological advantage. Possible strikes against U.S. space-based assets, the ballistic missile threat from North Korea, and China's ability to deny U.S. Naval assets access to the Taiwan Strait with shore-based cruise missiles are all readily conceivable examples. State adversaries almost certainly would attempt to exploit potential vulnerabilities that could substantially degrade U.S. conventional dominance in a future conflict. Iraq's attempt to disrupt U.S. precision-guided bombs—with electronic jammers and smoke from oil fires—during the early stages of the 2003 invasion is an example of a failed asymmetric effort to disrupt U.S. capability.

In the 1990s, U.S. planners became increasingly concerned about the threat posed by WMDs because of three post-Cold War developments. The first was the 1994 nuclear crisis with

North Korea (see Chapter 18). The second was the fear that former Soviet states had not kept a close eye on old Soviet weapons stockpiles, technology, and scientists (see Chapter 22). The third was the ongoing, active containment of Iraq and the numerous United Nations missions to discover and dismantle its weapons programs (see Chapter 20). Though the United States has its own vast WMD capabilities, the possession and possible use of such weapons by an adversary can pose an asymmetric threat to the United States, because the various constraints on their potential use by American forces would likely rule out a symmetric response.

In the cases of North Korea and Iraq, U.S. policy makers were particularly concerned that states with weak conventional military capabilities would turn to nuclear weapons as a technological equalizer. That concern was seemingly justified when North Korea claimed to possess nuclear capability as a way of bolstering its position in the world and finally conducted a nuclear test in 2006. Policy makers were also concerned that terrorists would gain access to WMDs, either via transfer from a state or through the acquisition of a weapon or technology on the international black market. A terrorist group with nuclear weapons raised an entirely new set of concerns for U.S. planners because of the uniquely asymmetric characteristics of terrorist organizations.

Varieties of WMDs. While the term *WMDs* is useful shorthand for describing nonconventional weapons, it also has the unfortunate effect of aggregating numerous weapon types in a single category and obfuscating the actual variability in the nature and impact of these weapons. The term *CBRN*—which delineates Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear weapons—is more descriptive and useful than *WMDs*. In addition to an unusual level of destructiveness, these weapons have in common the fact that they have been rarely used and have unique psychological impacts on the target population.

The effects of CBRN devices can be quite varied. Whereas a full-size nuclear device might kill tens or hundreds of thousands of people immediately, the initial impact of a radiological or chemical device might be comparable to a conventional explosive. The impact of a biological attack could be even more varied; some modes of such attacks—such as the anthrax letters that were sent in the U.S. mail system in late 2001—have very localized effects. However, a different delivery system could have transformed a similar agent into a weapon that could kill hundreds or thousands of people. The common characteristic is that, if effectively employed, CBRN weapons can have a devastating psychological effect that reaches well beyond their immediate destructive power.

Within this chapter, references to *WMDs* are intended to connote high-impact events: a nuclear detonation or devastating chemical, biological, or radiological attack. Nevertheless, it is worth remembering the ambiguity of the terminology. Not all *WMDs* are particularly destructive, nor are all technologically asymmetric attacks necessarily deadly.

Terrorists and WMDs. In addition to how U.S. policy makers view *WMDs*, it is important to understand the enemy's perspective. While al-Qa'ida is discussed in detail later in this chapter with regard to *WMDs*, al-Qa'ida leaders recognize that *WMDs* are different from conventional weapons, and they do not take the decision to use *WMDs* lightly. Using such weapons would have serious theological and strategic implications. A Saudi cleric, Naser bin Hamad al-Fahd, has issued a *fatwa* (a religious opinion written by a wise man) that justifies the use of *WMDs* against the West.⁸ Al-Fahd justifies the use of *WMDs* in the right circumstances with the following rationales: The prophet (Muhammad) used catapults in the seventh century (which also killed indiscriminately); destroying an enemy's territory is acceptable "if the fighting requires it"; killing women and children as collateral damage is permissible while striking a legitimate target; only Sharia law applies to Muslims and not international law, which would prohibit such attacks; the United States already has used *WMDs* against Japan; and everything in Islam should be done to the best of one's ability—including killing. While this *fatwa* faces some

challenges from other Sunni clerics, it does provide an idea of the extent of consideration and justification to use WMDs. Osama bin Laden argues that Muslims have an obligation to develop WMDs as a means of defense against the West.⁹ Numerous other al-Qa'ida leaders have since made reference to this fatwa and the use of WMDs, including nuclear weapons, leaving little doubt that they would use them if circumstances permitted.

Organizational Asymmetry. Despite their recognition of asymmetrical threats, U.S. planners may have historically underappreciated the danger posed by organizational asymmetry. Organizational asymmetric threats are not designed to use or exploit unique technology to defeat the U.S. military. Rather, they are largely focused on circumventing U.S. strength through the creation of organizations that are difficult to detect and disrupt. Organizational asymmetry may also limit the American ability to wage war militarily by degrading the U.S. population's will to fight or denying the U.S. allies. Organizational asymmetry is designed to produce three advantages, listed below.

Surprise. Organizational asymmetry is invariably designed to allow a weaker enemy to attack a critical target without being interdicted or detected beforehand. Thus, organizational asymmetry creates a difficult intelligence problem. By avoiding detection, asymmetric forces can strike in any number of locations against numerous targets with little or no warning. As the weaker force, surprise is often the only factor that allows tactical success.

Escapability. Innovative organizational techniques not only allow an adversary to attack without warning, but they make it more difficult to find, track, and punish those responsible for committing violent acts. In traditional guerilla warfare, this often means hit-and-run attacks, ambushes, and the use of remotely detonated weapons.

Deniability. A quick attack and quick escape also prevent the target force from accurately identifying who organized and implemented an attack. This can be useful for states looking to affect a situation covertly, because they do not want their enemy or a third party to be aware of their involvement. Nonstate actors use the same general principle to limit their enemy's ability to respond to the group with overwhelming force.

Forms of Organizational Asymmetry. Today, the challenges created by organizational asymmetry are most evident in terrorist groups, but this is not the only place they are found. States also develop asymmetric capabilities, from special forces teams to integrated command structures, such as that employed by the Marines, which tightly links air, sea, and ground forces. The U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force have highlighted their asymmetric advantage as a critical strength that they contribute to American defense.¹⁰ Although these techniques are taken for granted in the United States, seen from the outside, they are organizationally and technologically asymmetric capabilities.

Terrorists are different because they elevate organizational asymmetry from an operational innovation to a strategic principle. Unlike Mao Zedong, for example, who conceived of guerilla operations as a means to stalemate an enemy while developing the tools to overcome it conventionally, terrorists often seek to circumvent their enemy's military entirely and attack the civilian population directly." Their plan for victory is inherently political, and their attacks are aimed at achieving strategic political objectives without ever attaining the capability to challenge the U.S. military in direct confrontation. This approach hearkens back to Sun Tzu, who argues that "what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy."¹²

Terrorists use their limited military means in specific ways to attack the strategies of their enemies. Unable to overcome those enemies directly—or, unlike Mao, unable to conceive of developing the military capacity to do so—they must find ways to subdue their enemy without

directly confronting their enemy's army. A terrorist group uses organizational asymmetry to overcome qualitative and quantitative weaknesses. One way they do this is to organize in ways that make them difficult to detect and track, as discussed above. But terrorists also gain an asymmetric advantage by using their disadvantaged position to justify virtually any level of brutality, including massive attacks against civilian targets.

It is important to understand the moral dimension of organizational asymmetry, because it helps frame all sorts of behavior commonly linked to terrorism, from attacks against civilians to the beheadings of captives. The moral aspect of asymmetry is more than just the willing brutality of some terrorist groups; it also stems from limitations that American society puts on its government. From restrictions on torture and demands that prisoners be given trials to the uproar over surveillance programs that incorporate lesser protections for civil liberties, American society sets moral parameters that limit the government's freedom of action. Virtually all states operate within moral parameters of some kind, shaped either by their values or by the need to justify the appropriateness of their cause. Indeed, these basic parameters have become entrenched not only in national life but in the agreements the United States uses to govern its interaction with other states.

Because these restrictions do not operate on terrorists in the same fashion, the moral parameters of a targeted society create seams that terrorists attempt to exploit. These seams are not limited to military affairs; rifts in society, demographics, political culture, and bureaucratic organizations also become exploitable. This dynamic sets up one of the fundamental challenges of counter-terrorism for a liberal democracy, such as the United States: It must seek effectiveness against terrorists while preserving the values and institutions that are intrinsic to the American way of life.

Technological and Organizational Asymmetries Combined. While technological and organizational asymmetries can individually be challenging, when combined they can produce a result that is, indeed, catastrophic and pose a significant threat to U.S. policy. As reflected in Figure 14.1, various combinations of technological and organizational asymmetry compose varying levels and types of threats. In some cases, states can achieve technological advances that are disruptive to U.S. defense policy and require technological, political, or diplomatic responses. Alternatively, terrorists can threaten the U.S. by combining their organizational asymmetry with relatively unsophisticated technology. This was exemplified with the skyjacking of various airliners, the seizure of the Achille Lauro cruise ship, and the bombing of relatively soft U.S. military targets in the 1970s and 1980s. These terrorists can be pursued with U.S. technology, intelligence, and law enforcement, much as they had been pursued prior to the 9/11 attacks. If terrorists are able to combine technological asymmetries with their inherent organizational asymmetries, they can have the capacity to inflict devastating harm on the United States or other targets of their aggression. The 2006 NSS sums up the challenge for policy makers: "We are committed to keeping the world's most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the world's most dangerous people."¹³ Countering the potentially devastating effects of terrorism will continue to be an enduring challenge for the United States for the next several decades. Before turning to one potential policy response—preemption—it is important to reflect further upon the nature of the terrorist threat itself.

Terrorism

According to the U.S. government's official definition, *terrorism* is "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents."¹⁴ This definition highlights four important characteristics of terrorism. First, the violence (or, in some other definitions, the threat of violence) is not random or arbitrary but is planned and organized. Second, it is politically motivated, so it excludes criminal activity. Third,

it is directed at noncombatants—civilian targets who would normally be protected under international law. Some have used this distinction to explain that, while hijacking and crashing the planes that hit the World Trade Center on 9/11 were acts of terrorism, using American Airlines Flight 77 to hit the Pentagon was an attack against a legitimate military target. The U.S. government, on the other hand, includes the attack against the Pentagon (as well as those against Khobar Towers or the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut) as terrorism, because it considers military personnel who are off duty or unarmed as not being legitimate military targets. Finally, terrorism is conducted by groups that are subnational or clandestine and not uniformed military organizations. When military organizations conduct violent operations on behalf of a nation, that is not terrorism; it is war. In war, the internationally recognized Laws of Armed Conflict, which define when those operations are legal or illegal (i.e., war crimes), are well established.

What is interesting about the current official definition is that, prior to 2001, it previously included a modifying phrase in which terrorism was "usually intended to influence an audience." Previously, many had believed that "terrorists wanted a lot of people watching and not a lot of people dead."¹⁵ The rationale was that the ability of terrorists to achieve their political aims was a function of the attention and publicity of their acts. If acts could be spectacular, without killing many non-combatants, they would achieve their ends without negative repercussions that could affect recruiting members, raising funds, and promoting other organizational objectives. The deletion of this phrase reflects the recognition that some terrorist organizations today specifically aim to inflict mass casualties in their attacks.

Terrorism is not, of course, a new challenge. It has long been the weapon of the weak against the strong. In the late eighteenth century, during the French Revolution, revolutionaries used terrorism to overthrow the monarchy. In July 1946, in the Holy Land, Irgun, a militant Zionist organization, blew up the King David Hotel, killing ninety-one people, to influence the creation of a Jewish state. From 1970 to 2005, the Irish Republican Army used terrorism, at the cost of hundreds of lives, in an attempt to extend Irish rule in Northern Ireland. Palestinian organizations have used terrorism continually for nearly six decades, again killing hundreds, on behalf of an independent Palestinian homeland. In the 1950s, the Viet Cong, seeking to extend North Vietnam's rule over all of Vietnam, systematically assassinated South Vietnam's village leaders—in front of the villages' people—to paralyze the South Vietnamese government's ability to function. These examples illustrate *revolutionary* or *national liberation* terrorism. While many people were killed in some of these attacks, most of the acts were intended to advance political causes and affect the society well beyond killing individuals in a particular attack.

A second type of terrorism, *state-sponsored* terrorism, has been an important feature of international politics during the past several decades. Adopted as a national policy by a variety of states, such as Libya, North Korea, and Iran, governments of sovereign states have, at different times, funded, explicitly supported, and to some extent influenced the activities of terrorists groups. State-sponsored terrorism has the potential to spread more widely if Islamic extremists succeed in their efforts to take over governments in predominantly Muslim countries.

In just the past few decades, a more deadly variant of terrorism has appeared that might be called *hyperterrorism*, which seeks not to inflict calibrated damage but instead to maximize death and destruction. A prime example is the now disbanded religious cult named Aum Shinrikyo, or "Supreme Truth." Centered in Japan, with numerous branches elsewhere, it burst upon the world's consciousness when its followers released its own manufactured deadly sarin gas in Tokyo's subway system in 1995. Its delivery method was extremely crude, but it nevertheless managed to kill a dozen people and sicken at least one thousand others.

Al-Qa'ida, discussed below, is the current prime example of an organization that deliberately seeks to produce high-casualty attacks.¹⁶ Even if U.S. authorities did not recognize early the intent to cause massive deaths, this goal was clearly indicated in al-Qa'ida's 1993 plot to bomb the World Trade Center and its 1995 plot to bomb twelve airliners over the Pacific Ocean. In December 2004, one of al-Qa'ida's senior strategists, Abu Mus'ab al-Suri (Mustafa Setmariam

Nasar), published a letter arguing that if he had been involved in the planning, he would have tried to put WMDs on the planes that crashed into the World Trade Center on 9/11.¹⁷ Had a nuclear or radiation weapon or biological or chemical agents been included in the 9/11 attacks and exploded in downtown Manhattan, tens of thousands (if not hundreds of thousands) of people would have been killed. The economic and psychological damages would have been exponentially worse.

As the example of Aum Shinrikyo suggests, widely varying types of terrorist organizations may develop over the next several years. Given the asymmetric threats that they pose and the pressures of resource constraints, poverty, globalization, and religious extremism, the number of distinct terrorist groups may well increase in the future. Nevertheless, the most significant and most dangerous current group, which will affect U.S. policy for at least a generation, is al-Qa'ida. Just as it was essential during the Cold War for policy makers to understand the ideology, history, background, and thinking of the Soviet Union, it is equally important today for policy makers to fully understand al-Qa'ida. While a complete discussion of al-Qa'ida would take an entire book (the best books on the topic are listed at the end of this chapter), the following brief description provides some of the most important information.

The Nature of the Al-Qa'ida Threat. The United States and its allies currently confront a global Islamist insurgency that "seeks to overthrow the status quo through subversion, political activity, insurrection, armed conflict, and terrorism."¹⁸ Al-Qa'ida is often viewed as a monolithic terrorist organization. However, due to U.S. successes in Afghanistan as well as continuing sources of radicalization, al-Qa'ida has evolved since 2001 from a relatively cohesive regional organization to a complex, decentralized global movement. According to leading expert Bruce Hoffman:

Al-Qa'ida thus exists more as an ideology than as an identifiable, unitary terrorist organization. It has become a vast enterprise—an international franchise with like-minded local representatives, loosely connected to a central ideological and motivational base, but advancing the remaining center's goals at once simultaneously and independently of each other.¹⁹

While most Westerners ambiguously refer to this entire movement as al-Qa'ida, Hoffman argues that it is useful to think of al-Qa'ida in terms of four major dimensions:

- *Al-Qa'ida Central.* This category consists of the remnants of the al-Qa'ida organization that existed prior to 9/11 as well as new players that have risen through the organization to replace leaders that have been killed or captured. Experts believe these individuals reside primarily around the Afghanistan and Pakistan border and continue "to exert actual coordination, if not direct command and control capability, in terms of commissioning attacks, directing surveillance, and collating reconnaissance, planning operations, and approving their execution."²⁰

- *Al-Qa'ida Affiliates and Associates.* This category consists of "formally established insurgent or terrorist groups that over the years have benefited from bin Laden's largesse and/or spiritual guidance and/or have received training, arms, money, and other assistance from al-Qa'ida. Bin Laden has attempted to gain support and assistance from these groups by co-opting their local agendas and redirecting their attention and efforts toward the global jihad."²¹ Associated groups are operating in places that include Uzbekistan, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

- *Al-Qa'ida Locals.* This category consists of "dispersed cells of al-Qa'ida adherents who have or have had some direct connection with al-Qa'ida—no matter how tenuous or evanescent." These individuals have had some prior experience with terrorism in such places as Algeria, the Balkans, or Chechnya, or they were recruited locally, brought to Pakistan for

training, and then returned home with the plans for an attack and the ability to conduct it. Al-Qa'ida locals can be active or dormant, and their targeting choices may be specifically directed or left to the local terrorist cell.²²

- *Al-Qa 'Ida Network*. This fourth and final category consists of "home-grown Islamic radicals" around the world who have no direct connection with al-Qa'ida, but who are nonetheless prepared to conduct attacks in support of al-Qa'ida's goals. An example includes the Hofstad Group in the Netherlands.²³

To understand how the United States and its partners have come to face such a formidable and diverse enemy, it is important to understand the origins of al-Qa'ida and why it began to target the United States.

The Origins of Al-Qa'ida. It is a great irony that two of the greatest perceived successes of U.S. foreign policy in recent decades—the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s and the 1991 eviction of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait—played key roles in the development of al-Qa'ida and the Islamist terrorism that currently threatens the United States.²⁴ As will be discussed in Chapter 19, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, the United States responded by supporting the local *mujahideen* resistance. Through the provision of money and weapons to the Afghan fighters, the United States sought to weaken the Soviets and reduce Soviet influence on the immediate periphery of the oil-rich Persian Gulf region.

As the Afghan War progressed, a number of Arabs—known as "Afghan Arabs"—came to Afghanistan to assist the Afghan fighters against the Soviets. These fighters came from countries throughout the Arab world, with a significant percentage coming from Saudi Arabia and Egypt in particular. Originally, these Afghan Arabs were scattered among the Afghan fighters, "functioning as morale boosters who could simultaneously teach the Afghans about Islam, aid them with education and medicine, and bring news of the Afghan jihad to wealthy donors in the Middle East."²⁵ Between 1986 and 1987, however, this changed. Against the advice of many fellow jihadists, bin Laden decided to organize these Afghan Arabs into an independent fighting force. Bin Laden felt his Arab force could serve to motivate Muslims around the world to pursue jihad if his force were able to courageously oppose the Soviets on the field of battle. That the number of Afghan Arabs fighting in Afghanistan probably never exceeded several hundred and that they had little tangible impact on the conduct of the war did not preclude bin Laden and the authors of *Jihad* magazine from lionizing and exaggerating their exploits. By 1988, this core group of Arab Afghans came to represent the nucleus of al-Qa'ida, whose purpose was to "wage jihad around the Muslim world."²⁶

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 emboldened bin Laden and his nascent organization. Bin Laden and his followers saw these events as related and directly due to the efforts of the Muslim fighters in Afghanistan.²⁷ In a March 1997 interview with CNN's Peter Arnett, bin Laden said the victory in Afghanistan destroyed the myth of superpower invincibility in the mind of Muslims and encouraged them to believe they could end foreign influence on their countries.²⁸ When asked about the significance of the Afghan war for the Islamist movement, bin Laden said, "The influence of the Afghan jihad on the Islamic world was so great; it necessitated that people should rise above many of their differences and unite in their efforts against their enemy."²⁹ Bin Laden finished his response with a statement that in hindsight makes al-Qa'ida's later decision to target the United States far from surprising. Bin Laden concluded, "any act of aggression against even a hand's span of this land [Islamic world] makes it a duty for Muslims to send a sufficient number of their sons to fight off that aggression."³⁰

Why Al-Qa'ida Began to Target the United States. One reason that bin Laden and al-Qa'ida began to target the United States in the 1990s may be that their efforts to change the

status quo by attacking the "near enemy"—regimes viewed as insufficiently Muslim within the Middle East—were not successful. However, the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia undoubtedly also significantly influenced this change of approach.

In August 1990, a few months after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Hussein invaded Kuwait, threatening Saudi Arabia and its vast oil resources. Emboldened by his success in Afghanistan, bin Laden offered to provide thousands of fighters to oppose Hussein.³¹ The Saudi regime rejected bin Laden's offer and instead turned to the United States and the international community for assistance. Within a few months, the U.S. military presence went from fewer than seven hundred military personnel in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) combined to five hundred thousand military personnel in Saudi Arabia.³² This introduction of hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops in the region represented a dramatic turning point. Bin Laden and many others viewed it as a historic development that threatened the most sacred land of Islam.

As early as 1994, bin Laden publicly denounced the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia. He followed these initial public condemnations with a message in 1996 entitled "Declaration of Jihad." Bin Laden explained:

[T]he greatest danger to befall the Muslims since the death of the Prophet Muhammad is the occupation of Saudi Arabia, which is the cornerstone of the Islamic world, place of revelation, source of Prophetic mission, and home of the Noble Ka'ba where Muslims direct their prayers. Despite this, it was occupied by the armies of the Christians, the Americans, and their allies.³³

Two years later, in February 1998, bin Laden joined Ayman al-Zawahiri and three other Islamist leaders from Egypt, Pakistan, and Bangladesh in issuing a formal declaration regarding the religious duty of Muslims to wage jihad against American military personnel and civilians. After a paragraph of the requisite formalities, the authors immediately give their preeminent reason for the jihad against the Americans:

Firstly, for over seven years America has occupied the holiest part of the Islamic lands, the Arabian peninsula, plundering its wealth, dictating to its leaders, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases there into a spearhead with which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples.³⁴

While the Afghan War served as the catalyst for the birth of al-Qa'ida, the deployment of a half million U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia inspired the nascent organization to direct its ire against the United States. The U.S. decision to deploy U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia represented an unprecedented affront to many Muslims that swelled al-Qa'ida's ranks and inspired attacks against the United States and its interests.

This is not to suggest that any U.S. policy maker bears responsibility for the creation of al-Qa'ida or its decision to target the United States. While the United States sent generous aid to the Afghans, there is little to no evidence that the United States directly supported the Arab Afghans or had any connection with bin Laden during the Afghan War.³⁵ Furthermore, it would have required exceptional foresight to have seen that U.S. support for Afghan fighters might indirectly facilitate the creation of an organization that would later have the capacity and intent to target the United States. Similarly, U.S. interests required the United States to ensure that Hussein did not gain control over Saudi as well as Iraqi and Kuwaiti reserves. Saudi Arabia had to be protected, and Hussein needed to be evicted from Kuwait. It is difficult to imagine a reasonable scenario in which Americans, in deference to popular Islamic sensitivities, would have turned their back on years of informal U.S. security guarantees and refused the Saudi regime's request to deploy U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia. However, as the 1990s progressed and significant numbers of U.S. troops remained in Saudi Arabia, U.S. decision makers are

responsible for not responding to the gathering chorus of warning regarding the hostility generated by the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia.

Al-Qa'ida Since 9/11. Several events in recent years have sustained and even strengthened al-Qa'ida. The claims of al-Qa'ida and its associated movements continue to resonate among Muslim populations. Reasons for this include widespread anger and humiliation regarding the U.S.-led invasions of predominantly Muslim Afghanistan and Iraq; the continued suffering of fellow Muslims in Palestine, Chechnya, and Kashmir; and the mistreatment of Muslim detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison, for example.³⁶

While a large quantity of evidence exists to indicate that these engines of radicalization continue to supply fresh recruits and supporters for al-Qa'ida, some argue that the resonance of al-Qa'ida's message is better explained by maladies pervasive in the Arab world. The 2006 *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* largely discounts the role of U.S. policy in Islamist radicalization and instead points to four factors that cause terrorism: "political alienation ... grievances that can be blamed on others . . . subcultures of conspiracy and misinformation . . . [and] an ideology that justifies murder."³⁷ This focus on maladies in the Arab and Muslim world allows U.S. policy makers to avoid the uncomfortable necessity of analyzing the potential negative impact of U.S. policies.

The debate between those who point to U.S. policy as a catalyst for Islamist radicalization and those who point to problems within the Arab or Muslim world has raged since 9/11,³⁸ However, framing the debate in this manner is not necessarily helpful. While terrorism surely does not spring entirely from U.S. policy or from conditions in the Arab or Muslim world, both provide powerful explanations for its continued presence. Efforts to address both are more likely to make U.S. national security policy successful in the years ahead.

Preemption: Arguments For and Against

In response to the events of 9/11 and in recognition of the terrorists and the potential for an asymmetric threat against the United States, the Bush administration made the case for a new American approach to protecting its security interests abroad. The policy—called *preemption*, or the Bush Doctrine—sketched out a proactive American defense posture that would identify and target threats before they had a chance to strike at the United States. Implicit in the Bush Doctrine was the assumption that, in the post-9/11 world, waiting for an enemy to strike before responding was irresponsible and dangerous. Although 9/11 clearly demonstrated that terrorists could cause extraordinary damage while armed only with box cutters, the events of that day also indicated that the U.S. defense and intelligence communities might some day be caught off guard by a terrorist group or rogue state armed with WMDs.

The doctrine of preemption was developed as a practical response to new security conditions and was published in the September 2002 NSS. This occurred just as the public case was being made for the invasion of Iraq, which would take place in March 2003. Not surprisingly, the arguments for and against the new doctrine were wound together tightly with the debate over whether to invade Iraq. It is important to recognize, however, that the two are not necessarily linked. Some adherents of the doctrine of preemption felt it was misapplied to justify the invasion of Iraq. Like any security doctrine, preemption describes sets of conditions when force should be used, but agreement with those principles is not the same as agreeing that the circumstances in Iraq met the standard delineated by the doctrine.

The Argument for Preemption. Preemption advocates argue that the United States has entered a new, unprecedented era in which the possible linkage of terrorism and WMDs demands an entirely new approach to national security policy. The new approach, preemption, is designed to replace the inadequate security doctrines of the past. The president made this

case explicitly when he formally introduced the doctrine of preemption during a graduation speech at the United States Military Academy:

In defending the peace, we face a threat with no precedent. Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger the American people and our nation. The attacks of September the 11th required a few hundred thousand dollars in the hands of a few dozen evil and deluded men. The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology—when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations.³⁹

George W. Bush's argument stressed the nexus of organizational and technological asymmetry—that in a confusing new era, small groups could possess the ability to bring a superpower to its knees.

The Bush administration articulated and defended the doctrine of preemption around three critical arguments. These arguments, which were made in various arenas during 2002, were used to justify and explain the new doctrine. Several of the arguments were intended to refute and discredit security paradigms used to safeguard the United States during, and immediately following, the Cold War. The purpose of these arguments was to demonstrate that the United States had no alternatives other than taking a proactive, preemptive approach to safeguard the nation. The arguments are:

- Terrorists cannot be deterred, because the United States cannot target what they value.
- WMDs cannot be contained, because individual weapons can be surreptitiously transferred.
- The costs of a reactive defensive policy are prohibitively high, because the impact of a surprise attack can be extraordinary.

Given these conditions, the only means for the United States to ensure its security is to proactively—and preemptively—strike at potential threats. Regardless of whether the United States in future administrations adheres to preemption as a national strategy, a close examination of each point will help illustrate the challenges that confront policy makers.

Terrorists Cannot Be Deterred. A new strategic doctrine is necessary because the past strategies of deterrence and containment are no longer effective against the current threat. Deterrence requires that, to prevent an attack, a state must be able to disproportionately harm that which the enemy values. During the Cold War, deterrence meant maintaining a nuclear weapons capability that could survive a Soviet first strike to level Soviet cities, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 17. Although the 2002 NSS asserts that many states today are inherently less rational and more volatile than U.S. Cold War enemies, they still may be deterred by threats to vulnerable infrastructure.⁴⁰

Today's terrorist threat does not fit this model. First, al-Qa'ida does not have valuable physical infrastructure or a sense of political responsibility to a distinct population. This situation eliminates the credibility of any deterrent threat, making deterrence impossible. As George W. Bush put it in June 2002, "Deterrence—the promise of massive retaliation against nations—means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to de-fend."⁴¹

Second, al-Qa'ida's operatives and leaders share an ideological commitment that values their cause over their own lives. Even if the United States can successfully find and target the

perpetrators of an attack, this action may not generate a deterrent effect, because these individuals follow an ideology that values martyrdom.

Third, such terrorists as al-Qa'ida live and operate on territory ostensibly controlled by states and among populations that may not have any affiliation with the terrorist movement. This drastically increases the moral cost of responding to a terrorist attack with annihilating force because of the large chance of collateral civilian casualties. The moral questions reduce the credibility of a threat to respond to provocation with overwhelming force.

WMDs Cannot Be Contained. Unlike the Cold War, when containment meant limiting the spread of communist governments and Soviet influence, containment today means limiting the spread of a virulent ideology and preventing the proliferation of the world's most dangerous weapons. In spite of great counterproliferation efforts (described in Chapter 17), there is no highly reliable way to prevent states or terrorist organizations from transferring and moving WMDs. George W. Bush argued, "Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies."⁴²

The A. Q. Khan nuclear network that operated from Pakistan illustrates the problems with containment in the modern era (see Chapter 19). As the father of the Pakistani nuclear program, Khan transferred nuclear technology to rogue regimes around the world, including North Korea and Libya. The Khan network demonstrates the inherent difficulty in limiting the spread of information—and potentially weapons themselves—once governments have developed such capabilities. The prospect of a government itself distributing such information is even more dangerous than a rogue element, such as Khan.

The Consequences Are Too Great to Rely Solely on Defense. The impact of a catastrophic terrorist attack using WMDs would be not only the impact of the weapon itself but the psychological cost of an attack. Once a terrorist organization gained access to a nuclear or biological weapon, preventing that weapon from being moved or used would be virtually impossible. Again, the argument boils down to an issue of intelligence: Once a terrorist organization possesses a nuclear weapon, the group would have the operational initiative, because the United States might not know that the group possesses a nuclear weapon or might be unable to find it. Again, quoting George W. Bush, "We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties, and then systemically break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long."⁴³

Preemption as Necessary and Justifiable. With no other viable strategic option, the potential nexus of organizational and technical asymmetry demands a much more proactive security posture. George W. Bush said as much during his seminal speech at West Point:

For much of the last century, America's defense relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some cases, those strategies still apply. But new threats also require new thinking. . . . We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge.⁴⁴

The supposed irrationality of rogue states and the terrorist groups' lack of physical infrastructure mean that deterrence and containment are no longer adequate concepts. Although not nearly so catastrophic as that posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, these threats have created a unique danger that makes incidents of massive destruction more likely now. The best way to prevent a massive attack would be to preemptively attack nodes of technological and organizational asymmetry before they could be fully developed and united.

This strategy entails taking the fight directly to terrorist organizations around the world while simultaneously preventing so-called rogue states, such as Iran, from developing nuclear weapons.

The Case Against Preemption. Political and philosophical opponents of the doctrine of preemption began critiquing the new strategy immediately after it was proposed. Interestingly, most preemption opponents do not challenge its proponents' core assumptions about the nature of the world: that the increasing importance of rogue states and terrorist groups coupled with the spread of WMDs demand new approaches to minimize the risk to the U.S. homeland. However, critics argue that the new threats do not warrant a complete reorientation of U.S. strategy, especially when there are legal, moral, practical, and strategic problems with adopting preemption as a strategy. Exploring each of these critiques illustrates the problems facing policy makers.

Legal Arguments. Just war theory has long distinguished between preemptive and preventive strikes. This distinction is important, because preemptive strikes are often deemed legitimate under international law, while preventive ones are not.⁴⁵ In the just war literature, a *preemptive strike* is possible and legally justified against an enemy that poses an imminent threat. A clear example of a preemptive strike was Israel's decision to strike at Egypt and Syria in 1967 after they united their military commands and blockaded Israel's Red Sea ports. An attack on Israel by the Arab countries appeared imminent. Conversely, a *preventive strike* is designed to prevent a growing power from developing the military capacity to threaten another state before there is risk of an imminent attack. An example is Israel's strike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981. The reactor did not pose an imminent threat; the attack was instead designed to prevent Iraq from eventually developing a nuclear weapon. This attack was widely condemned (including by the United States) as being inconsistent with international law.

Critics argue that the Bush administration adopted preventive war as a principle of national strategy but has sought to disguise this more aggressive strategy by referring to it as preemptive (see Chapter 3). More specifically, critics argue that the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was an illegal act of preventive war, because Iraq did not pose an imminent threat.

Moral Arguments. The moral argument is that, as the most powerful democracy in the world, the greatest advantage of the United States over its enemies is its moral authority and the legitimacy of its power. This advantage is lost if the United States adopts a newly aggressive security doctrine based on preemptive military strikes.

Historically, this view has been taken by U.S. national security policy makers themselves. When a surprise attack was considered against the Soviet Union at the outset of the Cold War, it was explicitly rejected in the strategy document of the time (NSC-68) for the same moral reason: "A surprise attack upon the Soviet Union, despite the provocativeness of recent Soviet behavior, would be repugnant to many Americans.... Victory in such a war would have brought us little if at all closer to victory in the fundamental ideological conflict."⁴⁶ One parallel between the early Cold War and today is that the United States once again faces ideological and material threats. Actions that damage an enemy's current material capabilities may at the same time levy disproportionate costs by making an adversary's ideology more compelling to a broader audience of potential recruits, undercutting the legitimacy of U.S. power among even friendly international publics and governments. It could also legitimate aggressive military actions by other states, which could weaken international norms against using force and thus increase conflict worldwide.

Practical Arguments. Some critics argue that a preemption strategy requires extraordinarily accurate, reliable, and timely intelligence about a state's or terrorist group's WMD capability and intentions. A realistic understanding of the capabilities and limitations of intelligence suggests

that consistent achievement of that level of understanding is unlikely, especially given that the problem of WMDs proliferation is a particularly difficult one. Critics also argue that such high expectations are inconsistent with the recent performance of the U.S. intelligence community (see Chapter 7). If the intelligence community could not provide policy makers with an accurate assessment of Iraq's alleged WMD programs, then that same community is unlikely ever to be able to adequately support a preemption strategy.

The case of North Korea provides an important illustration of this point. Since the United States devastated North Korea, largely through the achievement and exploitation of air superiority during the Korean War in the early 1950s, the North Koreans have focused on the development of an extensive system of underground facilities throughout the entire country. This network makes it very difficult for foreign intelligence services to have high confidence in their assessments of North Korea's military capabilities. In addition, these underground facilities provide significant physical protection. It is unlikely that all highly protected North Korean assets could be destroyed through the use of conventional weapons alone, and, even if this were possible, it would be difficult to confirm success or failure absent forcible occupation of North Korean territory.

Strategic Arguments. Strategic critiques of the preemption doctrine seek to synthesize the legal, moral, and practical criticisms to demonstrate that alternative security strategies are superior. In part, these arguments try to salvage some aspects of containment and deterrence and improve those strategies instead of adopting preemption.⁴⁷

Strategically, a preemption doctrine is more likely to be implemented by the United States unilaterally with limited international coordination and support. Critics argue that the United States does not have the intelligence, military, law enforcement capability, or other capacity to implement a proactive strategy without the cooperation of friendly governments. The moral and diplomatic costs of an aggressive security policy carry real strategic consequences because of the consequent lack of international support for U.S. efforts and the overall deterioration of the U.S. image abroad.

Some of these critics concede that there are instances when the United States should preemptively attack states that pose a threat, but they contend that raising this last-resort option into a formal doctrine has had major negative diplomatic consequences. Furthermore, by stating an intention to use preemptive strikes, the United States encourages "potential enemies to hide the very assets we might wish to take preemptive action against."⁴⁸ Using a big stick is much more effective if you walk softly beforehand. The inverse problem is that if the United States fails to strike, as in the case of North Korea, the new security doctrine begins to appear hollow.

Conclusion

The invasion of Iraq has brought the debate over the doctrine of preemption squarely into the public's eye. Never since the early days of the Cold War has a president so boldly engaged the public with a clear vision for the strategic direction of the United States and then implemented the strategy. Unfortunately, George W. Bush's doctrine of preemption has been muddied by its fusion with the Iraq War and its failures. Critics argue that these failures demonstrate the fundamental flaws in the strategy, while supporters contend that an implementation failure does not condemn the concept itself.

The preemption doctrine was designed as a response to the modern incarnation of asymmetric warfare and the potentially catastrophic nexus between WMDs and rogue actors. One of the most interesting aspects of the debate over the doctrine is that it often hinges on disagreements over facts rather than strategy. Advocates on either side disagree over critical issues, such as the extent to which the United States has the capability to achieve its security goals unilaterally or whether it can achieve the degree of intelligence reliability needed to make

preemption feasible. One issue on which all sides agree is that the problem is not going away. Rogue states and terrorism are here to stay. The technology that enables the creation of WMDs is only proliferating. No strategic doctrine is perfect, but there is more evidence than ever that the United States needs a clear conception of its strategic future, and the debate over preemption will have a critical impact on that conception.

Discussion Questions

1. Is the threat of terrorism today a completely new threat that requires a completely new approach, or can previous defense strategies be adapted to face this threat?
2. To what extent do the organizational structures and technological characteristics of the United States facilitate particular challenges by determined enemies?
3. What policies can the United States adopt to minimize its vulnerability to asymmetric attacks? Should those policies include new material solutions, new methods of operations, new defenses, or other solutions?
4. What are the most relevant characteristics of terrorism to national security policy makers? How have they changed?
5. To what extent does al-Qa'ida's need to provide a theological justification for the use of WMDs provide another possible means of challenging their use of such weapons?
6. Why did al-Qa'ida begin to target the United States? What are the leading sources of radicalization that continue to fuel al-Qa'ida and its associated movements?
7. Can intelligence ever be certain enough to justify preventive war?
8. When the United States decides to use force, how important are national and international perceptions of U.S. legitimacy and moral authority?
9. What are the advantages and disadvantages of enshrining preemption as a core U.S. security doctrine?
10. The war in Iraq is generally considered the first implementation of the preemption doctrine. What are the lessons from this case, and will they apply in all cases?
11. Have the fundamental dynamics of the world changed so much that containment and deterrence are no longer useful security doctrines?

Recommended Reading

- Bergen, Peter L. *The Osama bin Laden I Know*. New York: Free Press, 2006.
- Brachman, Jarret M, and William F. McCants. *Stealing al-Qa'ida's Playbook*. West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006, www.ctc.usma.edu.
- Daalder, Ivo H., and James Lindsay. "Bush's Flawed Revolution." *American Prospect* 14, no. 10 (November 2003): 43-45.
- Forest, James F., ed. *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007.
- Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.
- Howard, Russell D., and James F. Forest. *Weapons of Mass Destruction*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007.
- Howard, Russell D., and Reid L. Sawyer. *Terrorism and Counterterrorism*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005.
- Kastenberg, Joshua. "The Use of Conventional International Law in Combating Terrorism: A Maginot Line for Modern Civilization Employing the Principles of Anticipatory Self-Defense and Preemption." *Air Force Law Review* 55 (Spring 2004): 87-125.
- Lambakis, Steven, James Kiras, and Kristin Kolet. *Understanding "Asymmetric " Threats to the United States*. Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, 2002.

Laver, Harry S. "Preemption and the Evolution of America's Strategic Defense." *Parameters* 35, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 107-120.

Moghadam, Assaf. *The Roots of Terrorism*. New York: Chelsea House, 2006.

Paz, Reuven. "Global Jihad and WMD: Between Martyrdom and Mass Destruction," in *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, Vol. 2, edited by Hillel Pradkin, Husain Haqqani, and Eric Brown, 74-86. Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, Inc., 2005.

Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*. Translated by Roger Ames. New York: Ballantine Books, 1993.

Wester, Franklin Eric. "Preemption and Just War: Considering the Case of Iraq." *Parameters* 34, no. 4 (Winter 2004/2005): 20-39.

Internet Resources

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, <http://ctc.usma.edu> National Counterterrorism Center, www.nctc.gov

Notes

Chapter 14: Asymmetric Conflict, Terrorism, and Preemption

1. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 101.

2. This discussion of asymmetric attacks was informed by Steven Lambakis, James Kiras, and Kristin Kolet, *Understanding "Asymmetric " Threats to the United States* (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, 2002).

3. Secretary of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 1997* (Washington: Department of Defense, 1997), fas.org/man/docs/qdr/index.html

4. The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, 30., www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/.

5. Secretary of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 1997*.

6. See Department of Justice, White Paper on "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Presidential Decision Directive 63," May 22, 1998, www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/white_pr.htm.

7. See Steven A. Hildreth, *Cyberwarfare* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated June 19, 2001). A comprehensive reference is Lech J. Janczewski and Andrew M. Colarik, *Cyber Warfare and Cyber Terrorism* (London: IGI Global, 2008).

8. Reuven Paz, "Global Jihad and WMD: Between Martyrdom and Mass Destruction," in *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, vol. 2, eds. Hillel Pradkin, Husain Haqqani, and Eric Brown (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, Inc., 2005), 78.

9. Robert Wesley, "Al-Qa'ida's WMD Strategy After the U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan," *Terrorism Monitor* 3, no. 20 (October 21, 2005) I-IO.

10. The value of asymmetry is stressed in the annual vision statements issued by each service. The Air Force states: "We are committed to sustaining our position of strength, the *asymmetric advantages* the Air Force gives our nation—America's edge." See Michael Wynne and Michael Moseley, *Air Force Posture Statement* (Washington, DC: U.S. Air Force, 2007), I. The Navy states: "Our Navy must maintain its *asymmetric advantages* over any adversary: superior power, precision, advanced technology, information, and people." See U.S. Navy, *Sea Power for a New Era* (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy, 2007), I.

11. Mao Zedong, "Problems of War and Strategy" (speech given at Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party, November 6, 1938), [www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_i_2 .htm](http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_i_2.htm).

12. Sun Tzu, *Art of War*, 77.

13. The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, 19., www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/.
14. 22 United States Code, Section 2656f (d). This definition is used for the annual counting of terrorism events. See also Paul R. Pillar, "The Dimensions of Terrorism and Counter Terrorism," in *Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, eds. Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 24-43.
15. Bruce Jenkins, "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?" RAND Paper P-554I (Santa Monica: RAND, 1974), 4.
16. There are reports of some internal conflict within al-Qa'ida concerning whether maximizing casualties should be their objective or whether that detracts from their efforts. Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, in a July 9, 2005, letter to the al-Qa'ida in Iraq leader at the time, Abu Musab Zarqawi, counsels him against "scenes of slaughtering the hostages," because "we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma." The letter is available at www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/203gpuul.asp. These specific objections notwithstanding, the predominant approach of al-Qa'ida is to maximize casualties in most of their attacks.
17. Al-Suri, Abu Mus'ab, "Letter in Response to State Department," *Usamah's Memo Forum*, December 2004.
18. David J. Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28: 4 (August 2005): 603.
19. House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, *Combating Al-Qa'ida and the Militant Islamic Threat: Testimony of Bruce Hoffman*, 199th Cong., 2nd sess., February 16, 2006, 3, www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND_CT255.pdf.
20. Bruce Hoffman, "Islam and the West: Searching for Common Ground The Terrorist Threat and the Counter-Terrorism Effort," CT-263 (Santa Monica: RAND, 2006) 3.
21. *Ibid.*, 4.
22. *Ibid.*, 5-6.
23. *Ibid.*, 6.
24. Andrew Bacevich (lecture at the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, April 26, 2007).
25. Peter L. Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 50.
26. *Ibid.*, 49.
27. Bruce Lawrence, ed., *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden* (New York: Verso, 2005), 50-51.
28. *Ibid.*, 48.
29. *Ibid.*, 49.
30. *Ibid.*
31. *Ibid.*, 112-113.
32. Defense Manpower Data Center, Statistical Information Analysis Division. siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil; . CNN, "Gulf War Facts," www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2000/gulf.war/facts/gulfwar/index.html.
33. Lawrence, *Messages to the World*, 25.
34. Lawrence, *Messages to the World*, 59-60.
35. Bergen, *Osama bin Laden I Know*, 60-61.
36. Hoffman, "Combating Al-Qa'ida and the Militant Islamic Threat," 7; Lawrence, *Messages to the World*, 162-172.
37. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, September 2006, 9-10, www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006.
38. Stephen M. Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy* (New York: W. W. Norton , 2005), 62-108.

39. George W. Bush, "Graduation Speech" (at the U.S. Military Academy, June 1, 2002), www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html.

40. The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, 15., www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/.

41. George W. Bush, "Graduation Speech." June 1, 2002, West Point, NY.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Article 51 of the UN Charter states: "Nothing . . . shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations." This has been extended to include attacks that are anticipatory self-defense against an imminent attack, but not one that would prevent the capability to wage an attack at some unspecified time in the future. See UN Charter, Article 51, www.un.org/aboutun/charter.

46. NSC-68, Section IX.C, www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/nsc-68/.

47. See, for example, Ivo H. Daalder and James Lindsay, "Bush's Flawed Revolution," *The American Prospect* 14, no. 10 (November 2003), 43-45.

48. Ibid.

Chapter 16 Irregular Challenges, Military Intervention, and Counterinsurgency

In explaining the position and role of the United States in the world, the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy argues that "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few."¹ At root, this statement is about the decreasing relative importance of conventional, state-based military-on-military threats to U.S. national security, such as those discussed in the preceding chapter, and the rise of nontraditional challenges, such as the problem of terrorism discussed in Chapter 14. This chapter concentrates on what defense planners have termed *irregular challenges* (see the upper left box in Figure 13.1 in Chapter 13).

The increasing importance of irregular threats to U.S. national security is best seen as the product of broad trends in the international environment and deliberate choices by current or future potential U.S. adversaries. Characteristics of the current strategic environment that have contributed to an increase in the importance of irregular threats include the lack of a rival superpower facing the United States as well as a general condition of peace among the world's most developed, democratic states; the problem of failing and failed states around the world and the resulting lack of governance; evolving norms in the international system that are supportive of state intervention in large-scale human rights catastrophes; the forces of globalization that are increasing the interconnectedness of states and peoples around the world; and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) that can make the existence of hostile groups and individuals too costly to ignore.

In addition to these broad forces, the rising importance of irregular challenges to U.S. national security interests is also the result of deliberate choices by strategic actors seeking to oppose the United States. As discussed in Chapter 13, U.S. armed forces may be the most capable in the world, but they enjoy this advantage more in some contexts than others. American strengths in conventional warfare and traditional forms of military competition, although still highly valuable, provide incentives for hostile actors to challenge the United States in asymmetric and nontraditional ways.

Of course, these various dynamics are often intimately related. As just one example, the existence of mostly ungoverned territory in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan provides hostile groups with a potential sanctuary within which they can organize, train, and plan. These groups can then take advantage of modern communication, transportation, and weapon technologies to strike at U.S. interests around the world.

Defining Irregular Challenges

The 2005 National Defense Strategy describes irregular challenges as coming "from those employing 'unconventional' methods to counter the *traditional* advantages of stronger opponents."² These challenges are strategically important:

Increasingly sophisticated *irregular* methods—e.g., terrorism and insurgency—challenge U.S. security interests. Adversaries employing irregular methods aim to erode U.S. influence, patience, and political will. Irregular opponents often take a long term approach, attempting to impose prohibitive human, material, financial, and political costs on the United States to compel strategic retreat from a key region or course of action.³

The dangers posed by irregular challenges have intensified because of the problems of governance in many states around the world, as well as the continued force of "political, religious, and ethnic extremism."⁴

There are several possible ways to distinguish irregular challenges from traditional threats. One is by the legal and political status of the belligerents. In this view, an irregular war is waged between state and nonstate adversaries.⁵ Although this distinction has some utility, it is not universally helpful. As the example of state-sponsored terrorism makes clear, states may still be the main players in some irregular challenges to U.S. national security.

A second method to distinguish irregular challenges, and the one favored in the government document cited above, is by the means or methods of conflict. Irregular methods range from piracy to terrorism to insurgency. In theory, the specific form of an irregular challenge could vary greatly as long as it responded asymmetrically to U.S. strengths in conventional forms of combat. In this sense, the possible use of WMDs by nonstate adversaries constitutes an irregular and a catastrophic challenge.

To some extent, the category of irregular challenges is a residual grouping comprised of all uses of force other than traditional state-on-state, relatively symmetric armed conflicts. Although its breadth may limit its analytic utility in some respects, the category is nevertheless useful to defense policy makers and analysts who argue that the U.S. military has yet to adequately transform its Cold War structure—which was optimized toward deterrence and high-intensity combat against a peer adversary—to one that is also capable of meeting U.S. needs in the current strategic environment.

Military Intervention

Irregular challenges also are distinctive, because they lend themselves to military intervention as a possible U.S. preventive measure or response. Richard Haass usefully describes "armed intervention" as entailing "the introduction or deployment of new or additional combat forces to an area for specific purposes that go beyond ordinary training or scheduled expressions of support for national interests."⁶ For a variety of reasons, the period immediately following the Cold War saw an increase in the "internationalization" of internal crises and conflicts as states intervened within the territory of other countries in response to these events. Military interventions to meet various irregular challenges are discussed below.

Support to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. Political scientists James Fearon and David Laitin define *insurgency* as a conflict between an "incumbent" (a government or occupying power) and its external patrons versus organized, nonstate groups and their patrons who either seek political power within the country or seek to secede.⁷ In an important sense, an insurgency is fundamentally the result of a "political legitimacy crisis of some kind."⁸ American military doctrine recognizes that "insurgency has taken many forms over time," including "struggles for independence against colonial powers, the rising up of ethnic or religious groups against their rivals, and resistance to foreign invaders."⁹

The United States has played a variety of roles in these conflicts, intervening in some cases in support of insurgents and in others in support of the incumbent. With regard to the former, during the Cold War, the United States sometimes supported insurgent uprisings against communist regimes. A good example is the training and logistical support the United States provided to rebels in Afghanistan during the 1980s against the Afghan government and its Soviet patron. Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. indirect or direct support to insurgents is more likely to stem from a determination that a regime is despotic and a potential threat to international peace and security.¹⁰ An example is U.S. support to separatist insurgents in the conflict between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Serbia over Kosovo in 1999.

In other cases, U.S. national interests have led policy makers to intervene on behalf of an incumbent government and to support or conduct Counterinsurgency operations. According to U.S. military doctrine, *Counterinsurgency* consists of "those military, paramilitary, political,

economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency."¹¹ Examples of U.S. Counterinsurgency operations date back to the nineteenth century. The American army fought more than one thousand separate engagements against hostile Native Americans between 1866 and 1890. Perhaps the most broadly known U.S. counterinsurgency campaign occurred in Vietnam beginning in the early 1960s and was the source of much of Chapter 15's discussion of limited war. The intervention in Iraq that began in 2003 may eventually displace the Vietnam experience as the most significant example of counterinsurgency for the American public.¹² Counterinsurgency operations are discussed in greater depth below.

Stability Operations. The Department of Defense (DoD) *defines stability operations* as "encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief."¹³ In a discussion of major operations and campaigns, the U.S. military's capstone doctrinal manual argues that the re-establishment of conditions favorable to U.S. interests "often requires conducting stability operations in support of broader stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (efforts)." It goes on to argue that stability operations constitute a core U.S. military mission in that they help to:

establish order that advances U.S. interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.¹⁴

Often-mentioned examples of U.S. success in postconflict stability operations include the U.S. occupations of Germany and Japan after World War II. As of early 2009, the United States was again involved in stability (as well as counterinsurgency) operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.¹⁵

Nation Assistance. A *nation assistance* type of operation involves civil or military assistance provided by U.S. forces to another state while on that foreign state's soil according to an agreement between the U.S. government and the host government. It is distinguished from foreign humanitarian assistance, discussed below, in that its purpose is to promote "sustainable development and responsive institutions" with a long-term goal of fostering regional stability. An example is Operation Promote Liberty—a nation assistance operation to rebuild Panama in 1990—that followed Operation Just Cause, in which U.S. forces toppled the regime of Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega.¹⁶

Enforcement of Sanctions and of Exclusion Zones. *Sanctions and exclusion zones* may be established by the United Nations (UN) or a treaty or armistice, or they may be imposed by a state (with sufficient power) unilaterally. Enforcement of sanctions involves operations "that employ coercive measures to interdict the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area." A recent example is the multinational effort to enforce UN sanctions after the 1991 Gulf War.¹⁷ The purpose of exclusion zones is to prevent certain types of activities in certain areas (e.g., no-fly or no-drive zones). "Exclusion zones usually are imposed due to breaches of international standards of human rights or flagrant violations of international law by states."¹⁸ After the 1991 Gulf War, the United States also participated in the enforcement of exclusion zones in northern and southern Iraq.

Peace Operations. U.S. military doctrine defines *peace operations* as encompassing "multiagency and multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance."¹⁹ Two elements of this definition are especially noteworthy. First, just as with the definition of stability operations, it suggests that military forces have a role to play, but alone they will be insufficient. Military operations must complement and support diplomatic and other efforts designed to facilitate a political settlement, looking to the re-establishment of legitimate governance.

Traditionally, there have been two major categories of peace operations:

- **Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs).** *Peacekeeping operations* are "military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, and are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long term political settlement."²⁰ Traditional PKO are authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which covers the "Pacific Settlement of Disputes."

- **Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO):** Peace enforcement operations "are generally coercive in nature and rely on the threat or use of force ... PEO may include the enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of personnel conducting humanitarian assistance missions, restoration of order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties to a dispute. However, the impartiality with which the [peace operations] force treats all parties and the nature of its objectives separates PEO from major combat operations."²¹ PEO may be authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which authorizes the Security Council to call on member states to respond with force to actions that threaten international peace and security.

In recent revisions to U.S. doctrine, three additional categories of peace operations have been added: *conflict prevention, peace making, and peace building*. In the first two of these, the military plays a subordinate and supporting role to U.S. diplomatic efforts. Operations in the last category, peace building, begin while PKO or PEO are underway, are expected to be of relatively long duration, and include measures "aimed at strengthening political settlements and legitimate governance and rebuilding governmental infrastructure and institutions."²² Peace building operations are a special case of stability operations.

The United States could participate in peace operations as part of an international organization, such as the UN, or a regional organization, such as NATO. The United States could even conduct them unilaterally, though the legitimacy that multilateral action provides may be especially important in the conduct of a peace operation. The United States participated in a few peace operations during the Cold War; one example is the Multinational Force and Observers Mission in the Sinai, which resulted from the 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. However, U.S. involvement in peace operations accelerated during the 1990s and in that decade included sizeable deployments to Somalia, Haiti, Macedonia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. These missions were the subject of controversy concerning whether the U.S. national interests and values at stake were sufficient to justify the commitment of national resources and whether the wear and tear on the U.S. military overly degraded its readiness to accomplish more critical functions. However, the path of nonintervention was also not without controversy. The most important example of a devastating humanitarian catastrophe to which the United States—as well as the rest of the international community—was slow to respond was the Rwandan genocide in 1994.²³

In addition to provoking a broad debate relating to national security strategy, the peace operations of the 1990s were met with some ambivalence within the military. U.S. military doctrine in the 1990s, which officially labeled such deployments "operations other than war,"

reinforced the idea that in conducting peace operations the military services were performing tasks that were peripheral to their core mission of war fighting.²⁴ In addition, this label may have led many to see an unrealistic distinction between peace operations and combat. In reality, actual fighting—or the ability to prevail if fighting were to break out—may be necessary to create the conditions under which peace can exist. Peace-building operations are then a natural and perhaps inevitable successor to more active hostilities if an enduring solution is sought. Conceptually, then, peace and combat operations may be critical to achieving the political purposes of the United States, even if they demand somewhat different skills.

UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld once said, "Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it."²⁵ Current U.S. military doctrine differs by acknowledging that peacekeeping is a sometimes soldier's job; military missions are an important component of peace operations.

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. U.S. military humanitarian assistance operations abroad are conducted to relieve or reduce the consequences of natural or man-made disasters or to alleviate the effects of endemic conditions, such as disease, hunger, or other forms of privation, in countries outside the United States. Foreign humanitarian assistance operations are generally limited in scope and duration and are intended to supplement or complement efforts of host-nation civil authorities or agencies.²⁶ Examples include U.S. operations focused on the provision of foodstuffs and shelter to Iraqi Kurds in northern Iraq in 1991 and the initial Somalia intervention of 1992.²⁷ An example of a foreign humanitarian assistance effort that could also be viewed as a major operation was the U.S. participation in 2005 tsunami relief efforts.²⁸

Rescue and Evacuation. Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) are narrowly focused and sharply limited in scale. Their sole purpose is to relocate threatened noncombatants from hostile and threatening environments to environments of relative stability and peace.²⁹ Most memorable in the U.S. experience is the unfortunate failed rescue attempt of U.S. hostages from captivity in 1980 after they were seized from the U.S. Embassy several months earlier. A second example is the U.S. dispatch of Naval and Marine forces that evacuated 2,690 people, including 330 Americans, from Liberia in 1990 to protect them from threats and violence that accompanied Liberia's civil war.³⁰

A Brief History of Insurgency. Most military historians look to the activities of Spanish irregulars against occupying French forces between 1808 and 1814 as constituting the birth of the modern concept of insurgency. The United States ended the nineteenth century embroiled in a counterinsurgency campaign of its own in the Philippines. In this operation, which began as part of the larger Spanish-American War, U.S. forces fought for fifteen years before the insurrection was finally defeated. As exemplified by these cases, prior to the twentieth century, insurgencies or guerrilla wars were most often efforts by indigenous populations to preserve pre-existing political, social, or cultural arrangements in the face of foreign conquest or intervention.

During the twentieth century, insurgencies began to take on a more revolutionary or ideological character. Prior to World War II, insurgencies were often motivated by a desire to end foreign rule. Even while embracing national self-determination in some contexts, the western imperial powers simultaneously engaged in regular and irregular warfare in the defense of their empires. During the Cold War, and particularly after extensive European decolonization during the 1950s, insurgencies often took on a more ideological character.³¹ The United States and the Soviet Union selectively supported either insurgent forces or the incumbent government, depending on the nature of the struggle.

Mao Zedong led a successful communist insurgency against the Chinese Nationalist government during the 1930s and 1940s, culminating in the establishment of the People's

Republic of China in 1949. Building on that success, for more than twenty years, Mao sponsored and supported communist insurgencies in a number of Asian nations. These were successful in former French Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos) but unsuccessful in a number of others (Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines). In the Philippines, a small communist insurgency sputters on but is overshadowed by a larger, more virulent Islamic insurgency, largely in the southern part of the country.

Insurgencies in the first decade after the Cold War and into the early twenty-first century have much in common with insurgencies in previous periods but also manifest some potentially significant differences. In terms of continuity, as discussed above, insurgencies occur in contexts of contested political legitimacy. They are also more likely to occur in situations in which the perceived relative deprivation of particular groups in society is particularly high.³² The uneven effects of globalization could aggravate perceptions of relative deprivation, as those facing persistent poverty and underdevelopment are increasingly aware of the living conditions of those who are better off.

Although they share elements of continuity with those of the past, insurgencies in the current era often exhibit new characteristics.³³ A first new characteristic relates to the *underlying circumstances* out of which insurgencies grow. U.S. military doctrine argues that post-Cold War insurgencies "typically emerged from civil wars or the collapse of states no longer propped up by Cold War rivalries.... Similar conditions exist when regimes are changed by force or circumstances."³⁴ When insurgencies flow from conditions of state collapse, state failure, or forcible regime change, a counter-insurgency must build "political order and legitimacy where these conditions may no longer exist."³⁵

A second new characteristic relates to the *goals of insurgent forces*. Since the end of the Cold War,

ideologies based on extremist forms of religious or ethnic identities have replaced ideologies based on secular revolutionary ideals. These new forms of old, strongly held beliefs define the identities of the most dangerous combatants in these new internal wars. These conflicts resemble the wars of religion in Europe before and after the Reformation of the 16th century. People have replaced nonfunctioning national identities with traditional sources of unity and identity.³⁶

To the extent that insurgent groups are organized around fundamental aspects of identity and religion, compromise and ultimate political reconciliation will be more difficult.³⁷

A third noteworthy characteristic of contemporary insurgencies is their *transnational nature*. As discussed above, during the Cold War the international dimension of insurgencies often consisted of the external involvement of the superpowers or their allies in internal conflicts that had an ideological dimension. These transnational connections have become more complex and extensive over time, enabled by communication technologies and driven by many of the same processes that constitute globalization. For example, through "the internet, insurgents can now link virtually with allied groups throughout a state, a region, and even the entire world."³⁸ In a prime example, al-Qa'ida draws on local grievances and may either support or participate in internal conflicts as a means of furthering a worldwide, revolutionary agenda. This situation has led some policy makers and analysts to highlight the existence of a new "global insurgency."³⁹ According to U.S. military doctrine, combating "such enemies requires a global, strategic response—one that addresses the array of linked resources and conflicts that sustain these movements while tactically addressing the local grievances that feed them."⁴⁰

Insurgencies around the world can affect U.S. national security in at least two basic ways. First, as discussed in the opening of this chapter, given modern technology, it is increasingly the case that challenges of governance in any region of the world can have direct implications for the security of the U.S. homeland. Second, as the world's only remaining superpower, the

United States has global interests as well as the capability—and some would say responsibility—to play a leading role in fostering peace and stability in the international system. The internal and external instability that flow from insurgency constitute an important challenge to international security.

Counter-insurgency and U.S. National Security

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, counterinsurgency operations are of great significance to U.S. national security in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Iraq War alone has entailed an enormous commitment of U.S. resources, and the outcome has potentially weighty consequences. The bipartisan and independent Iraq Study Group pointed out the potential repercussions of a U.S. failure in Iraq:

A slide toward chaos could trigger the collapse of Iraq's government and a humanitarian catastrophe. Neighboring countries could intervene. Sunni-Shia clashes could spread. Al-Qa'ida could win a propaganda victory and expand its base of operations. The global standing of the United States could be diminished. Americans could become more polarized.⁴¹

Developments within Iraq have significance for Afghanistan as well as the region as a whole, because a collapse in Iraq could possibly trigger a broader war or the spread of sectarian strife across state borders. In addition to grave consequences in human terms, increased instability could impinge upon the flow of oil from the region, with serious consequences for the global economy.⁴² Arguing that "Iraq is a centerpiece of American foreign policy," the Iraq Study Group found that in Iraq "the United States is facing one of its most difficult and significant international challenges in decades."⁴³

In addition to the importance of contemporary counterinsurgency campaigns, it is also useful to look at this type of operation in depth because of what the U.S. experience in Iraq illuminates about general difficulties the United States faces in meeting irregular challenges to American national security. Relevant issues include the appropriateness and the adequacy of the capabilities and capacities of individual U.S. government organizations and agencies; the need for effective, extensive interagency cooperation; the costs of the operations; the requirement for domestic support; and the need for conflict termination planning.

Counterinsurgency Principles. Every insurgency is likely to have unique characteristics, with their character at least partially "determined by specific historical and cultural circumstances."⁴⁴ Nevertheless, U.S. military doctrine argues that basic counterinsurgency principles of general utility can be drawn from historical experience:⁴⁵

- *Legitimacy Is the Main Objective.* What constitutes political legitimacy will vary to some degree according to social, political, and historical context. Nevertheless, the primary purpose of counterinsurgency operations is to buttress the legitimacy of the supported government, and all actions must be informed by this aim.

- *Unity of Effort Is Essential.* As discussed above, a Counterinsurgency is not solely a military operation. Where possible, civilian and military Counterinsurgency resources should be under a common authority. Military commanders at all levels must coordinate extensively with other government agencies, host-nation forces and agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and even nongovernmental organizations to integrate and synchronize counterinsurgency efforts.

- *Political Factors Are Primary.* Keeping in mind that the main goal of counterinsurgent forces is to establish or buttress the legitimacy of the supported government, political factors must receive foremost consideration in the conduct of operations: "military actions conducted without proper analysis of their political effects will at best be ineffective and at worst aid the enemy."⁴⁶

- *Counterinsurgents Must Understand the Environment.* The goal of Counterinsurgency operations and the complex environment in which they take place make it necessary for counterinsurgent forces to have an in-depth understanding of the cultural, social, and political characteristics of their environment, as well as an understanding of important actors and groups and who exercises power and how.

- *Intelligence Drives Operations.* To have the proper effects, the actions of Counterinsurgents operating at all levels must be informed by reliable, timely, and detailed intelligence reporting: "With good intelligence, a counterinsurgent is like a surgeon cutting out the cancers while keeping the vital organs intact."⁴⁷

- *Insurgents Must Be Isolated from Their Cause and Support.* Although killing insurgents may be important in a specific situation, to succeed over the long term, counterinsurgent forces must isolate insurgents from material or ideological sources of support from local and international sources. To do this, Counterinsurgents may use physical, informational, diplomatic, or legal means.

- *Security under the Rule of Law Is Essential.* The security of the population is essential to the legitimacy of the supported government. Bringing security to the population will require "clear and hold" operations much more frequently than "search and destroy" operations. Counterinsurgent forces should seek to transition from combat operations to police enforcement as rapidly as possible, ensuring that the actions of forces supporting the government are consistent with the rule of law.

- *Counterinsurgents Should Prepare for Long-Term Commitment.* Insurgencies have typically been protracted forms of conflict. Because the population is more likely to give its allegiance to the government when it has a high estimation of the determination and staying power of counterinsurgent forces and their prospects for success, a long-term commitment may be needed.

In addition to these principles, U.S. military doctrine recognizes a number of imperatives for U.S. forces. These include managing information and expectations, using the appropriate level of force, learning and adapting, empowering the lowest levels, and supporting the host nation.⁴⁸ These principles and imperatives contain significant lessons for military forces participating in counterinsurgency operations, demanding restraint, intellectual agility, and good judgment at all levels of leadership.

Counterinsurgency Challenges. Historical as well as contemporary examples of U.S. involvement in counterinsurgency efforts, including those in "Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa, and now in Southwest Asia and the Middle East," reveal a number of challenges. Many of these are not just characteristic of counterinsurgency operations but are likely to be evident in other forms of military intervention in response to irregular challenges. Because of the intensive ground force requirements of counterinsurgency operations, this section focuses more on the Army and to some extent the Marine Corps than the other military services. However, all the

U.S. military services face challenges in reorienting from a Cold War focus toward capabilities needed against irregular challenges.⁴⁹

Military Doctrine and Training. The preface to the 2006 Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual argues, "Counterinsurgency operations have been neglected in broader American military doctrine and national security policies since the end of the Vietnam War over 30 years ago."⁵⁰ One reason is that consensus has rarely existed in the United States regarding strategy, doctrine, and operational concepts for effectively dealing with what many have long regarded as low-level conflicts.

At the level of the military services, reasons for neglect may include institutional interest and organizational culture, and the two are intertwined in a complex fashion. Capturing both of these dynamics to some extent, Carl Builder argues that the Army's traditional self-concept as the nation's obedient handyman ready to serve whatever purposes the country's political leaders gave to it was skewed by World War II. Having experienced during that war a form of warfare in which it excelled, the Army ran the risk of overoptimizing against the challenge of high-intensity, conventional combat. This would serve institutional needs and cultural preferences but also entail risk: "[I]f the Army . . . cannot successfully intervene against third-world forces to preserve American interests, many will be surprised and quick to remonstrate with the Army for the inadequacies in its planning, training, doctrine, and equipment."⁵¹ Even during the Vietnam War itself, some see evidence of insufficient adaptation. Andrew Krepinevich argues that an overly strict adherence to the "Army Concept," a belief that the U.S. Army should focus on midintensity, conventional war and rely heavily on firepower to keep casualties down, prevented the Army from adopting appropriate counterinsurgency tactics in Vietnam.⁵²

The experience of U.S. ground forces in Iraq after the spectacular initial success of the 2003 invasion suggests that, in addition to being there in adequate numbers, they again faced a situation for which they were not entirely prepared in terms of doctrine or training. Influential critic Nigel Aylwin-Foster, given voice in one of the military's own professional journals, argues that although the U.S. "Army is indisputably the master of conventional warfighting, it is notably less proficient in . . . Operations Other Than War."⁵³ Recognizing that U.S. challenges immediately following the invasion stemmed from a variety of sources, Ay 1 win-Foster argues that the actions of U.S. ground forces were also partly to blame for the growth of an Iraqi insurgency in 2004. Citing the statistic that only 6% of U.S. pacification operations in Iraq from May 2003 to May 2005 were focused specifically on providing security to the population, he claims that the U.S. Army was culturally insensitive, overly focused on killing insurgents, and too slow to adapt.⁵⁴

Since that time, as evidenced by the publication of the new counterinsurgency manual, there have been vigorous and broad efforts to respond to the requirements of contemporary insurgency in terms of doctrine and training.⁵⁵ However, concerns remain over the extent to which such learning will endure beyond the end of U.S. involvement in its campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. To be enduring, change will need to be supported over an extended period of time by key leaders within the organization who ensure that it is institutionalized in doctrine, training, organizational structures, equipment acquisition, and personnel incentive systems.⁵⁶

The Ground Force Capacity of the U.S. All-Volunteer Military. According to the 2006 counterinsurgency manual, "maintaining security in an unstable environment requires vast resources, whether host nation, U.S., or multinational."⁵⁷ This requirement applies not only to counterinsurgency but also to other forms of U.S. military operations against irregular challenges in which stability is a desired goal. Depending on the contributions of allies or coalition partners and the status of a supported country's security institutions, the required U.S.

contribution may be significant. In the absence of a U.S. national police force, this requirement falls primarily on U.S. ground forces.

The U.S. armed forces that have to meet this requirement have, until very recently, been shrinking for the past thirty-five years. Since the Vietnam War, the overall number of American men and women on active duty has fallen from 3.5 million to 1.4 million. The U.S. Army, the country's primary force for protracted land campaigns, declined from 1.6 million troops in 1968 to just over four hundred eighty thousand at the time of the September 11, 2001, attacks. These cuts in the U.S. armed forces have been a nonpartisan affair, with the Army shrinking from eighteen divisions to twelve under President George H. W. Bush and then to ten under President Bill Clinton.

Although the end of the Cold War made these force reductions understandable, U.S. military operations abroad accelerated in the 1990s, with commensurate strain on a smaller force. As discussed in Chapter 3, this strain and resulting military readiness problems became an issue in the 2000 presidential campaign. Questions about the adequacy of ground forces to support the U.S. national security strategy became even more frequent after the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. In January 2007, newly confirmed Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced a recommended increase of ninety-two thousand ground forces—a number that would bring the Army and Marine Corps to end strengths of 547,000 and 202,000, respectively, by 2012.⁵⁸

Although these additions will help the Army and Marine Corps manage future requirements, U.S. national security commitments have currently placed major strains on U.S. ground forces. Most of the Army's forty-four combat brigades have seen two or more combat tours between late 2001 and 2008, with many units having four combat tours. This strain was exacerbated when tours were lengthened to fifteen months and the "dwell time" between combat tours was reduced to only twelve months.⁵⁹ The standard had previously been that a soldier should have at least twenty-four months at home between twelve-month deployments.

Due to these on-going requirements, the Army and Marine Corps have enormous challenges in the retaining of junior officers (especially at the rank of captain), recruitment, training, readiness, and equipment maintenance.⁶⁰ The United States also faces strategic risk because, as many have observed, "[a]ll 'fully combat ready' active-duty and reserve combat units are now deployed or deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan. No fully-trained national strategic reserve brigades are now prepared to deploy to new combat operations."⁶¹

Existing constraints on ground forces have accelerated the use of civilian contractors, with problematic repercussions:

The Defense Department estimates that roughly 20,000 security contractors operate in Iraq alone, the equivalent of over three Army combat brigades. . . . Unlike our soldiers and marines, these contractors are subjected to little in the way of oversight, despite the fact that counterinsurgency operations demand the highest levels of restraint on the part of counterinsurgent forces.⁶²

Contractor security forces are more likely to focus on their specific purposes, such as providing security to a particular dignitary, than on the broad requirements of the overall mission, which requires that the legitimacy of the supported government and the political effects of all actions must remain foremost considerations. A heated controversy caused by the killing of nine Iraqi civilians by Blackwater contractors in Baghdad in September 2007 is representative of the problematic effect that these contractors can have on an overall U.S. counterinsurgency effort.⁶³

Though the U.S. Army and Marine Corps are still among the most capable ground force organizations in the world, some analysts have begun to ask the question: "What is the maximum force utilization rate we can sustain before degrading a first rate military?"⁶⁴ According

to Major General (retired) Robert Scales, "No one from the Vietnam generation would ever have foreseen that America's ground forces would be so stretched for so long without breaking."⁶⁵

An increase in force size is one possible response to this situation, though this option is very expensive, takes time to implement, and will be a challenge to execute without unacceptably lowering recruiting standards. Further, some argue that merely increasing existing force structure constitutes an inadequate response to the requirements of today's complex contingency operations. These analysts argue that the United States should invest instead in capabilities, such as advisor units, optimized to help the Army succeed in irregular warfare operations.⁶⁶

As an alternative, the country's political leaders could recognize the constraints posed by the size of U.S. ground forces and adjust the goals of U.S. national security strategy and policy to better reconcile ends, ways, and means. However, the nature of the current strategic environment could make that difficult. In the words of one review of alternative futures:

One of the major problems affecting global security—failed or failing states that could or do nurture terrorist organizations—is unlikely to disappear in the future. Although chastened by the Iraq experience, U.S. policymakers may nonetheless feel compelled to engage in stability operations or Counterinsurgency, just as Bush, who promised in 2000 to get U.S. military forces out of the "nation-building" business, felt compelled to send forces into Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks of September 2001.⁶⁷

Without a renewal of conscription, which will not occur absent a major catastrophe, American policy makers will need to keep limitations in available ground forces in mind as they make decisions regarding future large-scale or long-term military interventions.

U.S. Government Agency Capability and Capacity and the Interagency Process. A recurring theme in current U.S. military doctrine is that military force may be necessary, but will alone be insufficient, in planning and executing successful U.S. responses to many irregular challenges to American national security. Instead, the United States must also bring diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power to bear to be successful in interventions, such as peace operations, stability operations, and Counterinsurgency. In an apparent affirmation of this perspective, the 2006 Iraq Study Group's "most important recommendations" were for "enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region."⁶⁸

To play their needed role, organizations and agencies across the U.S. government must have the *capability* to operationally deploy and the *capacity* to perform these functions at the required scale. As one study states: "While the U.S. military is unmatched in terms of its effectiveness, capabilities, and reach, the U.S. government lacks a standing, deployable capacity for stability operations in non-DoD agencies."⁶⁹ The study goes on to note that "recent changes in U.S. interventions—increased operational tempo, rapid success on the battlefield, and an ever-expanding list of post-conflict objectives—have dramatically increased the need for rapid civilian deployments."⁷⁰ In the absence of civilian agency capability, military units are often put in charge of performing a broad array of tasks, relating to economic, social, and political development, for which they may not have the requisite expertise and which further stretches military resources.⁷¹

This dynamic helps explain why emphasis on the need to develop civilian capabilities and capacity in these areas often comes from the U.S. military and defense analysts,⁷² speech, he said:

My message is that if we are to meet the myriad challenges around the world in the coming decades, the country must strengthen other important elements of national power both institutionally and financially, and create the capability to integrate all the elements of national power to problems and challenges abroad.... One of the most important

lessons of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq is that military success is not sufficient to win: economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more—these, along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success.⁷³

Gates went on to note that the U.S. military had sought to meet many of these needs in the absence of civilian partners and argued that much of the resulting organizational learning on the part of the military would need to be retained and institutionalized. Nevertheless, these efforts were "no replacement for the real thing—civilian involvement and expertise."⁷⁴ Though the State Department responded positively to Gates's ideas and increased the number of diplomats assigned to partner with military commanders, significant needs remain unmet.⁷⁵ Beyond organizational capability and capacity, the effectiveness of the interagency process is also essential. Interagency coordination in response to crises or even in the management of ongoing operations still largely takes place on an ad hoc basis. As discussed in Chapter 9, there is no single, unified national security apparatus with the capability to plan, manage, and control all national security-related spending. Also, as discussed in Chapter 10, the interagency process has continued to expand and grow more complex over time as new functions and entities have been added to the U.S. government to respond to new national security needs. Recommendations to improve U.S. government effectiveness in interagency cooperation have included proposals to further institutionalize strategic planning, to clarify presidential national security guidance, to define interagency roles and responsibilities, and to develop more robust mechanisms to strengthen connections among "policy, resource allocation, and execution."⁷⁶

Costs of Operations. As discussed above, counterinsurgency operations may require the devotion of enormous resources. Through Fiscal Year 2008, funding for the Iraq War alone reached \$608 billion.⁷⁷ As of 2009, U.S. military casualties included over four thousand two hundred dead and over thirty thousand wounded.⁷⁸ Among the wounded are many who have suffered life-changing injuries and face long-term disability. These numbers do not include the much smaller number of U.S. civilian or contractor personnel casualties.

As important as these budgetary and casualty figures are, they do not capture the full range of costs that are associated with a large-scale American military intervention. Additional important costs include: diplomatic costs in the event that an American military intervention lacks strong multilateral support; the time and focus required of U.S. national security policy makers, which may come at the expense of other national security priorities; domestic costs relating to public trust in political leaders and government institutions if interventions do not succeed; possible stresses on the Constitutional balance between government institutions created by a long war; the effect of a U.S. intervention on international or regional peace and stability; the impact on lives or government finances of U.S. coalition partners; and the impact on lives and property in the target country. These costs will vary in every conflict. For example, successful interventions could have beneficial effects on the reputation and influence of the U.S. government abroad or the domestic political standing of the country's leaders. Nevertheless, the potential importance of such costs is worthy of evaluation as national security policy makers seek to choose between various courses of action.

Public Support. One of the principles of counter-insurgency operations, discussed above, is the need for a long-term commitment. Regarding the U.S. intervention in Iraq, Ryan Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, reaffirmed this general principle in his September 2007 testimony to Congress, stating that, although it would be possible for the United States to achieve its goal of a "secure, stable democratic Iraq at peace with its neighbors," the "process will not be quick, it will be uneven, punctuated by setbacks as well as achievements, and it will require substantial

U.S. resolve and commitment."⁷⁹ Although the link between domestic public opinion and government policy is not simple or direct, a major challenge for policy makers is sustaining U.S. commitment over the long term as a majority of Americans oppose the Iraq War.⁸⁰

In Chapter 2, it was suggested that Americans have traditionally approached national security affairs with a degree of impatience and that protracted limited wars do not fit this temper. The U.S. historical experience provides some interesting precedents for sustaining protracted military interventions abroad. Declining U.S. public support was a driving factor in the U.S. military withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973 and the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia in 1994. On the other hand, even after policy makers claimed that the operation would last for only one year, the United States sustained a military commitment in Bosnia for ten years beginning in 1995 with little public attention or opposition. Similarly, an extended U.S. intervention in Afghanistan that began in 2001 still received approval from a majority of Americans near the end of 2007.⁸¹ Of course, in a prime example of patience, the American public stood fast in the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union for more than forty years. This brief survey suggests that, although sustained U.S. public support should not be taken for granted, it may be achievable, depending on the circumstances.

Conflict Termination. A final challenge, related to many of those above, is *conflict termination*. Successful conflict termination is necessary because, to paraphrase Carl von Clausewitz, the best way to judge military operations is by the success of the whole. Tactical and operational victories may not be adequate to the achievement of the country's political purposes; planning for and resourcing those actions necessary to bring a particular intervention to a successful close are also critical.⁸²

U.S. military doctrine published in 2006 makes it clear that the supported commander "must work closely with the civilian leadership to ensure a clearly defined national end state is established." This end state should be "the broadly expressed diplomatic, informational, military, and economic conditions that should exist after the conclusion of a campaign or operation." With regard to the effect of this end state on military planning, "[t]ermination of operations must be considered from the outset of planning and should be a coordinated OGA [Other Government Agency], IGO [intergovernmental organization], NGO [nongovernmental organization], and multinational effort that is refined as operations move toward advantageous termination." Finally, with regard to setting expectations, U.S. military doctrine argues that "military operations will normally continue after the conclusion of sustained combat operations. Stability operations will be required to enable legitimate civil authority and attain the national strategic end state. These stability operations historically have required an extended presence by U.S. military forces."⁸³

Though U.S. military doctrine seems closely attuned to the requirements of conflict termination, doctrine itself may be more or less meaningful according to the extent to which it is embodied in the actual practices of the organizations it is meant to guide. Realization of this doctrinal vision will also require cooperative involvement by the country's political leaders and other agencies within the U.S. government, as well as compliance by the DoD and the military services.

The Beginnings of Reform

Since 2004, the U.S. government has made deliberate efforts toward reorganizing U.S. intervention capacity and capabilities, particularly within the State Department and DoD. One of the major efforts has been a collaborative effort between the State Department and DoD to develop common tasks and objectives for stability and reconstruction operations. In 2004, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was formed in the Department of State with the mission to "lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government

civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so that they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy."⁸⁴ Despite the potential value of its functions, to date, limited resources have mostly restricted its efforts to improve coordination and planning.⁸⁵

Change within the DoD has been perhaps more significant. In February 2005, President George W. Bush issued an Executive Directive to the DoD that ordered all armed services to improve their stability and reconstruction capabilities and capacities to levels commensurate with their traditional prowess at major combat operations.⁸⁶ In response, the DoD developed and issued Directive 3000.05, which states that stability operations are a "core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support."⁸⁷

In spite of these notable efforts to reform and reorganize for more effective U.S. intervention policy, many challenges remain in seeking to create more effective intervention capabilities within the U.S. government. In particular, anemic funding and resource allocations to U.S. government agencies other than the DoD have limited the effectiveness of efforts to create expanded civilian capabilities. As a consequence, U.S. intervention policy still largely relies on the military—an approach that seems increasingly unable to respond to the national security challenges of the twenty-first century.

Looking Ahead

In the decades since the end of the Cold War, limitations in U.S. intervention capability have become all too apparent. Failures to secure, stabilize, and reconstruct in the wake of otherwise successful initial combat operations have been matched by failures to adequately perform similar functions at home in the aftermath of such disasters as Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (see Chapter 6). Unfortunately, these challenges seem unlikely to diminish in the future. As the 2005 Council on Foreign Relations task force report notes, "In today's world of failed states, terrorism, proliferation, and civil conflict, the trend is clear: The United States will often be drawn into complex situations when they affect its national security or its conscience."⁸⁸ The United States has taken initial steps to create more robust intervention capabilities, but the effectiveness of even these initial steps remains unproven. There is undoubtedly still a long way to go.

Discussion Questions

1. What is an *irregular challenge* to U.S. national security? How is this category of threats useful to defense policy makers?
2. To what extent are irregular challenges to U.S. national security of increasing importance in the early twenty-first century? Why or why not?
3. What types of military operations might the United States employ against irregular challenges? Under what circumstances is each likely to be appropriate?
4. How has the nature of insurgency changed over time? What are some of the important characteristics of contemporary insurgencies?
5. What does historical experience suggest are principles of Counterinsurgency operations? Which of these are most important? Under what circumstances do these factors vary?
6. What challenges are the United States likely to continue to face in Counterinsurgency operations? Are these challenges relevant to other types of military operations? Why or why not?
7. Does the United States have adequate nonmilitary capabilities to deal with the irregular national security challenges of the twenty-first century? What could be done to improve these capabilities?

Recommended Reading

Beckett, Ian F. W. *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opponents Since 1750*. New York: Routledge, 2001.

Cassidy, Robert M. *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006.

Covey, Jock, Michael Dziedzic, and Leonard Hawley. *The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation*. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2005.

Damrosch, Lori Fisler, ed., *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993.

Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006.

Haass, Richard N. *Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994.

Harkavy, Robert E., and Stephanie G. Neuman. *Warfare in the Third World*. New York: Palgrave, 2001.

Hashim, Ahmed. *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006.

Joes, Anthony. *Resisting Rebellion*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2006.

Lomperis, Timothy. *From People's War to People's Rule*. Raleigh: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.

Mandel, Robert. *The Meaning of Military Victory*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2006.

Merom, Gil. *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Nagl, John. *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaysia and Vietnam*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.

Osgood, Robert E. *Limited War: The Challenges to American Strategy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957.

Paret, Peter, ed., with Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert. *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Wilson, Isaiah. *Thinking Beyond War: Why America Fails to Win the Peace*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Internet Resources

Council on Foreign Relations, *In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities*, www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Post-Conflict_Capabilities_final.pdf U.S.

Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) No. 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting

Publication (MCWP) No. 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, 2006, [http://usacac.army.mil/](http://usacac.army.mil/cac/repository/materials/coin-fm3-24.pdf)

[cac/repository/materials/coin-fm3-24.pdf](http://usacac.army.mil/cac/repository/materials/coin-fm3-24.pdf) U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 3000.05, November 2005, "Military Support for

Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,"

www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/300005.htm U.S. Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of*

America, March 2005, www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d200503i8nds.pdf

Notes

Chapter 16: Irregular Challenges, Military Intervention, and Counterinsurgency

1. The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, September 2002, I.
2. Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States*, March 2005.
3. *Ibid.*, 3.
4. *Ibid.*
5. Colin S. Gray, "Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* i: 2 (Winter 2007): 42. The classic reference manual originally published in 1940 has been reprinted as *Marine Corps Small Wars Manual, United States Marine Corps, ig40* (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower Press, 1996).
6. Richard N. Haass, *Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994). Also see Bruce W. Jentleson and Ariel E. Levite, "The Analysis of Protracted Foreign Military Intervention," in *Foreign Military Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict*, eds. Levite, Jentleson, and Larry Berman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 1-22.
7. James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 76 fn. 4.
8. Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism* (Washington, DC: Brassey's Inc., 1990), 17.
9. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) No. 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) No. 3-33.5 *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 1-3. Hereafter, this document will be referenced as FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5.
10. See Haass, *Intervention*, esp. chap. 1 and 7. See also Howard M. Hensel, ed., *The Law of Armed Conflict: Constraints on the Contemporary Use of Military Force* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2005).
11. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 12, 2001, as amended through October 12, 2007), 128. Hereafter, this document will be referenced as JP 1-02.
12. Ian F. W. Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 24.
13. JP 1-02, 508.
14. JP 1-02, 1-17.
15. Current U.S. Army and Marine Corps doctrine argues that stability operations, along with offense and defense, are an intrinsic part of Counterinsurgency operations. See FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 1-19. See also Richard A. Lacquement, Jr., "Building Peace in the Wake of War: Appropriate Roles for Armed Forces and Civilians," in *American Defense Policy*, 8th ed., eds. Paul J. Bolt, Damon V. Coletta, and Collins G. Shackelford (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 282-294.
16. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 13, 2008), VII-6. Hereafter, this document will be referenced as JP 3-0.
17. JPs-o, VII-5.
18. JP 3-0, VII-6.
19. JP 1-02, 410.
20. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-07.3 *Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 17, 2007), x. Hereafter, this document will be referenced as JP 3-07.3.
21. *Ibid.*

22. Ibid.
23. See Julia Preston, "Rwanda Confounds UN Security Council," *Washington Post*, May 8, 1994, A25; "Why Not Rwanda?" *New Republic*, May 16, 1994, 7; Charles Krauthammer, "Stop the Genocide in Rwanda," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1994, A25; and Herman Cohen, "Getting Rwanda Wrong," *Washington Post*, June 3, 1994, A23.
24. See Michael J. Meese and Sean M. Morgan, "New Requirements for Army Expert Knowledge: Afghanistan and Iraq," in *The Future of the Army Profession*, 2nd ed., proj. dir. Don M. Snider (Boston: McGraw-Hill Publishing, Inc., 2005), 350.
25. As quoted in JP3-O7.3, II-i.
26. JP3-o, VI-9 to VI-io.
27. Haass, *Intervention*, 63.
28. JP 3-0, 1-14.
29. Haass, *Intervention*, 19.
30. Ibid., 64.
31. Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies*.
32. Robert Taber, *The War of the Flea: Guerilla Warfare in Theory and Practice* (New York: Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1965), 180.
33. Becket, *viii*.
34. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 1-4.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. See Donald L. Horowitz, "A Harvest of Hostility: Ethnic Conflict and Self Determination after the Cold War," *Defense Intelligence Journal* i: 1 (1992): 137-163; and Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," *International Security* 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996): 136-175.
38. Ibid.
39. See Robert M. Cassidy, *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006).
40. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 1-4. See also David J. Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 4 (August 2005): 596-617.
41. James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, cochairs, *The Iraq Study Group Report* (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 32.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., 2.
44. Gray, "Irregular Warfare," 43.
45. The list of principles is from FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 1-21 to 1-24. Principles are verbatim, though descriptions of them are not. See also Eliot Cohen et al., "Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency," *Military Review* 86, no. 2 (March/April 2006): esp. 49-51.
46. Cohen et al., 50.
47. Ibid.
48. Imperatives are drawn verbatim from FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 1-24 to 1-26.
49. For an example, see Chief of Naval Operations, *Navy Strategic Plan* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2006), I.
50. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, v'h'.
51. Carl Builder, *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 192.
52. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 4-7.
53. Nigel F. Aylwin-Foster, "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations," *Military Review* 86, no. 6 (November/December 2005): 2-3.

54. Ibid., 3-7.

55. See David H. Petraeus, "Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq," *Military Review* 86, no. 1 (January/February 2006): 2-12; and Peter W. Chiarelli and Stephen M. Smith, "Learning from Our Modern Wars: The Imperatives of Preparing for a Dangerous Future," *Military Review* 87, no. 5 (September/October 2007): 2-15.

56. For the importance of personnel systems in sustaining military innovation, see Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the Next War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).

57. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 1-2.

58. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), "Expanding the Army: Costs, Constraints, and Future Commitments," *IISS Strategic Comments* 13, no. 1 (February 2007): i.

59. Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Testimony of Lawrence J. Korb*, XXth Cong., XX sess., April 17, 2007, 1-4; and Government Accountability Office, *Military Personnel: Strategic Plan Needed to Address Army's Emerging Officer Accession and Retention Challenges* (Washington, DC: GAO-O7-224, January 2007), 27.

60. Ibid., 1-9.

61. Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Testimony of General Barry R. McCaffrey*, i loth Cong., 1st sess., April 17, 2007, 3.

62. Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Testimony of Andrew F. Krepinevich*, i loth Cong., 1st sess., April 17, 2007, 5.

63. See Robert Baer, "Why Blackwater—and More—Should Leave Iraq," *Time*, September 20, 2007, www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1663937,00.html.

64. Ibid.

65. Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Statement for the Record of Major General (Ret.) Robert H. Scales*, I loth Cong., Ist sess., April 17, 2007, i. See also Andrew F. Krepinevich, "The Thin Green Line," Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Backgrounder, August 14, 2004.

66. Krepinevich testimony, 13; Korb testimony, 8; and John A. Nagl, *Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, June 2007).

67. IISS, i.

68. Baker and Hamilton, *Iraq Study Group Report*, xiii.

69. *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era*, Phase II Report (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2005), 55.

70. Ibid., 56.

71. In some cases, international governmental and nongovernmental organizations may help in fulfilling these functions, but their involvement cannot be guaranteed in advance, and their actions cannot be fully controlled by the United States.

72. Nina M. Serafino, "Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement," *CRS Issue Brief for Congress*, updated March 27, 2006, CRS-g.

73. Robert M. Gates, "Landon Lecture," (speech given at Kansas State University, November 26, 2007), www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=i199.

74. Ibid.

75. Nicholas Kralev, "State Doubles Military Advisors," *Washington Times*, January 18, 2008, Ai.

76. *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols*, 6-7.

77. Congressional Research Service, "The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations since 9/11," RL33110, updated November 9, 2007, CRS 5.

78. Casualty figures for Afghanistan and Iraq are posted by the Department of Defense, siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/castop.htm and www.defenselink.mil/news/casualty.pdf

79. House Joint Hearing of the Committee of Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services, *Testimony of Ambassador Ryan C. Cracker*, 110th Cong., 1st sess., September 10, 2007, i.

80. As of December 2007, 65% of Americans opposed the U.S. war in Iraq. "Iraq," www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm.

81. As of December 2007, 56% of Americans approved of U.S. military action in Afghanistan, and 41% disapproved. "Afghanistan," www.pollingreport.com/afghan.htm.'

82. See Isaiah Wilson III, *Thinking Beyond War: Civil-Military Operations and Why America Fails to Win the Peace* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

83. JP3-0, 1-14 to 1-15.

84. U.S. Department of State, "About S/CRS," www.state.gov/s/crs/ci2936.htm.

85. *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols*, 59.

86. White House, Statement on Presidential Directive on U.S. Efforts for Reconstruction and Stabilization, December 14, 2005, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/i2/20051214.html
www.whitehouse.gov/release/2005/i2/20051214.html.

87. U.S. Department of Defense, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR), Department of Defense (DoD) Directive Number 3000.05 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2005), 2.

Chapter 20

The Middle East

The new millennium ushered in momentous transformations in the Middle East that have significantly affected key U.S. interests. The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process again stalled; the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, served as an impetus for the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq; and international concern grew over Iran's possible pursuit of nuclear weapons. The confluence of these events has increased the turbulence in an already unstable Middle East (see Figure 20.1). (Note: The term *Middle East* in this chapter includes Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Oman, Yemen, and Sudan.)

In 1993, through their signatures on the Oslo Accords, Israel and the Palestinians indicated their acceptance of a peace settlement based on the concept of a two-state solution. However, a lack of tangible progress produced a Palestinian rebellion in September 2000 against the continued Israeli occupation and the corrupt Palestinian Authority (PA), which had gained control of newly autonomous Palestinian areas. This second Palestinian uprising, known as the *Al Aqsa Intifada* ("Al Aqsa" after the mosque in Jerusalem, and "Intifada" for uprising), unraveled previous progress and left the peace process in tatters.¹

A year after this renewal of violence between Israelis and Palestinians, deadly terrorist attacks in the United States triggered events that led to enormous changes in the Middle East. To root out al-Qa'ida operatives who were behind the attacks and who had established training camps in Afghanistan with the assistance of its fundamentalist Taliban regime, the United States attacked Afghanistan in October 2001. With the stated intent of finding and destroying weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), in March 2003 the United States launched an invasion of Iraq that toppled its brutal dictator, Saddam Hussein. An additional goal of the invasion was to establish a democracy in Iraq that would serve as an exemplar to other societies in the Middle East. It was posited that a successful democracy in Iraq could help stem the growth of regional extremism by addressing what many believed to be one of its important root causes—political disaffection and unrepresentative governance. In the years after 2003, however, violence and political instability in Iraq diminished prospects for the successful establishment of a representative democracy and upset the regional balance of power by eliminating Iraq as a counterbalance to Iran.

The deep and increasingly difficult U.S. involvement in Iraq and the creation of a Shiite majority government in Iraq have emboldened Iran to take a more assertive stance in the region. Elected in 2005, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, supported by the powerful religious establishment, has pursued strongly anti-Western foreign policies. Iran has continued to pursue its national interests by supporting terrorist groups, such as the Shiite Hezbollah that operates primarily in southern Lebanon. On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers and killed six others across the border in Israel, precipitating a thirty-three-day war in which Israel's air strikes killed numerous Lebanese civilians and massively damaged Lebanese infrastructure without significantly hurting Hezbollah. In return, Hezbollah launched hundreds of rockets against mainly civilian targets in northern Israel and emerged from the inconclusive conflict claiming victory. Despite pressure from the international community, Iran has also continued to advance its uranium enrichment program, prompting fears that its true goal is the development of nuclear weapons. Further, by 2007 it had become clear that Iran was providing arms and training to Shiite militias and extremists in Iraq.²

U.S. Interests

Despite these new and challenging dynamics, two enduring U.S. interests in the region remain reliable access to energy and the security of Israel. In the early twenty-first century, additional important U.S. interests include securing stability and security in Iraq, preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons, containing Islamist radicalism, and maintaining influence in a strategically important region of high volatility.

Oil. The Middle East is the world's most important source of oil exports. Persian Gulf countries produce 28% of the world's oil, retain more than 70% of the world's excess oil production capacity, and hold 65% of the world's oil reserves.³ The importance of the Middle East as an oil-producing region has continued to increase over time as the U.S. dependence on imported oil and global demand have continued to grow. Whereas 35% of U.S. oil consumption came from foreign imports in 1973, by 2006 the number had grown to 60%. Although only 17% of U.S. imports come from the Gulf area, the global oil market is essentially an integrated whole; the loss of Persian Gulf oil due to armed conflict or terrorism would greatly affect world energy supplies and lead to increased competition for resources located elsewhere.⁴ Three fourths of Japan's and two thirds of western Europe's oil imports originate in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf. Without these supplies, consumers in these countries would be required to seek other sources. Additionally, China's demand for oil has increased tremendously since the 1990s; it has overtaken Japan as the world's second-largest consumer of oil, after the United States. It imports 32% of its oil, with 58% originating in the Middle East.⁵ Absent highly unlikely dramatic progress in the development of alternative fuel sources, the rapid development of such countries as India and China will continue to fuel increased global demand for oil for at least several decades to come.

The Security of Israel. U.S. relations with Israel have always been complicated. Prior to Israel's creation in 1948, members of the U.S. government clashed over whether recognizing the nascent Jewish state would be a liability, given the U.S. relationship with the Arab world and especially the Persian Gulf states.⁶ Despite competing interests, President Harry Truman ultimately decided to back the creation of the new state.

Since 1948, commitment to the security of Israel has been one of the most enduring features of U.S. policy in the Middle East. This is true despite periodic disputes between the two states, including Israel's participation with Britain and France in the Suez War in 1956 and Israel's continued settlement of the West Bank and Gaza after its occupation of the Palestinian territories in 1967. An important motivation for continuing U.S. support is that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East. That support is consistently and persuasively bolstered by the unflinching efforts of the American-Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAC), which is widely recognized as the most powerful lobbying organization in the United States. AIPAC's efforts are seconded by various influential Christian groups.

Despite the early political support provided by Truman during Israel's founding, U.S. materiel support for Israel did not become truly significant until the mid-1960s. Until then, France and Britain had been its major suppliers of arms. In 1966, responding to Israel's fears of increased Soviet arms deliveries to Egypt and Syria, the United States agreed to provide it with large quantities of modern military equipment. Due to this continuing arms relationship, as well as to the terms of the 1979 Camp David Peace Accords (which are discussed later in this chapter), Israel remains the largest single recipient of U.S. foreign aid.

The Stability and Security of Iraq. Since the 2003 invasion, the United States has been heavily engaged politically, economically, and militarily in Iraq. Although successful in toppling Saddam, it was still debatable in late 2008 whether the U.S.-led invasion had led to a stable,

effective successor regime capable of maintaining internal order and protecting Iraq from external interference. Indeed, the continued U.S. presence in Iraq itself proved to be a problem because it served as a source of Arab humiliation and bolstered perceptions that the United States intends to dominate and exploit the region. Yet premature withdrawal could create a catastrophe. According to the 2006 bipartisan Iraq Study Group, failure of U.S. policy in Iraq could lead to ethnic cleansing, a large-scale humanitarian crisis, a violent sectarian partition of the state, a brutal successor regime, a broader regional conflict, and the possibility of "Sunni-Shia clashes across the Islamic world."⁷

As a consequence of deterioration in security conditions within Iraq in 2006, American strategy shifted in early 2007. From a focus on finding and fighting insurgents, U.S. forces switched to a "clear and hold" approach—i.e., clearing selected areas (Baghdad initially) of insurgents and then holding those areas with a continuing troop presence. The additional troops needed to execute the new strategy were provided by additional Iraqi units but also by the United States. Accordingly, about thirty thousand more U.S. troops were "surged" to Iraq, bringing the total there to more than one hundred sixty thousand. As of late 2008, the surge was proving successful, though the durability of improved security conditions was far from assured. Critics pointed out that the Iraqi political reconciliation necessary for long-term stability and progress in Iraq was proceeding at an unacceptably slow pace.

Iran and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Regarding Iran's nuclear program, the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2006 states:

For almost 20 years, the Iranian regime hid many of its key nuclear efforts from the international community. Yet the regime continues to claim that it does not seek to develop nuclear weapons. The Iranian regime's true intentions are clearly revealed by the regime's refusal to negotiate in good faith; its refusal to come into compliance with its international obligations by providing the [International Atomic Energy Agency] access to nuclear sites and resolving troubling questions; and the aggressive statements of its President calling for Israel to be "wiped off the face of the Earth."⁸

If Iran were to develop nuclear weapons, it seems likely (though hardly certain) that it could be deterred from their deliberate use through the threat of retaliation, just as nuclear-armed states have been deterred in the past. However, Iran's possession of nuclear weapons could lead to their use by miscalculation or accident. Moreover, there are at least three other significant concerns. First, Iran may deliberately, or accidentally through an inadequate system of controls, transfer a nuclear device to a nonstate actor who cannot be deterred in the same fashion. Second, Iran's possession of a nuclear arsenal may spark an effort at military pre-emption by another state, such as Israel. Third, Iran may set off a dangerous regional nuclear arms race among Sunni-dominated states distressed by Shia Iran's possession of nuclear weapons.

Political Islam and Countering Radical Islamist Ideology. U.S. interests in the Middle East include protecting the United States and its citizens wherever they might be from acts of terrorism inspired by an extreme ideology that justifies public violence—even the targeting of noncombatants—in the name of jihad. (*Jihad* is often translated as *struggle*, which may imply nonviolent means but is also used in the context of violent action.) Countering radical extremists requires the capturing or killing of Islamist terrorists as well as ending the willingness of states, such as Iran and Syria, to harbor and support such terrorist groups. An even more difficult, but essential, task necessary to long-term success is the delegitimization of radical Islamists' claims and violent acts. That effort must begin with an understanding of Islam, including differentiating

between its extreme interpretations and its liberal interpretations. These interpretations compete for legitimacy and popular support throughout the Muslim world.

Islam, the world's second-largest religion, implores its followers to submit to the will and ultimate sovereignty of God (Allah) as communicated through Muhammad, the final prophet of God, in its holy book, the Koran.⁹ Muhammad's proclamation in Mecca in AD 622 that there is only one God and that all humanity is subject to God's authority ultimately had a unifying effect on the previously fractured, tribal cultures of pre-Islamic Arabia. The subsequent rapid spread of the Islamic caliphate throughout the region and into Europe and Asia serves, for many Muslims, as historical validation of the truth and authenticity of God's revelations. Inherent in this sense of authenticity is the belief that the early generations of Muslims flourished (were blessed by God) because of their devoutness and adherence to Islamic law and traditions.¹⁰ The fact that the Muslim world today lives in relative powerlessness and poverty—especially compared with the West—constitutes a serious, ever-present source of humiliation for some believers. They ask, as scholar Bernard Lewis suggests in a classic text about Islam, "What Went Wrong?"¹¹

One answer, within the fundamentalist strain of Islamic political thought, holds that diminished devoutness among subsequent generations of Muslims led to eventual Western exploitation and domination of the region.¹² Accordingly, restoring the Muslim world to its rightful state of societal justice and strength will require a return to first principles. Dutiful Muslims must reject corrupting Western influences and man-made political institutions and rise up and wage jihad against corrupt regional regimes and the West.¹³ The United States is a particular target; radical Islamists argue that the United States is at war with Islam. Many Muslims see U.S. political, economic, and military engagement in the Middle East—particularly U.S. support for Israel and military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq—as confirmation of this narrative.

However, a competing approach exists that is considered by many to be legitimate within the Islamic tradition. Sometimes termed *Liberal Islam*, this approach promotes pluralism, liberalization, freedom of conscience and political participation, rights for women and non-Muslims, and interpretation of Islamic law in light of modern political, economic, and social conditions.¹⁴ Liberal Islam upholds the personal and political sovereignty of God (not popular sovereignty as in the West) and insists that the restoration of societal justice, vitality, and strength in the Muslim world will require a return to Islam's true first principles (which include liberal principles), but in the context of modern political and economic institutions. Dutiful Muslims, it is held, should rise up publicly and oppose radical Islamists, who are misguided practitioners of an illegitimate doctrine and therefore acting in opposition to God. Unfortunately, these liberal voices are too often drowned out by the sounds of the fundamentalists' suicide bombers.

Clearly, the United States has an interest in combating violent religious extremists and in countering the ideology from which violence stems. A challenge for the United States is to protect its interests while refining its political, economic, and military engagement in the Middle East to strengthen liberal Islamic thought and institutions and to encourage the delegitimization of extremism. Of course, the United States has a limited capacity to directly facilitate the delegitimization process, so much will depend upon developments within the region and between extremist and moderate Muslims. The continued intractability of the Israeli-Palestinian issue, America's unwavering alignment with Israel, U.S. support of some repressive regimes in the Middle East, and the continued presence of U.S. troops in the region all combine to limit American influence in meeting this challenge.

Continuing Regional Influence. With the 1968 withdrawal of British forces from the area, the United States and the Soviet Union became the region's principal external influences. Using U.S. support for Israel as the area's anvil, the Soviets continually sought to hammer out a solid anti-American Arab bloc. Military aid and advisers were the principal means used, although trade and civilian aid projects, such as support for Egypt's high-profile Aswan Dam, were also

employed. The Soviet Union's strategy yielded mixed results but was relatively successful in Iraq and Syria.

The disappearance of the Soviet Union left the United States as the only major external actor in the region. In the absence of the Soviets, American military power was dramatically demonstrated by the 1990-1991 Gulf War and in late 2001-2002, in Afghanistan. Awareness of and respect for that power lingers on, although the setbacks in the Iraq War demonstrated its limits. The attractiveness of America and the perceived legitimacy of American leadership have been drastically reduced by the travails in Iraq. Although for decades U.S. policy in the region has been mostly distrusted by the Arab world, those negative views reached new peaks with the American invasion of Iraq. Even in countries with strong intergovernmental ties with the U.S., such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco, the "street" was overwhelmingly negative, with its conclusion that the invasion was "to control oil, protect Israel, and weaken the Muslim world."¹⁵ Clearly, it will be essential to mount a major public diplomacy effort to offset these views. It is equally clear that substantive policy modifications and new initiatives will also be needed, or the public diplomacy effort will founder. In this context, successful handling of Iran's defiance on the nuclear issue and its meddling in Iraq will be especially significant.

History of U.S. Involvement in the Region

Increased U.S. Engagement and the Importance of Oil. Starting in the mid-1960s, a series of political and economic changes in the Middle East and the rest of the world combined to increase the importance of the region to U.S. national security. These trends and developments included an enormous increase in global oil consumption, the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza during the 1967 war, the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf area in 1968, and the broadening influence of the Soviet Union in the region.

These changes affected the relationships between the United States and the states of the Middle East in three important ways. First, several U.S. interests in the region that previously had been of only marginal concern were elevated to the level of important or even vital. Second, the growing Soviet presence and declining British power made it crucial to find new means to protect these newly important interests. Third, U.S. interests in the Middle East, such as the security of Israel and of Persian Gulf oil, which had been treated by policy makers as essentially separate, became increasingly intertwined.

The rapid increase in world oil consumption after 1965 fundamentally altered the conditions governing the production and distribution of oil. Before then, the major oil companies had been able to ensure that the supply of oil met or slightly exceeded demand. By 1970, however, the supply of oil was not increasing fast enough to keep pace with escalating demand, and competition among consumers for available oil intensified. Furthermore, in 1970, first Libya and then others began to pressure oil companies for improved concessions and payments. As producing states gradually realized that the market for oil had become a seller's market, they nationalized the oil business and raised prices.

Between 1968 and 1975, the average price of oil increased from less than \$2 per barrel to roughly \$11 per barrel. Most of this increase occurred at the end of 1973 and early in 1974, when prices were quadrupled following an embargo by Arab producers against the United States and the Netherlands because of their support for Israel during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In the United States and other importing states, such steep increases led to serious balance-of-payments problems and contributed to inflation. The realization was driven home that America had a strong interest in ensuring reliable access to Middle Eastern oil at acceptable prices.

The 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War posed a renewed threat to oil supplies as each side attacked the other's production and refinery facilities. Despite the consequent loss of about 3 million barrels per day of exports, oil was initially plentiful due to unprecedented standby production capacity, primarily in Saudi Arabia. Nor did the years of conflict, including Iraq's and Iran's

targeting of tanker ships in the Persian Gulf beginning in 1984, seriously threaten overall oil flows from the Gulf. Pipelines could, to a limited extent, divert Saudi and Iraqi oil to the Red Sea. However, it should be noted that the 8 million barrels per day or more exported through the Gulf accounted for more than 40% of world trade in oil; effective closure of the Gulf's 28-mile wide Strait of Hormuz would have wreaked havoc on the global economy.

The risk during the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990-1991 was not only that the conflict would interrupt the supply of oil but also that if Saddam were to control most Persian Gulf oil reserves and the choke point of the Strait of Hormuz, he would have been in a position to set a monopoly price on the world's oil. The resulting U.S. intervention stemmed not only from a desire to return sovereignty to Kuwait but also from an American appreciation of the potential threat to the health of the U.S. and international economy.

By 2005, the price per barrel of oil had spiked to \$70 as a product of increased demand and limitations in refining capability throughout the global oil industry.¹⁶ In July 2008, the figure reached a record of \$147 with continuing market volatility.

Such terrorist groups as al-Qa'ida decry U.S. efforts to ensure access to the region's oil through support for "un-Islamic governments." But regional disengagement is simply not a viable U.S. option. Given the decades that would be needed to develop sufficient alternative liquid fuels, dependence of the U.S. and the global economy on oil will mandate continued U.S. efforts to establish partnerships with friendly governments in the Middle East into the foreseeable future.

Support for Israel. As noted above, it was not until the mid-1960s that Jerusalem began to receive large amounts of military and financial aid from Washington. In response to Soviet support for Egypt and Syria prior to the 1967 war, the United States began providing substantial military arms and equipment to Israel. Since that time, a continuing challenge for U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East has been to balance its relations with Israel and the Arab states.

In 1973, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat launched a surprise attack against Israel, jeopardizing the existence of the small state. After being informed of a Soviet airlift to Syria, President Richard Nixon authorized a full-scale U.S. airlift to Israel.¹⁷ All told, Israel received an emergency package of \$2 billion worth of U.S. arms during the crisis. Although the Arab states initially inflicted severe casualties on the Israelis, they were unable to retain control of the territory they gained early in the war.

Despite the continuing flow of U.S. arms, Israel came to recognize that excessive reliance on U.S. goodwill could restrict its freedom of action. As a result, it embarked on a program to acquire and manufacture enough military equipment to enable its forces to wage a war against the combined forces of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia for three weeks without exhausting their supplies. Strategically, the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979 helped Israel achieve this goal. The United States facilitated the acceptance of the 1979 peace treaty with pledges of massive financial and military aid to Egypt and Israel. This assurance of supply, combined with Israel's own production and military predominance in the region, seriously reduced the possibility that the United States would be able to pressure Israel in a future crisis. Importantly, Israel also gained flexibility through the removal of Egypt as a possible opponent.

An important test came when Israel preemptively and successfully struck Iraq's Osirak nuclear facility in 1981. Although President Ronald Reagan condemned Israel's attack in the United Nations (UN) Security Council and temporarily suspended the delivery of F16 aircraft that Israel had already purchased, the Arab world was outraged at what they perceived to be a mild American response to an attack on Iraq's sovereignty. Israel also demonstrated its strategic independence by invading Lebanon in June 1982 in response to Palestinian guerilla attacks launched into Israel from southern Lebanon. Eventually Israeli troops laid siege to West Beirut, forcing the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to withdraw from its sanctuary in Lebanon.

Only after the Reagan administration threatened a breach in relations did the Israelis call off their siege. Nevertheless, Israel and the United States were drawn into the quagmire of Lebanon's civil war, and both incurred serious human and political costs before they were able to withdraw. Israel's troops did not leave Lebanon completely until Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak's unilateral withdrawal in 2000.

Reagan's successor, President George H. W. Bush, sought to distance himself somewhat from the right-wing Likud government of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Moreover, the first Gulf War in 1991 and America's aid to Kuwait restored some U.S. credibility in the Arab world. Consequently, George H. W. Bush was able to convince key Arab states to participate in the Madrid Conference, discussed below, and to undertake bilateral and multilateral negotiations with Israel. He also opened talks with the Palestinians and threatened to withhold financial aid from Israel in a fruitless effort to pressure Shamir to cease constructing Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Following his predecessor's acrimonious relationship with Israel's leadership, President Bill Clinton fostered warm ties with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Building on the 1993 Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians, Clinton actively sought to build a sustained peace. His efforts culminated in the U.S.-sponsored Camp David summit in July 2000 between Barak and Palestinian Chairman Yassir Arafat. Unfortunately these leaders failed at the summit to resolve final status issues for the creation of a Palestinian state.

When President George W. Bush assumed office in January 2001, he initially neglected the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and then moved firmly into backing Israel following the terrorist attacks on the United States later that year. To many in the Bush administration, Israel's war against suicide bombers and the U.S. struggle against international terrorists constituted the basis for even deeper cooperation between the two countries. An added complication later arose when Hamas, an organization that refused to recognize Israel and renounce violence, won a majority in the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections. Despite these challenges, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice increased U.S. activism in the peace process during the second four years of the George W. Bush administration. It remains to be seen whether these and subsequent efforts will result in real progress on the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Operation Desert Storm: The First Gulf War and Its Aftermath. On August 2, 1990, still reeling from the manpower losses and economic dislocations of a stalemated eight-year war with Iran, Iraq invaded the tiny sheikdom of Kuwait. Led by the United States, most of the world responded with condemnations and a variety of economic sanctions. By the end of 1990, most countries supported military action if Iraq failed to immediately and unconditionally withdraw. Last-minute diplomatic efforts failed to resolve the crisis, and a U.S.-led coalition attacked Iraq on January 16, 1991. Coalition forces from thirty-four countries, numbering more than seven hundred fifty thousand thousands of aircraft, and nearly two hundred warships, liberated Kuwait in a forty-four-day campaign.

Within two weeks of the start of hostilities, the Iraqi army in Kuwait was cut off from its command and control linkages and most of its logistical lifelines. Only the continuing threat of Iraqi Scud missiles aimed at key Israeli and Saudi cities remained a danger, but, by the third week of the air campaign, actual launches of Iraqi Scud missiles were reduced to zero. The complex ground campaign began on February 23, 1991, and in a one-hundred-hour assault and flanking maneuver, allied forces encircled and defeated the Iraqi army.

Concerned with maintaining the coalition and fearful that complete destruction of Iraq's forces would result in chaos and create a power vacuum that Iran could exploit, the U.S.-led coalition allowed a substantial portion of the Iraqi army to escape. As a consequence, and in defiance of ceasefire agreements, Saddam was able to reconstitute a sizable force that he used a few months later to quell uprisings of internal opponents, including Kurds in the north and

Shiites in the south. After much Kurdish suffering, the UN imposed a protective area in Iraqi Kurdistan and provided humanitarian relief there. Further, in 1992, the international community imposed a no-fly zone over Iraqi territory south of the 36th parallel to protect the mostly Shiite local communities from Saddam's air power. Despite these measures and continuing economic sanctions that proved painful to Iraq's people and damaging to its economy, Saddam resisted full compliance with the cease-fire agreement's call for the destruction of all of Iraq's missiles and chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons manufacturing facilities.

The UN sanctions against Baghdad were an important component of Washington's overall policy of *dual-containment* in the Persian Gulf. This policy, articulated in 1993, was designed to contain and isolate Iran and Iraq. Although U.S. policy toward these two states fell under the same framework, Washington's objectives for each were different. Whereas a change in regime became virtually a prerequisite for a resumption of U.S.-Iraq relations, the United States demanded only that Tehran alter its behavior by terminating its support for terrorism and its efforts to develop WMDs.

To many contemporary observers, the Gulf War of 1991 marked the beginning of a new era. For the first time, the United States became massively involved militarily on the ground in the Middle East. Some Western observers contended that the war's end provided an opportunity for a new world order of cooperation among the great powers after the demise of the Soviet Union. Others saw the war's conclusion as an opportunity to transform traditional political structures in the Middle East through the spread of pluralism and democracy. One immediate effect was that Americans achieved new credibility within the region. The United States took advantage of this opportunity to press for an international peace conference to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and eventually arranged the October 1991 Madrid Conference.

Except for Egypt, which had signed a peace agreement with Israel in March 1979, this regional peace conference saw the first direct negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. This Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist, although only implicit, set the stage for agreements between Jerusalem and a number of regional actors and states, most notably the Oslo Accords with the PLO in 1993 and a treaty of peace with Jordan in 1994. In addition, Arab states in the Gulf and North Africa established commercial relations with Israel.

U.S. Military Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Following the 9/11 attacks, George W. Bush declared a "war on terrorism." It soon emerged that fifteen of the nineteen terrorist hijackers were from Saudi Arabia, which resulted in consequent deterioration of relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia. Further, under pressure from militant Islamic groups and the Saudis themselves, the United States removed its troops from Saudi Arabia. As covered further in Chapter 19, in October 2001, the United States attacked Afghanistan to force from power the Taliban regime that had supported al-Qa'ida with finances and training bases. By spring 2002, U.S. and Afghan forces had largely suppressed Taliban and al-Qa'ida elements and had succeeded in establishing a pro-American government in Kabul headed by Mohammed Karzai.

After this apparent success in Afghanistan, the United States again turned its attention to Saddam in Iraq. Although Saddam's ouster was considered during the first Gulf War, George H. W. Bush had opted to end the war once Saddam was driven from Kuwait. The primary considerations behind that decision were the status of the international coalition that had fought the war and the obligations that the United States would assume if it decided to overthrow the Iraqi government.¹⁸ Slightly more than a decade later, in the wake of the large-scale terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, the calculus had changed. George W. Bush was convinced that Saddam's noncompliance with UN resolutions on the elimination of WMDs meant Saddam had such weapons; moreover, George W. Bush was more willing to accept the risks associated with changing the Iraqi regime.

In his 2002 State of the Union address, George W. Bush labeled Iran, Iraq, and North Korea an "axis of evil," alleging that those states supported terrorist groups and were pursuing WMDs. His administration spent the next year making the case that Iraq possessed WMDs and had connections with al-Qa'ida and other terrorist organizations. While seeking international support, the United States made it clear that it would act unilaterally if necessary.

After considerable internal debate, the George W. Bush administration opted to present its case to the UN. The Security Council passed Resolution 1441, which called on Saddam to admit UN weapons inspectors and threatened severe repercussions in the event of his refusal to comply. Saddam then permitted UN inspectors access to purported weapon sites and delivered some documents that ostensibly revealed the status of Iraq's weapons programs. The United States, however, pointed to Saddam's repeated noncompliance with earlier UN resolutions and limitations in his current compliance, emphasizing his untrustworthiness.

On March 17, 2003, in a televised address, George W. Bush gave Saddam and his sons forty-eight hours to leave Iraq. When the deadline passed and Saddam remained, the United States and the United Kingdom moved pre-positioned troops from Kuwait into southern Iraq and began air strikes on key targets. Within two weeks, the United States and other coalition forces had gained control of southern Iraq and were preparing to move on to Baghdad. Despite limited resistance that slightly slowed the advance, including opposition from irregular fedayeen fighters, Baghdad fell on April 9, 2003. In the north, Kurdish militia took over key cities, such as Mosul, Kirkuk, and Erbil. George W. Bush declared the end of major combat operations in a dramatic speech on an aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf on May 1, 2003.

With this declaration, postconflict requirements, such as sealing borders, maintaining order, rebuilding Iraqi infrastructure, and administering the country until a new Iraqi government could be established, rose to the fore. With insufficient numbers of forces in country, the initial U.S. response to these requirements was grossly inadequate.¹⁹ The first civilian entity charged with establishing an administration until the Iraqis were prepared to take over the governance of their country was the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). This organization was established on January 20, 2003, and led by retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner. Garner's prewar understanding that his work in Iraq would take only three months lends credence to a pervasive view that the George W. Bush administration did not plan sufficiently for "worst-case scenarios" for post-war Iraq.²⁰ Garner arrived in Baghdad on April 21 after a significant amount of destruction had already occurred from widespread looting. He left Baghdad on June 1, and ORHA was dissolved on June 16, 2003.

By May 2003, the president had selected former Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III to head the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which would replace ORHA and assume responsibility for reconstruction and political transition. Arriving in Iraq on May 12, 2003, Bremer made two key, controversial decisions within his first thirty days in Baghdad: to disband the Iraqi Army and to engage in a "de-Baathification" of the Iraqi government—i.e., purge Saddam loyalists from all positions of authority. Although there were arguments in favor of both of these decisions, their impact proved to be disastrous, increasing the number of opponents of the occupation and vastly heightening the difficulty of creating order and stability. After little more than a year, on June 28, 2004, the CPA handed sovereignty back to the Iraqis.

As postinvasion challenges in Iraq grew, the George W. Bush administration hoped that Saddam's capture and Iraqi elections would limit the violence. On December 13, 2003, Saddam was captured in a dirt hole near his hometown of Tikrit. In December 2005, elections were held to select the Iraqi legislature. Although these elections indicated progress, most people voted along sectarian lines, and after the elections it took almost five months for a government to form.

Meanwhile, violence increased in scale and complexity. In addition to the mostly Sunni insurgents, other violent actors—including Shiite militias, foreign fighters, and criminals—entered the fray.

By 2009, U.S. casualties numbered more than 4,200. Estimates of the number of Iraqi insurgents and civilians killed ranged from one to six hundred thousand.²¹ American popular support for the war plummeted, and Congress sought to restrict the president's capability to continue American involvement by attaching various exit requirements to funding provisions. Though specific exit dates were eliminated from funding bills, public debate over enduring U.S. military involvement in Iraq continued to escalate.

Factors Affecting Regional Stability

The ability of the United States to protect its national interests in the Middle East has been significantly affected by the regional issues already mentioned. However, such highly visible specific issues are only part of the challenge. An important underlying contributor can be found in the sources of political and social instability that continue to characterize much of the region.

State Strength. Many Middle Eastern states were either created or significantly altered after World War I in a highly arbitrary fashion by the European powers that dominated the region. The political systems established to govern the new entities reflected European rather than local interests and values, and borders were drawn largely to satisfy the interests of the European powers. As a result, some ethnic or cultural groups who conceived of themselves as separate were incorporated into a single state. In other cases, cohesive linguistic or religious groups were divided into several states dominated by their traditional antagonists. Most prominent among these are the Kurds, who are dispersed in a large geographic area cutting across parts of Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran.

As a result of these artificial boundaries, once the states of the Middle East achieved independence, the level of national cohesion and political solidarity tended to be low. In all parts of the region, the focal points of loyalty were the family, village, tribe, and ethnic group. Ties of regionalism, ethnic and cultural solidarity, and religion competed vigorously with the new state governments for popular allegiance.

Complicating these internal political dynamics was the widespread appeal of Arab nationalism. Egypt's charismatic leader, Gamal Abd al-Nasser, used Arab nationalist rhetoric in the 1950s and 1960s to galvanize Arab masses across the Middle East against "reactionary" regimes in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, Zionism, and continued Western colonialism. The allure of Arab nationalism led to experiments with Arab unity, the most prominent of which was the "United Arab Republic" formed in 1958 between Egypt and Syria. This union lasted only three and a half years, collapsing from political differences between Nasser and Syria's leadership.

In the competition among Arab states in the Middle East, Arab nationalism itself became a source of contention. Border clashes and attempts to subvert rival regimes, either through propaganda or the distribution of arms and subsidies to potential dissidents, were common.²² Conflicts between Arab states were further exacerbated by tensions stemming from rapid economic change. After World War II, countries of the Middle East saw land reforms, the development of heavy industry, and the growth of state ownership and bureaucratic controls over the economy. Increased taxes, scarcities, and heavy inflation seemed to accompany the new economic policies. Economic dissatisfaction was easily converted into political unrest.

In the oil-producing countries, the problems caused by economic development were different but no less acute. The vast funds generated by the oil industry enabled them to initiate major economic development programs, although the required technical expertise was largely absent. As a result, by the late 1970s, Americans, Europeans, Egyptians, and Palestinians played key roles in the economies, bureaucracies, and educational systems of the oil-producing countries of the Arabian peninsula. Yemenis, Pakistanis, and Indians made up much of the unskilled labor force. This foreign presence became a politically sensitive issue and a source of grievance. For example, in Iran prior to the 1979 revolution, the Islamic opposition was able to

use highly visible Westerners as a symbol of the corrupt Pahlavi regime. To this day, American relationships with regimes that are friendly to U.S. interests and the continued presence of U.S. forces in the region are sources of widespread resentment. As merely the most dramatic example, Osama bin Laden proclaimed in 1996 that the U.S. troop presence in Saudi Arabia was a justification for Muslims to attack Americans and U.S. interests worldwide.²³

Arab-Israeli Conflict. As outlined above, one of the most profound and persistent of the many regional problems in the Middle East is the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1947, the UN called for the partition of Palestine to create a Jewish and Arab state in an attempt by the international community to alleviate the tensions between the two groups. The United States voted in favor of the UN partition plan of a two-state solution with Jerusalem under international administration. On May 14, 1948, David Ben-Gurion proclaimed the formation of the state of Israel and became its first prime minister. Full-scale war promptly broke out, with the armies of five neighboring Arab states intervening haphazardly on the side of the Palestinians.

By April 1949, Israel had defeated the combined Arab forces and gained control of additional territory that had not been assigned to it in the original partition plan. More than seven hundred thousand Palestinian Arabs had been expelled or fled from their homes and were living as stateless refugees in neighboring Arab countries. Jordan took control of the West Bank, and Egypt maintained authority over the Gaza Strip—both areas assigned to the Palestinians in the original plan.

Arab-Israeli hostility was deepened by Israel's inconclusive 1956 attack on Egypt, in concert with the British and French, following Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal. A number of hostile Arab moves in the spring of 1967—including Nasser's ejection of UN peacekeeping forces that had been present in the Sinai since 1956, Egypt's closing of the Straits of Tiran at the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, and the massing of Syrian forces on the Golan Heights—precipitated a surprise preemptive strike by the Israeli air force on the morning of June 5. The June 1967 war, in which Israel defeated Egypt, Syria, and Jordan on three fronts in six days, radically altered the political and military balance in the Middle East. The combined Arab forces suffered a humiliating defeat as Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Syria's Golan Heights. Continued Israeli occupation of those lands increased antagonism toward Israel to the point that this animosity took precedence over various inter-Arab disputes.

The resulting inter-Arab rapprochement was demonstrated by the joint Egyptian-Syrian surprise attack on Israel in October 1973. The Saudis and other oil-producing states in the region supported the Arab cause with oil embargoes against the United States and the Netherlands. Despite early Arab successes, once again the Israelis were victorious.

On the Arab side, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, signed in March 1979 in Washington, D.C., signaled Egypt's shift from further support of pan-Arab military confrontation to policies of political accommodation and economic cooperation with Israel. In return, Egypt regained control over the Sinai, captured by Israel in 1967, and gained an Israeli promise of autonomy for the predominantly Palestinian West Bank area. The Saudis joined the other Arab states in opposing Egypt's separate peace with Israel.

No serious progress was made in the 1980s in resolving the thorny Palestinian problem. On December 8, 1987, an Israeli army vehicle hit a car and killed four Palestinian passengers. This incident sparked the first *intifada*—a spontaneous wave of mass demonstrations and violent riots in the Israeli-occupied territories that lasted in varying degrees of intensity for several years.²⁴ Despite these developments, in December 1988, PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat recognized Israel's existence and renounced the use of terrorism, satisfying U.S. preconditions for talks with the PLO. Over the objections of the Israeli government and the American Jewish community, the Reagan administration began meeting with PLO leaders in Tunis. But the talks, which were intended to lay the groundwork for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, broke down in

March 1989 after a planned Palestinian attack on a Tel Aviv beach was thwarted at the last moment by an Israeli coastal patrol.

Beyond the Israeli-Palestinian track, the overall record on reconciliation between Israel and its Arab neighbors has been mixed. The 1994 Jordan-Israel peace agreement set out an ambitious agenda of cooperative relations between the two countries in diverse fields, including economic development, tourism, environmental protection, cultural exchanges, and even security.²⁵ Although official relations have developed, popular Jordanian opposition to the agreement remains strong. Because a majority of Jordanians are of Palestinian origin, Jordanians are resistant to the development of normal relations with Israel until the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is resolved.

In May 1999, Barak became the Israeli prime minister and formed a coalition that championed a final resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He began direct negotiations with Syria on the future of the Golan Heights, but those talks were suspended when Israel and Syria hit a key obstacle: Israel wanted security guarantees, while Syria required Israel to agree to full withdrawal from the Golan Heights before it would make any concessions.

On Israel's northern border, Syria controlled Lebanon's foreign policy and limited Lebanon's ability to make a separate peace treaty with Israel. After the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005, Lebanese protesters poured into the streets, demanding the withdrawal of Syrian troops that had been present in Lebanon since 1976.²⁶ By April 2005, Syria had withdrawn its troops, and it appeared that Lebanon was on the road to building a new, more independent parliamentary democracy. Yet Hezbollah's continued control of Lebanon's southern border, as well as the July 2006 kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers, prompted a destructive war fought on Lebanese soil. Due to the tremendous destruction Israeli air strikes caused in Lebanon (an estimated \$4 billion of damage) and the more than seven hundred fifty thousand refugees created by the conflict, it seems unlikely that Lebanon will respond positively in the near term to any efforts to create a peace treaty between the two countries.

The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process. Israel's national election of June 1992 returned the left-of-center Labor Party to power after fifteen years in opposition. The new prime minister, Rabin, a hero of the June 1967 war with impeccable credentials as a tough-minded security hawk, represented the mainstream of an Israeli electorate who wanted peace but did not want to compromise security or capitulate to Arab terror. Eventually, the lack of progress of other efforts convinced a number of leading political figures in Israel that the path to peace lay in direct negotiations with the PLO, which had been designated by the Arab League in 1974 to be the "sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." With Labor's victory, the Israeli parliament was persuaded to lift the ban on private contacts with the PLO.²⁷ Direct negotiations between the PLO and Israel began in earnest in a secluded farmhouse outside the Norwegian city of Oslo in January 1993.

The Oslo negotiations resulted in the *Declaration of Principles*, also known as the Oslo Accords, signed by Rabin and Arafat in an extraordinary ceremony on the White House lawn on September 13, 1993. The agreement worked out in Oslo was a framework for negotiation intended to build trust between the two parties through incremental steps, the most prominent of which would be an Israeli withdrawal from significant portions of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These redeployments did not include relinquishing control of external security or the security of the one hundred forty Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. The Oslo Accords were followed by the Cairo Agreement in May 1994, which committed Israel to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank town of Jericho, paving the way for Arafat's first return to Palestine since the late 1960s. Further negotiations yielded a third agreement in September 1995, dubbed *Oslo B*. Cumulatively, these agreements promised the Palestinians limited autonomy, with authority over 90% of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza

Strip. But by early 1998, Israel had ceded full control over only about 3% of the territory and shared control over an additional 24%.

Despite progress, extremists on both sides continued to oppose reconciliation. Terrorism and retaliation continued unabated. Israeli extremists made their opposition known through the assassination of Rabin in November 1995. In May 1996 elections, the Israeli public returned the Likud Party to power under the leadership of hard-liner Binyamin Netanyahu, who ran on a platform of "peace with security." Netanyahu demanded that the PA root out and destroy Palestinian extremist organizations. In Netanyahu's first year in power, the peace process ground to a halt. The Palestinians lacked faith in an Israeli political party that was inexorably opposed to the Oslo Accords and that advocated the continuation of Jewish settlement in disputed areas, including East Jerusalem, which the Palestinians considered their future capital.

By 2000, two years after the Palestinians were supposed to have reached final status agreements with Israel, they still lacked an independent state. The slow pace of the peace process along with the deteriorating economic and political situation of Palestinians set the stage for another rebellion. It was in this charged environment that the head of the Likud Party, Ariel Sharon, entered the mosque enclave above the Temple Mount on September 28, 2000, despite warnings that his visit would exacerbate tensions.²⁸ Sharon's aggressive assertion of Israeli sovereignty over one of the most holy places in Islam as well as Judaism at a sensitive stage in negotiations triggered a new escalation in violence. In contrast to the first intifada, the Palestinians embraced more violent means, including the use of firearms. It was clear that the Oslo Accords were dead.

To stem the heightened violence in the Middle East, the United States, Russia, European Union (EU), and the UN—known as the Middle East Quartet—drafted a road map for peace in December 2002. Although deferring complex issues, such as the return of refugees or the status of Jerusalem, the proposal called for a Palestinian state by 2005.²⁹ The road map led to a ceasefire that began on June 29, 2003. However, on August 14, 2003, Israel assassinated a Palestinian militant—a member of Islamic jihad—who Israel claimed was responsible for planning suicide attacks and who was in the midst of planning a new assault.³⁰ In response, the Islamic resistance movement Hamas carried out an attack on August 19 that killed twenty Israelis. The ceasefire was over, and the peace process was again in tatters. Two years later, however, Israel began to withdraw from Gaza and parts of the West Bank, reflecting Sharon's new acceptance of a two-state solution to the continuing crisis.

The death of Palestinian leader and national symbol Arafat in November 2004, coupled with the waning of the *Al Aqsa intifada* that had begun in September 2000, ushered in a period with the potential for peace and the consolidation of a democratic Palestine. The PA sought to stem the appeal of more violent organizations, such as Hamas, the Islamic jihad, and a secular group known as the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigade. Unfortunately, the PA did not reform sufficiently before the January 2006 elections, leading to Hamas's victory at the polls. Israel, the United States, and the EU have all refused to negotiate with Hamas until the organization recognizes Israel's right to exist, honors all previous agreements between the PA and Israel, and renounces terrorism. Despite enormous financial pressure (the United States and the EU refuse to aid the PA until these conditions are met), Hamas has held firm in its refusal to comply with the aforementioned conditions. Fresh American efforts to reinvigorate the road map were launched toward the end of the second George W. Bush administration. These led to the convening in Annapolis, Maryland, at the end of 2007 of a major conference attended not only by Israelis, Palestinians, and the Middle East Quartet, but also by a number of Arab states. However, the resulting minimal progress toward peace reaffirms that the conflict is likely to endure.

The Role of Iran. Arabs and Iranians have coexisted uneasily within the framework of Islam since the Arab conquest of Persia in the AD seventh century. When subsequent Iranian empires were strong, they dominated Arab lands on both sides of the Persian Gulf. In contrast, when

such empires were weak, local Arabs quickly threw off Iranian control. Arab-Iranian tension in recent decades stems partly from Arab fears that an increasingly strong Iran will seek to reassert its past hegemony over the Gulf.

After World War II, U.S. military assistance to thwart Soviet influence in Iran enabled the Shah, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, to expand and strengthen his armed forces considerably. In the late 1960s, the Shah began to purchase large quantities of arms designed to provide Iranian forces with a significant offensive capability. To the Arabs, and most significantly to Iraq, it seemed that these forces were oriented directly at them. From the Iranian point of view, such a military buildup was necessary to provide security for vital Persian Gulf oil fields and tanker facilities. Iranian diplomats went to great lengths to convince Arab rulers that Iran's military power posed no threat. At the same time, however, the Shah did not hesitate to use force to seize three Arab islands in the Persian Gulf in 1971 or to give military support to Kurdish rebels in Iraq.³¹

The Iranian revolution of 1978-1979 upset all the old assumptions, in Iran and elsewhere in the region. The Shah's accelerated economic development program was carried out with a heavy infusion of Western values and Western technicians to work on projects in infrastructure, industry, and health care. Though some Iranians were in favor of these developments, others criticized what they saw as a Westernizing effort and the slow pace of change, persistent inequality, government corruption, and authoritarian nature of the Shah's rule. The precipitating cause of the Shah's downfall was his attempt to crush religious opposition to his regime. Although Iran's rulers had traditionally shared power with religious leaders, the Shah was convinced that the mosque stood against his modernization efforts. The Shah found himself confronted with a genuine popular revolution under the banners of resurgent Islam. Contributing to the Shah's demise was his increasingly repressive and authoritarian rule in the face of a sizable, politicized middle class.

Unwilling to share power with the middle class and alienated from traditional sources of support, the Shah relied more heavily on repression to maintain control. As a result, Tehran and other major cities saw massive demonstrations and street riots. This instability culminated in the Shah's flight from Iran in early 1979 and the Ayatollah Khomeini's triumphant return from exile in France to establish a "pure Islamic state."³² The new government also antagonized and humiliated the United States. In November 1979, a group of several hundred students stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking more than fifty American diplomats and Marine guards hostage for 444 days. The United States was able to rally international opinion and law to its side, but the Iranians ignored the pressure. Western technicians, essential to maintaining the advanced weapons systems the Shah had purchased, were pushed out of the country and the once-large and well-armed Iranian military went into decline.

To exploit Iran's weakened, isolated condition and also to preempt possible Iranian incitement of Iraq's large Shiite population, Iraq launched a series of ground and air assaults against Iran in late September 1980. The resulting Iran-Iraq War lasted for eight years. Despite some initial territorial gains, Iraq was unable to prevail over Iran's weakened forces and was forced to withdraw in 1982. Iranian counteroffensives, which resulted in massive casualties particularly on the Iranian side, began immediately. The credibility of U.S. attempts to help terminate the war suffered sharply with the revelation of covert U.S. arms sales to Iran in 1985 and 1986 (the Iran-Contra affair). Both exhausted and with casualties in the hundreds of thousands, Iran and Iraq finally agreed in August 1988 to halt the fighting.

When the Ayatollah Khomeini died in 1989, the climate in Iran began to change. Prior to his death, Khomeini was able to use his charisma as well as growing repression to stave off the opposition. However, once he passed from the scene, reformist tendencies began to surface. Elected in 1989, President Ali Rafsanjani embarked on policies to ameliorate Iran's relations with Western powers. In 1997, Iran elected reformist President Muhammed Khatami, who ran on a platform that called for liberalization of the mass media, freedom of expression, civil rights,

and pluralism. Relations between Iran and the United States finally began to thaw. Unfortunately, this trend proved short lived. The slow pace of domestic reforms, as well as the manipulation of the electoral system by the hard-line mullahs in the Guardian Council, who banned reformist candidates from running, brought hard-liner Ahmadinejad to power in the 2004 elections.

Ahmadinejad took an antagonistic approach to the West, called for Israel to be "wiped off the map," and accelerated aspects of Iran's nuclear program. In December 2006, the UN agreed to sanctions against Iran for its pursuit of uranium enrichment. The sanctions were strengthened in March 2007 by UN Resolution 1747, which banned Iranian arms exports and levied financial and travel restrictions on Iranians involved in suspected proliferation-related activities. Yet the effect of these sanctions was weakened by the lack of uniform support. As one important example, China had signed an energy contract with Iran in 2005 that made it reluctant to implement effective sanctions. Support for sanctions was further eroded by the late 2007 release of American intelligence finding that Iran had, in 2003, stopped its program to weaponize uranium. Because Iran continues an expanded uranium enrichment program that could readily be adapted to produce weapons-grade material, and because it could quickly revive its weapons program, the danger of a nuclear-armed Iran persists.

Conflict in Iraq. As noted earlier, Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, lauded initially as an effective high-tech military operation against Saddam's conventional forces, bogged down into a counterinsurgency war for which U.S. national security decision makers and military forces were not prepared. The new Iraqi government executed Saddam on December 30, 2006, but the insurgency continued and grew in intensity, taking a large toll in U.S. and Iraqi casualties. Opposition to the war grew rapidly in the American public and abroad, but tended to subside in 2008 under the impact of a new and effective counterinsurgency strategy led by General David Petraeus.

By late 2008, Washington and a functioning, reasonably secure, democratic government in Baghdad had agreed upon a Status of Forces Agreement that would extend a U.S. military presence in Iraq through 2011. Iraqi provincial elections were scheduled for January 2009. Estimates of both the outgoing Bush administration and the incoming Barack Obama administration were that troop reductions could be made in Iraq and that U.S. and NATO troops should be significantly augmented in Afghanistan. Whether the apparently successful counterinsurgency strategy adopted for Iraq was appropriate for use against Taliban warlords and al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan was an open question.

Whether a viable constitutional democracy can be maintained in Iraq will be a key factor affecting Middle East regional stability as U.S. decision makers confront threats from Iran.

Developments in Turkey. Turkey occupies a key position in the Middle East, geographically and functionally. It is a bridge between Europe and Asia, and during the Cold War it was also a barrier between the Soviet Union and the Mediterranean. Since 1951, Turkey has been an important component of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, serving as a security bulwark on the alliance's southeastern flank. Although Turkey's strategic significance to the United States temporarily waned after the demise of the Soviet Union, it was restored following the catastrophic attacks of 9/11.

In 2003, Turkey's parliament voted to refuse to allow U.S. forces to transit the country to invade Iraq from the north, souring relations across the board. Tensions persist between the two countries over the growing independence of the Iraqi Kurds and over Turkey's anxiety about the aspirations of its own Kurdish population. The Bush administration attempted to repair relations in November 2007 by declaring the Turkish separatist group, the PKK, as a "common enemy" and by providing to Ankara "actionable intelligence" on the PKK. Turkey remains an important U.S. strategic partner. The continued value that the United States places on this relationship is

reflected in U.S. efforts to pressure Europe into accepting Turkey as a member of the EU. From the U.S. perspective, the EU's admittance of a Muslim country would have profound positive effects on U.S. security and other regional interests.³³

Looking Ahead

Undoubtedly, the Middle East will be turbulent for years to come. The lack of progress on the Palestinian-Israeli front, the tension between Israel and Hezbollah, the violent conflict in Iraq, and Iran's insistence on enriching uranium provide ample grounds for pessimism. Clearly, the United States will continue to have important national security interests in the Middle East and will stay engaged in the region's affairs. Yet U.S. engagement, direct and indirect, has the potential to backfire into regional resentment and to further fuel instability.

Political leaders in the region recognize U.S. economic and political power and in many cases aim to retain close relationships with America. Virtually every significant political group in the Middle East has found some area—economic, political, scientific, or military—from which it can derive benefits from maintaining good relations with the United States. The resulting U.S. ability to exert influence on both sides of regional disputes has been a major diplomatic and security asset. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of U.S. involvement in the region is increasingly treated with great skepticism by much of the population of the region, and this skepticism will be difficult for the United States to overcome.

The conjunction of high stakes and persistent instability makes the Middle East the single most critical and difficult region for U.S. national security policy makers. However, the United States still possesses formidable assets with which it can further its interests in this region. Using these assets wisely to promote peaceful change will be a major continuing challenge.

Discussion Questions

1. How have U.S. economic interests in the Middle East changed during the past thirty years?
2. What policies could the United States pursue to prevent further large increases in the price of oil?
3. What advantages and disadvantages does Iran possess in its relationships with other countries in the Middle East? Will Iran become a regional superpower in the twenty-first century? What are the implications for the national security interests of the United States in the region?
4. What non-Middle Eastern powers, other than the United States, have major interests in the Middle East? How do you expect them to attempt to exert their influence?
5. How important is it for the United States to be closely involved in searching for a settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Can the United States be an honest broker in the dispute?
6. How did the 9/11 terrorist attacks affect U.S. interests in the region?
7. Has the U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003 made regional stability more or less likely?
8. Does the history of colonial rule still affect Middle Eastern politics today? If so, how?
9. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages for the United States of relying on Israel and Saudi Arabia to further U.S. interests in the Middle East. What advantages or disadvantages would those countries derive from such an arrangement?

Recommended Reading

Abbas Milani, Abbas. "U.S. Foreign Policy and the Future of Democracy in Iran." *Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 3 (Summer 2005): 41-56.

- Ajami, Fouad. *The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Andersen, Roy R., Robert F. Seibert, and Jon G. Wagner. *Politics and Change in the Middle East*. 8th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice-Hall, 2006.
- Ayoob, Mohammed, Robert Springborg, Ann Lesch, Ziya Onis, and Shireen Hunter. "The Middle East in 2025: Implications for U.S. Policy." *Middle East Policy* 13, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 148-176.
- Diamond, Larry. "Lessons from Iraq." *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 1 (2005): 9-234
- Hen-Tov, Elliot. "Understanding Iran's New Authoritarianism." *Washington Quarterly* 30, no. 1 (Winter 2006/2007): 163-179.
- Hourani, Albert. *A History of the Arab Peoples*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991.
- Hunter, Shireen T. *Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990.
- Karsh, Ephraim. "Geopolitical Determinism: The Origins of the Iran-Iraq War." *Middle East Journal* 44, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 256-268.
- Milani, Mohsen M. *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic*. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994.
- Piscatori, James, and Dale Eikelman. *Muslim Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996.
- Quandt, William B. *Decade of Decisions: American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977.
- Robinson, Glenn E. *Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.
- Rose, Euclid. "OPEC's Dominance of the Global Oil Market: The Rise of the World's Dependency on Oil." *Middle East Journal* 58, no. 3 (Summer 2004): 424-443.
- Sterner, Michael. "Closing the Gate: The Persian Gulf War Revisited." *Current History* 96, no. 106 (January 1997): 13-19.
- Waxman, Dov. "Between Victory and Defeat: Israel after the War with Hizballah." *Washington Quarterly* 30, no. 1 (Winter 2006/2007): 27-43.

Internet Resources

Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, www.gcc-sg.org/eng/
 Energy Information Administration, www.eia.doe.gov
 International Atomic Energy Agency, www.iaea.org
 United States Central Command, www.centcom.mil
 U.S. Department of State Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, www.state.gov/p/nea

Notes

Chapter 20: The Middle East

1. The first uprising or *intifada* erupted in 1987 and ended after the Persian Gulf War in 1991.
2. General David H. Petraeus, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, *Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq*, September 10-11, 2007, www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/no/peto9ioo7.pdf.
3. Phillip le Billon and Fouad al Khatib, "From Free Oil to 'Freedom Oil': Terrorism, War and US Geopolitics in the Persian Gulf," *Geopolitics* 9, no. 1 (Winter 2004): 114.

4. See Energy Information Administration, "Where Does My Gasoline Come From?" www.eia.doe.gov/bookshelf/brochures/gasoline/index.html.
5. Pak K. Lee, "China's Quest for Oil Security: Oil (Wars) in the Pipeline?" *Pacific Review* 18, no. 2 (June 2005): 266.
6. H. W. Brands, *Into the Labyrinth: The United States and the Middle East 1945-1993* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), 19.
7. James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, cochairs, *The Iraq Study Group Report*, Section I.E., "Consequences of Continued Decline in Iraq," http://bakerinstitute.org/Pubs/iraqstudygroup_findings.pdf.
8. The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington DC: March 2006), 20.
9. The Koran, formally compiled under Islam's third caliph, Uthman (AD 644-656), is said to be an exact translation of God's revelations to Mohammed without error or omission. Islamic law (sharia) is primarily comprised of dictates in the Koran, hadith (sayings of Mohammed), and the sunnah (examples or ways of Mohammed).
 - i o. The seventh through thirteenth centuries represent a "Golden Age" of Islam. During the same period, Europe struggled during what is considered the Dark Ages and early Middle Ages.
11. See Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong: The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2002).
12. Prominent advocates of the strict-adherence approach in political Islam include Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, Hassan Al Banna, Sayyid Abul Ala Mawdudi, and Sayyid Qutb.
13. For an overview, see William McCants, Ed., and Jarret Brachman, Project Director, *Military Ideology Atlas: Executive Report* (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, November 2006), <http://ctc.usma.edu/atlas/Atlas-ExecutiveReport.pdf>.
14. Charles Kurzman, ed., *Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
15. F. Gregory Cause III, "Can Democracy Stop Terror?" *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 5 (September/October 2005): 72.
16. Leonardo Maugeri, "Two Cheers for Expensive Oil," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006): 149-161.
17. Dana H. Allin and Steven Simon, "The Moral Psychology of US Support for Israel," *Survival* 45, no. 3 (September 2003): 126.
18. Michael Sterner, "Closing the Gate: The Persian Gulf War Revisited," *Current History* 96, no. 606 (January 1997): 15.
19. Larry Diamond, "Lessons from Iraq," *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 1 (January 2005), 10.
20. See, for example, Thomas F. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006), 3-4.
21. Brian MacQuarrie and Bryan Bender, "Disputed study says 600,000 Iraqis killed during war," *Boston Globe*, October 12, 2006, A16.
22. For complete coverage of this topic, see Malcolm Kerr, *The Arab Cold War*, 3rd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).
23. Osama bin Laden, "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places," www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_i996.html.
24. For more information on both the 1987 and 2000 intifadas, see Ruth Margolies Beitler, *The Path to Mass Rebellion: An Analysis of Two Intifadas* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004).
25. See Steven A. Cook, *Jordan-Israel Peace, Year One: Laying the Foundation* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1995).

26. Syria is suspected to have carried out the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri, who called for the removal of Syrian troops and influence from Lebanon.

27. David Makovsky, *Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 14.

28. A day before Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount, Adnan Husseini, chairman of the Islamic trust, met with Jerusalem Police Chief Yair Yitzhaki to convince him to have the visit canceled. See Lee Hockstader, "Street Army Spearheads Arab Riots," *Washington Post*, October 4, 2000, A1. This area is the site of the Dome of the Rock and Al-Aqsa mosque as well as the Second Jewish Temple. It is sacred to both Muslims and Jews.

29. Neil King, Jr., and Jeanne Cummings, "Road Map Seeks Palestinian State Within a Year," *Wall Street Journal*, February 28, 2003, A7. For a full discussion of the roadmap, see U.S. Department of State, *A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, April 30, 2003, www.state.gov/r7pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm.

30. Guy Chazan, "Militant is Killed, Further Clouding Truce in Mideast," *Wall Street Journal*, August 15, 2003, A6.

31. Sharham Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, *The Foreign Relations of Iran* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), 178-181.

32. Amos A. Jordan, "Saudi Pillar on Firmer Soil," *Washington Star*, February 18, 1979: D1.

33. Steve Wood and Wolfgang Quaisser, "Turkey's Road to the EU: Political Dynamics, Strategic Context and Implications for Europe," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 150.